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Summary.
The Communist Party(CP) was formed in 1921, on the foundation
created by the International Socialist League ( I SL ) . An
investigation of the theory and practice of the CP reveals the
combination of a socialist commitment with an abstract
theoretical perspective. The Party was obstructed, through its
own idealised understanding of class relations, from pursuing its
declared goals. This study investigates the rhythms of struggle
and the dynamic development of the workers' movement. It examines
the growing social weight and developing structural strength of
black workers and the organisation and action which these
generated. CP policies are examined in the light of these
developments.
Oppression which spans different classes created the underlying
basis for a class alliance between the oppressed black petty
bourgeoisie and exploited and oppressed black workers. The CP
tended to conflate a co-incidence of different processes of
radicalisation and different class interests. The Party broke
from the white labour tradition out of which it had emerged; it
pursued a policy of popular frontism for much of its history.
This policy, and the conflation of different processes and class
interests promoted an uncertainty within the Party as to its
role. On this basis, the Party did not always identify underlying
processes, and hence its uncertainty as to how to relate to the
dynamic processes of radicalisation, organisation and action, and
the ebbs and flows of the class struggle was promoted. In 1950,
the Party responded to the threat of state banning, and, at a
time when working class combativity was developing, it disbanded.
In the period under study, the goal of working class leadership
in an organised class alliance was not achieved.
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Note on terminology
At its conference in 1923, the South African Native National
Congress changed its name to the African National Congress. At
the same conference, the resolutions refer to Bantu, Natives,
Non-=Europeans and Africans. At its 1929 conference, the CP
adopted the slogan calling for a Native Republic. At different
times, this was called a Black Republic. A resolution from the
Executive Committee of the Comintern spoke of the "negro
population", "a black country", and "the native workers". In
1934, Umsebenzi asked: "Native', 'Bantu' or 'African'? - What
shall we call ourselves?" The article suggested that instead of a
Native Republic, the CP slogan should have been for n 'a Bantu
Republic' or possibly 'an African Republic". It concluded: "For
the present Umsebenzi will continue to use all three words,
Native, African and Bantu, until such time as agreement is
reached by the advanced section of blacks [sic] themselves."
In 1936, the All African Convention faced the same issue. The
conference minutes record that "[d]uring the discussions, a
rather novel idea of designating Europeans in South Africa was
mooted.—. One delegate.—. urged the Convention in all sincerity
to adopt the nomenclature of 'Non-Africans' for all Europeans as
distinct from Africans". I have used the nomenclature "black", to
refer to those who were known as "African", "Indian",
"Coloured", collectively and separately. In the great majority of
cases, the part of the black population with which this study is
concerned is the majority of the working class and oppressed
people which is subject to the Pass Laws. For clarity, I have
been obliged to use "African", "Indian" and "Coloured" where the
context might otherwise create confusion about which section of
the black population is being referred to.
At times I have used quotations whose language reflects the
class, race or gender prejudices of the people from whom the
quotes come. I hope that nothing which I have said myself uses
terms which are not acceptable to exploited and oppressed people.
INTRODUCTION
In 1921, the Manifesto of the newly-formed Communist Party of
South Africa (CPSA/CP) declared:
"The Communist Party of South Africa .... makes its appeal to
all South Africa workers, organised and unorganised, white and
black, to join in promoting the overthrow of the capitalist
system and outlawry of the capitalist class, and the
establishment of a Commonwealth of Workers throughout the
World."
The Manifesto went on to discuss the Social Revolution, and to
attack bourgeois governments. It continued:
"It is time for the Labour Movement in South Africa to hearken
to the call of the times, to discard its futile reformism, its
misleaders' careerism, its petty middle class opportunism, its
subservient snobbery and cowardice, of the past - all typical
of the 'social patriotic' Second International which failed
the workers so miserably at the outbreak of the great war, and
which is even now being rehashed as the '2 1/2 International'.
It is time to recognise the historic and titanic nature of the
fight and to unite all our forces in countering the enemy's
palpable activity with even more active Red forward movement,
political and industrial, of all the workers; a Great Push so
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militant, well organised and unified by solidarity as to
deliver, in co-operation with the advanced Labour Movement of
the rest of the world, the knock-out blow to a hated class and
system. To this standard the United Communist Party of S.A.
bids all class conscious workers rally .—.
"For the immediate future, indeed, the main duty of the
party and of every member of it is to establish the widest and
closest possible contact with workers of all ranks and races
and to propagate the Communist gospel among them.—. But
propaganda 'is not enough' —. and the Party will be alert to
turn to the advantage of the Labour Movement wherever possible
any phase of discontent or disaffection, any opposition to
imperialism, any indignation at the 'skiet skiet' native
policy, any genuine revolt of the masses against tyranny;
striving always to hasten, sharpen and shorten the inevitable
conflict, to guide and inspire the struggling workers in times
of stress and trial like the present, and generally to act as
the revolutionary vanguard of the Labour army of South
Africa. 1,1
In 1950, a decision of the Central Committee of the CPSA
dissolved the organisation. A Central Committee Statement
declared:
"COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM HAVE STOOD THE TEST OF TIME. FOR MORE
THAN 100 YEARS IN ONE COUNTRY AFTER ANOTHER, THE ENEMIES OF
THE PEOPLE HAVE RUTHLESSLY, INHUMANLY, SOUGHT TO CRUSH THE
MOVEMENT FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC LIBERATION, FOR THE
2
END OF THE CLASS WAR, FOR PEACE AND SOCIALISM.
All those attempts have failed. Communism lives on, gaining in
strength and stature. Rooted in the history of the working
class, expressing their deepest aspirations and needs,
Communism can not be destroyed as long as society is divided
into two worlds: rich and poor, oppressor and oppressed:12
This study aims to develop an analytical understanding of the
politics of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA/CP), in the
period from its formation to its dissolution. It attempts to
explain the way in which the CPSA understood and related to the
political dynamic of developing class relations. I will be
seeking to demonstrate that, from its inception, the CP viewed
and related to developments through an idealised, abstract
theoretical perspective. This perspective both formed, and
distorted, the Party's understanding of the political processes
and developments which it sought to influence; hence its capacity
to affect the course of events in accordance with its declared
goals was undermined.
Several analyses have illuminated aspects of the issues with
which this study is concerned. Central amongst these have been
the studies by CP members - Lerumo Simons and Simons :I and
Bunting;5 the work of Roux; 6 unpublished theses by Brookes7and
Johns8 and Southall and papers by Hirsorrand Legassick 1.1 All these
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studies contain a wealth of empirical information. There is a
consistent tendency in the studies by CP members to emphasise
what are seen as the Party's contributions to the national
liberation and class struggles. The study by Legassick involves a
theoretical consideration of the concept "nation" which is
examined against his own theoretical understanding of nationalism
and the national question. The points at which all these studies
are most illuminating, as far as providing an explanation of the
theoretical perspective and policies of the CP is concerned, is
where they examine the CP in the context of the class society and
class forces within which it operated. Drawing from the possible
approaches suggested by the existing literature, I have attempted
to pursue this latter approach, employing a methodology which
situates the CP, and explains its policies, within the context of
the social processes to which it sought to relate. From this
starting point, this study seeks to present a general under-
standing of the development of the political relations between
classes in the period under consideration, and, on that basis, to
investigate the policies of the CP.
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The massive upsurge of the workers' struggle in South Africa has
given rise to and been reflected in the development of Marxist,
neo-Marxist, revisionist or radical class analysis of South
African society. The starting point of the analyses however has
not always been
recent pioneers
and Johnstone
the dynamics of the workers' struggle. The more
1of a class analysis, notably Legassick7 Wolpe 3
have tended to take as their starting point the
liberal obfuscation of the dynamics of South African society.
Their central concern has been to explain racial division as the
product of class society. They have explained and stressed its
rationality and functionalism in capitalist terms, as against the
liberal analysis which has categorised the racism in South
African society as an irrational aberration which has obstructed
capitalist profit-making, and, according to some analysts, will
be removed by the natural processes of capitalist development.
Because of their starting point, these class analyses have
inevitably overlooked or ignored aspects of the dynamics of the
class society whose existence they have established. They have
pointed to working class resistance, but their cut-off point has
tended to be the point at which the value, to capital, of social
developments, has been revealed and explained.
In the course of the 1970's, a school of analysis, based on the
analytical approaches of Althusser and Poulantzas developee This
school took relations between different fractions of capital as
the focal point of their analysis. Their approach has been dealt
with in critiques by ClarkeT and Innes and Plaut 1,7 and will be
considered at different points in the course of the text. In
5
summary, because of the perspective on political developments
which they employed, the fractionalists either overlooked, over-
simplified, or distorted what was happening inside the working
class, and the dynamics of the class struggle. The class struggle
tended to be analytically reduced to a secondary role, after the
struggle between different fractions within the ruling class.
Political developments were explained as the result of that
intra-class struggle. To the extent that they are considered at
all, workers tend to become the passive objects of historical
developments whose course has been decided by the struggle for
hegemony within the ruling class. The fractionalist approach,
which, as Clarke has explained, operates at the level of
appearances, was developed at a time when, at that level, the
South Africa state appeared to be all-powerful. O'Meara,
explicitly seeking to move beyond the limitations of a
fractionalist perspective, has provided an exceptionally
illuminating understanding of the development of Afrikaner nat-
ionalismT This study draws from O'Meara's analysis. But it is
concerned to address an issue outside his focus: the effect of
Communist policies on the struggle for the political leadership
of white workers. If there was a growing determination amongst
sections of the white working class, and unskilled Afrikaans
workers in particular, to change the conditions under which they
lived and worked, why was that expressed in support for Nation-
alism, rather than in the growing influence of the Communists
among Afrikaans workers?
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As the workers' struggle began to reach historically new levels
in the course of the 1970's and 1980's, two analytical approaches
came to dominate:- the labour process approachT and the approach
of the social historiansIn the early part of the same period,
as the trade union movement developed, there was also a tendency
to portray the history of the class struggle as the history of
the rise and fall of trade unions 2.1 In the way in which they were
developed, these approaches all had the value, as against the
fractionalists, of recognising that workers are historical actors
in the making of their own history. The work developed within the
framework of these approaches has illuminated aspects of
developing class relations. In each case, however, the analytical
perspective involves a limitation on a broader understanding of
the dynamics of the class struggle. The concentration on trade
unions has automatically excluded the majority of the working
class - the non-unionised workers. It has also tended to take, as
its starting point, the existence or absence of unions, without
investigating the processes by which the receptivity amongst
workers to class organisation more generally is developed or
suppressed.
The social historians have provided invaluable, vivid pictures of
the immediate realities of working class life and struggle. But
the analytical perspective tends to limit the vision of
particular struggles to the immediate. The way in which those
struggles are to be situated within the broader struggle of the
working class as a whole remains an analytical task which the
social history itself does not undertake. Additionally, there is
7
a tendency to focus on visible action, without an equivalent
illumination of underlying processes - or of periods of inaction.
The value of the labour process approach has most recently been
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revealed in the excellent study by Jon Lewis. The study seeks to
explain organisational and political developments amongst a
specific part of the working class - the white workers. In doing
so, the approach demonstrates its twofold limitations:- too much
causal weight is attached to a single process - changes in the
labour process; and the workers' movement is reduced to the
organised workers. Lewis points to the latter as a restriction
within his study; it is, in fact, a limitation imposed by the
method itself. It excludes a proper investigation of non-
unionised workers, employed and unemployed. Similarly, the
approach excludes an investigation of the impact of living condi-
tions and "community issues". Not only are these central parts of
the broader political process, they also play a central role in
the way in which workers perceive what is happening, and act, at
the workplace. Some of the most illuminating parts of Lewis's
work are where he moves beyond the immediate limitations of his
hypothesis, and explains developments by taking account of a much
broader range of factors than the causality attached to changes
in the labour process actually allows. It is not, then, simply a
case of extending his theoretical perspective to something else -
it becomes a question of changing the perspective.
In approaching the two major tasks which this study undertakes -
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the exposition of a broad understanding of the development of
class relations, and an analysis of the way in which the OP
understood and related to these - I have made extensive use of
the Party's view of the development of the political process, and
of its own history. In addition to the major works by Party
members already mentioned, the numerous editorial notes in the
documentary history recently published by the Party combine to
.	 24	 .provide an historical overview. With the exception of Simons and
Simons, these works are all published by the Party and constitute
official histories. The work by Simons and Simons is not an
official Party history. But its authors were leading Party
members, and the work is a reflection of the thinking of
individuals in that position. The authors of these works are
collectively referred to as "the Party historians".
The official Party histories all reflect a primary concern to
portray what are seen as the strengths and contributions of the
Party. The study by Simons and Simons, while reflecting a similar
concern, tends to investigate developments in greater depth. In
doing so, they reveal a vision of historical developments which
is common to all the Party historians. This is clearly manifested
in a comment they make about the dissolution of the CPSA in 1950:
"In the hour of dissolution as a legal party, the communists
could claim the achievement of an objective that had been central
to their purpose since 1928. The class struggle had merged with
the struggle for national liberation. H25Through the perspective of
the CP historians, the struggle comes to be viewed as the process
of progress towards the historical destination - the alliance
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between the ANC and the CP - the organisational and political
embodiment of the revolutionary alliance between the working
class and the petty bourgeoisie, and of the fact that the
national liberation struggle and the class struggle have become
the same thing. In the course of that process, class differences
become less important than differences between "conservatives"
and "radicals"; and the different and dynamic class bases of
radicalism are submerged beneath a vision of the oppressed
people. There is a pervasive tendency to abstract and hypostatise
historical cases of radicalism from the conditions in which they
develop 6 and to see an increasingly radical continuum, along
which the black petty bourgeoisie moves, towards its part in
achieving "the objective which had been central to their purpose
since 1928."27
It is inevitable, in the history of an organisation which has the
goals of the CP, that political choices should be opened up
before the Party, and that decisions taken should not always
prove to be the best possible. The way in which Simons and Simons
portray the history of the CF reflects the same vision of the
historical destination of the Party. The "good periods" of the
Party are understood primarily in terms of whether it is
developing a closer alliance with the organised black petty
bourgeoisie. The "bad periods" are when it is not pursuing that
alliance. Party historians identify clear cases in the period
under discussion where, in their judgement, the International
Socialist League (ISL) or the CP followed the wrong course. The
10
first, before the formation of the CP, was when the ISL failed to
recognise the progressive nature of African nationalism. The
second was in the period 1929-33 when a "dogmatic sectarian
tendency" prevailed within the Party and the international
Communist movement?3 The third was in the period following the
break with sectarianism, in which there was what is seen as a
naieve belief that an alliance, ranging from the rank and file
Afrikaner nationalist to the mass of black workers, could be
constructedr The final problem is identified in the Party's
decision to disband - a decision which is criticised as
expressing a "tendency towards legalistic illusions"°
The Party historians all explain each of the problems, which they
have collectively identified, by one or more of three different
•approaches, The first is a simple distortion, of which there is
an example in the documentary history. The impression is conveyed
that the Party opposed the industrial colour bar at the time of
the 1922 strike3. 1
 Slovo, in a study of the tactics of the national
liberation struggle, conveys the impression that the Party was
disbanded directly by the Suppression of Communism ActP2The
second approach is an individualisation of political processes.
The problem in the third period becomes the problem of the
individuals who controlled the Party in that perioceThe problem
of the naivety which followed the third period becomes the
problem of Hardy, who was advising the Party in that period. And
the third approach is to remain at the level of description,
without seeking to explain what is being described. So, for
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example, there is an identification of legalistic illusions
behind the decision of the Party leadership to disband the
organisation, but there is no substantive attempt made to analyse
the illusions and seek to explain their origins.
Permeating the work of the Party historians is a tendency which
is reflected, both in different analyses dealing with and
touching upon the CP, and in the noticeably limited extent of
such work. The full dynamic of political decisions and political
choices is lost sight of. There is a strong tendency towards a
determinist reduction of the subjective as an active part of the
political process. Decisions which are taken, explicable by the
circumstances, are seen and portrayed as if they were inevitable
because of the circumstances. This is one factor contributing to
something of a veil around the CP and its policies - which have
not been subjected to the same historical scrutiny as have the
activities and policies of other political organisations. It is
as if there is an assumption that the CP represented and embodied
what Communists sought to represent and embody - the consistent
expression of the interests of the working class. There is an
associated tendency to see political choices, and political
decisions, actually being made only where the decision seems, to
the analyst, to be wrong. In this study I seek to examine the
questions which the work of the CP historians have raised, but
not adequately answered. Why was it that Communists believed in
the industrial colour bar? How was it that Bach and Wolton were
able to dominate the Party in the third period? Why was there a
harsh sectarian spirit - why did the Communists not resist it?
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Why did the Party not enlighten Hardy? Why did they accept his
vision? Where did the legalistic illusions, reflected in the
decision to disband, originate? What were the underlying
continuities between the apparently different political
approaches of the Party in different periods?
A central part of this study is the assessment of two major
subjective processes:- the rise and fall of working class
combativity; and the political analysis and policy decisions of
the CP. Different analysts, dealing with similar issues to those
with which this study is concerned have pointed to the need for a
materialist understanding of the subjective, and the problems
posed by an idealisation of the working class, and the assumption
of complete freedom for political leaders to make choices 34. Fine
points to "a big danger which must be avoided but which has
plagued many a 'left' analysis. It is taken for granted that the
masses (or the working class) are always militant, raring to
fight, full of the most advanced revolutionary ideas, capable of
overcoming all opposition - were it not for the betrayal of a
renegade leadership." He points to a range of objective
constraints on what is politically possible, in any set of
circumstances. He goes on to argue that recognition of such
contraints should not lead to an imbalanced analysis which
excludes "the subjective element, the element of will and self-
consciousness"r A materialist analysis requires that the working
class is not a-historically abstracted from the conditions of its
existence in relation to capital. As far as the conceptualisation
of the working class is concerned, a starting point of the
perspective which I am employing regards it as essential to class
society that the basic contradiction between capital and labour
not only exists, but will be expressed in conflict. That starting
point is in itself the product of a conception of the working
class in its relation to capital. It is because of the oppressive
conditions created by the process of capital accumulation under
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which the majority of the working class lives, and the
exploitative relationship embodied in that process of
accumulation, that the struggle of workers arises in the first
place. As has been pointed out, this does not mean that workers
are all always ready to struggle. But it does mean that the basis
upon which a spontaneous receptivity to organisation and action
recurrently develops, is always present. The fact that the
working class does not exist independently of capital means,
amongst other things, that a variety of measures will be employed
by the state to seek to ensure that the conditions for continued
capital accumulation are maintained -i.e to make sure that the
working class as a whole is prevented from responding to the
conditions which capitalism imposes upon it, or that the response
is contained, or channelled in a way which does not threaten the
existence of capitalist relations of production. The measures
taken by the state, however, can not remove but, rather, maintain
the basic contradiction, and therefore the consistent basis for
class struggle and organisation. In particular conditions in the
historical process, the measures taken by the state serve, in
fact, to promote struggle and organisation.
As well as a consideration of the basic relationship of conflict
between capital and labour, this study is also concerned with the
relationship between the petty bourgeoisie and the working class,
and, in particular, the oppressed black petty bourgeoisie and
black workers. At different points in its history, the CPSA
identified both the fact that oppression extended to more than
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one class 5 and the fact that the interests of different oppressed
classes were not always the same3.7 The orthodox position which the
Party shared with the Communist movement historically was to call
for a class alliance, under the leadership of the working class8
The fact that the Party itself did not always pursue that
orthodox position will be discussed at different points in the
text. Its departures took two different forms: either, as in the
third period, an effective dismissal of the fact that oppression
extended to different classes; or, as in the popular front
period, a tendency to submerge an understanding of class
differences beneath the identification of a common oppression.
The point of departure for this study is the recognition that
oppression spans different classes; the fact that black workers
and the black petty bourgeoisie are both oppressed, and the fact
that the living standards of large parts of the black petty
bourgeoisie are similar to those of millions of black workers,
provide the objective basis for an alliance between the two
classes. But it can not be assumed that that basis is
automatically or consistently translated into an actual alliance
between the two classes; nor that any alliance which does emerge
will perfectly reflect the interests of both classes. To make
either such assumption reflects an a-historical approach, in
which the subjective expression and organisation of class
interests is conceptually reduced to the objective basis for a
class alliance.
A similar reductionism, in the actual course of events with which
this study is concerned, was applied at a different point by
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Sidney Bunting, a leading figure in the formation of both the
International Socialist League (ISL) and the CP, and one-time
editor of the Internationa1 3.9 He was clearly an individual with a
profound socialist commitment. His contributions to the Party
journal reflect a deeply-felt socialist humanism. He also
provides an example of a case in which individual commitment and
morality are not based on a dialectical materialist foundation.
In the context of the 1920 strike of black miners, this leads to
a degree of negativism because the strike did not conform to an
abstract, idealised vision of "proper class consciousnessIn
the context of the 1922 white miners' strike, the same
combination of socialist commitment and idealism leads him to an
idealist reduction of the subjective element - the consciousness
and ideas of the leaders and rank and file - to a part of the
objective basis of the strike - the defence of jobs and wagesT In
both cases, although the-idealism leads to different results, an
abstract perspective produces a failure to understand the con-
crete dynamics of the struggle, and hence undermines the
possibility of re.lating successfully to it, in terms of declared
goals. Notwithstanding a deep socialist commitment and a personal
loathing of racism, Bunting does not see that the black workers
fighting one of the most important strikes in South African
history are part of the workers' movement; and he ends up sup-
porting the racist industrial colour bar, and arguing that black
workers should do the same.
The example of Bunting illuminates the two ways in which idealism
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can operate. An idealist approach can effectively ignore the
subjective as a factor in the historical process, analytically
reducing it to a mirror image of part of what is seen as the
objective situation. In this way, the product of idealism co-
incides with that of a vulgar, non-dialectical materialism. Or
idealism can ignore part of the objective situation, analytically
reducing it to a mirror image of the subjective.
A materialist understanding of the subjective not only guards
against the idealism which assumes that workers are waiting, as
an immediately revolutionary mass; or that workers are a passive
mass which must be 'awakened' by their leaders. It must also be
deployed against the idealism of the viewpoints which isolate
misconceptions, or backwardness amongst workers as if these also
exist independently of capital; or an idealism which understands
the meaning of what workers do simply in terms of what those
workers think. A part of the struggle of the working class has
been, and is, the struggle to overcome the ideological as well as
the physical controls of capital. Just as the dynamics of the
struggle for ideas should not be idealised, so the actual
struggles against exploitation and oppression which do occur
should not be understood simply or primarily in terms of the
thinking of those who undertake the struggle. The social meanings
of ideas, which are social products, can not not be reduced to
their formal content alone, but have to be explained and under-
stood in terms of their meaning within the dynamics of the class
society in which they exist. This study does not rely, for an
understanding of state policy, simply on what is being said
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within the ruling class and the government. Nor is the role of
the petty bourgeoisie understood on the basis of its political
declarations. In the same way, it does not operate in terms of
the belief that because the CP declares a wish to be the expres-
sion of the interests of the working class, it does so as
successfully as objective conditions allow. If the working class
can not be understood in abstraction from the conditions of its
existence, neither can the CP. I have tried to approach the
study of the CP using the same theoretical perspective through
which other political organisations and processes have been
investigated. The Party is viewed, not a priori as the expression
of the will of the working class, but as a political
organisation, with declared socialist goals, seeking to influence
the social processes in the context of which it exists.
In pursuing the analytical objectives of this study, I seek to
avoid the problems identified above. The approach rests very
heavily upon interpretation. This is necessarily so. There are no
absolutely clear, unambiguous indicators which are immediate
reflections of the subjective. Even the meaning of what
historical actors say they think has to be interpreted, before
its social meaning can be understood. Nor is the range of
objective political choices always obvious - especially where the
choices actually taken appear inevitable in the circumstances. As
far as the mood of the working class is concerned, there are a
range of indicators which have been used in the course of the
study. A rise or fall in the level of action; the articulation of
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new demands; the development of new organisations; the decline of
existing organisations; the revitalisation of old organisations;
the payment and non-payment of taxes; strike action or the
absence of strike action; these, amongst others, are indicators
of development within the working class. But the question of what
precisely they mean in a particular situation is a matter of
interpretation. So, for example, a rise in the level of union
membership can, at one stage, be the indicator of a developing
combativity. That is what happened towards the end of the 1930' s.42
At another stage, combativity can be rising while union
membership is falling, as happened at the end of the 1940's13It
is possible to empirically identify the rise and fall in the
levels of membership. But each such movement is the product of an
underlying process, in motion before its results become
empirically obvious. The 1942/43 strikes, for example, are
empirical indicators of an upsurge of workers' militancy. But the
process creating that upsurge, and the stage of its development
when the strikes occurred, is less easily identifiable. A range
of mediating factors will affect the way in which workers
perceive and respond to developments and experiences. It is the
dynamism of this process of mediation which means that workers
can respond to the defeat of one strike with a retreat from
action, and the defeat of another with increased combativity; or
to one police raid with apparent fear, and another with a "riot".
The interpretation of how events like the 1942/43 strikes fit
into the overall dynamic of the development of the workers' move-
ment and class relations, and an attempt to situate such events
within a theorised understanding of phases of struggle, forms a
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major part of this study.
As the investigation will demonstrate, there are no a-historical
rules or precise timetables according to which the workers'
struggle moves. Nor did the CP always respond in the same way to
apparently similar developments. Groups of workers have struggled
in times of economic crisis and in periods of capitalist
expansion; in expanding industries and contracting industries; at
times when real wages were increasing, and at times when they
were declining; in "favourable" employment conditions, and at
times when unemployment was an immediate and mounting threat. At
different times, different groups of workers have stood at the
fore of the class struggle - not necessarily those with jobs, or
with skills, or with the most developed political consciousness,
or the best organised. Defeats have sometimes been met with an
escalation of action, and have sometimes served to force back the
movement of struggle. The CP has, at different times, supported
objectively racist demands campaigned against racism. It
has seen the same Labour Party at one point as part of the labour
movement45and, at another, as outside the labour movement 6 It has
responded to some strikes by seeking to obstruct theeand to
others by seeking to promote them.
No perspective can succeed in explaining such varied developments
if it hypostatises causality. The attempt throughout is to
understand and portray the subjective as part of a dynamic
process, in concrete historical conditions. The consciousness of
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workers is not measured according to an a-historical idealised
conception of "pure class consciousness", but in terms of its
actual meaning in the context of the class struggle in which it
exists. The process by which particular decisions are arrived at
-whether by workers or the CP - is portrayed and understood as a
dynamic process, undertaken by human actors, with circumscribed
but real historical options. The objective constraints in any
specific situation are themselves seen as the historical product
of dynamic social processes. The attempt throughout is to uncover
and illuminate concrete historical processes and historical
options within those processes. The range of options with which
this study is concerned are those which analysis reveals actually
existed. So, for example, this study views the support of the CP
for the industrial colour bar in the 1922 strike as an
explicable, but not inevitable, political choice. The CP history
which suggests that the Party pursued a different policy reveals,
in the process, that such an option existed. But the option did
not exist only in ex post facto analysis, but also in the
concrete political conditions which existed at the time. The
different interpretations and responses to the Black Republic
Programme also reveal the range of concrete possibilities which
existed, and were manifested, at the time. The possibility of
promoting and building a strike movement was demonstrated during
the war years by the action of thousands of workers, although it
was not the political option chosen by the CP.
The study is concerned to illuminate those, and other, historical
options and choices, because their existence was part of the
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reality of a dynamic political process to which the CP related
and in which it participated. These historical options underline
the fact that CP policies were political choices, explicable but
not inevitable in the circumstances. It is not the concern of the
study, however, to move beyond that to the different issue of
suggesting what should have happened. Nor is it the concern of
this study to examine how far different courses could have been
developed, or what would have happened along the way.
On the basis of the different points raised above, this study
seeks to provide an analysis, in an actual historical process, of
the broad rhythms of the workers' struggle, and the political
development of class relations. On the basis of this
understanding, the way in which the CP understood and related to
political developments is investigated. This thesis represents
the conclusions of a process of investigation in which I have
attempted to employ a methodology sufficiently flexible to take
account of the factors discussed above, and consistently rigid in
the understanding that workers are oppressed and exploited human
subjects, actors in the course of the dynamic process of their
own struggle. In the presentation of my conclusions, I have tried
to retain enough theory to make clear the operation of the
perspective, and enough history to demonstrate the capacity of
the theoretical approach to uncover and illuminate the aspects of
the historical process which it seeks to explain. While not
seeking to provide a comprehensive history of the class struggle,
the workers' movement, or the CP, I believe that this study
23
employs a methodology in investigating and seeking to explain
aspects of each of these, which provides the basis for further
study in areas which this exposition neglects.
This study covers a defined historical period and is concerned
with historical processes in that period. Its concern is to
illuminate the general way in which the CP saw and responded to
political developments. In pursuing that concern, the
understanding of the political development of class relations has
not moved beyond an attempt to capture the general dynamic of
those developments in which the response of the CP is being
considered. I have generally focussed on developments in the
urban areas of the Transvaal because these are the "power-houses"
of the country. Developments in the rural areas have been
specifically focussed upon only where they are especially
important to understanding the issues with which this study is
concerned - for example in the rise of the ICU. The consideration
of both the working class and the petty bourgeoisie has therefore
been essentially focussed on the urban working class and the
urban petty bourgeoisie. The study is generally organised
chronologically, with each chapter dealing with a defined period,
but a certain amount of chronological overlapping has been
unavoidable. The period covered is from the formation to the
dissolution of the CP, 1921-1950. It has been necessary to go
back, at least to 1915, and forward, at least to 1952, to
consider the meanings of each of those developments and the broad
sweep of class relations within the context of which they occur.
The chapters dealing with developments before the formation and
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after the dissolution of the CP do not address the same range of
issues as the main body of the text. The investigation of the
pre-1921 period seeks to establish the theoretical legacy which
was brought into the newly-formed CP. The investigation of the
post-1950 period seeks to illuminate aspects of the relationship
between the petty bourgeoisie and the working class which existed
before that period.
As mentioned above, I have made extensive use of the work of the
CP historians. These are not only invaluable secondary empirical
sources which reflect the value of analysis which is derived from
participation as well as observation; they also serve as highly
informative primary sources, revealing much, in ex post facto
analysis, of the perspective through which developments were
viewed by Communists active at the time. I have relied especially
heavily on Party documents, journals and newspapers. The latter
especially are the best possible sources, both for providing
information on developments in the class struggle, and showing
how the Party in its day to day activities saw and explained
those developments. But they are particularly important sources
in another sense. This study is especially concerned to
understand and investigate the policies of the CP at the point at
which the Party tried to give those policies a significance
outside of its own ranks. Its focus, therefore, is not on
internal meetings and decision-making processes, but on the point
at which the CP conveyed its policies to the community outside
it. It is at that point that CP policies assumed a wider social
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significance, and at that point that the Party tried to give its
policies a wider social significance. The Party press represents
the best and in fact the only consistent chronicle, recorded in
the heat of political developments, of what the Party chose to
convey of its analysis, programme, policies and ideas to the
broader community. Historically in the tradition of Communist
Parties, the Party press has been the consistent statement of the
collective and official view of the Party. It has been an
essential part of the process through which the Party tried to
carry its message to the masses. This is so, even in a context of
widespread illiteracy. It has still been the Party newspaper
which has provided the systematic chronicle of the thinking of
the Party, its guide to action for its own members, and a
systematic statement of the ideas which those members were
required to carry to those amongst whom they worked. In this
sense, the action of Party members was itself also informed by
the Party press. Given my concern to focus on the point at which
the Party tried to give its ideas a broader social significance,
extensive use of party newspaper and pamphlets - the consistent
official statements of Party policy and what it chose to convey
from that policy to the outside world - has been absolutely
indispensable. I have also made extensive use of the works of
other participants in the events under discussion - through books
such as those by Roux, KadalieT TabatPand Luthuli; and the range
of participants represented in the Karis and Carter collections°
Specific items from the Molema and Xuma collections have also
been used. Daily newspapers have been consulted for information
concerning some of the events discussed, and several government
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commission reports, statistical handbooks and Official Yearbooks
have been used.
Earlier in this introduction, there was an attempt to situate
developments in the academic study of class relations in South
Africa within the broader developments of those relations. No-one
is immunised from the pressures created by the developments
around them. I believe that this study, with whatever
inadequacies, misconceptions and differences of interpretation
and approach, is part of a series of studies which reflect the
persistent dynamism of developments in South African society. In
my own case, I was a student at a white university who believed
that I was seeing developments through a radical perspective.
Beneath the surface of events, the process leading up to and out
of the 1976 Soweto uprising was developing. There was a dynamic
movement of struggle which I was unable to see. Developments in
the class struggle since then have shown me and others something
of that dynamic. They have taught me of the need to respect the
men, women and youth of the working class and their allies, who
fight the struggle about which I and others write. It is my hope
that this study serves to show that respect, and something of
that same dynamic, at another point in history.
CHAPTER ONE
1915 - 1921
On August 4, 1914, official German Social Democracy, and with
it the International, collapsed miserably. Everything that we
had been telling the people for fifty years, everything that
we had declared to be our most holy principles and had
proclaimed countless times in speeches, pamphlets, newspapers
and leaflets - with one stroke all that was shown to be empty
talk. The party of the international proletarian class
struggle has suddenly become, as if through an evil spell, a
national liberal party; our strong organisations, of which we
were so proud, have turned out to be completely powerless,
and we have gone from being the respected and feared enemy of
bourgeois society to being the weak-minded and justifiably
despised tools of our own mortal enemy, the imperialist
bourgeoisie. More or less the same steep decline of socialism
has taken place in other countries. The proud old call,
'Workers of the world, unite!' has been changed on the
battlefields to the command, 'Workers of the world, cut your
throats!'
"Never in the history of the world has a political party gone
bankrupt so wretchedly, never has a more noble ideal been so
disgracefully betrayed and humiliated!"
- Rosa Luxemburg:
The war fever, whipped up by national ruling classes inside
Europe, took with it many of the Socialist and Labour parties.
Socialist conviction, analysis, and programme of yesterday were
replaced by chauvinist fervour, as much of the leadership of the
sections of the Second International allied themselves and their
organisations with "their own" ruling class. Class struggle was
to be "deferred", in favour of the "national interest". Leaders
of the parties of the Second International, and the unions
associated with them, became major recruiting agents to ensure a
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steady supply of working class recruits, and under-managers, in
order to ensure that production was maintained for the war
effort.
The South African Labour Party (LP) first took an anti-war
position? On 2 August 1914, the Administrative Council of the
Party issued a call to workers everywhere to organise against the
war p
 On 4 August 1914, Britain entered the war, and jingoist
militarism in support of the "mother country" spread amongst a
section of the leadership and ranks of the LP. Despite the
official Party policy, The Worker, the official Party newspaper,
repeatedly advocated a pro-war po1icy.4 Some Party branches
expressed opposition to the anti-war position; 5 Party leaders
joined the campaign in South West Africa (SWA)? Party MPs (with
the single exception of Madeley, who shifted position soon after)
voted support for the war effort! With the majority of the Party
leadership committed to supporting the war, the policy of the
Administrative Council was increasingly being undermined.
The anti-war opposition responded to this situation inside the
Party by organising an internal opposition - the War on War
League, and producing a journal, the War on War Gazette P The
objectives of the opposition were to maintain Party unity, while
struggling to win the Party back to its "native principles' of
international socialism and anti-militarism"? How essential to
the Party these had been, the political pressure of the
developing war very quickly demonstrated. At the January 1915
Party conference, a majority of delegates appeared to be in
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support of the League l.°The League leadership, trying to avoid a
split in the Party, put forward a compromise resolution which was
passed unanimously. It was left to each individual, exercising
"freedom of conscience", to decide whether to support or oppose
the war2'
The efforts of the opposition and its compromise were to prove
futile, either in maintaining unity, or in promoting a consistent
and active commitment to socialist principles inside the LP. In
June 1915, Creswell, the Party leader, returned from the campaign
in SWA to spearhead a drive in favour of a pro-war policy12 A
special conference was called in Johannesburg, and on 22 August
1915 a pro-war resolution was overwhelmingly carrieeThe War on
War League responded by forming itself into the The International
League of the SALP, publishing a weekly journal - The
14International. The International of 24 September 1915 reports the
decision by the League to withdraw from the LP:
"At the meeting held the previous week it had been decided to
submit the question of withdrawing from the South African Labour
Party to a plebiscite of the members. There was a full poll of
members during the week. The plebiscite resulted in an
overwhelming majority in favour of severing all connections with
the SALP.—."
On 22 September 1915, the International Socialist League (ISL)
was established.
The formation of the ISL rested, then, on an apparently clear-cut
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issue of political principle - the attitude of socialists to the
war. The split from the LP represented a conviction that, on this
issue, opposing views were irreconcilable. Behind the unanimous
support for the anti-war stand inside the ISL were, however, a
series of different political positions. The War on War Gazette
had stated that the League's constitution involved a single
principle. Its members "pledge[d] to oppose this or any other war
at all times and at all costs"15
 A whole variety of different
political positions were consistent with that approach, and
people joining the League did not necessarily have a common
political programme, strategy or political analysis.
The ISL, at its formation, was a politically undeveloped group,
based on a commitment to an ill-defined "socialism" and
"internationalism"; its members had practical experience of
political work only in one section of the working class - the
upper layers of the white labour aristocracy. They shared a
common tradition of exclusive concentration on the white workers,
and amongst them was held a range of patronising and racist
attitudes towards blacks - features of a "white labour tradition"
which had completely dominated the LP. The ISL may have appeared
to have been formed on the basis of clearly-defined political
principle, but underlying the appearance was a set of ill-
defined, ambivalent, and sometimes contradictory political
positions. The very fact that the people involved believed that
they were operating together on the common foundation of
political principle meant that they were ill-prepared to
recognise and attempt to deal with the underlying political
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differences. It was on this inherently unstable foundation that
the ISL set out to examine its political environment, and develop
an understanding of its political tasks.
The ISL members had before them the clear example of the
political bankruptcy of the LP. In the course of its history, the
League developed a deeper understanding of different aspects of
the politics from which it was seeking to break. There was an
ongoing attempt to develop away from traditional LP policies.
Given, however, the traditions from which the members of the ISL
came, and the unstable political foundation on which the
organisation rested, a reaction against what seemed wrong with
the LP was not in itself enough to lead to a comprehensive break
with the politics of the white labour tradition, and to a clearly
defined alternative. It was only when a small group of
individuals within the ISL attempted, in practice, to give
meaningful effect to some of the policies which were emerging in
contradistinction to the LP, that decisive political developments
started taking place within the ISL.16
In 1915, however, when the organisation first began the attempt
to develop its policies, it was ill-equipped, theoretically and
in terms of political experience, to respond to the situation
around it from a perspective other than that of the white labour
tradition. As the organisation slowly began to develop an
alternative perspective, the differences within it, and the
inherently unstable foundation on which it rested were to come to
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the fore. The ISL was faced, immediately, with the contradiction
between the socialist internationalism which it professed, and
the white labour tradition from which it emerged. If white
workers were to be expected to oppose the war on the grounds of
class solidarity with workers in other countries, should they not
be expected to extend that solidarity to the oppressed black
workers of South Africa? The development of ISL policy on this
issue - which it described as "the great and fascinating problem
of the native"17 -was to reflect a growing recognition of the
contradiction between an aspect of the tradition from which it
emerged and the principle of internationalism which it espoused.
The International of 1 October 1915 expresses a clear attempt to
break away from the politics of the LP and extend the principles
of internationalism into the specifics of the SA class struggle:
"An internationalism which does not concede the fullest
rights which the native working class is capable of claiming will
be a sham. One of our justifications for our withdrawal from the
Labour Party is that it gives us untramelled freedom to deal,
regardless of political fortunes, with the great and fascinating
problem of the native. If the League deals resolutely in
consonance with Socialist principles with the native question, it
will succeed in shaking South African capitalism to its
foundations. Then, and not till then, shall we be able to talk
about the South African proletariat in our international
relations. Not till we free the native can we hope to free the
white."
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This statement expresses the desire of the League to move beyond
the fetters of the LP policy towards black workers. At the same
time it expresses, as does all League propaganda at the time,
primary concern with the white worker. The "political fortune" to
which the article refers has to do with the LP concern not to
raise the question of black workers, in order not to alienate the
whites. The League was to be resolute in rejecting policies
designed for electoral advantage. Nonetheless, it appears to be
outside the considerations of the writer that the goals of the
League might include the building of a political base amongst
what it comes to recognise as the majority of the working class -
the black workers. In the same edition of the International, the
implicit assumptions of the white labour tradition are made clear
in the claim that "the conference, which it is hoped to call in a
few months here should be representative of the whole of South
Africa" Given the League's resources, membership and location,
"the whole of South Africa" can only mean broadly representative
of the organisations of the white worker throughout South Africa.
The way in which the ISL initially approached the "native
question" served to compound two facets of its initial starting
point: firstly, a basis of individual morality from which to
approach issues of class struggle; and, secondly, the closely
connected absence of a developed materialist theoretical
framework within which to locate that morality, and from which to
approach those questions of class struggle.
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The first systematic ISL policy on the "native question"
reflected an abstracted idealism on the basis of which
expressions of proletarian internationalism and a commitment to
working class solidarity could be coupled with a de facto
segregationist position. At its first conference, early in 1916,
the League, having encouraged "the organisation of workers on
industrial or class lines, irrespective of race, colour and
creed"19adopted the following in its main resolution on the native
question:
"This League affirms that the emancipation of the working class
requires the abolition of all forms of native indenture, compound
and passport systems, and the lifting of the native wage worker
to the political and industrial status of the white.—." The
following amendment was added, and accepted:
"....meanwhile endeavouring to prevent the increase of the native
wage workers, and to assist the existing native wage workers to
free themselves from the wage system"2.°
At its first conference we see the totally different, and in fact
contradictory, politics of at least two different tendencies in
the League being blended together into an abstract, idealist
whole.
The belief in segregation was to survive after the organisation
had effectively, although not formally, rejected the notion of
de-proletarianisation. Thus there is reference to "the
ethnological tendency .— which makes for the natural social
apartness of white and black"!1 And in an International editorial,
the League puts forward a view on how best to maintain
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segregation:
"One would imagine that Industrial Unionism proposed the
introduction of Brahminical marriage rites by the way the
Segregationist continually harps on the mixed marriage question;
as to the evils of this, both whites and natives largely agree.
The way to healthy social segregation is through Industrial co-
operation. 
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On this basis, proletarian internationalism could be understood
as an expression of paternalist duty. It could, in other words,
be absorbed by some of the members of the ISL in such a way as to
leave substantially unchallenged a view of the "civilising"
mission of the whites; of blacks as more or less helpless
victims; of white workers (the most skilled, the best organised)
as automatically having the primary role in building socialism.
All of these were tenets which, while containing an abstract
commitment to the freedom of blacks, could also involve a
commitment to segregation and be contained within the framework
of the white labour tradition.
Despite these positions, a commitment to proletarian
internationalism, however ill-defined and loosely understood, had
led the ISL to express a formal commitment to inter-racial
working class solidarity; and a tendency within the organisation
was consistently seeking to break from the crude racism of the
LP. Immediately after its formation, the League was objectively
faced with the problem of how to reconcile its newly-expressed
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commitment to inter-racial class solidarity with elections based
on a racially exclusive franchise. The evidence suggests that the
League did not see the need for such a reconciliation. The
majority of its members came from a tradition in which election
campaigns were entirely opportunist, based on a conception of how
best to win votes. For those members, entering an election
campaign in order to put forward political principles - even if
they were unpopular - represented in itself a major political
break from the LP. In the process of this step, other political
issues, posed by the racially constituted framework of the
"democratic process", remained submerged, and were not
considered. The League entered the Transvaal provincial and
municipal elections in October 1915 and October 1916 23on a
platform dominated by the anti-war position, under the slogans:
"NO CONSCRIPTION" and "AWAY WITH THE CAPITALIST WAR AND
CAPITALIST ROBBERY'r .24 The position of the League, and the way in
which it approached the elections, thus represented a major
political development from the political method of the LP. It
also meant that the first major political work of the League
provided immediate practical support for the persistence of a
primary concern with white workers.
The practical realities of trade unionism at the time operated in
a similar way to concentrate the attention of the League on the
white worker. Almost all union members were white, their leaders
were white, and many of them were craft organisations in
industries where access to skills was racially exclusive. For
the ISL, steeped in the white labour tradition, lacking a
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materialist conception of the development of capitalism, the
tendency to automatically concentrate upon the white workers, and
assume their vanguard role in an empiricist way, was deep-rooted.25
Consequently, the earliest propaganda efforts of the League in
relation to "the organisation of all workers irrespective of
race, colour and creed", were directed at convincing white
workers that the organisation of black workers would be in their
(the white workers') interests.26
The earliest political experience of the League, then, did not
challenge the particular remnants of the white labour tradition
which persisted in it; nor did it challenge the idealist approach
to the political situation. These challenges were to come, over
time. Meanwhile, the refusal to go along with jingoist
militarism, and the overt rejection of the crude racism of the LP
represented a clear break from the politics of the LP - even if
"internationalism" was understood in a way which did not
substantively challenge some of the aspects of the white labour
tradition.
The attempt by the League to move away from the politics of the
LP was strengthened by two major conclusions, deriving from the
practical experience of the majority of members, before the split
from the LP. Craft unionism had come to be seen as a divisive and
corrupting form of labour organisation; and a political method
which was based on a simple opportunist appeal for voters'
prejudice was seen as an unacceptable and ineffective means of
striving for socialism. In an editorial in the International,
less than two months after the formation of the League, the
opposition to craft divisions is made clear:
"The new movement will break the bounds of craft and race and
sex. It will be founded on the rock of the meanest proletarian
who toils for a master. It will be as wide as humanity. It will
recognise no bounds of craft, no exclusion of colour."27
Given the pre-existing racial exclusivity of the craft unions,
and the racially-determined access to skills and training, the
principle of racially integrated organisation clearly implied a
form of organisation that did not follow craft lines. The
opposition to the racial divisions in the labour movement and the
opposition to craft unionism complemented each other. The League
also attributed divisions amongst white workers to craft
unionism: "The purely craft nature of the unions has also come
out in their complete oblivion to the sufferage of the lower-paid
and unemployed white workers, mainly women."28 Examining the lack
of a united organisation of mineworkers, the International
writes:
"What is the greatest hindrance to the organisation of the miners
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here? One is the temporary sojourn of the men in the industry
owing to its vigour, aggravated by the fact that timber men,
fitters, carpenters, and engine drivers in the mines are
organised solely in their crafts, far away from the issues of
industry which so vitally affect them."29
In the comments on the organisation of mineworkers, the writer
clearly has in mind only white workers; a commitment to non-
racialism in principle and an opposition to craft unionism may
have promoted and complemented each other - but they did not mean
that the white labour tradition was therefore destroyed.
Craft unionism thus came to be rejected, as both the cause and
the expression of the failure of the organised, skilled, white
worker to develop any genuine solidarity with the rest of the
working class - working class women, unskilled, unemployed whites
as well as blacks - when the attention of the League was directed
to the issue. The ISL began to adopt a clearer and clearer
commitment to industrial unionism. And it identified, as its most
immediate task, the need to develop propaganda aimed at
convincing the organised white worker of the ISL's conclusions.
This development of a commitment to industrial unionism co-
incided with the ISL's conclusions concerning the experience of
what it saw as "opportunist electioneering" inside the LPPThe
question facing the ISL shifts from how to win votes to whether
to participate in elections. The question is not taken up because
the mass of the working class are excluded from elections, but
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because of the rejection of "opportunism", and doubts about the
real power of Parliament and other elected bodies. In an
editorial headed "Ethics of Elections", the International writes:
"The revolutionary character of a party does not consist in
abstaining from fighting in elections. It consists in fighting
them on a revolutionary issue. True the Provincial Council offers
no remedy, no solution. We are even getting convinced that
Parliament does not either. But the elections to these bodies
constitute the only bodies yet known to the people. The question
for us is - shall the people be left to the false issues raised
by the non-socialist parties?"31
The doubts about Parliament are resolved less than two months
later:
"Parliament is after all only a house. Its function is to
regulate and adjust the capitalist system and to legislate the
necessary violence for its preservation. But whichever power
controls industry can dispense with Parliament and remain
unscathed.... A socialist majority without adequate industrial
organisation behind it would not mean the resolution of class
conflict. The day of such a socialist majority would —. be the
day of its defeat. An attempt on its part to establish socialism
would result only in bloody anarchy. II 32
The critical attitude of the ISL to parliamentary activity was
not initially based on simple a-politicism.33 It arose as a
specific response to the practical experience of vote-mongering
within the LP, and reflected the general belief that political
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issues could be addressed and resolved through industrial
organisation:
"In all countries the problems of Labour vary enormously. The
first necessity of the industrially organised working class will
be to sweep away the chief barriers to efficent working class
solidarity. The pensions bogey which prevents the Railwaymen
coming together, the denial of equal civil liberty to the native
wage worker, the compound and indenture system which make him
cheaper and more exploitable - these great barriers unparalleled
in any other labour movement, against the marshalling of the
proletariat side by side can only be removed by political
action.—. The extent to which labour can get its political
demands acceeded to will not depend primarily on whether it gets
20 or 40 representatives to carry out its mandate, but on the
strength of the industrial organisation which will back those
mandates."34
For the ISL, then, industrial unionism was not a substitute, but
the necessary basis for "political action" - although,
consistently with the politics of the League generally, what
"political action" meant was left vague and undefined. Industrial
unionism was adopted as a particular organisational form,
necessary to developing economic and political struggle. This
position was at first consolidated, and then extended, by the
influence which syndicalism came to have inside the ISL.
Syndicalists had been active in the SA labour movement before the
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beginning of the 20th Century, and syndicalism was the guiding
doctrine of a number of small socialist organisationsP5These
included the Social Democratic Federation which was to
paticipate, in 1921, in the formation of the CPSA. Syndicalists
were attracted to the anti-war opposition in the LP, and then to
the ISL. Equally appealing was the strong criticism which the ISL
made of the dominant leadership of the official labour movement.
The ex-LP members of the ISL were in turn particularly receptive
to the syndicalist commitment to industrial unionism and the
suspicion of elections 6 This receptivity was compounded by the
theoretical weakness within the League - the absence of a
developed analytical method and political theory. For the ISL,
seeking to break away from the obvious class collaboration of the
LP, syndicalism presented the only developed attempt to apply at
least aspects of Marxist theory to the South African situation.
The availability of the developed theoretical framework of
syndicalism coincided with the growing commitment to industrial
unionism within the ISL. The commitment to a form of organisation
- arising out of the practical experience of the attempt to
pursue general socialist principles - began to be theorised in
terms of the overall strategy of syndica1ism 7 The political
lesson, derived from political experience, came to be "explained"
by a general theory which seemed to fit the experience. Its
lack of a theoretically developed and concrete materialist
understanding of the class struggle around it laid the basis for
the politics of the League to become a series of responses to
immediate appearances - coupled with an idealist commitment to a
set of principles. The missing link between general principles
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and immediate political programme was a theoretical method which
could, on the basis of a concrete political analysis, show the
way to translate the general principles into the immediate
programme. Syndicalism was the abstract theory - a codification
in terms of which the actual politics of the organisation, the
differences, the idealism and the empiricism, came to be
"theorised." Given the separation between abstracted principles
and immediate political responses, and recognising the
differences within the League from its inception, it was to be
expected that for different members the same principles and the
same political situation would give rise to different - and even
contradictory - political responses.
The syndicalists brought to the ISL a tradition which rested on
calls for the broadest possible organisation of the working
class, and rejected parliamentary politics. Syndicalism thus
promoted a generalised concern with the working class - rather
than with the working class electorate, or the already organised
workers. That tradition complemented corresponding sentiments
amongst ex-LP members. But, given the idealised and abstract
meaning of syndicalism for the League, that generalised concern
did not, in itself, create a substantive challenge to the white
labour tradition of the LeagueP9 It could co-exist, at the level
of a general ideal, with a variety of immediate political
attitudes and actions. Even as a tendency developed with the
beginnings of an orientation to the black worker 9 the broader
limitations of the white labour tradition continued. In
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particular, there continued the belief in the primary role of the
white worker in the struggle for socialism, forms of paternalismP
and the approach to issues of the class struggle from the point
of view of the white worker. And many of members of the ISL, the
white worker almost invariably meant the organised, skilled or
semi-skilled, male white worker.
Against this background, the developing concern with the black
worker was to be expressed in three inter-related ways: an
attempt to combat racism amongst League members and to convince
them of the need to "educate and organise" the black; efforts to
move away from any accommodation to the racial prejudices of the
white worker; and propaganda attempts to convince the white
worker of the need for solidarity from and with the black. It was
only in the second period of the League's development (mid-1917
to 1921) that this increasing concern is actually carried over
into practical attempts to carry out out the professed task of
educating and organising the black worker.
As we have seen, the first newspaper of the newly formed League
informed its readers that "an internationalism which does not
concede the fullest rights which the native working class is
capable of claiming will be a sham"T By 1917, the increasing
importance which the League attaches to the "native question" has
become clear. Turning to an examination of its role in building
that "internationalism", the International writes:
"[T]he salient point in theory and practice which socialists have
to fight out in South Africa is their attitude towards the native
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wage labourers. This question goes to the root of socialist
theory —. it is the burning question of the time for us. "42
During the intervening period, the initial largely moral
orientation to the issue of black workers had come to be
reinforced by a more concrete analysis.
The initial policy of the League (first conference, January 1916)
had involved a commitment to the de-proletarianisation of the
black worker. Shortly after, this policy is implicitly
overturned. Dealing with the question of unemployment pay for
whites, the International writes:
"All agree for various reasons in deprecating charity.
Nevertheless for the hundreds of poor folk who now have to accept
the degrading dole at Pretoria, Socialism is emphatically not the
remedy. Capitalism is the remedy, and Socialism is the remedy for
the remedy.
"Socialism is come to destroy not industry, but Capitalism. As
the only present condition for the development of industry is
that it shall be capitalist industry every extension of
capitalist industry should, all other things being equal, be
encouraged as the only remedy for agrarian unemployment."43
Within an idealist, rigidly segregationist framework, it was
possible to envisage an expanding industrial white South Africa,
and an agrarian black South Africa where, presumably, the problem
of agrarian unemployment would be resolved by other means. But
the League's belief that industrial expansion is to be welcomed
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comes to challenge its policy of de-proletarianisation of the
black. At the same time, the persistence of segregationist
beliefs inside the League created a pressure on those who
supported an orientation to black workers not to rely simply on
moral arguments, but to develop more solid theoretical positions
in support of that orientation. As the concern with black workers
develops, so too does the recognition that they constitute a
majority, and, in an economy in which industry and capitalist
agriculture are expanding, an increasing majority of the working
class 4 The importance of black workers starts being seen, not
simply in moral terms, but increasingly in terms of the
strategic location of black workers within the production
process.
In February 1916, the International refers to "black workers .—
who form the bulk of the South African proletariat" 4.5 An editorial
in the following edition of the paper states: "We see the kaf fir
get more and more control of the drills in the mine. Very soon he
will exercise the economic power that goes with it." 43In March
1916, the de-proletarianisation position is explicitly
overthrown. "We are —. compelled to deal with the native
question not by removing it, but by recognising the native as
perforce a permanent fellow worker.'"47 Having recognised the
permanence, and pointed to at least part of the potential power,
of black workers, the ISL supports the comments of labour leader
George Mason:
"You can never stop industry in this country without organising
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the native.— In the July strike they had discovered that the
interests of the white workers were bound up with those of the
native. They found that they could not stop Kleinfontein mine
without native co-operation. He therefore appealed to them and
they responded almost to a man and the mine was stopped."48
SG Rich underlines the developing recognition of the need to
organise black workers when he writes in the International:
"Let us face the facts. The bulk of unskilled labour in South
Africa is done by natives - 'kafffirs', 'niggers'. A Labour
Movement which does not make it a policy to organise and educate
the unskilled, is, by that fact, a movement of only part of
labour, and is sure to sacrifice the rest. Furthermore, without
the unskilled, whose life by that fact is the most thoroughly
proletarian of any, the labour movement can not be revolutionary.
It has foregone the motive power of revolution."49
The cumulative effect of different factors -the support for
industrial unionism, the rejection of parliamentarism, the
growing recognition of the permanence of black workers, moral
principles, and the experience of struggle - all combine to
promote a growing commitment to the education and organisation of
the black worker. As the International puts it:
"The duty of a revolutionary political party today is to create
the class conscious, industrial solidarity, without fear or
favour to white skin or black, of an undivided working class."50
Assessing its role in the conditions which might be generated by
the war, the International writes:
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"Indications [are] there will be a huge barricading mob perhaps,
but it will be our ruin if we are content to ride on it instead
of organising and educating it on unflinching, uncompromising
Socialist lines, teeth clenched - and - irrespective of race,
creed or colour."51
The tendency which identified the task of organising and
educating the black workers because they were a permanent part of
the working class faced two clear problems in taking up that
task: firstly, the lack of willingness amongst some of the
members of the ISL to agree with its developing theoretical
understanding of the place of black workers in the process of
production; secondly, the lack of response from white workers to
the initial propaganda calls for class solidarity across racial
lines. That this tendency was itself operating within the broader
limitations of the white labour tradition is revealed in the fact
that, during the first period of its development, it took no
direct steps aimed at organising and educating black workers.
Instead, it was almost exclusively absorbed in propaganda efforts
aimed at convincing not merely white workers generally, but also
its own members, of the desirability of such organisation and
education.
In the edition of 1 October 1915 (10 days after the formation of
the League) International carries a report of the latest in a
series of Sunday open-air meetings which the War on War tendency
in the LP had begun. The article points out:
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"A feature of these meetings is the little knot of interested
native and coloured men always there. Some bought the
International. Let who will sneer, nothing convinces us of the
universality of our appeal so much as this. We shall never be on
bedrock until we can command the attention of the dark skinned
proletariat of South Africa".
On 2 June 1916, the International advertises a meeting to be held
by the ISL:
"Next Thursday ... Mr Robert Grendon, the accomplished editor of
the Johannesburg native newspaper Abantu Bathu will be the
lecturer, his subject being 'Links between black and white'. So
far as is known, this is the first occasion in the Transvaal on
which a native has addressed a white audience on a subject of
this kind."
In the International there is gradually introduced news of black
workers 2 and reports of speeches by black leaders. ISL meetings
are advertised as being open to blacks, and later there are
invitations to black leaders to address white socialists. There
is a consistent series of pleasPusually by Bunting, calling on
white workers and socialists to take seriously the task of
organising and educating black workers .54 Through the
International, leaflets, election propaganda and speeches by its
members, the ISL tried to carry the idea of working class
solidarity to white workers. The manifesto for the Johannesburg
municipal elections, issued on 6 October 1916, distributed in the
white working class areas in which the League was standing,
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argues:
"It is for the white workers to stretch out the hand of
industrial unity to the native workers and enlist the enormous
economic power they can wield from the side of the capitalists to
the side of the working class and true civilisation."55
In May 1917, the International argues:
"We can engineer other campaigns, put up big lists of Labour
candidates and get Labour Parties artificially organised by the
capitalist press, but to ignore the native worker, and confine
our hopes of the working class movement to the top layers of the
white artisans is to reduce it into a nationalist skirmish for
prior places at the capitalist table, with Wallers at the head,
dishing out the sops.
"The most accute form the class war can take in South Africa
today is the preparing the minds of the people to the inevitable
coming of the power of the native proletariat, and making its
coming benificent to all. And 'the people' includes the native
worker. i'56
The International of 16 March 1917 reveals two milestones - the
first article in the paper by a black, and an "historic occasion
as Socialists demonstrated for the first time on the Rand against
racial legislation which did not directly affect whites"FThe
article was written by Horatio Bud-Mbellewho had been on the
platform at the protest meetingP9 It lauded the stand of the ISL
against the Native Affairs Administration Bill, and against
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racism generally. A report of the meeting in the International
comments:
"Last Sunday's protest meeting of whites and natives in the
Trades Hall was declared one of the best and most enthusiastic
League meetings yet held.—. [A] large sprinkling of natives
turned up in response to the press advert inviting all
'irrespective of race, colour or creed', with a solid block of
whites in full sympathy with the objects of the meeting, namely
to protest against the Native Affairs Administration Bill. It was
gratifying to see how easily the whole audience caught up the
spirit of forgetting for the time being that there was such a
thing as colour. 11 60
As the League moved towards its third year, such advances
remained limited exceptions. And as far as its major work was
concerned - solidarity appeals and propaganda directed at white
workers, it was still having little impact. The first testing
ground of the League was elections, and the highest vote it ever
achieved was little over 300T Initially, syndicalists had seized
upon the lack of electoral success in order to fuel their
argument in favour of syndicalist electoral abstention. The
League decided not to stand in the 1917 municipal elections 6. 2 But
it was difficult for the League to escape the conclusion that if
white workers did not vote for its message of industrial
solidarity, there were still substantial obstacles to be overcome
before they could be expected to act upon it. The actual
experience of the League, in attempting to take its message to
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white workers, was that its appeals alone were not enough.
Parliamentarism had been rejected, craft unionism had been
denounced and its divisive nature explained, but the white
workers still did not listen. This opened up questions which,
if taken up, challenged the general theoretical and practical
political method of the League.
The consequences of this for the League were potentially
extremely significant. That tension, ill-perceived and
inadequately understood as it may have been, operated in the area
of the primary work of the League. There was a pressure for the
League to explain more - and to develop the theoretical method
which would help it to do so. That pressure was complemented by
the attempts to theoretically understand, rather than simply
moralise about, the position of the black worker within the
process of production. The most immediate result was to
strengthen the argument of those in the League who supported an
orientation to black workers, both because they were a permanent
part of the working class, and because the self-interest of white
workers demanded their support:
"There is no way of suppressing coloured or native workers or
preventing them from working.—. Organisation by white workers to
refuse to work where coloured men are employed at a cheaper rate
only leads in the long run to the dismissal of the white workers
in favour of the coloured, and statistics show that this is going
on. The only alternative, dictated both by the self-interest of
the whites and by the fundamental principles of the working class
movement, is to ignore colour or race distinctions and rope all
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the coloured workers into the movement and its organisations;
further to abandon the divisions of industrial organisation
according to pay, and recognise that the movement can not wait to
be all embracing (as it must be to win) until everyone gets
standard pay, but on the contrary everyone will never get
standard pay until the movement embraces all grades--"63
The League found itself under the growing pressure which its
policies and theoretical approach had promoted. If white workers
could not respond to the call to solidarity because of craft
unionism, and the lack of organisation amongst black workers was
itself an obstacle to freeing the whites of their prejudice, then
a political method of appeals to whites could never, by itself,
succeed. But the only possible conclusion - that the League
should turn to the task of actually building the organisation of
black workers - hit directly against the white labour tradition
from which the organisation had not completely broken. Behind the
differences in the organisation, two clear emergent tendencies
can be identified - although in the real situation, they were not
clearly and precisely articulated as different tendencies, and
there were overlaps between them.
The first, on the basis of actual political experience, was being
forced towards attempts to develop a more concrete theoretical
analysis and establish a more consistent and theorised
orientation to black workers. The second remained firmly within
the white labour tradition, with entrenched prejudices largely
unchallenged. General socialist principles were invoked in an
abstract way, being used to justify and explain that situation.
Through the whole history of the ISL, the development of the
first tendency - the "progressive tendency" - was tentative. The
individuals - in the leadership of the organisation - who were
making the developments which it reflected were themselves caught
up within the broader limitations of the white labour tradition.
And, as events were to show, despite the development of a more
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concrete analysis, they were liable to view developments in the
class struggle through a rarefied and abstracted perspective.
Such theoretical insights as were developed from the attempts to
explain the political situation were partial, ill-defined, and
unsophisticated. Their significance lies, not primarily in their
content, but in the type of theory and the theoretical method
which they represent - a more concrete theory arising from a
developing political practice. The development of such a
theoretical method, in the first phases of the existence of the
ISL, did not occur as a smooth process. It was being born within
a framework which incorporated the broader limitations of the
white labour tradition. The starting point is always the white -
worker or socialist - and what to explain to him or her. There
are remnants of the approach which raises the issue of black
workers exclusively in terms of the self-interest of the white.
There is an almost complete isolation from what is actually
happening amongst black workers P4 The labour movement is
understood to be the organised workers - the white workers. But
the theoretical method which identified the black as a permanent
majority of the working class created tensions with these aspects
of the white labour tradition, as well as with the cruder racism
of some of the other members of the League. The progressive
tendency was most obvious in its attempts to develop an
orientation to the black worker. But the theoretical method which
it was developing laid the basis for a more developed political
strategy embracing the white worker as well.
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Carried to its logical conclusion, the division within the ISL
would inevitably lead to different programmatic demands,
different tactical and strategic conclusions. The beginnings of
that set of difference were created when one part of the League
actually began to turn to the organisation and education of black
workers - not simply because the interests of the white workers
demanded it, or simply because it was morally correct - but
because these workers were a permanent, majority part of the
working class, and the actual struggle for socialism demanded
that they be organised. The development of this latter
understanding inevitably widened political differences which had
been masked within the League at its foundation. Amongst people
who had propounded segregationism, de-proletarianisation, and
invoked the "ethnological factors" making for the "natural
separation of black and white", there could obviously not be
unanimous approval for any active policy of non-racial
organisation of the working class 5 The furthest that those with
such positions could be drawn was to a recognition of the need to
organise blacks because, before they returned to the rural areas,
they were important to the struggles of the "real" working class
- the white workers. There can be no doubt that there was a
struggle going on inside the ISL even if, given the theoretical
limitations and the lack of consistent and clearly defined
positions on which the organisation was founded, that struggle
was not fought out through clear argument between different
positions. By mid-1917, however, that underlying conflict had
not come fully to the fore; the two tendencies and lines of
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theoretical. development within the League had not been
sufficiently clearly defined or articulated; the essentially
unstable foundation of the organisation remained basically
unchanged. But the challenge to this situation was there - and
growing.
Roux, discussing the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution, argues:
"Native affairs began to play a smaller part in the activities of
the ISL as well as in the pages of its newspaper. Who could be
bothered with politically backward and largely unorganised
Africans when such resounding events were happening overseas?
Work among Africans, never very popular with the rank and file in
the League, was crowded out or left to a few 'cranks' of whom
Bunting and Jones were the most outstanding and persistent."66
The reality waS more complex than the picture he presents. The
Bolshevik Revolution gave an enormous boost to the progressive
tendency and its argument that there should be an orientation to
the mass of the working class. It was, however, understood and
used in an abstract way, coming to serve as a "confirmation" of
the validity of industrial unionism. And, in the common
enthusiasm which it created amongst the members of the League,
the underlying differences and lack of clarity within the
organisation were submerged. It was, in other words, not the fact
that League members focussed on this international development,
but that they viewed it through an abstract theoretical
perspective, in a way which left unresolved differences
persisting beneath the surface, which meant that the Bolshevik
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Revolution did not serve merely to promote the progressive
tendency developing within the League. But it is equally true
that the unfolding revolution was used as a spur to organisation
amongst black workers:
"The Russian revolution in South Africa means the welcome hand to
the native workingman into the fullest social and economic
equality he is capable of attaining with the white man. This is
the bedrock on which we split in South Africa:67
"Instead of waiting on Russia, any apparent slackening overseas
must spur us on to redoubled propaganda, redoubled organisation
by way of compensation here, and in particular, to much more than
redoubled educative effort among our disinherited native toilers,
the real working class, broadly speaking, of South Africa:68
The League turns to the issue of education in a much more
critical way. Referring to the Sunday meetings, the International
writes:
"But let us be frank about these meetings. The audience they
attract will certainly have to support the proletarian
revolution, but it can not be said as yet to be even a white
working class audience, while as for native workers,
notwithstanding repeated advertisements welcoming 'all
irrespective of colour' they are still too shy and suspicious of
the white to attend, except on rare and special occasions.u69
In a report of the 4th July Independence Day meeting,
International writes:
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"It was most gratifying to see a number of natives, men and
women, in the hall; a feature which, when it develops, will
inevitably widen our speakers' outlook and make real our
professed repudiation of race or colour distinctions. Let each of
our speakers ask himself: 'Did my address interest, or appeal to
those natives in the audience? If not is it their fault, or is it
my fault for dealing only with purely white mans' affairs,
pitching my key to an audience of shop-keepers instead of
proletarians?' For every reason we hope to see more and more
native wage-earners at these meetings each Sunday."7°
This is the first clear sign of an awareness within the League
that it is the responsibility of the socialist to convey a
message in a way which connects with the experience of the
worker. A development of the same understanding would have
removed the presumption that all black workers could read, or
understand English. It was taken further, to a clear declaration
of something which had not always been obvious in the League - an
understanding that black workers were not a passive mass, capable
of action only when they were educated by socialists. The same
lesson was to be repeated to the League when black workers went
on strike (without having been "educated and organised"), and it
was this action of black workers which drew the politics of the
League onto a new level.
A part of this development was reflected in July 1917, in the
International. Referring to black workers, the article argues:
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"The people under discussion are not to be considered passive
creatures waiting for their white brothers to emancipate them.
They will have to be very fully consulted in all matters of
interest to them. When using the term working class, proletariat
etc, if we would be sincere, we must without reservation include
this section of the people. To do otherwise cuts away the
foundation on which we must seek to build the abolition of all
class privileges. It follows then that being workers, they must
fight for the full reward of their labour, and must organise for
that purpose industrially. Whether in the white unions in the
initial stages, or in parallel organisations is a matter of
tactics which native and white workers must mutually agree upon."71
Such a view represents a clear development from earlier positions
in the International, where the passivity, inactivity and lack of
organisation by black workers are put forward as reasons for the
racism of white workers.72 The nature of the comments, however,
reflects the persistence of the presumptions of the position from
which the writer (Andrews) views the world. Socialists are white
and educated; the audience they speak to is white; socialists and
workers are almost always presumed to be male; the question of
black workers is approached via the position of the white worker,
and the solution still requires the agreement of the whites. In
that sense, the organisation of black workers is still seen as
conditional upon the attitude of whites.
Nonetheless, the progressive tendency within the organisation,
prompted by the unfolding example of the Bolshevik Revolution,
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came to the point of resolving the ambivalence which had stood as
an obstacle to any real involvement amongst black workers:- on
the one hand, the condition for the crushing of the racism of
white workers was seen as the organisation of blacks; on the
other, the way in which the issue was pursued was through
propaganda, aimed at convincing the white worker of the need for
the black to organise. Finally, in July 1917, the first real step
towards "educating" the black worker was taken. The ISL began a
series of classes on the labour movement for blacks 7.3 The base
provided by these classes became an important part of the
foundation of the Industrial Workers of Africa (IWA). The
International begins to announce triumphantly that black workers
are responding to the message of industrial unionism2 !4 And a
series of major struggles by black workers in the ensuing period
served to strengthen the orientation to those workers by some
within the ISL.
The IWA, initially called "The Society of the Industrial Workers
of the World", was formed at a supposedly secret meeting on 27
September 1917 6 The first public evidence of the existence of the
organisation was at a meeting, under the joint auspices of the
IWA, Transvaal Native Congress (TNC), and African Peoples'
Organisation (APO) on 21 December 1917.76 Shortly after its
formation, the IWA produced a leaflet in Sotho and Zulu - a
general call for black workers to unite and "awake":
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"There is only one way of deliverance for you, Bantu workers.
Unite as workers, unite! Forget the things that divide you. Let
there be no talk of Basuto, Zulu, or Shangaan. You are all
labourers. Let Labour be your common bond.
"Wake up! And open your ears. The sun has arisen, the day is
breaking. For a long time you were asleep when the great mill of
the rich man was grinding and breaking the sweat from your work
for nothing. You are strongly urged to come to meeting of the
workers and fight for your rights. Come and listen to the good
news and deliver yourself from the chains of the capitalist.
Unity is strength ...."77
This pamphlet was distributed at a time when a boycott of mine-
stores was being developed on the East Rene The leaflet was
distributed on at least some minesPand at the IWA meeting of 15
March 1918, "one member urged the production of more leaflets,
claiming that the IWA's leaflet had helped to cause the stores
boycott."8°
In June 1918, black sanitary workers in Johannesburg went on
strike - the "bucket-boy strike". The workers demanded between 4d
and 6d a day increase, from a minimum salary of l/81 The strike
was broken by the use of black police as scabs, and by the arrest
of 152 workers. were charged under the Masters and
Servants, Riotous Assembly, and Criminal Laws Amendment Acts.
Many of the strikers were given a two months sentence; for
others, the sentence was suspended.83 As an immediate result of
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that strike, three members of the ISL - Bunting, Hanscombe and
Tinker - were charged with incitement to violence, with the
prosecution arguing that the IWA and the ISL were responsible for
the strikeP4 The case collapsed when the main prosection witness
turned out to be a police informer giving false evidence.85
In the aftermath of this strike, the APO, TNC and IWA set up a
joint committee, and organised a public protest meeting on 19
June 1918. This meeting launched the demand for 1/- a day for all
black workers on the Rand by 1 July, failing which a general
86strike would be called on that day. In the days leading up to 1
July, workers were urged not to strike by the Vice President of
the Native National Congress (NNC) 8.7 On the day, a message from
the President of the NNC called on workers not to strike under
any circumstancesP8 Several thousand miners still came out at
three Rand minesra thousand municipal workers joined the action.
At the Ferreira municipal compound, the strikers were attacked by
a police charge, and soldiers surrounded the compoune°
In this period of a growing movement of opposition, spearheaded
by working class action, the NNC launched an anti-pass campaign?'
This campaign, despite the wishes of its leaders, became caught
up in the general situation of growing combativity and
organisation?2 In January 1919, the Industrial and Commercial
Workers Union (ICU) was formeeIn February there was a strike
for higher wages in Bloemfontein, and "riots" when strikers and
supporters were attacked by police9.4 In March 1919, there was a
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series of clashes between anti-pass protestors and police. The
campaign resulted in approximately 700 arrests - and the near
attack of Bunting, who was defending some of those arrested, by a
mob of whites?5 In December 1919, the ICU led a dockers' strike in
Cape TownrAnd in February 1920, the movement was led onto a new
level by the development of a massive miners' strike on the Rand?'
The strikers made three demands- a wage increase from 2/3 a shift
to 10/- per day; improvements in the mine stores; and access to
higher paid skilled jobs? 8 On 20 February, 40,000 miners were
reported as being on strike at nine different minesr By 25
February, the number on strike was 71,000nn a report presented
to the Executive of the Third International, Ivon Jones described
the 1920 strike as "the most portentous event so far in the
awakening of the native workers". He put the number of strikers
at 80,000. Within a week, the majority of strikers had been
forced back to work. The police surrounded different compounds,
cutting off groups of workers from each other. Workers were
ordered down the mines at gunpoint. At Village Deep, three miners
were killed when they resisted police orders. At least eight
other workers were killed in the course of the struggle1°2
Here was clear evidence to support the message which some
socialists within the ISL had tried to preach: black workers were
not passive, they would also fight for their rights. The actual
level of organisation and action by black workers strengthened
the arguments of the progressive tendency - and also challenged
their own conception that the labour movement consisted of
organised whites. The mine-store boycott was regarded as a
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"piece of misguided tactics, an attack on the branch rather than
the root", but it was lauded as a "fine exhibition of 'scab-
proofness'" :103
"There is a tendency on the part of whites to laugh at the
ignorant native kicking at the middle man. It is clear he ought
to go for a rise in wages. We can all see that now. He is robbed
not as a consumer but at the point of production. This is what
the Socialist has been urging on the white worker for many years.
Meanwhile, while the boycott is misdirected, the solidarity
displayed is the significant thing. It ought to make the white
Trade Unionist pause in admiration, and consider their relations
towards the mass of unskilled labour which they today spurn as
beneath the place of working class solidarity. t1104
The 1920 strike brought to the fore the developments inside the
organisation. It produced, for the first time, a specific call to
white workers to support the actual struggle of blacks:
"Back them up! The Chamber of Mines will be asking you to take up
the rifle to dragoon the Native strikers. Don't do it! That would
wreck the Labour movement in this country.
"Be on the side of labour, even Native labour, against our common
capitalist masters. The Natives have shown that they can stop the
mines as well as you can. Get them on your side.—. 11105
But the enthusiasm and support from the ISL for these developing
struggles by black workers was tempered. Together with the
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message that black workers were also workers had gone the message
that they needed to organise before they could win their rights.
The often spontaneous action, never organised in the idealised
way which the ISL believed to be necessary, did not neatly fit
into that model. The ISL members arrested for incitement in the
aftermath of the bucket-strike defended themselves by arguing
that they would never call for action while workers were so badly
organised. And in March 1918, International warned:
"Take warning. Left to themselves and condemned to secrecy, the
native workers who are determined in any case to assert
themselves are in danger of attempting to do so by mistaken
methods, possibly of violence which, without benefitting them,
may cause disaster all round. Their patient instruction in the
light of day by white men having knowledge and experience of the
cardinal principles of the Labour Movement, will ensure a
constitutional progress which, though it will end in the
surrender of the capitalist class, will avoid such evils as the
white workers justifiably fear.°06
And, even in the enthusiasm for the 1920 strike, when the
organisation was being forced to recognise that blacks were
already part of the labour movement, the organisation pointed to
the "barriers of race, language, and above all, police" which
prevented them from "instructing the native labourers on the
principles of working class solidarity".107
Records from police spies give us some idea of how the
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syndicalists within the ISL allegedly understood the
"constitutional progress", to which the International referred.
While such sources of information can not, in any way be relied
upon, they do in some cases present a picture of propaganda and
argument which is consistent with the features of the idealised
and abstract approach of the ISL which has already been noted.
Discussing the production and distribution of the IWA leaflet,
Dunbar, an ISL member, summed up, saying that the pamphlets"
'will tell them how to organise and the results of organisation'.
He emphasised again that 'if all the natives strike and stop
work, the Government can not put the whole lot of them in gaol,
because they will have no food to feed them. Then they will give
them what they demand very soon'106
The police spy reported Dunbar's message at another meeting as
follows:
"We natives on the Rand don't vote, so we can stop work and
strike, demanding what we want, and we will get it in two days,
without any trouble. If we can organise all the natives on the
mines and one day the whole lot strike and demand what they want,
the Government will come in motor cars and give you what you
demand, because the white man can not do without your labour.—.
In his opinion it would be better for us natives to start and
form a society as soon as possible and be organised, and when
things come right strike for our rights. 14°9 ( It was left to
Bunting, at the following meeting, to warn that "we must not
think we are not going to have difficulty and trouble, but we
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must be strong and persevere and withstand any difficulty which
presents itself".)1
If these positions were adopted by Dunbar, they illustrate the
inability of syndicalism to come to grips with the real dynamics
of state power. To the extent that it presented a programme, it
amounted to "organise and strike, and win". Neither did the
theoretical grounding of the ISL equip it to come to grips with
the dynamics of spontaneous class action. The action which did
develop acts as a pole of attraction to those within the
organisation with an orientation to black workers. But the
general theoretical vision which they have brings into sharpest
focus not the dynamics of that action and its objective meaning
in the class struggle, but the place which it occupies along an
idealised measuring guage of class consciousness. The main
positive point made about the action is not that it reflects the
actual development of the workers' movement - but that it can be
used to propagandise about the need for organisation and
solidarity - the ISL's abstract vision of these things being seen
as the only way in which the workers' movement can actually
develop.
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From its formation, the ISL had expressed a strong opposition to
nationalism. The International, in January 1916, criticises
"Guild Socialism" for its combination with "the effete and ever
treacherous dogmas of nationalism", arguing that "to wean the
workers from the latter, Marx considered to be the first step to
freedom"12' This critique of nationalism arose in the context of
the ISL's opposition to the war, and to the policy of supporting
"your own bourgeoisie" in the war. It strongly influenced the way
in which the organisation approached the issue of African
nationalism.
The rejection of nationalism and the deep political suspicion
which the League had of the black petty bourgeoisie did not mean
that it simply rejected the struggle for democratic demands, even
where these were organisationally expressed under a petty
bourgeois black leadershi p 1.12 It specifically supported demands
which it categorised collectively as "elevation of the native to
the political and industrial status of the white"1 13 It is under
the heading "The Pass Laws - Organise for their Abolition" that
the nationalist leadership is vilified as constituting "the tame
wing of the National Council of native attorneys and parsons"21 4
As the ISL became engaged in the practical struggle to win the
support of black workers for industrial unionism and socialism,
the critique of the politics of the black petty bourgeoisie grows
in both vehemence and depth. In October 1917, the International
writes:
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"We would also warn our native fellow workers against the enemies
of their colour. Just as the Rand Daily Mail is not a friend of
the white workers because it happens to be in English, so Abantu
Bathu is not necessarily a friend of the native workers because
it happens to print in Zulu or Sotho. The capitalist has ways and
means of subsidising all papers.
"What the native worker should remember is that there is no
colour line in the working class, however much some hireling
Labourites draw that line. The interests of a native wage-earner
is not with his native property owner or native spokesman
subsidised by the Corner House, but with the white workers who
fight capitalism of any colour—.. Our call to native workers is
different to any other. We call upon them to organise
industrially and fight for themselves.—. And the native workers
are beginning to realise the newness, the truth of the message of
industrial solidarity, for they are responding to the call, and
will not heed the voice of the Corner House itself in the lamb's
skin of Abantu Batho."115
The black petty bourgeoisie is seen and portrayed as an obstacle
to industrial unionism and hence as an obstacle to the core of
the strategy of the ISL:
"To get anything in this capitalist world you must organise,
organise. It is not enough to meet in a room or on a market
square.... Many holy men, perhaps the editor of Abantu Batho
among them, will hold up horrified hands at the thought of
natives organising, except under the tame wing of the National
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Council of native attorneys and parsons. Others who recognise the
degradation of the Pass Laws will say the remedy is too drastic.
But we tell you, fellow workers, that not only is it good to
organise for the sake of getting grievances remedied, but that
the one way in which the natives of SA can uplift themselves
morally and mentally, is by combining in the industrial field.
Industrial combination is not a 'regrettable necessity', it is
not a weapon to take up with a wry face, it is the highest, most
elevating, most inspiring form of human association, and at the
one and the same time, the most powerful weapon on the face of
the earth; stronger than all cannons and bayonets—. „in This
article came shortly after a meeting of the group which formed
the IWA, at which Bunting had asked the workers (and police
spies) present about their views of the NNC.)117
The International expressed the position of the organisation in
this way:
"Kautsky says somewhere that Socialists have always been on the
side of genuine emancipation movements such as the Polish or
Irish movements. Such instinctive sympathy with any agitation
designed to shake off any chains, even if complicated with racial
and sectional interests must be felt among natives all over South
Africa at that Native Affairs Administration Bill of 1917 now
before Parliament."118
But, from the abstract position in terms of which the
organisation is operating, every political development is
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evaluated in terms of how it fits into an idealised conception of
class solidarity and class organisation. Viewed from that
perspective, the "limitations" of the spontaneous struggles of
black workers stood out. From the same perspective, the politics
of the NNC was clearly a dismal failure1 19 The most vehement
criticism of the nationalist leadership is made, not because they
take up the struggle for democratic demands, but because of their
inability - or opposition - to organise such a struggle, and
organise it in a way which promotes the idealised view of working
class solidarity.120
A broadly similar view is taken of Afrikaner nationalism. In an
editorial under the heading "Do we want a Republic?"
International recognises grievances on the basis of which
Afrikaner Nationalists are making gains amongst whites, and
portrays nationalism as an obstacle to the real solution of those
grievances:
"Nothing now can make any change at all affecting the workers
short of a Socialist Republic - i.e. the industrially organised
workers taking charge as workers of the Administration of social
needs for the good of all. That is the only revolution pending
now.—. It does not follow that the Nationalist agitation does
not offer help to the workers. It does.—. But we cannot allow
the working class movement to be deflected from the great goal by
agitation for a change in the mere veneer of tyranny and in the
personnel of the tyrants.—. If the workers will only recognise
their industrial solidarity, they will solve all the Nationalist
grievances and emancipate humanity into the bargain."21
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CP historians are critical of the ISL in two areas:- its
rejection of African nationalism, and its syndicalism1.22Our
analysis thus far suggests that neither of these criticisms gets
to the core problem of the ISL - its theoretical method, and the
political method associated with it. In the case of nationalism,
it is an oversimplification to protray the ISL as simply
dismissing African nationalism, or simply conflating the
nationalisms of oppressed and oppressor. The ISL did recognise
and make clear its recognition of distinctions between the two -
even if it did not consistently take account of that recognition.
What was common in its position on the two nationalisms was the
method in terms of which it understood them, and then responded
to them politically. In both cases, nationalism was evaluated in
terms of an abstract theory which did not get to grips with the
real political dynamics of the situation - and, in both cases,
nationalism "failed".
As far as the syndicalism of the organisation was concerned, the
central point is not the content of its policies - but the way in
which syndicalism came to be adopted and used. The organisation
slid into syndicalism because it lacked an alternative
theoretical framework and theorised strategy. The tactic of
industrial unionism filled the void created by the absence of
that strategy. Racism, working class solidarity, the Bolshevik
revolution, the Soviets - all of these could be "explained" and
contained under the blanket abstractions of syndicalism. In the
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process, the real political implications of using abstract theory
as the analytical basis for political action was made clear.
Under the abstract theory, political action could become a set of
empiricist responses and ad hoc adaptations to developments as
they appeared to be. These could be seen as consistent with the
abstract theory - although they were not necessarily guided by
it. Where there was an attempt to use abstract theory as if it
were a concrete programme, the result was the misleading
confusion put forward within the IWA.
This situation persisted even while a more concrete, materialist
position was beginning to be developed inside the organisation.
But the tension between the two main tendencies, and between
several different contradictory positions, was not clarified,
persisting beneath the surface. Meanwhile, the actual course of
events - the failure of white workers to respond to the ISL
calls, the emergence of the IWA and the surge of working class
resistance - promoted the orientation which some had always
urged, towards the black workers. That orientation was
strengthened by the tentative development of a more materialist
theory. The underlying process of pro 1 etarianisation was
identified; the fact that the majority of the working class was
black was recognised. In retrospect, these may be self-evident
truths. But it is testimony to the abstraction of the ISL from
the situation in which they were seeking to operate that they
were not actually self-evident at the time. Members of the
organisation did not know that blacks were irreversibly working
class, and a majority of the working class, because these were
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not factors immediately within their experience, or visible from
the perspective of the white labour tradition, or illuminated by
an abstract theory.
After negotiations during the course of 1921, The Communist Party
of South Africa (CP/CPSA) was formed in July, and its first
conference was held at the end of that mont0The CP was formed
out of a merger between the ISL, the Cape Town Social Democratic
Federation, the Cape Town Communist Party, the Cape Town Jewish
Socialist Society, Poalei Zion, and the Marxian Club of Durbare
The ISL was by far the biggest of these organisations, with many
more members than the rest combined 25 and it made the greatest
political input into the new CP.
In the lead-up to the formation of the CP the need for an
orientation to black workers was more firmly recognised than at
any stage in the history of the ISL. The great enthusiasm for the
Bolshevik Revolution, misunderstood as it had been, and the
tentative beginnings of the development of a more materialist
theoretical perspective meant that there was a strong receptivity
to Marxist positions - not without similarities to the way in
which there had earlier been a receptivity to syndicalism. But
that was not the only legacy which the ISL brought to the new CP.
Abstract theory continued to mould the perspective through which
the organisation viewed developments. Beneath the surface was a
set of underlying, unresolved conflicts and differences. The CP
was formed at a time when the impact of a sustained period of
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action by black workers was still fresh. Individual morality, the
influence of syndicalism, the tentative beginnings of a
materialist theoretical perspective, abstract theory and the
associated empiricist response to what was immediately visible,
had combined to promote acceptance of an orientation to black
workers. Very soon, these varying bases of the ISL/CP position
were to lead the new CP in a different direction.
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The development of the workers' movement, spearheaded by the
class action of black workers, had created the basis for wider
organisation of the working class. It had also served to draw the
attention of elements within the black petty bourgeoisie to the
working class. In July 1920, the Industrial and Commercial
Workers Union was formed at a conference in Bloemfonteir16drawing
together Kadalie's ICU, and a group of black workers led by
Msimang, who had organised around a minimum wage demand in
127
Bloemfontein in 1919. In the wave of action which had developed,
more and more workers collectively experienced the mood of rising
combativity which was shared amongst broader layers of the
working class. But, particularly for those taking action, their
experience, in the majority of cases, was also that of state
attack and defeat. For as long as action continued to develop,
the impact of the defeats was made secondary. The miners' strike
led the movement forward onto a new level. But the vicious defeat
of that strike, together with the cumulative impact of other
defeats, served to suppress the rising movement. Action died
down; the urban petty bourgeoisie, no longer under the pressure
of the forward movement of black workers, became absorbed in
consultations over the new Native Affairs Bill (which became law
128in 1920); in the same situation, the ICWU fell apart because of
personal differences between its leaders:129
But the impact of the 1920 strike, and the general rise of action
by black workers continued to play a part in the thinking of at
least some elements of the state. The Native Recruiting
Corporation commented:
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"The native strike is now over and the natives have returned to
work. It must not be assumed that all the labourers have returned
in a contented frame of mind.— It is now essential that every
effort should be made to arrive at some means whereby the present
conditions of labour amongst natives employed on the mines can be
ameliorated.... [Should this not be done] there is no doubt that
strikes amongst natives will recur and each successive strike
will be better organised than the last, bringing about not only
serious disorganisation to the Mining Industry but to the whole
industrial life of South Africa."130
In the aftermath of the strike, the mine-owners faced the
pressure of a sharply falling gold premium 31 and turned to the
question of cutting costs. In 1920, 21,455 whites on the mines
earned more than ten million poundsi132 179,987 blacks earned just
below six million pounds. Any further economic attacks against
black miners brought the threat of "a better organised strike",
and the black miners were not organised behind a leadership which
could be relied upon to try to avoid a confrontation. The Chamber
turned to the white miners. In negotiations between August and
December 1921, the white unions conceded the transfer of some
minor functions from whites to blacks, as well as a small wage
reduction/.33 These concessions can only have served to promote the
confidence and determination of the employers. On 8 December
1921, the Chamber announced that negotiations with the unions
were proceeding too slowly. It demanded a reduction of wages of
the highest paid (of approximately 17%), the abolition of the
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Status Quo Agreement, and a blank cheque to re-organise
underground work. According to the Chamber, this would mean 2,000
redundancies 134 The South African Industrial Federation (SAIF)
leadership was rapidly forced into a confrontation position.
Delegates from the coal mines (which had been targetted first)
met on 31 December 1921 and agreed on an immediate strike. The
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) organised a ballot of all
unions affected, with an official recommendation for strike
action. On 10 January 1922, after a ballot heavily in favour of
strike action, white workers on the gold mines joined the coal
miners' strike.135
There was no enthusiasm for extending the strike further from
the SAIF leadership 136. The centralised drive for picketing and
organising the strike generally came from the Council of Action -
a body formed and supported by the left and rank and file
militants, with Andrews in a leading positiorrIn March, when the
Chamber withdrew recognition from the SAIF: 313 the leadership
collapsed completely, and decided to hold a ballot with a
recommendation to return to workTAt this stage, leadership of
the strike passed into the hands of the Committee of Action. This
body consisted of the Council of Action and commando leaders
(most of whom had risen from commandants to generals, in the
course of the strike). The Committee of Action organised a mass
demonstration outside the Trades Hall which physically held the
SAIF leadership hostages of the rank and file, a situation which
partly prevailed politically as well.
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"In the late afternoon Joe Thompson, acting President of the SAIF
came out onto the balcony of the Trades Hall to announce that the
meeting had decided to vote for a general strike. The gathering
noisily demanded to know when it would start. Thompson could not
answer this. The men of the commandos, their patience strained,
told him to go back and find out. The delegates would be held
there until they supplied the answer.
"Thompson went inside and returned to announce that the general
strike had, in fact begun. It would be conducted by a Council of
Five.— The Council of Five promptly abdicated and handed
authority for running the strike over to the Committee of Action
',unconditionally. lac)
The Council of Action failed to maintain any firm organisational
relationship or establish its political leadership over the
commando leaders. Andrews recounts that on 8 March, at a crucial
stage in the conflict, when the general strike had just been
decided, the commando leaders held a secret meeting from which he
i
was excluded ut. This reflected, at a general level, the different
unco-ordinated relationships between the strike committees and
the commandos in different areas. In some cases, the commandos
were organised miners. The overall leader of the commandos was a
retired miner1.42 The first commando to be set up, the Putfontein
Commando - which was also the first to be involved in any
military action - consisted of small-holders.143 There is no
evidence to suggest that it was linked in any organised way to
any strike committee - and certainly nothing suggests that it was
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operating under the leadership of any strike committee. At one
stage, there were moves towards the establishment of trade union-
based industrial, rather than regional, commandos. But these
moves do not seem to have been carried forward into the actual
establishment of any trade union based commandos.1"
From the time of the "abdication of the Council of Five", control
of developments came into the hands of the commando generals. On
10 March, after the secret meeting of the generals, an armed
rebellion began245
 Military skirmishes took priority over attempts
to actually organise a general strike 146 - and the military
skirmishes led eventually to a military defeat.
In the course of the strike, three demands came to the fore -
defence of wages, defence of the colour bar, and the removal of
the Smuts government. The first two of these issues were
relatively clear-cut, and there was complete agreement by all
forces actively involved in building the strike. The last posed
more difficulties. Would Smuts be overthrown in an armed
uprising by the commandos? Would he be defeated by a workers'
general strike? Would he be defeated at elections? As the
generals took over the leadership of the movement, and the armed
rebellion began, the first of these options effectively displaced
the second. In reality, that process meant that the real
prospects of defeating Smuts came to depend more and more on a
military strategy. From the outset of the strike, faced with the
different options, the majority of the LP and National Party (NP)
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leadership focussed on elections2 47
 The endorsement of this
approach by the SAIF leadership opened the door to politicians,
who found a receptive audience, as they called for the defeat of
Smuts. The military defeat of the movement, and the ending of the
strike which followed upon it,I48 opened the way for the electoral
approach to dominate. The basis for this had already been laid,
during the course of the strike. Tielman Roos, at a strike
meeting in Germiston said: "Your best strike weapon is the
General Election. At the next one you will sweep the Smuts
government from power."149
The general arguments put forward by the SAIF in support of the
strike have been described in this way:
"The trade unionists proclaimed that Rand Workers were fighting a
national battle against Colour and Colour-blind capitalism; and
that it was the duty of all white South Africans to assist,
either by demanding a Parliamentary settlement in the strikers'
favour, or by refusing to aid the government should it actively
side against the white workers."0
During the strike, Labour and Nationalist politicians shared
platformsrl Hendrikz, the acting secretary of the MWU told
demonstrators early in the strike to vote for Hertzog or
Creswell 52. A Labour MP made a dramatic appeal for the
establishment of a provisional government and the formation of a
Republic IPMiners who had been born overseas and Afrikaners stood
together in a united movement of struggler 4 Militarily, the state
had defeated the strike, but that defeat had not immediately
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crushed the mood of resistance. The effect of the strike and its
defeat was to establish conditions in which that movement could
be turned into an strengthened electoral base for the NP and LP.
On the basis of a common interest in defending the colour bar and
defeating Smuts through the parliamentary process, a de facto
agreement was being established between the LP and NP.
In 1917, when a dispute between the SAMWU and employers had
developed around the same issues of wages and the colour bar,
Bunting had written:
"In this matter, the SAMWU are fighting a hopeless rearguard
action. Instead of labour fighting labour, surely our game is to
fraternize against the common enemy and fight the exploiter not
the exploited. Indeed if we whites as a class are to continue to
depend for our position on the exploitation of natives, we are
ourselves driven to the side of the exploiters. A union of
skilled craftsmen may for the time, enforce one concession or
another, although even such a gain is more precarious in this
country than elsewhere, for here they have less sympathy with and
from the unskilled. But they can never win the One Thing Needful,
the means of production, for they are only a fraction of the
workers who, as a whole, can alone displace the private owners of
capital. And it is futile to expect the natives to organise just
to win victories for the whites.—. The coming motive power of
Labour is in the hands of the unskilled. This anti-colour demand
can not, by any sophistry be classed as the Labour movement."155
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Referring to the role of the CP in the 1922 strike, Lerumo
writes:
"[T]he Party could not take a detached view. The great majority
of its members were within the existing movement of white
labour; they felt that they could not stand aside from a major
clash between their fellow-workers and the major imperialist
concentration in the country, backed by the hated Smuts
"156government.
Simons writes: "The fight was on. The duty of the communists was
to guide it correctly, instil a revolutionary consciousness in
the strikers, and lead them to victory."
How did the Party approach this task? 157 -
A manifesto was issued by the Party at the end of January in
which the basis of its position was laid out: "Without
necessarily identifying itself with every slogan heard in the
strike, the Communist Party of South Arica gladly offers its
assistance to the Strike Committee, convinced that essentially,
this is a fight against the rule of the capitalistic class.—."
It warned against blind faith in "the landowners", and that "the
middle class, prone as they are to face both ways may prove
broken reeds." The manifesto continued: "Our only permanent
allies are our fellow workers - irrespective of race or
colour.... "158
In the course of the struggle, the strikers drew some support
from landowners and the middle class. Certainly the racist LP, NP
and SAIF leaders were not going to lead the strikers in the
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search for an alliance with black workers. The central slogan of
the strike demanded the defence of a "White South Africa". One of
the declared purposes of some of the commandos was to make sure
that there was no "trouble" from black workers 1?9 Cou1d the CP give
a content, in the actual situation, to its propaganda in favour
of non-racial working class solidarity?
Apart from limited and abstract propaganda, the Party failed to
take up a political struggle against the racist defence of the
status quo. There were three major reasons for this. Firstly, the
strike brought to the fore the white labour tradition, aspects of
which had persisted within the organisation through the history
of the ISL into the formation of the CP. White workers, for the
first time since the formation of the ISL, were actually acting
in a way which could be made to fit the model in terms of which
they were the revolutionary vanguard. Secondly, the Party
actually supported the retention of the status quo, although its
most recent history states that "the Party could not support the
perpetuation of the industrial colour bar"TIn November 1921, the
InternationalP argued that white workers were "perfectly
justified in fighting to keep up the numbers and pay of holders
of blasting certificates" 161 In the course of the strike and in
its aftermath, the position changed. It was not simply the right
of workers to defend their own jobs and conditions - but the
right of white workers to defend racial access to these jobs as a
principle, which the Party came, effectively, to support. Jones
argues that despite "the undeniable justice of the capitalist
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plea for native advancement" (sic), the colour bar provided the
best possible condition for the co-operation of white with
black". "The attack on the Colour Bar threatened to put an end to
162
this .— state." In February, after the breakdown of an attempt
by Smuts to negotiate a settlement conferencd, 3 the CP accused the
AEU of a "distinct weakening on the question of the status quo
,164agreement'. The basis for this argument - where it was not the
simple operation of the white labour tradition - was the belief
that, if the colour bar were broken, blacks would be made to do
skilled work at their existing rates of pay. i.e. undercut
whites. Bunting also clearly believed that opposition to the
colour bar from black workers would amount to an alliance with
the mineowners. The capacity of black workers to organise and
fight for their demands, made visible by the 1920 strike, appears
not to have been considered by the CP. In accordance with the
white labour tradition, the black workers were viewed as passive
bystanders. As far as breaking down the racial divisions in the
working class were concerned, the most that the black workers
could do, in the view of the CP, was to support the white workers
and their demands. Bunting wrote: "Wages, then, not colour is the
point to strike about and so far as this is a strike to maintain
wages, it deserves the whole-hearted support of all Labour,
including the Coloured and Native workers themselves"1.65
As far as the white workers were concerned, the most that they
could do, in the CP's vision of class solidarity, was to realise
the necessity and value of that support. The immediate basis for
that unity was to be the demands being made by the white workers,
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and a united struggle against capitalism:
"To maintain the 'white standard' to build a 'white South Africa'
is impossible under capitalism, whose nature is to degrade every
class it employs. Then away with it! How? By dint of the utmost
solidarity of labour against the common enemy: nothing less can
"166
Thirdly, the CP analytically reduces the subjective basis and
political leadership of the struggle to a part of its objective
basis. Amongst all the other aspects of the strike, a group of
workers was seeking to defend their jobs and their wages.
Analytically, that aspect of the strike could be separated from
others. But, in the actual way in which the strike was being
fought and led, it did not exist separately. Nor could the one
aspect actually be separated from the other without all racist
aspects of the strike being clearly taken up and opposed. In its
manifesto, the Party made clear that "it did not necessarily
associate itself with every slogan heard in the strike" 1 .67 In the
actual context of the strike, that imprecise statement could not
provide the necessary clarity. Nor, in fact, would the other
positions taken by the Party allow it to do so. Restricting the
scope of what it could say, at each point, was the fact that it
actually supported the racist basis of the strike - the
industrial colour bar. The task which the CP set itself was not
to define racism out of existence, but to lead a political
struggle against it. But the method which it employed, and the
positions which it adopted, obstructed its capacity to pursue the
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latter, and promoted the former.
Earlier, the abstract theoretical method of the ISL had led to
Soviets being defined as industrial unions. It had led to some
members of the League seeking to use the abstract principles of
syndicalism as if they could be put forward as an immediate
programme of action. Now it led the CP to define the immediate
political content of the strike out of existence - and to put
forward to black workers, as an immediate basis for solidarity
with white workers, the need to support the racist colour bar. In
a similar process, the commandos became the Red Guards! 68 The next
major result of that method was for the Party to see a racist
popular front alliance between the LP and the NP as a workers'
united front.
The attempt to actually develop socialist organisation, and the
confrontation with reality which that had in part created, had
promoted the embryonic beginnings of the development of a more
concrete theory within the ISL. But the underlying political
foundation persisted - and remained basically unchallenged.
Against this background, the position which the CP adopted in
response to the 1922 strike can be seen as reflecting the
continuity of underlying political features. Because the Party
was being guided by abstract theory, its actual policies in the
situation were an ad hoc adaptation to events as they unfolded,
with socialist propaganda as an added element.
The strike was to become an important part of the ongoing process
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by which Afrikaner nationalism sunk political roots amongst white
workers. Its more immediate political result was an electoral
alliance between the LP and the NP, another part of that same
process. The policies of the CP, in relation to both of these
developments, meant that the Afrikaner Nationalists were able to
strengthen their influence amongst white workers, without a clear
political challenge from the CP.
CHAPTER TWO
1921 - 1929
Generally, left-wing analyses of the 1922 strike and the Pact
which followed it concentrate on making two points:- that the
defeat of the strike laid the basis for the incorporation of
white workers, through, amongst other things, the framework of
the Industrial Conciliation Act;1 and secondly, that the electoral
victory of the Pact government represented a shift in hegemony
between different capitals, or fractions of capitalF
The fractionalist analysis draws attention to the conflict within
the ruling class at the time. It provides a description of part
of the course of political events which followed. But it
overlooks an important part of the political dynamic in the
situation. Analytically, it may be argued with historical
hindsight that the balance of class forces in the situation was
such as to make the course of events which followed the strike
inevitable. But for that argument to be put forward, a much more
precise analysis of the balance of class forces - the balance
between classes - than anything which has been put forward by the
fractionalists is required. And such an approach would have to
take account of the fact that, even if a political process is
pre-determined by unchangeable objective conditions, that does
not mean that the process occurs without a dynamic movement at
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all levels, including the subjective. The change in government
did not come about as a simple and immediate consequence of
conflict between different sections of the ruling class, or a
direct reflection of the needs of different capitals. It came
about, in part, because of the political reaction by the leaders
of the organisations of white workers, and by white workers
themselves, following the defeat of the strike.
Lewis argues that the "defeat of the 1922 General Strike was a
crushing blow to the labour movement". He points to the fall in
union membership, the withdrawal of trade union recognition, and
individual victimisations on the mines? The victimisation of
militants has an impact which extends beyond the individuals
concerned. Trade union membership fell sharply, from 108,242 in
1921 to 81,861 in 1922.4 It was clear that, amongst some of those
most directly involved in the struggle, there was demoralisation.
But the mood of white workers more generally in the immediate
aftermath of the strike cannot be immediately deduced from these
facts alone.
In the concrete situation, several issues were objectively placed
before the white workers and their organisations: Would the
workers follow the lead of the NP and LP, and seek to win their
demands through Parliament? Would the belief that white workers
could secure their needs through action and organisations which
excluded black workers be challenged? Would the white workers and
their leaders respond to the situation by an aggressive struggle
to build their organisations? It was by the political response to
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questions such as these that the precise meaning of the defeat of
the strike came to be determined. And the actual responses which
emerged showed that real choices were possible, and were being
made.
Andrews, in a lecture on the history of the labour movement,
described the impact of the strike in this way:
"One result of the defeat of the workers of the Transvaal in 1922
was a considerable shrinkage in the membership of most of the
Unions, and a widespread feeling of hopelessness and defeat. The
phrase on the lips of the majority of Trade Union officials at
this time was 'never again'. The Government under General Smuts
took advantage of this sentiment, and in 1924 passed the
Industrial Conciliation Act, almost without opposition. Most of
the trade union officials .— supported the Bill."5
As we have seen already, the basis had been laid for politicians
of the NP and LP to exploit the situation created by the defeat
of the strike. The retreating and collapsing SAIF leadership
provided no lead for workers 6. But it is not clear that the defeat
of the strike meant the simultaneous crushing of the mood of
resistance amongst white workers generally. Within a short
period, the LP was to receive an increased share of the vote as
workers attempted, as they saw it, to carry on the fight against
Smuts. Nor was the question of alliances unambiguously answered.
As we have seen, an alliance did develop between the LP and the
NP - and represented by that electoral alliance was an alliance
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between white workers and sections of the petty bourgeoisie and
capital. But the Pact, and the class alliance which it
represented, provoked an opposition from within the LP!'
Creswell's attempt to have the socialist goal deleted from the LP
programme was defeated at the Party conference in 1923? And a
general meeting of white miners in Johannesburg in September 1923
argued that the constitution of the union should be changed, in
order to allow black membership (although in separate branches)T
Political choices were being made. What policies did the CP
pursue in this crucial period, in which the precise impact of the
defeat of the strike was still being determined?
The first Congress of the CP had decided, by 40 votes to 29, that
"a Communist Party could at no time identify itself with any
nationalist or other bourgeois party, and cannot support its
platform i2 The International described the Pact as "an alliance
between bourgeois nationalism and labour imperialism"? Despite
this, the CP decided, at its Congress in 1923, to support the
Pact.'3 The propaganda of the Party makes quite clear that there
was a recogRition that the Pact was a bourgeois political
formation which would not meet the needs of workers:
"Whether a purely Nationalist, or a Nat-Lab government the
workers will rapidly discover that the administration of the
country will not be materially different to that at the present
u
time."
"It is of course quite obvious that leading members of the Pact
have no sympathy with working class aspirations.—.5
"The alliance between Republicans and Imperialists, reactionary
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landowners and industrial workers cannot result in any material
benefits to the wage-earning class.—."16
Nonetheless, the position of support for the Pact persists.
A deep pessimism about the political consciousness of white
workers was reflected in explanations for the Party's support of
the Pact:
"As Communists we are aware of the largely futile character of
parliamentary institutions and part of our work is to discredit
parliament and bourgeois 'democracy', but in order to bring home
to the workers the impossibility of effecting their emancipation
through parliament they will probably have to go through the
bitter disillusionment of a Labour/Nationalist government in
power. ,,17
It is portrayed as being necessary, because of the illusions
which workers have in the NP and LP:
"We know that Hertzog and Creswell with their foggy ideas of the
causes of the ills of society will fail to accomplish what they
promise to do. Hertzog's nationalism will not carry the workers
very far, and Creswell's imperialism will hamper him at every
turn. Nevertheless, it is necessary that the ground should be
cleared. It is necessary that the [Pact] advocated by the Nat-
Labour combination should be put to the test. Only through an
exhaustive process of disillusionment does it appear that the
workers will be convinced that no solution of the problems
confronting them is possible within the capitalist system. The
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sooner nationalism and Labourism is given a trial, the sooner
1
will it be found out." 18
At times, the Pact is supported, not as a political good in
itself, but as the better of bad options: "The only alternative
at this election seems to be to vote for Smuts and the Chamber of
Mines. One has to choose the lesser of two evils, and on this
occasion at least, it would appear to be the Hertzog-Creswell
combination. ,,19
At times, it is argued that it is a necessary stage in the
progress towards socialism:
"In a country so politically backward as South Africa from the
working class point of view (although advanced from the
capitalist point of view) the defeat of the SAP government will
in itself mean quite an appreciable step in the march towards
complete emancipation."20
"Vote Pact' not for the sake of the 'Pact' but for the sake of
the working class as a step towards workers control of the whole
means of production and self-determination in a workers
republic"
"[T]he defeat of an avowedly capitalist government and the
substitution of a government with working class sympathies is a
necessary step in the advance towards Communism."22
And, at times, "inexorable economic laws „23were adduced to explain
that the movement of the white workers was consistently to the
left.
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The reaction of the Party to the Pact arises for three main
reasons. Firstly, there was a deep demoralisation amongst
elements within the Party who had, in the heady days of March
1922, believed that the white workers were beginning to play out
their role as the revolutionary vanguard. Underlying different
"explanations" is the assessment that the white workers, after
the defeat of the strike, cannot move beyond a backward position.
Secondly, the method of the Party, on immediate political
positions as opposed to general propaganda, results in a tendency
to follow, not an attempt to lead. The white workers appeared to
be moving backwards from the advanced positions which the Party
believed had been reached in 1922. The Party moved backwards
behind them. Thirdly, support for the Pact appeared to the Party
to be the equivalent of the united front position which the
Comintern was advocating generally? 4
Andrews points to the "widespread feeling of hopelessness and
defeaerLerumo sums up the feeling:
"The Party was bitterly disappointed in the results and
consequences of the strike. Despite the sacrifices and heroism of
the Communists, it was not to them but to the chauvinist Labour
and Nationalist Parties that the white workers turned, in their
anger and bitterness against Smuts and his Party.—. Many trade
union militants left the Communist Party, to throw their weight
behind the Labour-Nationalist alliance. Ivon Jones wrote —. 'We
have lost the trade unionists.—. as a cold matter of fact there
is no room for a CP in white South Africa except as the watchdog
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of the native.—. 11,26
At this crucial stage, then, the Party was plunged into a mood of
demoralisation - a mood which was fuelled by the false optimism
and misassessment which it had made in the course of, and
immediately after, the strike. When the completely idealised
expectations in the white workers failed to materialise, the
Party lost confidence in the possibility of immediately achieving
even sober goals - such as drawing a class line in white
elections. Even before the impact of the strike has been fully
determined, the Party attributes to white workers a new
backwardness - a retreat from their vanguard role in the "most
glorious event in the history of white civilisation in South
Africa. ,,27
Viewing developments from this starting point, the Party was
unable to recognise the particular conjunctural significance of
the moves within the MWU to allow black members, and of the
opposition to the Pact within the LP. At the beginning of 1924,
the International reported that the proposal was coming from
within the MWU that it should be opened to black workers 2. 8 The
Party welcomed the move, and called for it to be carried through
with "audacity and rapidity" 2.9 At the same time, the initiative
was described as showing "signs of falling into line with the
rest" 30.There is no sign that the Party launched or participated
in any campaign to promote the measure. The tentative moves
towards the beginnings of an alliance between black and white
miners fell prey to a combination of pressure from the Chamber,
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the bourgeois media, and the established union leadership?'
The Party strongly opposed the opposition to the Pact within the
LP. At the end of November 1923, the International wrote:
"It is up to all the SALP branches to ridicule and repudiate the
dunghill crowings of some Cape Labourites and secure for South
Africa its only chance by ratifying the Pact at the annual
conference. "32
The CP attributed the LP opposition to the Pact to vote-mongering
(which it believed was aimed at the "Coloured vote" in the Cape)P
There is little doubt that this was the basis of opposition from
some leading Cape LP members. But the Party made no attempt to
assess the extent to which that opposition extended beyond
leaders and elected representatives to working class members and
supporters of the LP. And, in its support for the Pact, it cut
itself off, not just from the base of opposition inside the LP,
but also from the mass of black workers 34. That such opposition
existed was reflected in a press report, carried by the
International, of a meeting of black workers:
"Mr Charles Pearce, MLA for Liesbeek is reported by Reuter to
have addressed a meeting of native workers at Ndabeni, when the
meeting unanimously adopted a long resolution viewing with great
alarm the amalgamation [sic] of the National and Labour Parties,
whose policies have been as different from one another as the
North is from the South Pole [sic], and resolving to oppose the
'Pact' candidates strenuously on the grounds that its only
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effects are
a. lust for power without any policy whatsoever
b. an anti-native and anti-Coloured programme with the view to
defranchising non-Europeans in the Cape
c. to reduce non-European workers in this country to a state
tantamount to economic strangulation.—.
If he did denounce the Pact, we are of the opinion that he is
mistaken in his tactics."35
During the course of the strike, the LP/SAIF leadership had laid
the basis for a focus on the electoral option - and the defeat of
the strike made it easier for them to exploit the situation to
their own electoral ends. The same leadership was telling the
white workers that they needed to look for allies - and the
allies presented to them were the NP. Both of these "answers"
served to undermine any commitment to "independent" class
organisation. And, as Andrews has pointed out, the union
leadership retreated after the strike, making infinitely more
difficult the option of any political strengthening of the white
unions. The policies of the leadership meant that, within all
their organisations, the white workers were being presented with
only one option: "Vote for the Pact, and win your demands through
Parliament." The CP tried to combat the movement away from the
unions with a campaign, launched at the beginning of 1924, under
the slogan "Back to the Unions" 3.6 At the same time, the prospects
of white workers actually turning with increased energy to
independent unionism was being undermined by parliamentarism and
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support for a popular frontist class alliance of their
leadership. On each of these issues the CP was, in part,
effectively endorsing and campaigning for the policy adopted by
the leadership of the white workers. At the same time,
consistently with the white labour tradition, the Party focussed
its attention on the elections - elections from which the
majority of the working class was excluded. And it continued to
approach those elections from the starting point, as it saw it,
of the white workers.
Simons argues that "[t]he communists were wrong in supposing that
defeat would sharpen class consciousness, drive out national or
racial antagonism, and imprint the moral of working class
solidarity" 3. 7 Defeat alone could not do these things. But the
impact of the defeat opened up questions for the white workers,
which, depending on the way in which they were answered, could
have begun to challenge some of the racist divisions within the
working class. The CP, in its support for the colour bar, had
effectively supported a key basis of racism during the strike. In
its aftermath, by its support for the Pact, it came effectively
to endorse the answers presented to the white workers by the
social democrats and Afrikaner nationalists. In so doing, it was
endorsing key aspects of the policies which were helping to turn
the defeat of the strike into a much wider defeat.
What impact a different policy by the CP would have had cannot be
precisely measured. Amongst white workers, it is likely that the
most that could have been achieved was the strengthening of a
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foundation for the development of a minority non-racist left-wing
within some white unions. That, in itself, would have been a
major historical development. For that to have happened, and for
the approach to the Pact to have been determined by the interests
of the working class generally, the CP would have had to approach
things from a different perspective. The real significance of a
different OP policy would have been the development of that
perspective. But the importance for this study of recognising the
real political dynamic is not in measuring what might have been.
It is in demonstrating that the policies pursued by the Party
were based on real political choices. And that those policies,
and the way in which it saw developments were, in themselves,
sufficient to preclude the Party from achieving the objectives
which it set itself at the beginning of the strike.
The OP decision at its 1923 conference to apply for affiliation
to the LP, and its support for the Pact, were theorised in terms
of the Comintern policy of the united front 3.8 The most recent OP
history implies that by united front, the Party meant the rank
and file movement between the Afrikaans and English members of
the CP, NP and LP?9 The International argued that the "united
front against Smuts had first been planned by British and Dutch
revolt leaders in the Fort":40 There had been a united movement of
opposition which drew together Afrikaans and English speaking
workers, amongst whom there must have been supporters of
different parties. But that movement did not exist without
political leadership. And, particularly in the aftermath of the
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strike, when the pressure of mass action had been removed, the
leadership role was taken over by the NP and LP. Between these
two parties, there was a formalised political alliance and
electoral Pact - and it is to these, despite its clear desire for
an alliance between the working class rank and file, that the CP
gave its clear and repeated support.
Viewed abstractly, the Soviets had been seen as industrial
unions. With the same perspective, support for an alliance
between "bourgeois nationalism and labour imperialism" - a
popular frontist alliance which specifically excluded the
majority of the working class - came to be seen and "theorised
as a united front. In the case of its adoption of syndicalism,
and then the united front, the ISL/CP had used a theory to
explain positions which had, by and large, already been adopted.
As the Party became more closely connected with and influenced by
the Comintern, the theory which it derived from the Comintern
came to to be used more as a guide to action.
In the 1924 election the SAP was defeated, with the Pact parties
winning 81 seats (NP 63, LP 18) to the 63 of the SAPTIn terms of
the electoral agreement, and in accordance with the policy of the
Afrikaner Nationalists of "leaving the white workers to the LP"?
the LP had been allocated the major urban working class
constituencies. Analysts of the Pact have pointed out that, as
far as the economic interests of the white workers generally were
concerned, there was little immediate benefit derived from the
Pact victoryP Those measures taken by the government which were
of immediate benefit to a minority of white workers were designed
politically to serve the interests of capital. They were aimed at
buying-off and diffusing the movement, which had generated the
1922 strike and had continued, to "get rid of Smuts".
Additionally, they promoted a situation where the maintenance of
the position of the white worker came to depend on measures
decided and taken by the state - in particular through employment
and "protective" 1 egisl ation! 4 A major political consequence of
the different developments we have seen was the increased
incorporation of already collaborationist white unions within
formalised state structures.
One of the first moves by the new government was designed to
strengthen its social base by opening up new jobs for white
workers in the government services. In October 1924, Hertzog
issued a circular letter instructing all government departments
to substitute "civilised" for "uncivilised" labour, wherever
possible,5 "Civilised" meant a standard of living "generally
recognised as tolerable from the usual European standpoint" By
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March 1926, 1,361 white labourers were directly employed under
the scheme. The Department of Labour also provided subsidies for
municipalities to make up the difference between the "the
customary native daily wage and a fair minimum wage to European
labour" 7 By September 1924, 2,906 white men were employed under
this subsidised Municipal Relief Scheme.49 Between 1924 and 1933,
the number of whites employed by the Railways rose from 4,760 to
17,683. In the same period, the number of Africans employed fell
from 37,564 to 22,008, and the number of Coloureds from 5,628 to
4,663.49
The Status Quo agreement had been declared ultra vires by both
soMagistrates and the Appeal Courts during 1923. The Pact
government drew up legislation, passed in 1926 as the Mines and
Works Amendment Act, laying down that blacks could not be
employed in any job for which a certificate was required. 51
 The
government promoted the Apprenticeship Act of 1922 in terms of
which committees of employers and white unions had control over
access to apprenticeshipsFThe Wage Act of 1925 laid down minimum
levels, with the multiple purposes of keeping wage levels down,
limiting the scope for employers to employ cheaper black labour
rather than whites, and creating a state structure through which
the issue of wages could be taken up in future situations of
conflict.53 These different interests, and the generalised interest
of capital in securing labour which is both skilled and cheap
enough for profitability did not necessarily demand precisely the
same result, as far as any particular Wage Board determination
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was concerned.54 Forward carried an assurance from a LP Cabinet
Minister to white workers:
"The wage legalised by the Wages Board will have to be the wage
that the employer will have to pay the employee engaged in any
particular work, no matter what his colour may be.
"Needless to say, this will meet the wishes of every white worker
in the country. I can not say the same for the employers, who
have always used colour as a cloak to hide nefarious and
scandalous underpayment for work done. In actual fact, the so-
called 'colour' bar has been a 'white' bar in practice giving the
black and coloured worker the right to 'freeze out' the more
experienced white worker in very many avenues of employment."55
The government had, in its own interests, to consolidate an
electoral base amongst white workers. This meant that the
government was under pressure to meet some of the demands - or at
least convince white workers that it would do so in the future.
Promises like that carried in Forward show the attempt to do the
latter. It also had, as a government of capital, to try to "place
a lid" on the demands and expectations of white workers which,
for opportunist reasons, it had, within narrowly defined limits,
promoted during the 1922 strike. The basis for the success of the
Pact government in achieving these aims had been laid in the
defeat of the mobilisation of the white workers, and in the
political retreat by the union leadership which followed that
defeat.
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The bedrock of the government "labour relations" policy was the
1924 Industrial Conciliation Act. This Act is primarily seen as
the measure by which the government cut off the possibility of
official recognition for black trade unions, and placed black
workers in an uncertain legal position, as far as trade unionism
was concerned.57 It served two other major political purposes. It
created a massive new legislative barrier to non-racial unionism.
And it constructed a framework of state structures and channels
into which, in the political conditions after the strike, the
white unions were drawn.
The effect of participation within these was to promote the
collaboration which was already taking place, and to place a
whole range of official prcedures in the path of any strike
action. As Andrews put it:
"The ICA was ostensibly passed to provide a means of settling
disputes and fixing wages and other working conditions without
resort to strikes and lockouts. In reality it was designed to
make strikes illegal for all essential services ... and in the
case of other industries to provide machinery for conciliation
boards, industrial councils and arbitration which had to be used
before a strike could be legally entered into. In practice, these
provisions made a successful legal strike almost an
impossibility. ,,58
In conditions characterised by the political impact of the defeat
of the 1922 strike, and particularly by the fact that the
expectations of the white workers had been channelled into a
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parliamentary direction, the measures taken by the government to
control the movement of white workers were, for a period,
relatively successful. During the period of the Pact government,
and particularly in its first term, the number of white workers
who were organised was relatively small. It was generally amongst
unorganised white workers that the deepest grievances were hele
When the re-organisation of the white unions came, in 1924, it
was at the initiative of Creswell, now Minister of Labour.
Andrews explains Creswell's intentions:
"Colonel Creswell —. wanted some representative trade union body
to give sanction to any industrial legislation that he might
introduce, and to help him secure the smooth running of the
Industrial Conciliation Act and Apprenticeship Acts."60
At the beginning of 1925 the SA Association of Employees'
Organisations was set upP l At its first conference that year, the
name was changed to the Trade Union Congress 2 From its inception,
despite the plans of Creswell, the left had a strong
representation on the leadership of the organisation, with
Andrews being elected Secretary, and Glass (also a Communist)
being elected Treasurer.63 The strength of the left at the
leadership level of the organised white workers was partly due to
the fact that a number of right-wing unions did not initially
affiliate to the federation 4 And, despite important positions
within some of the organisations of white workers, the left
within the broader movement of white workers remained relatively
small and isolated.65
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After the 1924 election, the LP called a special conference to
confirm its intention of entering a Pact government. 66 The CP, for
whom such a government had been variously "the only alternative",
"the way forward for South Africa", and a necessary stage on the
road to socialism, now changed its position, without explanation.67
Having completely rejected the opposition to the Pact within the
LP before the election, it now urged the LP special conference to
reject entry into a Pact government? 8Under the slogan: "Workers
of the World, UNITE! But not with the forces of reaction!"rit
urged the delegates to the LP special conference to oppose the
formation of a Pact government. The Party, via a period in which
it proposed to workers that they should support precisely those
forces of reaction in a united front, now returned to the formal
positions of pre-1922. The vague, often unexpressed, never
clearly argued, dissatisfaction with continuing aspects of the
white labour tradition came to the fore through the Young
Communist League which, from its inception, had tried to focus on
black youth at least equally to white 7.0 The main branch of the YCL
in Johannesburg had resolved, in the period that the Party
generally was focussing on the Pact, that the "main task of the
YCL of South Africa is the organisation of the native youth"P
Strong support for the 'new policy', of which Bunting was the
leading proponent, also came from the Cape Town branch of the
Party. It was from this branch that the major criticism relating
to the policy on the Pact had come:2
Different factors combined to promote a change of position within
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the Party. The objective of getting rid of Smuts had been
achieved; many of the white trade unionists who had been most
strongly imbued with the white labour tradition had left the
Party, in the aftermath of the strike; the pessimistic belief
that white workers could not be broken from backward positions
had the effect of turning some CP members towards blacks; and at
a time when white militancy had been crushed, militancy was
clearly developing amongst blacks.73
The theoretical perspective of the Party had led it into its
positions relating to the strike and the Pact. The same method
led it into a renewed focus on the opposition movement amongst
blacks - a movement which was becoming more organised and more
visible. The orientation to black workers, developed before
1922, had been displaced by political events, not political
argument or fully theorised strategic and tactical changes. As
events changed, the orientation re-emerged. It was mustered into
a majority position at the 1924 CP conference. The report on
"Native Affairs" reflected the new approach:
"The Communist Party must recognise the necessity of supporting
every form of native movement which tends to undermine or weaken
capitalism, and must fight for race equality of the natives on
the economic and political field. The Communist Party must use
every instrument which will induce the trade unions to admit
native workers. Failing this, it must organise the natives into
unions of their own, and apply United Front tactics."74
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It was also decided to reverse the position of applying for
affiliation to the LP. The Draft Programme which was adopted at
the conference declared:
"The South African Labour Party, by endorsing the principle of
capitalist democracy [sic], perpetuates the illusion that the
salvation of the workers can be attained through capitalist
institutions such as Parliament. By its failure to recognise
adequately the exploited native workers it forfeits all claim to
be a true working-class party."75
Industrial development in the immediate post-war years had seen a
large rise in the number of black workers in the major industrial
centres. In 1911 there were 424,908 Africans in urban
concentrations of more than 1,000. In 1921, the comparable figure
was 551,188. In Cape Town the population rose from 1,541 to 7,438
in the same period; in Port Elizabeth from 6,926 to 15,221; in
Johannesburg from 102,411 to 122,298; in Benoni from 16,353 to
32,415; in Vereeniging from 1,126 to 3,394. In 1911, there were
339 urban centres with more than 500 African inhabitants. In
1921, the number was 427 6 As these workers became more and more
firmly incorporated into capitalist industry and the social
conditions of an urban proletariat, their expectations
increasingly focussed on the universal needs of urban workers.
In the rural areas, more and more blacks were being forced to
seek work on white farms, or to "squat". In 1927, it was claimed
that there were more than 1,618,000 natives living on white-
owned land, as labour tenants, squatters, or wage labourers, of
whom there were at least half a million 7. 7 As the South African
Worker,(SAW) pointed out, the effect of Hertzog's Native Land
policy was to bring labour tenants under the Masters and Servants
Act and, in the vast majority of cases, their families as wel178
These developments, together with crop failures in the reserves
in 1924 and 192679could only serve to promote the grievances of
workers in capitalist agriculture, the movement out of the
reserves and to the towns, the pressures on workers with wages in
towns to subsidise those in the rural areas, and the growing
number of urban unemployed. There were thus developing black
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communities with growing demands in the urban areas, in a
situation in which tribal and subsistence social and economic
structures were being progressively destroyed and social welfare
functions at even the most basic level were not being provided.
In the same period, wages for at least some groups of black
workers were being cutP°And in 1925 the taxation system for
blacks was extended, so that every male native who reached 18 had
to pay a poll tax of one pound a year and, in addition, the
occupier of every hut or dwelling had to pay a poll tax of ten
shillings a year.81
The cumulative effects of these processes was to create a
groundswell of discontent and opposition throughout the country,
most accutely amongst the interlocking groups who were caught up
where the impact of social dislocation and economic hardship was
most severe - migrant workers in the developing urban and semi-
urban industrial areas whose families were beginning to live with
them, peasants who could not survive off the land, and
"squatters" on the farms. It was on this basis that the ICU was
to be sustained and developed. The groundswell of opposition
began to act upwards upon the black petty bourgeoisie, permeating
through to the leaders of the ICU and the ANC - more markedly so
and sooner in the case of the ICU, which had been established
with a clear orientation to the urban and rural masses. While
this process was in motion, there was a more immediate and
obvious political pressure operating on the black petty
bourgeoisie - the threat of oppressive measures directed
specifically against them by the government.
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In November 1925, Hertzog, who had the portfolio of Native
Affairs, gave notice of his intention to introduce four
segregation bills 8. 2 One of the cumulative effects of these was to
substantially challenge the precarious position in terms of which
some blacks had access to ownership of lane a place in the
electoral system through the Cape franchise and were less
restricted by pass laws 85. These proposals were tabled in three
bills relating to Africans' and the Coloured Persons Rights Bill.
There was not an immediate parliamentary majority for the Bills,
which, as a package, required a two-thirds majority because they
involved a change to an entrenched clause of the constitution.
They were sent to a Select CommitteeTr in February 1929, shortly
before the general election, the Native Parliamentary
Representation Bill and the Coloured Persons Bill were tabled,
and then withdrawn because of lack of the required two-thirds
support.88 But, as Johns points out, "[u]p to 1935, Hertzog's
Native Bills hung as an ever-present threat over the African
population...." 89 For the meantime, the threat of their
introduction forced some elements within the petty bourgeoisie to
look for channels of opposition; others were forced to look for
better channels of co-operation9.°
The petty bourgeois leadership of the ICU and of the ANC came to
articulate in a certain form this groundswell of opposition which
spanned different classes and elements within classes of black
South Africe It was on this basis that Kadalie was to move to
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the left, and become increasingly receptive to Communist
influence. The CP, in turn, was shifting to a focus on the more
visible movement of black opposition. Both the attitude of the CP
to Kadalie, and his to Communism were to undergo sharp reversals.
Roux, who was a member of the CP at the time, argues that "the
right of natives to form trade unions and political organisations
was becoming a major issue in South African politics"F He points
to the growth of the ICU, whose industrial base was in Cape Town,
and which, at the time of its conference in January 1923, claimed
18 branches, all in the Cape and South West Africa 9.3 The fact that
the Cape Town CP branch generally supported an orientation to
blacks was not being reflected in any involvement in the ICU at
that stage. It is a measure of the isolation of the CP from
developments amongst black workers that the Cape Town branch,
which was its second biggest, should have neither observers nor
representatives at the 4th Annual Conference of the ICU in
January l924? The International declares that the CP is "without
information" as to whether the ICU is "a fit and proper body" to
undertake those tasks relating to black workers which the CP
regards as essentialrThe result of this isolation was that, in
its formative period, the ICU developed without any organised
Communist influence 96.The support by the CP for the colour bar in
this period would have made such influence very difficult, as
would some of the policies of the ICU leadership. Kadalie, who
was initially an enthusiastic supporter of the Pact, was
regarded, in the period before the elections and change of CP
position, as little different from the conservative ANC leaders?'
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In January 1924, the International reports a speech of Kadalie's
in which he repudiates Bolshevism:
"The African Native has been a law-abiding person from time
immemorial. No African leader will join any political movement
purporting to upset any Constitution."98
During the course of 1924, as the basis for support for the Pact
disappears, the strength of the "negrophilists" inside the Party
builds up, and there is a consistent turn towards the ICU. At the
same time, the political pressures operating on Kadalie are such
as to shift him to the left. The ICU was uncovering a mass
receptivity to organised opposition, and there was the beginning
of a mass turn to the organisationrKadalie's support for the
Pact before the election had appeared to involve the belief that
his organisation would be freer to operate if there was a change
of government7But, shortly after the election, in the course of
a national tour, he was banned from Natal 1.01 The victimisation of
Kadalie serves as a focus for the changed attitude of the CP, and
promotes the tendency to differentiate between "conservative" and
"radical" black leaders. Reacting to the ban imposed by the Natal
provincial authorities, the International writes:
"The ICU sent its general secretary on an organising tour to the
various industrial centres of the Union. All went well until
Natal was reached, where the authorities have prohibited the
meeting on the grounds that trade unionism will induce the
uneducated native to claim higher wages. What abnormal brains the
Natal authorities have, to be sure, to have found that out.
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"But perhaps they have been so used to the J.H. Thomas type of
labour leader, whose one object is to hand the workers, bound
hand and foot to the bosses, that it was a surprise when the
native organiser spoke in a quite different strain. „102
During the May Day celebrations in 1926, the same leader who had
assured the bourgeoisie that no African leader would wish to
upset any constitution was now "urging workers to hail the
victorious republic of the Russian workers, and to unite for the
overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a workers
commonwealth” 103 The influence of the Party was greatly increased
when la Guma, who became general secretary of the ICU, joined the
CP in 1925.104
The 1925 constitution of the ICU105 indicates the movement to the
left of the ICU leadership, arising from the combination of
upward pressure created by the groundswell of opposition, and the
influence of the Communists. The preamble states:
"No peace can be between the two classes, as struggle must always
obtain about the division of the products of human labour, until
the workers through their industrial organisations take from the
capitalist class the means of production, to be owned and
controlled by the workers for the benefit of all instead of for
the profit of a few."
The pages of the SAW begin to reflect the more and more fraternal
relationship which is being developed with Kadalie l,06 along with
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the clear distinction between the ICU as a radical and the ANC as
a conservative organisation. A report on the 1926 ANC
Bloemfontein Convention concludes:
"Taken all round, it would seem fairly clear that not only was
the Convention dominated by the very moderate type of native
leader, but also by those native elements who have come more or
less under the influence of the South African Party. The ANC will
merely remain a name, and not a very prominent one at that, so
long as it neglects to concern itself with the main fight of the
oppressed South African natives, namely, the fight against
exploitation. ,u107
The ICU, however, was not only regarded as having concerned
itself with the main fight, but as having come to do so from a
thoroughly progressive perspective. The SAW concludes its
reaction to the Hertzog Bills with the call to workers and
peasants:
"Join the ICU
"Join the CP
"The organisations that fight on your behalf.„los
In this period, the International/SAW carried several articles
reflecting the official Comintern description and assessment of
the developments in the Chinese revolutionr 9 The central tenet on
which Comintern policy rested - the belief that the struggle
could be won with the CP subordinated to the Kuomintang 0 and the
working class subordinated in a class alliance which it did not
lead - was embodied in the assessment of events which it gave
118
out, and was to have a strong influence on the CPSA.111
Increasingly, the Kuomintang, which was affiliated to the
Comintern and persistently portrayed as a revolutionary body,
came to be regarded as the type of organisation, with the type of
policies, which were necessary in South Africa; and, as the
Comintern continued to demand the entry of the Chinese CP into
the Kuomintang under any conditions, the relationship of the
Chinese Party to the Kuomintang came to be seen as the model upon
which the South African CP should base itself in its relations
with the ICUP
The increasingly close relationship between the CPSA and the ICU
should be understood in terms of the Party's own conception of
the model which it was following. At the same time that the Party
was describing itself and the ICU jointly as the fighting
organisations of the masses, it was assessing the relationship
between the Chinese CP and the Kuomintang as follows:
"The [Kuomintang's] total programme is a model that might well be
studied by, for instance, our African Native Congress. It is
founded on a world wide prospectus of imperialism whose defeat is
contemplated as feasible only, (to quote Dr Sun Yat Sen) 'by
awakening the whole people and joining forces with other nations
in the world which are prepared to treat us as equals in the
common fight against the imperialist forces, such as free Russia
as well as the colonial and semi-colonial countries still under
the yoke ....' Within the Kuomintang Party, itself an
organisation with branches in nearly every part of the country,
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the CP of China works as a leaven, a stimulus and an educating
force, the two working together. The Cantonese are spared the
misfortune of that 'conflict of loyalties' suffered by the petty
bourgeoisie of England, or the Labourites of Natal. On the
contrary, the People's government and army (like those of Soviet
Russia) fight for the aims of the masses of the people
013themselves....
In October 1926, SAW reported the growth of the Chinese trade
unions, the Kuomintang and the Chinese CP, and commented that at
meetings, "[t]he speakers of the Kuomintang stress that the
Kuomintang has no intention of introducing Communism, but that it
is nevertheless working with the CP because the immediate aims of
the two Parties are the same. 014
In its assessment of political developments in China, the SA
Party identified the problems of reliance upon, and alliance
with, forces from outside the working class. There were clear
warnings against reliance upon bourgeois nationalists. In August
1926, a Conference of Chinese people in SA was held, in
Johannesburg, under the auspices of the KuomintaneAndrews spoke
at the conference. He "unofficially' welcomed the great struggle
of the Chinese people against world imperialism. He warned his
hearers that real freedom from oppression could only come though
complete economic freedom, and touched on the necessity of also
waging a fight against Chinese capitalists:016
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But the Party had little experience in dealing with and assessing
the trajectory of radicals from outside the working class. In
this situation, there was a tendency to accept the
categorisations of the Comintern, without taking full account of
the reservations which Party propaganda indicated. The Party
therefore identified the dangers of bourgeois influence within
the nationalist movement but, in line with Comintern policy, did
not initially identify the link between bourgeois interests and
the leadership of the Kuomintang. Similarly, theoretical warnings
about the nationalist bourgeoisie coexist with support for the
policy of Communist affiliation to the Kuomintang under whatever
conditions are laid down by the bourgeois nationalist leadership
of the Kuomintane 7 The product of this combination was a tendency
to see individuals from outside the working class who were
radical as revolutionaries, without a developed understanding of
the processes and pressures by which that radicalism was
promoted, sustained, weakened or destroyed.
As was the case in China, this view of developments inside SA was
to be challenged by the course of events. At the end of 1926, the
apparently fraternal relationship between the CP and the ICU
leadership collapsed, and leading Communists were expelled from
the ICU. During the course of 1926 la Guma, the Communist
General Secretary of the ICU, had toured thirteen branches218In
his report of that tour, he made several criticisms of the way in
which ICU officials ignored the organisation's constitution. He
singled out the way in which Kadalie bypassed the ICU National
Council. He also proposed the transformation of the ICU from a
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general union into industrial unions 1.19 These criticisms by la Guma
have been put forward by some analysts to explain Kadalie's
decision to expel the Communiste) There can be little doubt that
they promoted that decision. Johns points to a second major
factor: "[T]he question of ICU representation overseas provoked
disagreement between the Communist Party and the ICU. '°21These
disagreements promoted the developing hostility of Kadalie
towards the CP. A consideration of the policy of the Party on key
international issues illuminates both the disagreements with
Kada lie - and the way in which the Party was prepared to face the
developing conflict.
In the 1925 Programme of the ICU, drafted under the developing
influence of the CP, the ICU had coupled its declared goal of the
ownership and control of the means of production by the working
class with a strongly declared commitment to local and
international working class unity:
"This is the goal for which the ICU strives along with all other
organisations of workers throughout the world. Further, this
organisation does not encourage antagonism towards other bodies,
political or otherwise, of the African peoples or of organised
European 1abour." 122
It seems likely that the specific reference to white workers
reflects the impact of the influence of the CP. The CF obviously
believed that Kadalie was operating in pursuit of that goal when
they supported his decision to apply for affiliation to the
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British Trade Union Congress (TUC). The changing assessments made
by the Soviet leadership of the British TUC in this period served
to disorientate the CPSA, and undermine the authority with which
it could speak on international developments. Before the defeat
of the 1926 general strike in Britain, the General Council of the
British TUC was portrayed by the Soviet leadership, and by the
Communist movement internationally, as militant 1.23 Kadalie must
surely have believed that he could count on the support of the CP
when, at the suggestion of the British TUC, he applied for
affiliation to the International Confederation of Free Trade
124
Unions (ICFTU). At a time when social democrats and liberals were
building links with Kadaliethe position which the CP took on
international links seemed confusing. The Party opposed the
decision to apply to the ICFTU, categorising it, in accordance
with Comintern policy, as an agent of labour reformism:
"The announcement that the ICU had applied for affiliation to the
Amsterdam International came as a big surprise to those
acquainted with the true character of the latter body in
comparison with South Africa's militant organisation of native
workers.—. [O]ne may indeed wonder what has prompted the ICU
leaders to apply for affiliation, and it is certainly to be
regretted that so far very little light has been shed on the
matter." 126
There seemed to be an immediate inconsistency between politically
lauding the British TUC, but criticising the policy of the
organisation to which the TUC was politically committed. But it
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was not taken up within the Party. By the time the decision to
apply to the ICFTU was known, the political assessment of the
British TUC had changed. The basis of the favourable assessment
which Communists internationally had of the British TUC was the
fact that it was regarded and protrayed as an ally by the Soviet
Union with which it was a partner in the Anglo Russian CommitteeT
As the policies of the British TUC General Council increasingly
visibly belied the assessment which had been made of that body by
the Soviet leadership, the Comintern changed its assessment. The
TUC leaders, who had only days previously been described as
leaders of the workers in struggle, were now attacked as enemies
of the working classF8 The CPSA put it in this way:
"Events have shown that this [workers' militancy] was sabotaged
from the outset by the weak, cowardly, vacillating leadership
exercised by the reactionaries holding the reins in the General
Council. ”129
In his move to the left, Kadalie had come to rely more and more
on the power of militant rhetoric, and the threat of the strike
weapon. The CP, as we have seen, operating on the assessment of
the dynamic of the inexorable laws of capitalist development, saw
that militant rhetoric as the proof of an embryonic revolutionary
position. This assessment was fuelled by similar assessments
being made by the Comintern of the Kuomintang and of the British
TUC General Council, and then of the lefts on that Council. As
first the 1926 British general strike, and then the British
miners' strike, collapsed in defeatTthe political assessments
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made by the CPSA were shown to be incorrect. It is to be expected
that the false assessments and changing policy promoted
confusion amongst CF members. For others, like Kadalie, who were
neither committed to the Party nor to left-wing politics
generally, the process must have promoted a lack of confidence in
what the Communists were saying.
In this period, Kadalie was coming under the eye of different
elements within the international labour movement, as his power
and influence as a leader became more apparent. The Communist
movement internationally was caught up in its own misassessments
of the British TUC and accordingly being forced to turn against
what had previously been protrayed as its ally. These were
conditions in which Kadalie's suspicion of and opposition to the
la Guma report could be exploited by his anti-Communist
international contacts. On the basis of these different factors,
the hostility of Kadalie towards the Party was being developed.
But the Party was not prepared for the change.
As Kadalie came under the influence of the CP, as CP members
became more influential inside the ICU, the left turn by Kadalie,
the growing mass base of the ICU, and the increasingly militant
content of ICU policy, came to convince the CP that the ICU was a
mass organisation fitting the model of the Kuomintang in
important respects. The combination of these factors was to have
three major consequences. Firstly, there was a tendency for the
CF to operate in relation to Kadalie as if his radicalism was
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stable. For a period, the Party press carried no political
criticisms of his policies or his leadership1 31 Secondly, the CP
appeared to presume understanding and support from the leadership
of the ICU - which they tended to see as organically moving to
the left. Thirdly, the CP was not adequately prepared for
maintaining its position inside the ICU except through the
presumed support and understanding of its ally. In China, the
policy of the Comintern and its failure to understand the nature
of movements to the left by elements outside the working class
were to render the Chinese Party politically unarmed to foresee
and resist attacks against it by the Kuomintang132
 In South Africa,
similar limitations of perspective meant that the Party was not
politically prepared for attacks against it from the ICU
leadership.
In August 1926, SAW carried an article by L W Greene, attacking
"peculation" within the ICU133This led to a sharp clash with the
Natal leader, Champion, who attacked Greene for making his
complaints through the CP newspaper:
"Mr Greene might have assumed in his opinion that your paper is
the official organ of the ICU or in any way connected with the
ICU. I shall be much obliged if you will kindly tell Mr Greene
that the ICU has its own paper and does not want its reports
especially of that nature to be published in strange papers.434
There were initial public signs of a division between the
Communists and Kadalie in November 1926. An editorial in the SAW
criticises the ICU for acquiescing "in its National Secretary's,
Clements Kadalie's, reference to Communism as a second 'master'
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whom a member of the ICU 'cannot serve'"1.35
In December 1926, the Council of the ICU, meeting at Port
Elizabeth, resolved by six votes to five that: "No officer of the
ICU shall be a member of the Communist Party. ,136 Despite support
for Communist members from ICU branches, including those at Port
137	 138	 139Elizabeth, Vereeniging, and Johannesburg, the ICU leadership was
able to have a motion passed at the Annual Conference in April
1927 which ratified the Council decision and prohibited ICU
members from associating themselves in any way with the CPY/c)
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The fact of the connection which Kadalie had with the Second
International is not, at the same time, an explanation of why
Kadalie moved from his radicalism to some of the positions of the
Second International; or of why the leader of the ICU was free to
act as he did. As we have seen, the basis of the move to the left
by Kadalie lay in the mass radicalisation of the period, rather
than in his own political commitments or the depth of influence of
the CP. While the general groundswell of opposition amongst the
masses underlay Kadalie's movement to the left, it was not, in
itself, sufficient to consolidate that movement and maintain its
trajectory. The radicalism of the ICU reflected and promoted the
radicalisation of the masses. As mass opposition was drawn into
the ICU and articulated by the organisation, expectations were
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arousedUland a mood of confidence promoted. But, as part of the
same process, the supporters of the ICU came to believe that it
was the organisation which would provide 1iberation 1.4 The rhetoric
of ICU leaders included such promises, and aroused such
expectations 1.44The result was that the growing confidence of ICU
supporters came to rest, not in their own action and strength, but
in the leadership and in the organisation in themselves. The
tendency of the organisation to rely on the courts - a tendency
which was criticised by the CP after the expulsions - served to
promote the same consequence5
The mass base of the ICU was made up of often poorly organised
supporters, ranging from industrial workers in the urban areas to
peasants and chiefs in the countryside. There was a limited amount
of working class organisation within the ICU which could maintain
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a consistent upwards pressure; the structures of the organisation
provided very limited lines of communication between the rank and
file and the leadership; the link between the leaders and the
supporters of the organisation was, in many cases, provided
through rhetoric directed by the leaders to the supporters; the
processes of decision making were generally undemocratic, with
decisions being taken by leaders who were not subject to workers'
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control; and the build-up of opposition was not being expressed in
class action so powerful that it exerted a consistent pressure.
In explaining the conservative turn by the ICU leadership - and
the failure of the organisation to build a secure base in the
urban working class - analysts have pointed to the petty bourgeois
class origins of the organisation's leadershi 147p. Kadalie himself
pointed to the class differences within the organisation - at the
most basic level, between the mass of supporters and the petty
bourgeois leadership and officials:
"[Y]oung men, particularly teachers, flocked to the ICU, where
they occupied remunerative positions in various banch offices at
better wages than they received as teachers. In many cases .—
these young men were not all well-equipped or trained for
elementary trade union work. 048
In response to analysis which seeks to explain the developments in
the ICU in terms of the class origins of its leadership, Bradford
has argued:
"From all shades of left-wing opinion emerges a litany for the
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masses: trust not the petty bourgeoisie for the stench of their
privileged backgrounds rises from the graves of their class
suicides.—. By stamping a rigid, bourgeois identity on union
officials, the term obscures the extent to which they were drawn
from a racially oppressed grouping, which was highly fractured and
extremely susceptible to proletarianisati"
Bradford is right in insisting that the oppression of the black
petty bourgeoisie should not be overlooked. That oppression is one
of the factors which opens up the possibilities of an alliance
between black workers and the black petty bourgeoisie.
Furthermore, the immediate economic situation of elements within
the black petty bourgeoisie - their standard of living, their
conditions of life - may be indistinguishable in important aspects
from that of black workers. This is an additional factor opening
up the possibilities of a class alliance. The period under
discussion is one in which elements within both the working class
and the black petty bourgeoisie were radicalised. But class
differences do not disappear because there is an alliance, or the
possibility of an alliance, between different classes. Nor are
they removed when there is a radicalisation which spans elements
from different classes. Radicalism can and does have different
forms, different contents, and is created in different ways.
Peasants who physically resist encroachment on their land are
radical. If radicalism is measured along a static continuum, they
may appear to be more radical than workers who strike for higher
wages - and certainly appear to be more radical than workers who
are building elementary class organisations 1.5°The radicalism of a
petty bourgeois, who is resisting proletarianisation is different
130
to the radicalism of a worker who is resisting the conditions of
proletarian life. There are differences in the radicalism of
those who are opposing an increase in their rents, paid in
labour-time7and those who are resisting an increase in their
rents, paid in money. The radicalism with which a peasant resists
encroachment on his or her land is not identical with that of the
chief, resisting the same process. In some circumstances, these
different radi ca 1 i sms may be contained within a single
organisation, or movement of struggle, and articulated through
common demands. To a certain extent, that is what happened in the
case of the ICU. But, in the course of the class struggle, the
different radicalisms do not all generate the same demands, or
automatically fall into the same rhythm, leading in the same
direction, at the same pace. Without a conscious drawing together
of different radicalisms, the most that is possible is for these
to coincide at particular points. Even in a situation where
different class interests coincide, one set of interests will come
to dominate.
In the political dynamics of the situation, the ICU was faced with
a series of unresolved strategic and tactical questions: where
would the strength be built to win demands against employers and
the government? Behind what precise demands would that strength be
mobilised? What forms of action would be employed? What forms of
organisation would be built? These questions were partly obscured
in the period in which mass radicalism, and the radicalism within
the petty bourgeoisie, promoted the radicalism of the leaders of
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the ICU - and was reflected in the rapid growth of the
organisation. But they emerged very quickly when the organisation
could no longer simply rest on spontaneous and semi-spontaneous
militancy to drive it forward;152 when it was faced with the growing
threat of state attacksnd when its supporters came to expect
advances and improvements which the ICU leaders had promised.
These questions of strategy and tactics were beginning to come to
the fore by the end of 1926. They were partly taken up by the CP,
in la Guma's call for industrial unions 1.54 And they were reflected
also in the issues which the CF raised - the issues of democracy
and corruption within the organisation. Like some of the more
recent analyses of the ICU, however, the theoretical perspective
through which the CP viewed these issues actually served to
conflate different class interests behind an immediately shared
radicalism. When they initially made their criticisms within the
ICU, there was a tendency to do so in the belief that they could
be answered from the starting point of a basically common
radicalism.155
When they came to make the charge of corruption they were,
therefore, ill-equipped to understand how to take up that charge
inside the organisation. Corruption was not a deviation which went
against the left-wing politics of the ICU leaders - and which they
could be morally persuaded to reject. It was rather one of the
natural avenues pursued by mainly petty bourgeois leaders and
officials, some of whom had been pushed into left-wing positions
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on the groundswell of opposition developing all around them. It
reflects the disparate class forces inside-the ICU, and the
struggle against it could only have been definitively carried
through if the real basis of that left-wing movement - the
opposition of the urban and rural masses - had itself been
politically developed and more independently articulated. The
struggle against corruption would, in other words, have demanded
forms of mass democracy and control over leaders which cut off
avenues for petty bourgeois individualism. There is no doubt that
156there were petty bourgeois entrepreneurs who, facing the
formidable array of political and economic restrictions already
ahead of blacks and aspiring entrepreneurs, saw in the ICU a
vehicle providing access to funds and a level of political power
with which to pursue their own class interests. Inevitably, they
brought the threat and the reality of financial speculation and
corruption with them.157
The struggle against corruption inside the ICU was tied up with
the struggle to restrict and reject the pursuit of such class
interests. Inevitably, therefore, it involved the development of
the struggle for the independent class interests of the working
class to be asserted against those of petty bourgeois
entrepreneurs and individualist leaders. That struggle, in turn,
could not simply be taken up on the single issue of corruption,
but would have embraced the whole range of strategic and tactical
questions facing the organisation.	 There can be no doubt that
the corruption charges antagonised Kadalie and other leaders of
the ICU, and acted as an immediate pressure on Kadalie to break
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with the Communists and return to his former position. But the
fact that they could do so serves only to reveal the tentative
nature of his left turn, and highlights the limitations of the way
in which the Party had understood that political process. The fact
that Kadalie was relatively free to respond in the way he did
serves, in turn, to highlight the underlying weaknesses within the
ICU to which the CF had only just begun to respond.
The ICU was, in fact, a relatively unstructured mass movement, in
which different class interests were for a period camouflaged by a
groundswell of opposition which spanned the different classes. In
these conditions demagogues were able to articulate that
opposition, without consistently being under any organised
structure of democratic control. The leadership was relatively
free to respond to the course of events in whatever way it saw
fit. Viewed through an abstracted mechanistic schema, the
trajectory to the left came to be relied upon, even while the
conditions which were producing it could not in themselves sustain
it. During the course of 1926, the CP, reproducing the political
thinking of the Comintern, effectively followed behind the ICU
leadership, while at the same time antagonising that leadership
through apparent vacillation, abrupt changes of policy, and direct
criticisms. At the end of 1926, at a time when the ICU was
established as a growing mass organisation, Kadalie moved against
the CP.
Kadalie was relatively free to move from left to right in
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response to the forces operating upon him and his own assessment
of how best to secure his individualist goals. Those goals shifted
in turn, according to the forces which he perceived. Militant
rhetoric comes to be replaced by a commitment to
constitutionalism. His own explanation of why the Communists were
expelled indicates the abrupt reversal. The Communists, according
to Kadalie, had never lost an opportunity to oppose constitutional
methods; they "hoped to convert the organisation into a militant
force with a declared revolutionary policy"; "they were communists
not industrialists, and as soon as they evolved in the former
role, they ceased to be of use as industrialists" 1. 58 And, in later
years, the militant rhetoric returns, briefly, again. The same
approach, by other leaders of the ICU was, within a short period,
to be reflected in individualist power struggles and splits7as
the political developments within the ICU leadership took it
further and further away from the real course of developments
amongst the masses.
Simons describes a part of the CP reaction to the expulsions:
The Communists "reproached themselves for having failed to
anticipate and resist the expulsion from within the ICU. To avoid
offending it, they had refrained from organising trade unions on
their own account, or from conducting study classes while trying
to persuade it to undertake the work. „160
The expulsions forced the Party to move away from such a position.
Referring to the expulsion decisions the SAW wrote:
"The splitting of the native workers forces in the face of enemy
135
attack is one of the greatest pieces of treachery that could
possibly have been carried out. By their activities in this
respect, the ICU leaders have definitely branded themselves as
enemies of the working class movement. Not only have they smashed
all hope of an effective resistance being put up against the
rising tide of reaction, but they will have given a setback to
native trade unionism from which it will have much difficulty in
recovering. Truly they will have much to answer for in the future.
"The new situation that has arisen demands that every class
conscious worker gets immediately busy in exposing the reactionary
role of the capitalist good boys. The talk of representation at
Geneva and reliance upon law courts appeals must be shown up for
what they really are, viz: an attempt to side-track the demands of
the masses. In spite of the confusion that has been sown [sic]
broadcast, the ICU rank and file are still pressing for action to
be taken against the oppressive pass laws and Hertzog's proposed
native legislation. It is the duty of all militants in the ICU to
raise the rank and file to the realisation that their leaders are
deliberately shirking this fight:061
The relatively widespread opposition within the ICU to the
expulsions promoted the confidence of the Party. It also revealed
the extent to which the leadership could act without democratic
controls. SAW reported:
"In spite of the fact that every obstacle was put in his way by
local and national reactionaries our comrade [ Khai 1 e, at
Bloemfontein] succeeded in addressing a large meeting of native
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workers near Balko Location. They followed the remarks with great
interest but were prevented from passing a resolution owing to the
manoeuvres of the local secretary who succeeded in adjourning the
meeting • • • • ,,162
In Vereeniging, where a local branch of the ICU had passed a
resolution opposing the expulsions, the action of the leadership
was more drastic:
"Simply because the Vereeniging branch of the ICU protested
against the recent expulsion measures of the National Council at
Port Elizabeth, the ICU chiefs now refuse to consider it as being
a part of the ICU machinery, i.e. they have illegally declared it
expelled. "163
The Party initially campaigned for a special ICU conference, and
the unconditional reinstatement of the expelled Communists1.64That
campaign proved unsuccessful. As a result of the expulsions, 12
years after the ISL's first expression of commitment to the
organisation of black workers, the CP finally committed itself
fully in practice to the industrial organisation of black workers.
At the Party conference in January 1927, Makabeni, Khaile and
Thibedi were elected to the Central Committee, and the Party took
the decision to establish branches in black areas 1.65In the course
of that year, on the initiative of the Communists, several
industrial unions were formed. In March 1928, this process was
carried forward into the formation of the Federation of Non-
European Trade Unions (FNETU) 1.66 The President, Weinbren, the Vice-
President Kotane, and the General Secretary La Guma were all
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Communists. Thibedi, who had been a central figure in the initial
formation of the unions was one of the first - or the first -
black member of the ISL. At the end of 1928, FNETU had a
membership of 10,000 1.67Parallel to the growth of these new unions
was the development of a wave of industrial action. Lewis
characterises this as "a period of considerable industrial
militancy"1 (5.8These developments indicated that the movement, which
had generated the ICU and had been largely based in the rural
areas, was set to be taken onto a new level by the growing level
of organisation and willingness to take class action amongst
urban, industrial black workers.
The movement to the right of the leadership of the ICU added two
new factors to those operating within the workers movement -
confusion, as the militant leaders of yesterday denounced
militancy; and new divisions, which could only compound the
confusion. Nonetheless, the groundswell of opposition, reflected
in the development of the ICU as a mass organisation and in the
move to the left of its leadership, did not disappear when that
leadership moved again to the right. The combativity
spontaneously developing amongst layers of workers, and in part
reflected in the ICU and the new developments amongst urban
workers, created a more substantial basis for the strengthening of
the workers' movement and with it, the strengthening of the CP.
In the conditions imposed on the CP after the expulsions, the
position of "educate and organise" is no longer being left at the
level of general propaganda, or being made dependent on the
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willingness of other leaders to agree to the orientation; the
Party takes the initiative in directly launching concrete measures
aimed at building the organisation of black workers on ther
shopfloor. In the partial vacuum left both by the political turn
of the ICU leaders and the relative lack of a rank and file
organised structure, the combativity of groups of black workers
was to lead them to turn directly to the CP to provide the means
whereby to defend themselves and pursue their perceived class
needs. This receptivity created a response to the CP which was far
169more widespread than the Party appeared initially to expect. And
with that response came the growing pressure on the Party to
develop a programme which could speak directly to the immediate
situations of the different groups of workers who were turning to
it. There was also a development of the belief that, rather than
simply act as a pressure group in relation to other organisations,
the Party should build its own independent base amongst black
workers.
The development of an increasingly concrete orientation to black
workers was not the only position which existed in the Party at
this time. Nor, in the initial stages of the development of that
orientation, did it lead to a definitive and systematic challenge
to the overall abstract theoretical perspective of the Party. For
some in the Party, aspects of the white labour tradition still
persisted. In 1927, Andrews was the co-signatory (with Stuart) of
a report of the SATUC which rejected a request for affiliation
from the ICU on the grounds that white workers would feel swamped,
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that disaffiliations would probably follow, and that the ICU would
therefore remain isolated. In 1926, when the ICU was considering
applying for affiliation7Andrews explained the issue in this way:
"Dealing with the proposed affiliation of the ICU to the SATUC,
the speaker (Andrews) said the time was not yet ripe for such
affiliation. Unfortunately most of the white unions still halted
between a 'white collar' policy and a truly working class policy.
Their colour prejudice was —. in the way of unity.On
There are no indications that his position on the issue was
challenged inside the Party. It was in fact taken further by
Weinbren who was at that time a Communist member of the TUC
executive. "We were all scared that he would swamp us —. so we
rejected the application."172
Communists had been forced to the conclusion that Kadalie's
radicalism could not really be trusted and was not really
substantive. But that conclusion, derived from experience, was not
carried through into a challenge to the whole perspective through
which developments in the ICU had been understood. As developments
were to show, the same tendency to respond to the appearance of
political processes was to lead some Communists to an orientation
away from the working class, to the apparently more radical petty
bourgeoisie and peasantry. And, within a short period, the Party
came to see in Gumede, the new ANC President, the revolutionary
ally which they had seen in Kadalie.
The ANC met in conference in January 1926, shortly after the
speech in which Hertzog proposed his segregation Bills. The
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conference, at which Kadalie took an active part, decided to
launch a massive campaign, in alliance with the ICU, against the
Hertzog Bills113 The campaign did not materialise. In the face of
the threat of the Bills, and the failure of the existing
leadership to take up the campaign, a clear division developed
within the ANC, reflecting the division within the petty
bourgeoisie about how to approach the Bills1.74 A "more activist
group" developed, and succeeded in having Gumede elected as
President in June 1927. A letter from Gumede to "all leaders of
the African people" makes clear his initial moderation:
"The task before me is great, and I feel I cannot perform it
successfully without the co-operation of, and active support of,
all leaders of the race.—. I know, there are two wings to the
Bantu movement for political and economic emancipation from the
tyranny of European rule, the conservative and the radical. These
wings are absolutely necessary for our progress.—. Just as a bird
must have both wings for successful flight, so must any movement
have the conservative and radical wings—.."175
Shortly after this letter, which concluded with an appeal for
unity, Gumede attended the celebrations of the October Revolution
in MoscowY 6 He had previously attended the Brussels Founding
Conference of the League against Imperialism at the beginning of
1927.177
 (The CP had struggled unsuccessfully , before the
expulsions, to get the ICU to send a delegate to that conference.P
After these visits, at a time when rising militancy in Natal was
being expressed in the growth there of the ICU, Gumede moved close
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to the CP, praising its policies. On his return from Brussels he
said:
"Before I went —. the capitalist press had made me frightened of
Bolsheviks, but now I know of the magnificent sacrifices they are
making on behalf of the suffering people of the world. Do not be
afraid of Communists, —. for I am convinced they are your true
friends and helpers.
"All sections of the people of Africa must unite to give battle to
imperialism. —. There are two alternatives —., either they must
unite with imperialism which inflicted the terrible suffering on
them or else they would unite with the only country in the world
where freedom existed, and that country is workers' Russia."179
"SAW regarded Gumede's visit to the Soviet Union as an historical
breakthrough. It declared:
"The establishment of contact between Soviet Russia and the
African National Congress through the visit of President-General
Gumede and Cape Provincial Secretary La Guma constitutes a
manifestation of the revolutionising of the oppressed masses of
,180South Africa.
In the case of the shift to Gumede, the CP was once again
following almost exactly the developments of the political line of
the Comintern, from which source theorisations were derived for
the local shift. In this case, after the attacks against the
Communists which destroyed the alliance with Chiang Kai Shek, the
Comintern made a switch in alliance from Chiang to Wang Chin Wei j 81
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a switch which was reported in the SAW and followed inside the
CPSAT2 In exactly the same period, a part of the response of the CP
to the ICU expulsions was to shift personnel and political
attention to the ANC. Gumede's move to the left, occurring in the
face of escalating state threats and the continuing opposition
developing amongst the masses, was explained "as a manifestation
of the revolutionising of the oppressed masses". As there had been
a partial validity in the CP's recognition that Kadalie was "not a
J H Thomas type of union leader", so there was a partial validity
in the way in which the Party understood Gumede's radicalisation.
There was a radicalisation (not revolutionising, as the CP had
claimed) of "the oppressed masses", although by 1928, a part of
the groundswell of opposition which had generated the ICU had
subsided. But the radicalisation in which Gumede was most
centrally involved was not that of the masses - but that of a
section of the black petty bourgeoisie, responding to the Hertzog
Bills. As will be discussed further below, at the time of Gumede's
and La Guma's second visit to the Soviet Union, the policy of the
Comintern asserted the revolutionary role of the peasantry lP It
also reflected the belief that the "revolutionising of the masses"
was a sufficient condition for a popular frontist alliance to be
maintained on a revolutionary course 84 The policy of the Comintern
was proven to be wrong by the course of events, in each case. But
it was a policy which was promoted amongst elements within the
CPSA - from Comintern policy on China, and through la Guma's visit
to the Soviet Union.
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This reliance upon the unfolding of inexorable laws through which
oppressed blacks - of whatever class - would be "revolutionised"
was to find its theoretical legitimation in the trans-class
alliances and reliance upon leadership from outside the working
class which was being put forward by the Comintern through the
course of 1927, and which was the political approach pursued by
the League against Imperialism 85 It was this political orientation
which la Guma was to bring back from Brussels and Moscow to a CP
whose own method had already rendered it receptive to the
political practice emerging out of that political approach.
During 1927, la Guma carried back from the Soviet Union the basis
of the Comintern resolution relating to South Africa which was to
be debated at the 1928 Comintern Congress 15 That resolution was
brought back to a Party in which the progressive tendency remained
a central but relatively undeveloped force. It was weakened by the
theoretical perspective which it generally shared with the rest of
the Party, and by the abstracted idealism and empiricist responses
which this entailed. Practical experience of work amongst black
workers was still relatively limited; the development of the
unions which were to form FNETU had only recently begun. An
opposing tendency, responding on the basis of essentially the same
method to the political failures of the CP, and to visible
developments in the broader political situation, had come to
identify the way forward as lying in a class-alliance between
blacks. There was not necessarily a contradiction between these
two tendencies. But, in the actual situation, they were divided by
the differing weights which they attached to the different classes
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of oppressed blacks, and over the question of whether working
class leadership was necessary. The continuing adherence of
elements within the CP leadership to a conception of the white
workers as constituting the core of the vanguard had strengthened
an empiricist reaction amongst sections of the CP against the
conception, not merely of white workers, but of the working class
per se, as the vanguard. The theorisation of this position had
already partly been provided by the position of the Comintern on
China and on the anti-colonial struggle in general.
During the course of 1927, the CP had been pressured by events
into a situation in which it was more actively operating in terms
of its long declared commitment to "educate, organise and agitate"
directly in relation to black workers. With that development came
a growing pressure on the Party to develop a more concrete
political programme, and a more comprehensive analysis of the
society around it. The way in which the Party responded in this
situation came to be strongly influenced, and then determined, by
the policies of the Comintern.
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The basis of the Black Republic programme was agreed upon at
three meetings between la Guma and representatives of the
Comintern:
- The founding conference of the League against Imperialism and
for National Independence held in Brussels, 10 - 15 February,
1927;
- La Guma's visit to Moscow after the conference, when he met
Bukharin;
- La Guma's visit to Moscow as the CPSA representative to the
tenth anniversary celebrations of the October revolution
(September 1927 to early 1928).
For the Comintern, the period under discussion was dominated by
the developing economic problems inside the Soviet Union, the
political challenge from the Left Opposition inside the Soviet
Union and internationally, the developments in China, and the
"shift of the economic centre of the world to the USA"187The
response of the Soviet leadership and the Executive Committee of
the Comintern (ECCI) to each of these factors was to play an
important role in the development of the programme for South
Africa.
Given the assessment which was now being made of the United
States, the policy adopted by the Comintern to the US CP was a
particularly important part of Comintern policy overall. Inside
the US Party, Lovestone, the leader of the faction which
dominated the Party until the 6th Congress, had specifically
argued against the need for any particular approach or specific
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programmatic demands aimed at blacks in the USA.188 There were
elements inside the Party who, partly as a reaction to the
failure of the Lovestone leadership to take up the question, were
receptive to approaching it as a national problem, the solution
to which lay in a class alliance of blacks, struggling for
national independence. At the 6th Congress, this position was
most clearly represented by Ford, a strong partisan of the Foster
faction 189
The call for an independent negro republic provided Stalin with a
politically acceptable issue and solution around which to build
links with the faction inside the Party which he had already
targetted as his chief ally. The political perspective in terms
of which that call was being made inside the US coincided with
the class alliance parties and policies which were being pursued
as strategy by the Comintern at that stage. The political basis
for this had already been laid in the Comintern policy for the
Chinese CP.
As we have seen, in accordance with the policy of the Comintern,
the Chinese CP was itself inside a class alliance bloc, on
conditions laid down by its bourgeois nationalist leadership
after the coup under Chiang Kai Shek on 20 March 1926. In line
with the policy of the Comintern, the Chinese CP had maintained
support for a class alliance under the bourgeois nationalists,
persisting with the policy of remaining within the Kuomintang,
under conditions laid down by the bourgeois leadership, even
after the attacks against the CPTTowards the end of 1927, the
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Chinese CP followed the Comintern in an abrupt change of policy,
and launched a series of adventurist offensives in key towns, all
of which ended in defeats. The result was that the Chinese CP was
greatly weakened in the urban areas, but continued to expand in
the rural areas. This promoted an idealisation of the peasantry
as a substitute vanguard for the working class 191- a position whose
basis had already been laid in the overall popular frontist
approach. Both the denial of the specific class interests of the
working class in favour of cross-class alliances under the
nationalist petty bourgeoisie (or even bourgeoisie) and the
idealisation of the peasantry - were to be reflected in versions
of the South African programme, the content of which was being
finalised at that time.
At the end of 1927, the workers in the industrial centres of the
Soviet Union were facing the effects of a kulak grain blockade
which threatened to result in widespread famine, and provoke
widespread political opposition 1.92 After years of Bukharin's
"tortoise tempo" during which the very existence of the kulaks
had been denied, government officials now began to call for
extraordinary measures, to liquidate them as a class. Under
instructions from Stalin, there was a sharp and dramatic about
turn of policy by the Soviet government. From a period in which
there had been adaptations to the kulaks, there was now a policy
of forced collectivisation, which proceeded far more rapidly even
than the initial targets
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At the time of the 6th Congress, this ultra-left policy had
already been embarked upon. Facing acute pressure because of the
potential growth of working class opposition and the opposition
being articulated by the Left Opposition, it is quite clear that
Stalin intended to use the 6th Congress as a stage for the "final
onslaught" against the Left Opposition. The intention was to use
the Congress to promote the consolidation of Communist Parties
internationally which were loyal and disciplined supporters of
whatever line the Soviet leadership decided. As the example of
the US CP has illustrated, the task of securing such parties had
already begun, as early as the Brussels Conference, by the
establishment of links with, and the strengthening of, factions
which would later, it was hoped, form leaderships loyal to
Stalin.
As we have seen, while this attempt was going on the Soviet
leadership sharply changed policy, in accordance with its own
perception of how best to secure its position. Developments in
China, viewed through a popular frontist perspective, promoted an
idealisation of the peasantry; but the internal needs of the
Soviet bureaucracy led to the policy of liquidation of the kulaks
very soon after. Behind these shifts there was the political
continuity of the bureaucracy's perception of its own interests.
For Communists in other countries, where the pressure of
maintaining the position of the Soviet leadership was not so
immediate, the shifts caused some confusion. For the meantime,
even on the basis of shifting policy, there was a consistent
willingness, on the part of the Soviet leadership, to promote
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popular fronts in the struggle against imperialism. And there was
the consistent willingness to use that position as the basis for
consolidating the links around which the Soviet leadership aimed
to secure international sections which would accept, as their
political priority, the policies dictated by the Soviet
leadership's perception of its own interests.
The Brussels Conference and subsequent meetings with la Guma in
the Soviet Union provided Stalin, through his representatives,
with the opportunity to develop such a faction inside South
Africa. The Woltons became the first Comintern representatives
inside South Africa. The method which the S A Party had developed
meant that la Guma and others were extremely receptive to aspects
of the political line which the Comintern was promoting at the
time. We have seen how the Party followed the political line of
the Comintern in its support for the leadership of the ICU, and
then in its shift to support for Gumede. We have seen also how
practical experience was forcing the Party to confront aspects of
the political situation in a way which its traditional method had
not equipped it to do.
That same method, however, was clearly expressed in la Guma's
receptivity to the programme developed for S A by the Comintern.
Travelling with Gumede both to the Brussels Conference and to the
Soviet Union, la Guma saw, at first hand, what the Party had
theorised as "a manifestation of the revolutionising of the
masses". On the one hand, the growth of the ICU and the
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continuing militancy, especially obvious in the rural and semi-
rural areas, was clearly visible. On the other, la Guma could see
the persistent opposition of the organisations of white workers
to any form of class unity with blacks and the retreat from
militancy by white workers. Finally, la Guma was faced with a
Party leadership, which, while emphasising the need to organise
black workers, still had a tendency to conceive of the white
workers (the best organised) as the vanguard 194
 And while
continuing to emphasise the crucial role of the white worker, the
Party was still not operating on the basis of a clear programme
or strategy which connected concretely with the distinctive
social, political and economic oppression which affected the
black petty bourgeoisie as well as black workers. Reacting to
this situation in terms of the empiricist method of the Party, la
Guma turned away from a conception of the vanguard role and
independent interests of the working class, and substituted for
that the oppressed black people. The general political positions
of the Comintern at the time provided both a "theoretical
explanation", and an impetus for that substitution. The political
tension which existed within the Party as reflected in la Guma's
position could, in turn, be exploited by the Stalinist leadership
of the Comintern, which could thereby gain the type of link which
it was at that stage seeking to promote with all parties. Far
from "combining a firm adherence to Marxist theory with a
passionate belief in national liberation"1 95 1a Guma's political
position reflected the workings of the method of the Party, the
workings of abstract theory, in terms of which immediate
empiricist responses to surface appearances came to be theorised,
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ex post facto, by hypostatised concepts. In the process, the
political independence of the working class - the struggle to
articulate and pursue the specific class interests of workers -
was surrendered, to the popular frontist alliance of oppressed
black people. As la Guman made clear, the issue was not one of
class alliance within which working class interests would be
expressed. It was rather one of class alliance in which which
specifically working class interests did not have to be
expressed.
Simons quotes la Guma as arguing: "To be revolutionary, a
national movement in conditions of an Imperialist yoke need not
necessarily be composed of proletarian elements, or have a
revolutionary or republican programme, or a democratic base"1.96The
Kuomintang had met these criteria perfectly; the CPSA as a whole
had followed the line of the Comintern towards China, and the
commitment to develop such a national movement was clearly held
by an influential group within the CPSA.
When it came, however, to the full implementation of that line in
South Africa, there was resistance from inside the Party. In
December 1927, la Guma while in the Soviet Union submitted a
report to the ECCI informing them that "the resolution on South
Africa submitted by the ECCI has not received the approval of the
Central Executive of the Party".197 At approximately the same time,
it was being decided at the annual conference of the CPSA that
the Central Executive should discuss the resolution with la Guma
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(and Gumede who was also in the Soviet Union) on their return
from the Soviet Union, before submitting any report to the ECCl298
Roux has argued that the new programme was imposed on the CPSA
from outside199 Simons points out that a representative of the S A
Party was involved in the initial drafting of the resolution.
They also point out that Roux, while in the YCL, had supported
the submission of a dispute within that organisation to the
Cominternin the actual chronology of events, and the context in
which they occurred, there can be little doubt that the programme
was drafted by officials of the Comintern, in consultation with
La Guma. Bunting opposed the choice of la Guma as the CPSA
representative to the October Revolution celebrationd.m Apart from
the fact that this meant la Guma's second visit within a matter
of months, it is likely that Bunting was opposed to sending a
representative who did not support the position of the majority
of the S A Party leadership. The argument between Roux and
Simons raises the general issue of the relationship of a national
party to the International of which it is a part. Roux's position
expresses a hostility to a democratic centralist link; Simons
responds by pointing to the involvement of la Guma in the
development of the programme as proof of a "national input". Both
analysts overlook a crucial part of the dynamic in the situation.
Simons, by assuming the validity of the programme, removes the
necessity of investigating the process by which it was agreed
within the CPSA, and the impact of that process. Roux, by his
hostility to an international democratic centralism, obscures the
receptivity to the Comintern programme amongst elements within
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the CPSA, the process by which that receptivity developed, and
the limitations of the opposition to the new programme.
The Native Republic thesis was presented finally through several
different documents - the Comintern's programme for South Africa,
adopted at the 6th Congress;202the preamble to the general
programme adopted at the same Congressthe ECCI Resolution on
the Negro Question;204the ECCI Resolution on the South African
Question; 20 nd the programme of the CPSA, adopted in 1929 ("the
programme").206
 Three distinctive political orientations are
reflected in these different documents:
- the popular frontist alliance and idealisation of the
peasantry;
- an orthodox commitment to the leadership of the working class;
- the continuing belief amongst elements in the CPSA that the
white workers would cast aside their race prejudices because of
inexorable economic laws, and play a vanguard role.
There were clear contradictions between these different
approaches; this was to be expected because, in the course of the
preparation of the programme, the Comintern changed political
line sharply; and there were continuing political differences
contained within the Party itself.
The idealisation of the peasantry is most strongly reflected in
the programme adopted by the CPSA. Clearly revealing the
influence of la Guma and the political line of the Comintern at
the end of 1927, the programme, referring to the establishment of
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socialism argues that "this can only be accomplished under the
leadership of the United Workers and Peasants of town and
country", and further refers to "the agrarian masses who
constitute the great bulk, and potentially owing to land hunger,
perhaps the most revolutionary section of the oppressed race"'
The politics behind this formulation differs from that of the
ECCI Resolution on the South African Question, which, while
focussing heavily on the agrarian questioe 8 includes a specific
reference to the leadership role of the working class: "The black
peasantry constitutes the basic moving force of the revolution,
in alliance with and under the leadership of the working class."209
In a section of the CPSA programme which appears to be written in
the usually unmistakeable style of Bunting, the inexorable laws
making for unity of the working class are invoked, within the
framework laid down by the 6th Congress:
"As for the white working class and peasantry, they will not
forever be content with a position of tinsel 'aristocracy', whose
material advantages are continually dwindling, or with the venal
role of mere policemen, watchdog and bully for the master class
over the black slaves. Today there is almost as much poverty and
hopelessness to be found among large strata of whites as among
blacks. 'Poor whites' are already a 'depressed class' and many
white proletarians tend to become declassed or excluded as
'redundant' from the working class proper.—. At the same time,
white workers are beginning to realise the need of joint action
with blacks if they are ever to win in a first class 'forward
movement', which clearly implies that if the black is not to scab
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on the white, his demands must be espoused by the white. And
,210
after all, the whites are only a small part of the proletariat.
With the different priorities and orientations contained in the
various policy documents, and given the differences already
existing inside the Party, there were not only different
interpretations, but there was also considerable confusion inside
the CPSA as to what precisely the Native Republic meant. Was the
Native Republic a bourgeois democracy, a workers' state, a
workers' and peasants' state, a stage to one or other of them,
and if so, which stage, on the road to which form of government
and state?
The slogan was introduced at a public meeting in Johannesburg
thus: "A South African Native Republic is a stage towards a
workers and peasants government with full protection and equal
rights for all minorities."AW explained that: "A Black Republic
means real democracy and majority rule in South Africa. 412 In the
Comintern resolution, the Native Republic is described as "a
F13
stage towards a workers' and peasants' government.
,
 These
formulations clearly mean a democratic revolution, as a distinct
stage, to be followed by a socialist revolution. Even on the
basis of an unambiguous stages approach, the programme was still
unclear. As Legassick points out "this programme left unclear
precisely who was to achieve the democratic revolution and how.
White and black workers through a general strike? Or, if the non-
white bourgeoisie or intellectuals or peasants were to be
156
included, what was to be their strategic role?"214
In the CPSA programme, there is a clear st atement of a stages
approach: "This double burden of exploitation carried by the
native masses calls for a democratic revolution.... Such a
revolution does not by itself mean the final liberation of the
broad masses of South Africa. The stage remains to be traversed
to the final abolition of exploitation and domination of class by
gis
class.—. But the programme also argued that "the conception
and realisation of native rule merges into that of the workers
and peasants republic, non imperialist, non capitalist, non
racialist, and in effect Socialist:,2
The report of the 7th Conference of the CP, at which the Native
Republic programme was adopted, reveals the extent of that
confusion:
"The new Party programme was debated for over a full day. The
point that raised most discussion was the 'native republic
slogan'. The Chairman [Bunting] ruled that any motions involving
its rejection or modification were out of order under the CI
statutes, but welcomed discussion tending towards its explanation
[sic]. In the result, it was understood that it implied [sic], by
whatever [sic] stages, a workers and peasants republic, but [sic]
with the necessary stress on its overwhelming native character
for practically all natives are workers and peasants, and again,
probably [sic] only a workers and peasants victory can achieve
such a republic:217
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At the time that the Native Republic conception was first
introduced into South Africa, its political meaning was clearly
taken to be that which la Guma attributed to it - a bourgeois
democracy, with black majority rule. In the struggle for that
bourgeois democracy, the peasantry would be the leading force of
a national movement which would include blacks of all classes,
including the bourgeoisie. It was to this interpretation that the
opposition from within the CP was directed. That opposition, of
which Bunting was the leading spokesperson, reflected both the
development, and the limitations of the development, of a more
concrete orientation to black workers from within the Party?18
The opposition stood against the clear codification of an
orientation away from the working class. Bunting argued:
"[T]he draft programme of the Communist International says there
are two main revolutionary forces: the 'proletariat' in the
countries at home and the 'masses' in the colonies. I beg to
protest against this bald distinction. Our workers are not ONLY
mere 'masses', they are as truly proletarian as any in the
world.... There is no reference in the draft programme or in
Comrade Bukharin's speech to the colonial proletariat as such, to
the CLASS power of these colonial workers: as a class they are
relegated to inactivity."219
This opposition was based, in part, on the developments in terms
of which a more concrete and active turn to the organisation of
black workers was finally being put into practice. But it was
158
weakened by its idealised conception of a "pure" working class
solidarity and unity, and by its failure to come to grips with
the oppression of the black petty bourgeoisie. The extent to
which the Party had actually carried through an orientation to
the black workers was limited. And, for some elements within the
Party who had an orientation to workers, that orientation
represented a continuation of aspects of the white labour
tradition. The opposition was further weakened by the empiricist
nature of such an orientation as reflected, for example, in the
adaptation to the political leadership of the 1922 strike. The
method of the Party had led to these results. It had also
promoted the tendency within the Party to turn to radical
elements within the petty bourgeoisie, without understanding the
dynamics of that radicalisation. It was now leading elements
within the Party to turn away from the obvious and persistent
racism of the organisations of the white workers, and to the
overt militancy of blacks, especially amongst the rural masses
and oppressed petty bourgeoisie. There thus existed a strong
receptivity, amongst a part of the Party, to the initial
interpretation of the Black Republic Programme, promoted by la
Guma. It provided a formalised, theorised codification of an
orientation which had already begun to be developed.
To be successful, the opposition in the Party could not simply
take up the immediate content of the programme. They had to take
up the method, which was at the basis of the receptivity of the
rest of the Party to that programme. The opposition could not
seriously undertake that task, however, for they operated with
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basically the same method. Despite this, there were major
pressures operating on the opposition to promote their position:
the impact of the expulsions from the ICU; the extent to which
the combativity of the working class persisted and was being led
onto a new level by the growing organisation and action of urban
workers; the receptivity which workers showed when the politics
of the CP was brought to them directly, and an attempt made to
build an organised rank and file around those politics. Despite
the weak and confused way in which the opposition argued their
position, it reflected these pressures. The "Buntingites" were
not left with time, however, for us to know how their response to
these pressures would have developed. Just as the long-held
propaganda position of organising black workers was to be
directly implemented, the developments in the Comintern, which
had already guided the politics of the Party, took over. Because
of their loyalty, but primarily because of the fact that they had
not yet developed a clear and consistent programme for work
amongst black workers, or the method with which to pursue it, the
Bunting opposition yielded to the position of the Comintern. In
the discussion around the Comintern resolution, Bunting relied on
experience, the inexorable processes of history, and the eventual
invoking of Lenin. But none of these things had yet produced a
consistent, coherent programme and practice amongst black
workers; nor had it destroyed the empiricism and subjection to
abstract theory. Given that, even less could the opposition carry
through a challenge to the Comintern. The Comintern could exploit
the historic subjection to abstract theory of the CPSA to have
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its position accepted.
The political method of the CP had led from syndicalism, to
tailing the political leadership of the 1922 strike, to support
for the popular front beween the NP and the LP, to support for
Kadalie, to support for Gumede. In that process, the progressive
tendency within the Party emerged and developed; it was, however,
weakened by the general response of the Party to the 1922 strike
and the ensuing support for the Pact; it re-emerged, more
powerfully, and was set, on the very tentative foundations which
had been built, to continue its developments under the pressure
of the developing workers' movement, in which Communists were
increasingly centrally located. It was at this point that the
policy of the Comintern came to be adopted by the CPSA, in away
which cut across the developments which were being made.
A textual analysis of different documents in which the Native
Republic Programme was put forward reveals significant
differences of emphasis and orientation of the type that we have
seen. What was to become more important was the changing meaning
and differing interpretations of what was, in large part, the
same text. While la Guma's conception of the Black Republic had
been expressed in the programme adopted by the Party, he was very
soon to have the ground swept from beneath him. Not longer after
la Guma returned to South Africa as the proponent of the full
popular frontist politics of the Comintern, a political about-
turn in the Soviet leadership was giving rise to the politics of
"the third period"220
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CHAPTER THREE
1929 - 1935
The upsurge of struggle between 1918 and 1920 had been led by the
urban black workers and miners. The ICU had emerged out of that
upsurge. After a peak had been reached, in the miners' strike of
1920, it was primarily in the rural areas that the movement most
actively developed. In 1927 and 1928 the movement of opposition
which had generated the massive growth of the ICU began to be
lifted onto a new level, even as the ICU began to decline. This
was reflected in the growth of industrial unions, and the limited
wave of strike action which we have already noted. In the period
under consideration, the depth of combativity amongst urban
workers came to be reflected also in the development of
relatively widespread community struggles.
By the late 1920's, there had been a significant expansion of the
manufacturing sector. Lewis quotes the Labour Department's
journal as stating:
"South Africa is in the midst of a far-reaching economic
revolution, the keynote of which is the efflorescence of a great
variety of secondary industries and the progressive
industrialisation of large sections of the population."'
In 1929, the world was plunged into an international economic
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crisis, part of the impact of which was to interrupt this process
of manufacturing expansion in South Africa. According to
Houghton, many "industrial concerns were hit by the great
depression, and although the number of establishments increased
slightly between 1930 and 1933, the total employment, value of
gross output and net output all declined." 2 Houghton argues that
by 1933, the SA economy was emerging from that crisis and
entering into a period of sustained industrial expansion.
"[M]anufacturing industry made great forward strides between 1933
and 1939.— During the six-year period, the value of both gross
and net output more than doubled and the total labour force
increased by 77%.... Part of this increase represented a cyclical
recovery from the depth of the depression. But notwithstanding,
there was a general advance of manufacturing industry during the
period.°
Two recent studies both make the point that the impact of the
world capitalist crisis on SA was "dramatic and harsh though
uneven" in its impact "on the producing classes" 4. The need to
make such a point is in part created by the work of the
fractionalists,5 which has dominated analysis of the period.
Because of the fractionalists' theoretical perspective, the
impact of the depression was understood primarily in terms of the
"differential impact of the Depression on different capitals".6
The period of the international capitalist crisis was a period of
intensified class struggle inside South Africa. In conditions of
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economic crisis, the state was driven to make attacks against the
working class - and forced to seek to create the political
conditions in which those attacks could be carried through. In
the period under consideration, this meant that the state was
driven to attack the developing movement of opposition,
spearheaded by black urban workers. An investigation of the
dynamics of class relations in this period demands consideration
of three factors which have been almost completely ignored by the
fractionalists: the resistance by black workers to the attacks
against them; the growing opposition amongst a layer of white
workers and poor petty bourgeoisie against the conditions of life
imposed on them by the capitalist crisis; and the policies
pursued by the organisations of the working class.
In the 1929 elections, the Nationalists won an absolute majority
for the first time. A divided LP had its Parliamentary
representation cut from 18 to 4, with those 4 being divided into
two factions: The division in the LP, between the Councillites,
led by Madeley, and the Creswellites, emerged at the 1928 Party
conference, and was deepened in the run-up to the 1929 electionP
An immediate factor precipitating the split within the Party was
the decision by Hertzog to remove Made ley from the Cabinet. The
immediate reason for this was government anger at Madeley's
decision to meet a joint ICU/TUC delegation? The effect of it was
to deepen a division within the LP which was to the Nationalists'
advantage. But there was no substantive difference of principle
between the segregationist positions of either of the wings of
the LP. Two processes combined to create the basis for a
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political crisis within the LP:- changes in the composition of
the white working class, and a growth of political
dissatisfaction with the role of the LP in government. The way in
which the LP leadership responded to these processes created the
split within the party.
Lewis, following an argument put forward by Davies, has explained
the division in terms of "sectional interests among white
workers" 1.0 The argument points to a part of the basis for the
crisis in the LP. Changes in the process of production laid the
basis upon which sectional divisions within the working class
could arise. Lewis identifies a process of dilution and
deskilling; 11 O'Meara argues that the "artisan/unskilled division
of labour was increasingly replaced by that of semi-skilled
operatives working machines"f Coupled with this change, a
consistent movement to the towns of Afrikaners meant a process of
change in the social composition of the white working c1ass1.3
Lacking industrial skills, and with access to training and
apprenticeships often effectively barred, Afrikaans workers were
forced into unskilled jobs, often in government service. The
partial exception to this was on the mines. In 1926, Afrikaners
made up 60% of unskilled white workers, 53% of white miners, and
42% of whites on the Railways, but only 32% of bricklayers, 18%
of carpenters, and 10% of fitters in the urban areas /.4 For such
workers, the LP was seen as the Party of the sectionalist craft
unions, dominated by English-speaking and in many cases British-
born leaders, who used racist criteria and links with employers
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to keep the "best" jobs closed to Afrikaners. For a growing
number of white workers, the LP was in no sense an automatic
political home. These ongoing processes of change within the
white working class meant that there was a growing challenge for
the LP from within the white working class - the traditional core
of its electoral support. But it would be wrong to see the
divison within the Party as reflecting an attempt by any section
of the Party leadership to directly and consciously meet that
challenge. Nor would it be correct to see in this process of
change within the white working class the full basis of the
division within the LP. In addition to the Party's failure to
respond to the social changes within the white working class, was
its political inability to respond to the growing disenchantment
of white workers with its role in government.
The opposition to the Pact from within the LP has already been
mentioned. Opposition from within the Party to the Pact was to
continue. Towards the end of 1926, Forward wrote:
"It is no secret that .—. dissatisfaction with the pact
government exists amongst the rank and file of the L.P. The chief
reason for this is the failure to make industrial matters of the
first importance instead of useless and contentious questions
such as the Flag Bill, the Sedition Bill etc.'15
Reporting on the municipal elections in which the LP vote
dropped, Forward argued:
"Labour for the past 12 months has been playing at politics and
neglecting the needs of the working class in particular and the
whole community in general.'16
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The extent to which any solutions offered by Forward would have
served the interests of the working class is to be doubted. But
it serves to reveal growing disillusionment with the LP from its
own supporters and white workers generally. That disillusionment
- revealed only two years into the first term of the Pact - was
to grow as the economic crisis developed. Notwithstanding the
promises of the Pact, the Carnegie Comission found, in a survey
conducted in 1929/1930, that 17,5% of all white families with
children at school were "very poor". On the basis of these
findings, the projected figure for the country as a whole was
"more than 300,000 (as a conservative estimate) of the white
population [who] were "very poor". As the Commission pointed out,
these figures were based on findings " before the effects of the
present depression were so noticeable. &7 The centrepiece of LP
policy - the "civilised level" 18 provided an extremely low wage
level, and the employment measures taken by the government did
not remove the problem of growing unemployment? The LP's
participation within the Pact had removed any clear separate
political identity from the Party. Through that process, it
brught into question the continued separate organisational
existence of the Party. A combination of growing disenchantment
amongst white workers and the social changes changes within the
white working class created a growing political challenge for the
LP leadership. The leadership responded to this situation with a
repetition of existing political positions, combined with
confusion and opportunism. The result was a division within the
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Party which served, in turn, to accelerate the turn by white
workers away from it.
Before the election, both wings of the LP indicated their
willingness to continue with the PactT and their electoral
propaganda represented a continuation of racist popular frontism.
Hertzog entered the 1929 election with an agreement with
Creswell, and retained Creswell in the new Cabinetr This
confirmed that ruling class responses to the developing
capitalist crisis would be delimited by the framework imposed by
the form of popular front through which capitalist rule was then
organised. But behind the electoral arithmetic and cabinet
composition was an underlying weakness in the cohesiveness of the
governing popular front.
Davies, et al have argued that, from the time of the 1928 split
in the LP, national capital was in alliance with only a fraction
of the white new petty bourgeoisie. "A considerable portion of
the rest of the new petty bourgeoisie and white working class
were however being dominated by a racist and parliamentary
cretinist ideology - still in the form of the supportative class
- though to the form of the state rather than to national capital
exclusively. " 22 But this was not "a period of development without
n
contradiction".
Innes and Plaut have argued against the theorisation of the
period by the fractionaliste They point out that "by minimising
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the importance of class struggle and by over-emphasising the
importance of inter-capitalist disagreements, the Poulantzians
have failed to understand the real nature of the
conflict".7 The critique made by Innes and Plaut is valid. But it
is weakened by their own failure to investigate the political
dynamics of the period. In addition, in arguing against the
Poulantzian perspective whose effect is to define parts of the
class struggle out of existence through the theoretical concept
of the new petty bourgeoisie, Innes and Plaut imply that there
can be no alliance between sections of the working class and
capital - because their class interests are incompatibler Innes
and Plaut argue that the Pact government did not serve the
interests of the white workers, using three points (which are
also made by the fractionalists):- firstly, the government
protected the interests of capita1 2,7 including mining capital;
secondly, "average wage rates for white miners and white
industrial workers in 1932 were still lower than they had been in
1922"; and thirdly, there was an increase in "poor whites"r
These points do not mean, however, that there was not an alliance
between white workers and capital; nor do they mean that the
white workers were actually the new petty bourgeoisie. What they
demonstrate is that the alliance into which white workers were
led by the LP (with the support of the CP) in the aftermath of
the 1922 strike, was an alliance which served the interests of
capital. A recognition of that alliance does not imply that
conflict between the classes within it was therefore ruled out.
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The white workers were not "neutered"r What it demonstrates is
that right at the core of the form of capitalist rule was an
inherent instability. In the failure of that alliance to satisfy
the expectations of white workers was the basis for a renewal of
combativity, and a potential challenge to the alliance between
white workers and capital, and to the way in which that alliance
was organised. Lewis 33and Davieeboth point to the possibilities
of an alliance between poor whites and black workers, and to
state concern over those possibilities. The fact that the state
was now forced into attacks against the movement of opposition
spearheaded by black workers compounded the political necessity
for a stable, secure social base. For a period, the mounting
dissatisfaction of white workers and poor white farmers to the
conditions imposed upon them by capitalism in crisis was
contained by the Pact. As the course of events unfolded, that
dissatisfaction came to be chanelled predominantly into the quest
for a parliamentary alternative to the Pact?2
But this was not the only political option possible in the
objective conditions. Nor was it the only one which was actually
pursued. The process of deskilling and the threat of unemployment
placed before many white workers the need to look for avenues
along which to defend their positions; these pressures opened up
the possibility of a form of "independent" unionism;33 and there
were isolated cases of co-operation and common protest between
black and white workers 4 The political movement amongst white
workers was partly reflected in the formation of the Trades and
Labour Council (TLC) in 1930 3. 5
 The formally progressive content of
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some of its policies reflects the extent to which co-operation
between black and white workers was a serious possibility 36. But
the white workers amongst whom anti-capitalist, anti-Pact
grievances were likely to be the strongest included some of those
who were least likely to be unionised - the unemployed and the
unskilled?' And the immediate political legacy of the
organisations to which the white workers looked stood as a major
obstacle to the broadening of the incipient challenge to racist
popular frontism and to the building of a non-racial working
class alliance.
These organisations had supported or participated within the
Pact. They had put forward policies which channelled the
expectations of white workers towards Parliament. The union
leadership had obstructed the possibilities of an alliance
between black and white workers.38 And the great majority of the
leaders involved had supported the pursuit of demands through and
in accordance with the restrictive structures and procedures of
the Industrial Conciliation Act. The limited extent to which the
LP provided the white workers with a working class political
organisation had been further undermined, not merely by the class
collaboration of the LP in the Pact - but through the leadership
divisions which split the organisation 3.9 None of these factors
stopped the white workers and poor white petty bourgeoisie from
responding to the conditions imposed upon them with growing
anger.4° But they made it likely that the expression of that anger
would be contained, and served to channel white workers away from
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any alliance with blacks. The exception to this, in the course of
the period under consideration, at least formally, was the TLC.
But, as Lewis points out, the formal positions of non-racialism
of the TLC were not put into practice: Additionally, within the
organisation, militants were split between those who supported
that formal orientation, and those who believed that an
orientation to blacks was an unacceptable obstacle to an
orientation to unorganised whites.42
Nonetheless, in the actual dynamics of the situation, the Pact
government was forced to carry out attacks against black workers
and their organisations, at a time when it was beginning to grow
increasingly unpopular amongst whites.
In this period, elements within the ruling class looked towards
the black petty bourgeoisie as a medium though which to secure
social stability amongst the black masses. It was an option which
the ruling class had always tried to keep open. Its importance to
the ruling class is reflected in the formation of the South
African Institute of Race Relations (IRR) with the support of big
capital in 192943 - precisely to provide an avenue for such
collaboration. There is a clear parallel in the way in which the
Joint Councils followed the upsurge in the workers' movement of
1918 -19204: and the formation of the IRR came after the upsurge
reflected in the growth of the ICU and the formation of FNETU.
But the ruling class in crisis cannot keep all options open, or
freely choose those whom it seeks to draw into collaboration and
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alliance.
The question of alliances was the product of the basic political
issue facing the state: how to carry through economic and
political attacks against the mass of the working class. And that
question was in turn imposed upon the ruling class by two
developments the course of which, as a class, they are unable to
control. The first is the tendency of their economic system to
move from crisis to crisis. The second is the tendency of workers
to resist the conditions of life which capitalism imposes upon
them. In the period under consideration, the state was tied into
a situation in which the alliance with white workers was not
simply dispensable. But there were two major factors undermining
that alliance - the growing discontent amongst white workers, and
the fact that the capacity of the LP to deliver the white workers
into an alliance was increasingly questionable. The unavoidable
political price of the alliance which it pursued was policies and
action which would undermine the possibility of keeping open the
option of an alliance with the black petty bourgeoisie; at the
same time, the alliance with white workers was relatively
unstable - and the movement of black workers was developing.
A series of attacks was launched against the working class. The
state imposed increased unemployment, effective wage cuts 5 new
forms of taxes, tax increases, and extended the pass laws and
taxation for women through the Urban Areas Amendment Act (1930)!
In some urban areas, a 10pm-4am curfew was introduced 4. 7 A myriad
of different regulations was introduced by different urban
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authorities. The Native Services Contract (1932) was aimed at
tightening controls around workers in the rural areas, and on
movement to the towns'? It was one thing for the state to
introduce measures aimed at protecting capitalist profits and
political control. It was another for those measures to be
successfully imposed upon the working class. And once imposed, it
was yet another thing for the imposition of those measures to be
maintained. Particularly at the latter two stages, where a state
measure had an immediate impact on workers, there was working
class resistance. As will be discussed, the mass reaction to
taxation is evidence of a widespread, although largely
individualised, necessity and willingness to resist state
measures. In some cases, this atomisation was broken down through
the collective organisation and struggle of workers who shared
grievances and faced a common attack:*
The impact of taxation is not only economic, but also political,
in the sense that it is a means by which the state forces a
recognition of its authority and imposes discipline. That general
discipline will be given a particular content according to the
needs of the state - and its capacity to make sure that its needs
are met, at each particular point. Nzula has explained how
taxation was used to tie peasants to money-lenders in trading
stores.50 Through calling in their debts, those traders could force
peasants to accept employment. The major source of income for the
trader was neither sales nor interest on loans, but the premium
received for each worker provided to the prospective employer.
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And as the state turned to the question of tightening control in
the expanding urban areas, taxation came to be used as a major
weapon here as well. This occurred in three different ways:
firstly, a set of urban-based taxes was developed - such as the
lodgers' tax; secondly, tax receipts came to be demanded as a
form of pass in the urban areas; thirdly, the collection of taxes
was, in specific cases, organised through raids in the towns, in
which the state sought to demonstrate its authority and its
capacity to impose control through its repressive apparatus. But,
at each of these points of application, there was resistance. In
some instances, such as Potchefstroom, the issue of taxation, and
in particular the lodgers' tax, was central to local urban
struggles' But beyond the workers who were involved in those
struggles, the resistance against taxation extended to hundreds
of thousands of workers and peasants who were individually
resisting taxation. Despite the introduction of measures designed
to increase and extend taxation, the amount of money actually
-collected in taxes went down each year from 1929/30 to 1932/33,
and then fell again in 1935/36, as the combativity of the working
class began to rise again 2 The tax changes and standardisation of
the tax system meant that blacks in Natal faced an especially
high increase; but the actual amount paid in taxes in Natal
dropped each year from 1930/31 to 1933/34, and even when it began
to rise at that stage, the total collected was still far below
that of 1925
This fall in the amount of taxes paid does not reflect a lack of
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determination on the part of the state to collect those taxes.
What it does show is the relative failure of the measures which
the state adopted, its inability to transform plans on the
question into reality, the fact that people just could not afford
to pay, and the level of resistance with which the attempts by
the state to impose the new measures was met. A brutal direct
attack against the workers' movement was a likelihood through the
whole period under discussion. It was not surprising that on 14
November 1929, when such an attack came, it should be launched in
Durban against the dockers, a group of workers who were
relatively powerful, on the immediate issue of tax collection.
Pirow, the Minister of Justice, led an attack of 700 police (500
white, 200 black). The whites were armed with machine-guns. They
surrounded black compounds in Durban at 3am, and proceeded to
search some 5,000-8,000 people, demanding proof of payment of
taxes. 350 people were arrested, and onlookers were teargassed.54
That attack indicated the determination of the government, newly
re-elected, to move against the workers in the urban areas,
imposing new forms of discipline on them. It reflected also the
way in which the urban areas were more clearly becoming the
centres of the political struggle. The state was in fact shifting
the point of application of the tax laws, from the rural areas to
the towns, as far as migrant workers were concerned. This allowed
the state to operate where its repressive forces could most
immediately be centralised and where, it was hoped, one major
aggressive show of force could have a generalised intimidatory
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effect. In June, before the attack, a right-wing mob had attacked
the ICU offices 5. 5 This combination between official and unofficial
arms of the state in attacking workers was to be repeated on
different occasions in other parts of the country The immediate
impact of this combination was the increased severity of the
attack. But the very fact of involvement by the unofficial arm of
the state was indicative of the problems which the ruling class
had in building a stable and sufficiently powerful social base.
The unofficial arm of the state is not under the same control or
discipline as the official forces of the state. Its emergence
into direct action in this way is an indicator of the political
volatility amongst layers of those to whom the ruling class
looked for a stable social base.
Furthermore, the very fact that the political centre of the
struggle had shifted so conclusively to the towns promoted
political difficulties for the state in imposing the measures
upon which it had decided. If the forces of repression could be
concentrated, so too could the forces of resistance. The non-
payment of taxes was widespread - but it was occurring in a way
which left workers atomised on the issue. At the local level,
however, the objective possibilities of the individualised mood
of resistance being generalised and drawn together were several
times manifested in the building of organisation and action
around clearly articulated demands. Struggles revolving around
the conditions of control being imposed in the towns developed in
many different urban areas across the country. The struggles
against the lodgers' tax in in Potchefstroom, the pass laws' in
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Durban,57 and rent increases in Lange were all examples of
generalised action, although action in each area was isolated
from the others. The link between grievances which were felt
individually came to the fore in action and organisation which,
once it emerged, spread widely within the locality.
This possibility that attacks by the state and attempts to impose
discipline would generate a broad and united resistance was
revealed in the struggles which developed around the issue of
rents. In Langa, there was a successful rent strike, in response
to attempts to increase rents 5. 9 The resistance against both the
payment of and increase in rents differed from resistance against
taxation to the extent that cash rents were encountered primarily
as an urban problem, while traditional forms of resisting
taxation had been already developed in the rural areas. This
meant that while the immediate material basis for a united
working class resistance to taxation had been created only when
the state shifted the point of application to the urban areas,
the immediate basis for such a resistance on the issue of rents
was established from the outset. The way in which rents were
gathered promoted the tendency towards collective resistance,
bringing to the fore what was common in the sometimes different
individual experiences of workers. Rents were due to be paid at
the same time, by groups of people concentrated into the same
areas, to the same place. The centres of state authority in the
black areas were not primarily the police stations, but the
Superintendents' offices, from which point was co-ordinated the
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application of controls on all aspects of workers' lives, and
from which, increasingly, municipal police forces were organised.
It was from these offices that the application of all the new
urban controls of the period was co-ordinated and organised, and
they very quickly came to be seen as the centres of state control
which they were, and regarded as the primary targets of community
struggle. One of the demands in the Potchefstroom struggle was
for the removal of the Superintendent5°
As working class struggle develops a momentum, workers are able
to turn to a whole network of links within their class which is
sometimes extremely developed, and always far more extensive than
immediately apparent to the external observer? But there are
potentially overwhelming material problems which stand in the way
of this set of informal links being developed into more formal
organisation which rises above and draws together different
working class groups, at the level of the community and the
workplace. These include the lack of resources; tribal, racial
and other divisions; and repression from the state. There are no
conditions under which the state abstains from involvement in
developments in the workers' movement, and there are recurrently
conditions in which the state is driven to direct repressive
attacks against the workers' movement. Such were the conditions
in the period under discussion. But the state could not simply
muster the forces necessary to impose the new measures of urban
control, and carry through the economic attacks which the
capitalist crisis dictated. The state does not have the automatic
capacity to carry through its plans, even when these are
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relatively clear-cut. This is generally true and, in the period
under discussion, it was made more true by the challenges to the
class alliance through which capital organised its rule.
The working class was faced with the conscious plotting and
attacks of a state which could not rely upon any a-historical
strength to ensure that it achieved its goals. Within the working
class, there was clear evidence of a widespread generally common
set of grievances, and an individual mood of resistance. Where
conditions themselves promoted a collective form of resistance,
this sometimes developed into fairly widespread class action.
This is evidence of the objective possibilities for the
development of a broadly-based movement of resistance. But these
factors were not in themselves sufficient to break down the
atomisation of the working class at all levels, and generate and
sustain broad, united organisation. The mass and vanguard
organisations of the working class historically assume the
responsibility for organising that broad resistance, and
developing a conscious political response to guide it. But both
of those organisations were suffering from self-inflicted wounds
which were to deepen as the period continued. The result was that
the state was able to compensate for the limitations imposed on
its freedom to choose courses of action and pursue political
options, by the greater political weakness of the movement of
opposition. The reality was that the existing organisations of
opposition did not act in a way which could consolidate or
develop the basis for resistance which had been created by
180
workers. The developments within the leaderships of the CP and
the ICU which contributed to the political weakness of the
working class in turn politically weakened those organisations in
the face of developing state attacks.
Divisions within the ICU and the lack of a clear strategy and
tactics began to promote its decline as an organised force. For
a period this was masked by the continuing levels of mass support
which the organisation could rely on. It expanded in Nata162and
the Transvaa1,3 even as it was declining in the Cape. But mass
support was not in itself enough to maintain the development of
an organisation which was, at leadership level, increasingly
divided and which, at rank and file level, relied upon a degree
of combativity which could not be permanently, spontaneously
self-sustaining. By 1929, the ICU had been divided into three
different organisations - the ICU (Ballinger); the ICU yase Natal
(Champion); and the Independent ICU (Kadalie) 6.4 There was no clear
left-right division within the splits which had occurred. The
splits in the ICU, the accusations and counter-accusations being
thrown around by the different leaders, and the movement to the
right of Kadalie and then Champion, greatly weakened the ICU in
the face of threatening and actual state attacks.
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By 1929, the combativity in the working class, the depth of
resistance to mounting state attacks, and the political
developments in the CP in the aftermath of the ICU expulsions had
led to a massive increase in Party membership. At the time of the
1929 Party conference, the membership had reached 3,000!5 But, by
this time, the underlying developments within the Party were set
to promote a process of internal conflict. Given the political
basis on which that process occurred, it could only serve to sow
confusion amongst the broader membership of the Party, and weaken
the capacity of the Party to develop that membership. This
process of degeneration was not immediately obvious inside the
CP, partly because of the rise in its membership. Once the
Comintern programme had been accepted by the 1929 Conference, the
individuals who supported Bunting's opposition applied themselves
to promoting it as diligently as possib1e 6 In so doing, they
rested on the (self-) assurance that the programme really
represented a new formulation of the socialism they had always
been fighting for. By recourse to the type of vague, all-
embracing, and sometimes contradictory, formulations and
explanations that we have seen, they came to terms with the
Native Republic slogan. In so doing, they gave up the political
struggle against it, accepting, as the Party had always done, the
position of the Comintern, however abstract.
As we have seen above, the process by which the Black Republic
position came to be decided upon and adopted was such as to
interrupt the line of development which had been forced on the
Party after the expulsions from the ICU. The position had been
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adopted, not because of the objective demands of the concrete
political situation, but because of the current policies of the
Soviet and Comintern leaderships. The way in which the policy
decisions came to be taken was such as to suppress a full
discussion around political principles and analysis.
In July 1929, the 10th Plenum of the ECCI confirmed and extended
the ultra-left turn of the "third period", which had already been
embarked uporIF In the CPSA, which was brought increasingly firmly
under the leadership of the ECCI, this led to a changed
interpretation of the Native Republic slogan, and a process of
bureaucratisation within the Party. This included the abolition
of Party branches and branch meetings "because they were 'social-
democratic' in nature and 'anti-Bo1shevik",8 unilateral changes
of policy, a series of personalised attacks and accusations, and
numerous expulsions.
The process was to be carried through in the SA Party from the
Congress of December, 193e Before that, it had already led to
the disbandment of one of the Party's broad initiatives. In the
June 1929 general election, Bunting contested the Tembuland
(Transkei) seat:° During the course of his campaign, he clearly
came face to face with the remnants of the general wave of
opposition in the rural areas upon which the ICU had, in part,
developed as a mass organisation. The divisions inside the ICU
and its political degeneration, and the particular conservatism
of the ANC in the Transkei (under leadership of the Bhunga
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chiefs), meant that the enfranchised black petty bourgeois
militants, and the layers of the oppressed masses over whom they
had some political influence, would not automatically turn, or
continue to turn, to these organisations. The objective situation
created the possibility for an organisation which could embrace
workers and peasants as well as militant petty bourgeois
elements. This is partly reflected in the way in which such
people, in unprecedented numbers, were turning directly to the
CP, where it was visible. Responding to the situation, Bunting
and Makabeni formed the League of African Rights as a broad front
organisation, with a four point programme of democratic demands:
- abolition of the pass laws;
- abolition of restrictive land laws;
- extension of the franchise;
- free education!'
The League immediately attracted the support of influential
figures, some in other organisations. Gumede, Modiakgotla,
Tantsi, Kotane, Thibedi, Kotu, together with Bunting and Baker,
became its first office-bearers: 2
 The content of the League's
demands reflected the rural context in which it was formed. To
develop the organisation into the urban areas would have involved
further demands, relating specifically to the situation of the
urban worker. To sustain and build support on the broad basis to
which it aspired, the League would have had to couple its
propaganda with specific demands relating to more immediate
defensive objectives - such as opposition to the Amendment to the
Riotous Assemblies Act.73 The initial enthusiastic response to the
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emergence of the League suggests that, very soon, it would have
come under rank and file pressure to take up the range of
immediate issues facing workers and the oppressed petty
bourgeoisie. That pressure would, in turn, have created a
pressure on the League to develop a more concrete analysis of the
objective situation, and of the immediate way forward against
employers and the government.
The League, however, was given no time to develop in response to
the objective pressures of the political situation. Instead its
next step was forced upon it by the policies of the Comintern.
Soon after its formation, at a time when the objective political
situation demanded the building of an organised broad front for
defence against state attacks, a telegram from the Comintern
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ordered the immediate dissolution of the League. That telegram, a
letter from the Comintern in May 1930, the return of the Woltons
(who had been in the Soviet Union) 7
 and the assumption of
leadership by the Bach/Wolton bureaucracy at the 1930 Party
conference, combined to produce the sharp political reversal in
the politics of the CP 6
 in accordance with the similar reversal
of the Soviet leadership.
On the central issue of the Native Republic slogan, Bach was to
sum up the change in this way:
"Independent Native Republic means simultaneously a Workers' and
Peasants' Government. There used to be a mistaken idea in the
Party that the Native Republic was a step towards a Workers' and
185
Peasants' Government. . .. "77
The ECCI Resolution on the South African Question had asserted
the need for working class leadership over the oppressed masses.
In the interpretation given to that Resolution by la Guma, this
was subsumed beneath the need for a popular frontist alliance. In
the third period, the question of class alliances of the
oppressed was subsumed beneath direct calls to revolutionary mass
action led by the CP. The Preamble had introduced a distinction
between the exploiters and the exploited amongst "the negro
population":
"In proportion as the development of capitalist relations
disintegrates the tribal structure, the Party must strengthen its
work in the education in class consciousness of the exploited
strata of the negro population, and co-operate in their
liberation from the influence of the exploiting tribal strata,
which become more and more agents of imperialism." The ECCI
Resolution pursued the theme:
"[T]he South African bourgeoisie is endeavouring to attract to
its side certain elements of the non-European population, for
example the 'coloured' population, promising them electoral
rights, and also the native leaders, turning them into agents for
the exploitation of the negro population. This policy of
corruption has already brought about the fact that the leaders of
the negro trade union organisation - the Industrial and
Commercial Union - having expelled the Communists from the union,
are now endeavouring to guide the negro trade union movement into
the channel of reformism.—." The Resolution also spoke of the
need to "weaken the influence of the native chiefs corrupted by
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the white bourgeoisie".78
Bunting had emphasised the class differences among oppressed
blacks as one of the reasons for opposing the type of national
movement which la Guma proposed 7.9 As we have seen, the opposition
from Bunting was completely rejected, and, in the interpretation
of the programme given by la Guma, the class differences amongst
oppressed blacks were seen as of little relevance. But in the
interpretation of the Native Republic which developed in the
third period, the issue of class differences within the
"oppressed people" is given a greatly increased importance. The
influence of non-working class blacks within the broader movement
of struggle comes to be seen as a major obstacle; in the process,
the fact that blacks outside the working class are also oppressed
and the possibility of any front of opposition outside of the
direct leadership of the CP are dismissed. Bunting had argued
that the "CP is itself the actual or potential leader of the
native national movement" 8.0
 In the third period, a commitment to
struggle for political leadership of the broader movement by the
CP is turned into attempts to assume immediate and direct
leadership of the mass movement, calls to immediate revolutionary
action, and a rejection of any co-operation with any other
organisation.
The political limitations of the Bunting tendency, and the
process of adoption of the Native Republic programme which
arrested the development of that tendency, rendered it incapable
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of combatting either the bureaucratic methods, or the sharp
political turns which such methods served to secure. Employing
the methods of the Stalin bureaucracy, capitalising on the
political weakness of the opposition inside the Party and
exploiting the authority of the Comintern, Bach and Walton faced
little opposition in setting up a third period bureaucratic
leadership within the Party. Just as Stalin had reversed
political position without this resulting in any change to the
programmes which had been pre-agreed for the 6th Congress, so
Bach and Walton set about changing the meaning of the Native
Republic programme, without any formal change to the programme
itself. Stalin's reversal had taken place without any theoretical
assessment of why that change was necessary, why previous
policies had been wrong or what mistakes of method had led to the
wrong positions. The change had taken place through denunciations
of the proponents of the previous policies and ex post facto
theoretical legitimations.
In a similar way Bach and Wolton "accounted" for past mistakes
through denunciations directed against the "Buntingites". Within
the continuing process of the adoption of the same programme,
Bunting was first accused by la Guma of an ultra-leftist
socialist utopianism, and then by the new leadership for right-
opportunist bourgeois reformism. Bunting, who had probably done
more than any single individual within the Party to promote a
consistent orientation to blacks and a recognition of the rights
of the black majority, was accused of being unwilling to follow a
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black leadership. It had been Bunting who, on the basis of his
understanding of democratic centralism, had ruled out of order
any modification or amendment of the Comintern programme. Yet he
was accused of disloyalty to the Party.
In the lead-up to the 1930 Party conference, two resolutions were
circulated by Wolton, with the ECCI letter. Umsebenzi described
the resolutions in this way:
"The resolutions speak of a serious right wing danger within the
ranks of the Party.— These disagreements have revealed
themselves in the lack of cohesive decisions of the leadership,
in the organisational chaos which exists in the Party, and in the
intensely bitter, non-political and personal divisions of the
leadership [sic] which reflect themselves in and vitiate the
entire Party life. The theoretical platform developed by the
right wing reveals a fundamental opposition to the political line
of the Party as adopted at the 1928 [actually 1929] Conference of
the CPSA. In practice, this opposition expresses itself in
disbelief in the revolutionary capacity of the masses, in the
adoption of reformist tactics, and in the white chauvinist
disbelief in the capacity of the Natives to play their full part
in the leadership of the Party."81
The ECCI letter makes the same sort of accusations:
"The Party leaders are committing serious mistakes of a Right
Opportunist character.— The principle feature of the Right
Opportunist mistake committed by the Party is the failure to
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understand the decisive importance of the hegemony of the
Proletariat and the complete independence of the vanguard of the
revolutionary proletariat, the Communist Party in the nationalist
revolutionary movement and the failure to understand the
significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the social
revolution. 032
The ECCI letter stated that "the ideological and political
influence of the CP is by no means keeping pace with the growing
mass content" 8.3 This theme was taken up throughout the period -
usually as a criticism of the "right opportunists" and "social
fascists" within the Party. Together with it went the claim that
each success -usually exaggerated - was a confirmation of the
correct line of the Party. The tone of the report on a May Day
meeting in Cape Town is typical:
"Only due to the fact that the Party at the right moment
correctly estimated the reactionary role of the May Day Committee
which was led by the ILP and by then bringing forward the
independent leadership of the Party, calling for strikes and
demonstrations, and especially due to the great activities of the
Party in organising the unemployed, setting up committees of the
rank and file and exposing the treachery and opportunism of the
ILP, only thus was it possible to have such a big meeting on the
First of May."84
But the right danger was there as well:
"[T]he changing political situation in the Cape Town districts
reveals elements who are fully unable to re-orientate themselves
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and to understand the role of the Social Fascism in the class
struggle.—. The failure to understand the line of the Party with
regard to the reactionaries has gone in some cases to the extent
of supporting Social Fascist candidates at the Municipal
elections in Cape Town."66
At a time when the state was moving into a stronger and stronger
offensive against a politically weakened opposition movement, the
CP, loyal to the dictates of third period politics, equated an
economic crisis with a revolutionary sitution. A letter from the
ECCI in December 1931, printed in Umsebenzi, reveals the
contradictory mis-analysis on the basis of which CP members were
meant to operate. The letter identified as "one of the greatest
dangers facing the advance of the national revolutionary movement
today —. the extreme organisational weakness of the Native
proletarians and the low level of the strike movement."86Such
analysis was consistent with third period politics, because all
objective problems in the situation could be laid at the door of
the "social fascists", and "the right opportunist chauvinist
Bunting clique" who had "openly become chauvinist agents of
Imperialism, appealing to Pirow and Hertzog against the party."87
But third period politics also asserted the existence of a
revolutionary situation. Despite the problems identified in its
own analysis, the ECCI letter confirms the existence of such a
situation:
"All the necessary conditions exist for a successful development
of the revolutionary struggle in South Africa under the
191
leadership of the CP."
The Bach/Wolton leadership outlawed any attempt at co-operation
or united front politics with any other group. And they demanded
consistent adherence to the contradictory abstractions of the
ECCI. The result was that the Party leadership rendered its own
militants increasingly isolated and vulnerable, demanding that
they lead adventurist offensives, criticising them for reformism
when these failed to materia1ise!3'8
 The Party became more and
more isolated, not only from real developments amongst the
masses, but also from the defensive tasks demanded by the
objective situation. The leadership launched a series of
expulsions against a Party already under growing state attack.
The policies and measures adopted by the bureaucratic leadership
served to weaken the Party in the face of those attacks. In
several branches the Communists, already hit by state attacks,
were further weakened by expulsions. In different areas, the
Party surrendered its influence as a centralised national
organisation by the expulsion of leading members through whom
that influence had been concretised. The influence of these
people became the influence of militant individuals - some of
whom retained their loyalty to the Party, even after their
expulsionrAnd on those members who remained, the leadership of
the CF tried to impose political assessments which, on the one
hand, could only result in confusion and disorientation and, on
the other, came to be ignored by some members and supporters.
In Bloemfontein, two leading CF members were Malkinson and Ntela,
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who Malkinson had recruitee° In January 1931, they were
prohibited from addressing public meetings for six months. In
March, Malkinson was expelled 9.2 La Guma, was expelled, re-
instated,and expelled again 93. During the course of 1931,
Andrews, Tyler, Sachs, Weinbren, Klenerman and Bunting were
expelled from the Johannesburg branch.94 Thibedi had already been
expel 1 ed?5 In Durban, the urban centre of the most sustained
resistance and vicious attacks, Pick, Flax, Harrison, Raynard and
Fridman were expel led 9. 6 Nkosi was murdered at the Dingaan's Day
demonstrations in 1930, and 32 workers were arrested!' A further
130 were arrested when they demonstrated outside the trial in
January 1931r In February 1931, the leading member of the
Clairwood branch, Abraham Nduweni, was banished to Standerton for
two years, under the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act.99 (The
Clairwood branch had been formed in November 1930 when Nduweni
led his entire ICU branch into the CP. j°9Gana Makabeni, who had
succeeded Nkosi, was deported to Nqewetu in the Transkei7 In
October 1931, Roux, who had been sent to Durban from Johannesburg
by the Party, was banned from Durban for one year (he had
previously been acquitted of a charge of "creating hosti1ityq.°2
There was a series of police raids before Dingaan's Day in 1932,
and J Mbete and E Dhlamini were sentenced to six and three months
hard labour in Pinetown for "incitement to violence" 1 .°3 All of
these moves against CP members came after Pirow's military
occupation of Durban in the tax raids of November 1929. Roux
claims that more than 200 of the most active Communists were
deportee Many others were arrested. A bulletin issued by the
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Department of Justice in April 1931 had claimed that CP
membership was in the order of "some thousands of natives"? In
itself, this figure is clearly an exaggeration, being based on
the false assumption that the whole of Kadalie's ICU in the
Province had gone over to the CP. But the reality was that the CP
had a substantive location inside the black working class, with
influence extending relatively widely in the area, reflecting the
willingness of large numbers of workers to turn directly to the
Party in the period.
These were conditions in which the Party was at the very centre
of a nationally significant site of struggle. But the state
attacks drove some of the CP local leadership into a semi-
underground existence, at which level a "district committee" was
set upThe Communists in Natal clearly needed the support of the
national organisation, just as the workers in Natal, who were
bearing the brunt of the aggressive state attacks, needed the
support of the broader workers' movement. In part, the Party
responded to this situation by sending down people from
Johannesburg to replace those who had either been banished or
arrested. But nothing that the Party leadership was doing at this
stage was simply related to the objective political needs of the
situation. A small but politically important group of white
members was expelled. And then Bach was sent down to take over?'
With this move, the Party itself added to the isolation from the
mass of workers which the state attacks had promoted. Bach,
perhaps more than anyone else in the Party, seemed to believe
that the abstract mis-analysis of the ECCI could be used as a
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concrete guide to action. As an already weakened workers'
movement was further weakened by consistent state attacks, the
reports from Durban suggest an increasingly powerful
revolutionary movement108
- in accordance with the Comintern
assurance that capitalism was collapsing and revolution was on
the agenda - but having no basis in the concrete situation. The
political method of the Party promoted the isolation from the
mass of workers which the state had been seeking to impose upon
it. In the case of the state, it was physical repression and the
threat of physical repression which removed leading Communists
from the struggle. In the case of the Party, it was a political
method and the substance of policies of the third period which
did not connect, or provide the theoretical means of connecting,
with the concrete situation.
A similar pattern of state attacks, expulsions, and
disorientating politics took place in other areas. But in those
areas too, the pattern of state attacks was met with localised
resistance. In Pinetown, the CP branch was formed by Mbete after
he had been deported thereT In Germiston, the Party stood a
symbolic propaganda candidate in the 1932 bye-electioniPThe
campaign around that bye-election made the Party more visible
than it had been at any earlier stage. And when, during the
campaign, a right-wing mob attacked a platform of CP speakers at
a township mass meeting, the credibility of the Party soared111A
similar process, whereby the Party benefitted in the eyes of
workers by being a target of state attacks had occurred in
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Potchefstroom. When the Communists were publicly attacked under
the personal orders of the same Superintendent whose dismissal
was being campaigned for, large numbers of residents joined the
Party en masse212
It was clearly a period, then, of sharp political upheavals, when
there were repeated examples of struggle, reflecting the
willingness of workers to resist the range of state attacks. In
part, this was reflected in the rise of CP membership. But the
basis of spontaneous resistance from which these struggles were
generated was not in itself sufficient to compensate for their
major immediate weakness - the fact that they remained isolated
from each other, lacking organised co-ordination. The Party's
political method, and the results of that method, meant that the
CP was in no political position to approach that task.
The unions which the CP had begun to develop in 1928 were neither
organisationally nor politically strong enough to achieve what
the Party, the ICU, and the widespread resistance of workers
could not. They embraced only a small proportion of black
workers. They were under the direct control of the CP - which
meant that they suffered at the leadership level from the
confusion and disorientation promoted by CP politics, and from
the bureaucracy which was weakening Party branches. In the period
under discussion, Weinbren 1,3 Thibedi1
 la Guma 5 and Makabenil, all
central FNETU leaders, were all expelled from the Party.
The reality was that the turn to building these unions had
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reflected the politics of the tendency within the Party which was
slowly developing a method more closely related to the concrete
political situation. But as we have seen, the whole process of
the adoption and attempt to implement the Black Republic
programme had arrested the development of that method. The
building of the unions was important to the new leadership of the
Party not simply as a political task, but as a propaganda point
which could be invoked to prove the pre-revolutionary nature of
the situation2 17
 Consistent with the general method of that
leadership, it was not necessary that the propaganda claim should
fit the concrete political situation, but only that it should
reflect the politics of the third period. The FNETU unions were
not based on strategically powerful groups of workers; nor were
the unions firmly established where they were located. For the
workers who joined them, this was their first experience of
industrial and workplace unionism. It would take time for the
tradition of unionism to be established. In addition, these
unions had been built, not simply on a spontaneous upsurge, but
as the products of the conscious strategy of the CP, at a time
when the spontaneous upsurge which had generated the ICU had, in
part, run its course. Without that continuing dynamic impetus,
lacking established traditions of union organisation, with only
very embryonic structures and tiny membership, the unions were
very easily liable to become top-heavy; and developments at
leadership level could therefore play a particularly decisive
role. The abrupt changes by the Communists at that level could
therefore only serve to weaken the embryonic unions, at a time
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when the working class in general was having to face the growing
attacks of the state.
For a period, the objective weakness of the unions had been
partly masked by the fact that they represented a breakthrough in
terms of an organised layer of black workers. The reality was
that even with the clearest and most far-sighted leadership, the
unions themselves lacked the strength to resist the state
attacks. But they could have been part of the attempt to organise
a broader front of resistance, and aggressively turned outwards
in the attempt to tap the same support which was leading workers
directly to the CP, and the militancy which was being shown in a
series of localised struggles. CP politics, however, prohibited
this possibility. Right through the period, the general
programmatic focus of the Party was on calls for militant
political strikes and general political demands, without an
accompanying focus on building and consolidating elementary class
organisation, and on day to day workplace issues:18
One industrial workplace strike which the CP did try to initiate,
amongst the Cape garment workers 1119 in accordance with the general
line of the period, ignored the real tasks of organisation and
the real objective problems facing strikers. As a result, the
strike was "badly timed, ill-organised and failed utterly. It
was supported by very few workers, all of whose places were
quickly filled by the unemployed.' 120The reality was that the
reformist Cape union was a real obstacle to the strike - but
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according to the political practice of the third period, the
possibility of reformist unions having the capacity to influence
workers could be removed by denunciation.
In general, the primary defensive tasks and the need to maintain
and build independent class organisation were subsumed under
general propaganda about the deepening crisis facing capitalism.
The deepening political crisis facing the working class was
"explained" by denunciations of all other organisations and
leaders, and largely subsumed beneath calls to action and claims
about revolutionary usurges. Neither the theorisation of a
revolutionary situation into existence, nor the change of name
from FNETU to the African Federation of Trade Unions (AFTUFcould
avoid the process making for the collapse of the unions. A
combination of their top-heaviness, leadership policies, and
state attacks against unionists and the class in general was
reflected in a decline in union membership. By the end of 1932,
the membership of AFTU had declined from more than 10,000 to an
optimistic estimate of 800222
During the period under discussion, there was a development of
organisation and protest action amongst unemployed workers. This
reflected both the general level of struggle and organisation
which persisted into the beginning of the 1930's amongst the
working class generally, and the particular hardship amongst
those involved. It was amongst these workers who, more than any
others, had nothing to lose but their chains, that there was a
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degree of open co-operation between black and white. Organising
the unemployed presented massive objective difficulties,
particularly when unemployed blacks were liable to immediate
arrest:23 These difficulties were partly offset by the
determination of those workers to resist, but it is to be
expected that there was nonetheless a very large turnover of
membership in the unemployed workers' committees which the
Communists setup. In February 1932, there were such committees
operating in Johannesburg (two, with 250 members); Durban (22
members) and Cape Town (six, with 1,341 members).124
The Communists organised a number of street demonstrations which
clearly captured the common anger of unemployed black and white
workers. On more than one occasion, black and white unemployed
marched together, or separate marches co-incided, or were led
into each other by the CPTDespite the extra repressive measures
applying to black workers, and the fact that they were not liable
for unemployment relief, there was a degree of common ground in
the material positions of the two groups of unemployed workers
which provided the objective basis from which to draw them
together. This the Party set out consciously to do, both in its
tactics of demonstration (but not of organisation) 126and through
its programme of demands. This represented a watershed, making
precisely the same demands for all unemployed workere The Party
played the leading role in drawing the two groups of workers
together. But it was only when white workers were also able to
see and experience the strength and militancy of organised,
mobilised black workers, supporting demands which reflected the
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needs of both, that the subjective basis amongst white workers
for a degree of unity was established. It was thus the visible
strength of the black workers, directed against a clearly
targetted common enemy which finally opened up the immediate
possibility of unity.' 28
There appeared to be no attempt to involve the AFTU unions in
those demonstrations, nor to build organised links between the
unemployed workers' committees and the unions. In the event, the
limited examples of co-operation between black and white workers,
and the growth of organisation and mobilisation by the unemployed
were both under growing threat, as the state carried through its
attacks against the mainstream of the workers' movement. When the
struggle moved into a lull, as the impact of the state attacks
had its effect, it was amongst the unemployed workers that there
was continued, and even escalated, the level of struggle that
there had been in the preceding years: 29 But, standing out in
relative isolation from the mainstream of the workers' movement,
the struggle of this group of workers with no industrial strength
was inevitably dissipated.
The adoption of the Black Republic programme is regarded by the
Party historians as a major step forward in the organisation's
political developmentBut those same analysts recognise that the
period immediately after the adoption of that programme was one
of political confusion and degeneration for the Party? As we have
seen, however, the developments inside the Party arose directly
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out of the process by which the programme was adopted. They were
successfully carried through because of the support of one
tendency within the Party, and the limited development of the
tendency inside the Party which had been developing a position
more directly based on the concrete situation. And, in turn, the
developments inside the Party served to arrest and decisively
weaken the tentative development of a more materialist
theoretical approach, and the politics deriving from that, which
had been underway. The adoption of the 1928 programme represented
the functioning of the method based directly on remote abstract
theory - a method which had been located within the Party from
its inception. One political result of that process - a belief
that the peasantry was the major force of the revolution, was
giving way to its replacement - an adventurist call for immediate
working class offensives, even before the first had been properly
absorbed by the CPSA. The objective consequence, in each case,
was to disarm the Party and its supporters, at a time of mounting
state attacks.
By the beginning of 1934, the combination of these processes had
led to a situation in which the CP had almost ceased to exist,
with the membership being slashed from 3,000 to less than 1501 .32
There is a temptation, in terms of simple logic, to explain the
decline of the CP by the general attacks against the workers'
movement during that period. Such an explanation reveals one
aspect of the situation. But to leave it at that is to ignore a
crucial part of the political dynamic of CP politics, and a
crucial part of the broader political role of the Party. The fact
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is that the general movement of resistance was reflected in
substantial gains for the CP. At different times, in Durban,
Potchefstroom 33
 Bloemfontein1,34 Lang 35
 and Germistor136 there were
substantial increases in black working class membership. Those
gains were made in the face of the state attacks of the period -
very often, in the process of direct resistance against those
attacks. In each case where the Party made gains there were
specific local factors at work. But they were also black areas
which were similar to many others throughout the country, and it
is likely that the Party would have made gains in these as well,
had it had the initial implantation.
The turn by workers directly to the CP was creating pressures on
the organisation. But the impact of those pressures was being
distorted, insofar as the overall political development of the
Party was concerned. Firstly, many of the politically developed
members who were responsible for carrying the Party to workers
and petty bourgeois militants were expelled; secondly, gains or
losses in membership were used as evidence of the validity of the
policies of the third period, or proof of the failings of the
"right opportunists". The value of the experience and views of
new layers of workers within the Party was partly lost; thirdly,
the CP was turned away, by a series of political abstractions,
from the genuine basis of resistance which did exist.
During this period, the closer association of individual CP
members (notably Nzu127and later Kotane)38with theoreticians in
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the Soviet Union promoted a more developed general class analysis
of SA society than the CPSA itself had developed. This was
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reflected in much of the analysis developed by Nzula. But these
theoretical developments were taking place in a political context
which was dominated by the politics of the third period. The
result was that a more developed materialist analysis did not
come to form a theorised guide to Party action. The course of
Party action and immediate programme were being determined by the
general dictates of the third period. Rather, a more developed
class analysis became the background against which political
assessments and tactics derived from the politics of the third
period were expounded.
Meanwhile, in SA, a cruder combination of theory and third period
orthodoxy was being developed - in a process which was to give
140Wolton the nickname of "the deepening economic crisis" ° A central
issue for the Party was the process by which the more developed
general social analysis could be translated into practical
political conclusions. Together with that went the issue of how a
general social analysis could promote a deeper understanding of
actual political dynamics. In each case, the general theoretical
analysis was effectively dissociated from the practical political
conclusions and understanding of the concrete political process.
Because the more developed general understanding was being
developed in the context of the third period, its political value
for the Party in SA was largely lost.
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With the workers' movement being attacked and weakened, the
organised petty bourgeoisie inevitably came under pressure to
move to the right. Where the basis of resistance promoted the
growth of political organisation, the relative isolation of such
organisation rendered it easily liable to attacks. Outside of the
Cape, where there were different organisations based on the black
franchise, the ANC represented the most organised section of the
black petty bourgeoisie. The response of this organised grouping
to the government attacks of the period was reflected in the
campaign to get rid of Gumede as the President of the ANCr
Despite Gumede's radicalism, the actual structures and membership
of the ANC had remained largely unchanged. There was a
dislocation between the support, including that of workers, which
gave strength to different Congress meetings, and the elite
decision-makers. The result was that while Gumede's radicalism
reflected the developing mass mood, he had no developed base for
that radicalism inside the ANC. In addition, as the politics of
the period developed, any external base of support was subject to
the attacks which were being launched against the working class
in general. He was thus extremely vulnerable to any campaign
organised within the ANC to replace him.
At times of deepening class conflict, the question of class
alliances is placed firmly before the petty bourgeoisie. In this
period an alliance with the working class was an alliance with a
class under growing attack, whose only line of defence was mass
resistance. For the petty bourgeoisie, the threat of an attack
was clearly posed in the Hertzog Bills, and the power which the
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state could wield in attacking its targets was clearly
demonstrated in the attacks against the workers' movement. From a
perspective which seeks the line of least resistance, and which
is attracted to visible strength, any moves in the direction of
an alliance with the working class would only serve as a
provocation to the government.
This was a line of thinking to which the petty bourgeoisie as a
class was susceptible. It was also a line of thinking which was
directly carried to the black petty bourgeoisie by the white
liberals. As the majority leadership within the ANC saw it, the
only way they could defend themselves was through co-operation
with some section of the state. Getting rid of Gumede was the
precondition for using the ANC as an organisation through which
to seek to cement co-operation with capital. The most immediate
avenue to such co-operation was through the liberals. And it was
to that option - an option which had always been pursued from
within the organised petty bourgeoisie - that the dominant
elements within the ANC once again turned. The formation of the
Institute of Race Relations in 1929 provided a new national
organisational framework through which that could be done, as did
the Non Racial Franchise Assocation (NRFA). In its edition of 6
July 1929, Umteteli argued of the NRFA:
"None can deny the weight of influence wielded by such a body as
this, and the ANC should hasten to place its organisation and
conduct under the Association's direction. nw
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The leadership of the organised black petty bourgeoisie had to
demonstrate its bona fides as a "responsible" and therefore
suitable ally for the section of the state to which it looked.
Getting rid of Gumede became the precondition for using the ANC
as the organisation through which the black petty bourgeoisie
could organise for the alliance at which it aimed. In protest
against Gumede's radical policies and participation in the LAR
(of which he was President) the National Executive of the ANC
resigned in January 1930rAt the annual conference, in April
1930, Gumede made an outspokenly radical speech l:"He said that
"Soviet Russia was the only real friend of all the subject races
in the world. [The blacks] must demand equal economic, social and
political rights, and to this end they must use the weapons at
their disposal, organised labour unions. They should develop the
democratic idea wherever possible, and go in for strikes, the
burning of passes, and the refusal to pay taxes, as all such
would help the struggle for a Black Republic.°45
In the elections, Gumede was eventually defeated by Seme by 39
votes to 14:46The bourgeois press commented approvingly at the
time on the way in which the Chairman (Speaker) had acted against
Gumede and his supporters throughout the course of the
conference17. The ANC thus came under the control of a leadership
whose clear priority was the pursuit of an alliance with capital.
To aim at that alliance was one thing, to secure it completely,
another. The ruling class, recurrently forced to look for
alliances, never pursues alliances for their own sake. The
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political objective of ruling class alliances is always the
control and disciplining of the working class. In the period
under discussion, the primary alliance through which that
political goal was being pursued was that represented by the
Pact. The alliance with the organised black petty bourgeoisie
was, for the ruling class, a second option. The only way in which
that situation could be opened up for change was if the black
petty bourgeoisie presented itself as a better means through
which to seek to control the working class. But, in the
conditions obtaining in the period, the right wing elitist
leadership of the ANC, seeking to promote an alliance with
capital, grew more and more detached from the mass struggle.
In 1930, the CF had launched a pass-burning campaign which had
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met with some support, particularly in Durban. In 1931, leading
elements of the organised black petty bourgeoisie, representing
the ANC, ICU and APO met in conference1 49 That this meeting
occurred at all represents the force of the political pressures
operating at the time. On the one hand, there was the pressure
created by the resistance of black workers to the state attacks;
on the other, there was growing concern amongst elements within
the black petty bourgeoisie in the face of the viciousness of the
state attacks - and the palpable failure of the alliance with
sections of big capital to stop them. The conference focussed on
the pass laws and decided, in 1931, to start a pass-burning
campaign - in 1934.150
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Each day, the myriad of repressive measures which constitute the
pass laws and their application was being resisted, at their
point of application. That resistance included those with passes
who broke specific regulations - such as the night curfew. It
also included those many thousands of workers who were in the
urban areas illegally. Pass law-related issues were often central
to the localised struggles which developed in the period under
consideration. At the same time, the state was seeking to extend
and increase controls over workers in the urban areas. The time
gap involved in the conference decision represented the extent to
which those at the conference were distanced from the real rhythm
of working class resistance. Similarly, there was a distance
between the decision of the conference, and the form which the
widespread resistance to the pass laws was already taking. The
petty bourgeois leaders at the conference could use the limited
support for the CP campaign to explain their own caution. The
extent to which struggle was developing in this period - and the
individualised mood of resistance which existed much more widely
- suggest that the limitations on that support came not from a
lack of combativity, but from a lack of preparation, and a
failure to identify a course of action which seemed likely to
succeed to workers. There was a caution in the response of
workers to the state attacks. That caution was not leading
workers to stop their defiance of the pass laws. It was making
them seek ways of carrying through that defiance more
successfully. To the majority of workers, the largely symbolic
burning of passes clearly did not seem to provide such an avenue.
The caution of workers held them back from moving from a form of
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resistance which, in thousands of cases each day, was partly
successful, to a form of symbolism which showed no clear signs of
being stronger.
In the event, the struggle by workers continued - but the
conference leaders made no attempt to embark on their agreed
programme. By the time 1934 came, the very existence of the
organisations of opposition was under serious question. In part,
that question was posed by the severity of the state attacks. But
is was also posed by the way in which the existing organisations
and political leaders responded to those attacks - and to the
opportunities, created by the mood of resistance amongst workers,
for promoting a more widely organised resistance.
The national leadership of the ANC, in this period, had little
direct connection with workers, or their struggle. Where ANC
leaders did have a direct role in that struggle, this was at a
local level, where the local leadership opposed the approach of
the ANC nationally. In the Western Cape, the enfranchised petty
bourgeoisie did not rely for its organised political life as
heavily on the ANC as was the case in other provinces. Thaele,
the Cape leader, did not even attend the 1930 conference which
elected Seme7 In these circumstances, it was easier for local
leaders who were being radicalised by the struggle of the period
to capture control of the local organisation. This was the case
with Ndobe and Tonjeni in the Western CapeFBasing themselves on
the widespread opposition to the imposition of poll taxes, they
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called for a campaign of strikes and civil disobedienceT Congress
meetings in the area were characterised by the way in which they
became forums for workers to take up the range of issues facing
them154 Under the leadership of Ndobe and Tonjeni, who were co-
operating closely with Communists in the area, the ANC in the
Western Cape came to be developed as an organisation of militant
resistance. The militancy in the area was met by harsh state
repression, with right-wing mobs joining with the police in
attacking meetings and demonstrations.
The development of the ANC in the area on the basis of widespread
grievances and receptivity to organisation, the nature of the
state response and the conservatism of the established ANC
leaders, are all graphically illustrated by developments in
Worcester. This was a point at which the worsening economic
conditions for workers on farms and in the towns were brought
together - and this came to be reflected in the grievances which
the local Congress took up. In this area, the local ANC became
centrally caught up in exactly that type of growing confrontation
which the petty bourgeois leadership of the ANC nationally and in
the other provinces was seeking to avoid. Umsebenzi described the
situation as follows:
"The platteland in the Western Province is an armed camp. Special
detachments of police have been drafted to Worcester,
Rawsonville, Barrydale and other centres. All records have been
broken in the issue of licences for revolvers and guns to
Europeans (Non Europeans of course are not allowed to carry
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firearms to defend themselves).— And the cause of all the
trouble. It is because a few weeks ago the native and Coloured
farm labourers of Rawsonville dared to hold a meeting under the
auspices of the ANC, at which they complained about their
miserable wages and the fact that, in order to keep the wolf from
the door, their wives had to go out and work in the kitchens of
the European landowners.
"A gang of white farmers broke up that meeting with violence, and
since that time, the Western Province has been an armed camp.—
Feelings of Non Europeans have been further embittered by police
raids on the Worcester location in search of Kaffir beer,
prohibition in this country being for black men only. As a result
of one of the raids, a black man has been killed."155
On May Day, 1930, 400 workers defied a ban by the Town Clerk,
and organised a May Day march through the main streets of the
townr6 On the Sunday following, police opened fire on the regular
Congress meeting, killing five and wounding another 161.57 The
shootings were followed by further physical attacks:
"Following the shooting of non europeans by the police at
Worcester last Sunday week, a mob of armed white hooligans took
charge of the town. They assaulted a number of native and
coloured people, but their main objective seems to have been to
lay their hands on Ndobe and Tonjeni.°58
In the event, these two leaders, who were fast becoming local
heroes, were hidden by workers in the area for four days159
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In June, the state added legal measures to the physical attacks.
Umsebenzi reported:
"The new Riotous Assemblies Act was put into force for the first
time last week. All public meetings, except religious ones have
been prohibited in the districts of Worcester, Robertson.
Montagu, and Swellendam on any Sunday from June 22 to September
21. ,,160
Thaele responded to the Worcester shootings by saying that
neither side could be blamedr Meanwhile, he set about undermining
the position of Ndobe and Tonjeni. To do this, he organised
support in Cape Town itself, while the two militants were out in
the more remote areas, campaigning and organising.
opportunistically used the association of Ndobe and Tonjeni with
white Communists - even while he was willing to support an
alliance with white capitalists. Thaele was able to use the
authoritarian tradition of Congress and expel 10 Cape Town
mi1itants1.63 A special Provincial Executive passed a resolution
attacking the association of the radicals with the CP:
"Having noticed the spread of Bolshevistic tendencies among the
Non-Europeans in the Western Province, Congress is of the opinion
that leaders and propagandists with Communistic doctrines should
not be allowed to address meetings organised by Congress. Further
that the sale of literature published by the communists should be
prohibited on premises owned by Congress....°64
In a manouevre designed to divide the radicals, Ndobe was
suspended and Tonjeni offered his position of Provincial
Secretary. Ndobe and Tonjeni circulated a joint letter rejecting
162 Thaele
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the manoeuvre:65
By this administrative action, Thaele was able to build a
relatively strong position. But in the conditions of the period,
a right-winger could not have taken complete control of the
organisation by political opportunism alone. It was only through
measures taken by the state that Thaele was able to defeat the
opposition; conversely, because of the expulsions, manoeuvres,
and confusion created by Thaele's attempt to maintain his
position, the state was able to attack a militant Congress which
had been weakened by self-inflicted wounds. Moves by the state
against Thaele considerably helped his position. He was arrested
on 22 June 1930, after more trouble at a closed Worcester
meeting 166 More than anything else, this helped Thaele gain
credibility for the radical Garveyist rhetoric which he was
employing to try to undermine the Communist-allied militantsrIt
has been suggested that Thaele was a police agent 1.68 Certainly, his
arrest could have been part of a prepared conspiracy. But whether
that was the case or not, Thaele was objectively an agent of the
ruling class, and his politics helped to provide the state with
better conditions in which to attack the Congress militants.
They responded to the bureaucratic measures taken by Thaele by
forming, in November 1930, the Independent ANC (IANC) 19 This
organisation carried with it almost all the branches of Congress
outside of Cape Town. At about the same time that the IANC was
being formed, the attitude of the CF towards the Ndobe/Tonjeni
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militants changed:7° although individual CP members who were
working with them do not appear to have followed the change
fully. In September 1930, Umsebenzi carried an article under the
title: "Crawlers v. Fighters in the ANC":71 The article predicted a
split in the WP branch of the ANC, which was described as
"hitherto the strongest and most militant section of the ANC". It
discussed a division between the "good boys' and the militants.
In the latter category, Gumede, Nzula (at that time, General
Secretary of the CP) Ndobe and Tonjeni were all included. In
Umsebenzi. of 7 November and 14 November, there are non-commital
articles describing the split in the Western Province ANC, and
the inauguration of the IANC. The Communist Gomas was included in
its leadership.
The shift of attitude becomes clear in the editorial of the next
edition of Umsebenzi - 21 November 1930. Referring to the
formation of the IANC, it writes:
"What has been the role of the CP in these events, and what
attitude do we adopt to the new body? Perhaps our policy in the
past .—. has been a little too uncritical of the 'opposition'.
Perhaps we have seen a struggle between 'lefts' and 'rights'
where there has in reality only been a squabble between rival
aspirants for leadership and where certain leaders have found it
politic to adopt radical phraseology in order to win the support
of the rank and file. We must ask ourselves the question. 'May
not Ndobe and Tonjeni be sham 'lefts' and not real left-wingers
after all, and may not our uncritical support of them lead to
disillusionment and a sad blow to the CP when we discover
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eventually that they are merely opportunists and not the fighting
leaders we thought them to be?'
"We give our support to the new ANC and its fighting
programme.—. The policy of militancy is the policy of the
working class. It is a policy that can only be carried out under
the fighting leadership of the CP."
Later, as third perdiod politics became fully entrenched, Ndobe
and Tonjeni were dismissed along the lines suggested in the
editorial 172
The IANC captured the combativity which was being expressed in
different ways, at a local level, in different parts of the
country. But it was formed under the immediate and constant
threat of mob attack. The murders and attacks of the last year
had taken their toll, in terms of the confidence and depth of
resistance amongst sections of the working class. The
organisation did not have the strength of the urban centre of the
area (although it should be noted that earlier in this period,
there was an influx of workers in Ndabeni to the COT and Ndobe
and Tonjeni were both under constant threat and attack. In
September 1930, Tonjeni had been arrested: 74 In October 1930,
Tonjeni and Ndobe had both been banned under the Riotous
Assemblies Amendment Act of 1930 for six months from Worcester,
Robertson, Montagu, Swellendam and George - the centres of their
organisationY5 Under the combined attacks of the police, right-
wing mobs, an organised section of the petty bourgeoisie and the
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courts, located in an area which was under near military rule -
and isolated from the broader workers' movement and other
organisations of resistance, the IANC began to disintegrate.
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By 1932, the state offensive had secured a major defeat of the
movement of opposition which had generated the ICU. A combination
of the state offensive and the internal politics of the CP had
decisively reversed the growth of the Party; the development of a
method based more directly on the objective political situation
had been retarded; the value of the increasing theoretical
sophistication, evident in the writing of Nzula, was blocked by
the dominance of third period orthodoxy; a layer of militants had
been driven out of the Party and its political influence within
the broader workers' movement had been almost completely
destroyed. Where that influence persisted, it was through the
politics of individuals, some of whom had in fact been expelled
by the Party, but retained a loyalty to it.
The growth in the CP and AFTU membership had reflected the extent
to which militants were willing to turn directly to the Party and
the unions under its control. But this willingness developed in
exactly the period in which the Party was being thrown into
confusion and disorientation, and coming under the Bach/Wolton
bureaucratic internal regime. Nonetheless, the pressures making
for further developments of the struggle were to create, over
time, the conditions for the reconstruction of the organisation.
The Party was persistently able to draw on the authority of the
Bolshevik revolution; workers had shown, even in the extremely
difficult political conditions of the period that they were
willing to move directly to the Party, in search of an
organisational vehicle for struggle; and individual members and
supporters of the Party had retained a concrete location within
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the mass movement, even while the politics of the Party had
undermined that.
The conditions for the survival of the Party are to be explained
despite its politics, and the role which it played in the period.
There is a recognition of this implicit in the self-criticism
which CP historians make of the developments in the Party. They
present the Bach/Wolton bureaucracy as something of an historical
anachronism, between two phases of the development of the CPY6The
adoption of the Black Republic programme is seen as being in a
political continuity with the development post-1933 to a closer
alliance with the black petty bourgeoisie and the ANC1 77 There is
such a continuity, but the continuity in fact extends through the
period under discussion.
As we have seen, the process through which the Black Republic
programme was accepted was also the process through which the
Party was opened up to the bureaucratic leadership which was
being allowed to develop. At the same time, the politics of
alliance with the black petty bourgeoisie, and the quest for an
alternative vanguard to the working class, were also embodied
within the Black Republic programme. Despite superficial
appearances, underlying features of that politics were to persist
through the ultra-left period. What was similar - and what was to
remain similar through the history of the Party - was an
empiricist method, and the concommitant of an idealist conception
of the working class. In the case of those who followed the
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initial politics of the Black Republic programme, the visible
appearance of things was the basis for a political turn away from
the working class. In the case of those who followed the third
period interpretation, the revolutionary potential of the working
class was presumed to be an immediate concrete reality. In each
case, the working class was reduced to what it appeared to be at
one moment. The appearance was then abstracted and hypostatised,
and used as a theorised insight. The politics of the third period
changed the content of what had gone before. But there was a
continuity of political method. Once again, one aspect of the
reality of the working class was abstracted, hypostatised, and
then theoretically imposed upon a situation as if it were a full
analysis of concrete reality. Thus it was that a similar
political method could lead, at one moment, to the conclusion
that there was a more revolutionary class than the working class;
and the same method, at another moment, could lead to the
conclusion that the revolutionary potential of the working class
was immediately realisable. Both descriptions abstract the
working class out of the real historical circumstances of the
struggle - and use that abstraction as if it corresponds fully
and immediately with concrete reality. One of the major reasons
that militants within the Party were not equipped to deal with
the rise of the bureaucracy was because they lacked a
definitively different method.
What the CP historians do, then, is to obscure the real
continuity which did exist - both through the third period, and
between the initial politics of the Black Republic and the third
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period. In the process, they obscure the real break of continuity
- the way in which the development of a method based on a more
concrete assessment of the dynamic of class forces was arrested.
The impact of the underlying continuity of method, and the brake
placed upon the development of an alternative method were both to
be clearly reflected in the developing politics of the Party in
the next period.
The state offensive laid the necessary basis for the industrial
expansion which developed from 1933, establishing a balance of
class forces favourable to capital, the provision of a mass of
unorganised workers as a labour supply, and the political
capacity to maintain cheap wage levels. But with the industrial
expansion, the problem for the state of maintaining that balance
of forces began to be posed anew. Even as the problems posed by
the workers' movement and the economic crisis were being resolved
in favour of the state, the problem of political control over the
workers' movement was being reconstituted, on a level which the
state had not yet had to deal with. Industrial expansion means
subjecting workers to new conditions of discipline and
exploitation. It means drawing workers from the family and the
tribe into the collective experience of production.
Concentrations of workers in the towns are consolidated and
increased. And the state is faced with the need to impose its
system of control on these expanding concentrations of workers.
It was one thing for the state to win the conditions necessary
for industrial expansion. It was another to actually impose the
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meaning of that expansion onto workers. The state was faced with
a situation in which the very process of taking the measures
which the balance of forces made possible was likley to promote a
set of economic and social demands; new conditions of proletarian
life were likely to stimulate new resistance. And the very fact
of industrial expansion gave to the working class - and within
the working class to the black workers - an increased social
weight.
At the same time, the state was still faced with the task of
maintaining and consolidating the class alliance which was
necessary to provide it with the social base from which to
organise its rule. The police and township authorities had been
severely strained in imposing control over the movement of the
1920's. Now the increasing urban concentration of the working
class, its increasing social weight - and the political and
economic demands which would flow from these processes - were set
to create a far greater problem of control for the state. Despite
the defeats imposed on the movement of resistance, and the shift
in the political balance of forces which that brought, the
challenge to the balance of forces was already being
reconstituted, beneath the surface.
The fact that the urban centres were the economic power-houses of
the country was now being reflected in actual mass struggle,
organisation and demands. While the political defeats imposed by
the state shifted the political balance of forces and provided
the political conditions necessary for fast economic growth (i.e.
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extended and increased exploitation), the same process was
creating conditions whereby an increasingly large, urbanised
black working class was being consolidated. The result of this
was that the objective conditions making for class identity as
workers amongst the mass of blacks were considerably
strengthened. The political consequence of this development would
come to the fore, over time.
In 1933, the NP and SAP formed an electoral al liance7 and in 1934
this was carried through into the fusion of the two parties to
form the United Party (UP) 1.79 Bunting explains fusion in terms of
Hertzog's fear of losing the coming election, and his
personalityl.a9 Kaplan represents the process out of which fusion
emerged as a "dislocation between class interest and the party
political representation of this interest"18/. For Lerumo, it was an
18anti-working class conspiracy 2. None of these ex post facto
positions, or the analyses behind them, moves qualitatively
beyond the understanding of fusion developed by Nzula at the
time 183
Nzula, notwithstanding the influence of Third Period politics,
reveals core elements in the process leading to fusion. He
recognised the differential impact of the economic crisis,
pointing to the "fabulous profits [being made] on the Gold Mines
of the Witwatersrand, especially since South Africa abandoned the
Gold Standard —."; while "[o]ne of the results of the world
economic crisis on South Africa has been its unprecedented
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severity in the field of agriculture". He also pointed to the
impact of the economic crisis insofar as the supply of labour for
the mines was concerned: "The crisis has solved one of the
burning questions between the Chamber of Mines and the farmers,
i.e. the problem of native labour supply." On the basis of these
developments, and the impact of the economic crisis generally,
there was widespread discontent "among the farmers and landlords,
as well as large sections of the urban petty bourgeoisie and
white workers". For Nzula, this was the basis upon which fusion
developed. The Malanites were "nothing but the most cunning
supporters of the capitalist system in South Africa, whose job is
to keep the white workers and especially the Afrikaans speaking
184section, in bondage to capitalist and semi-feudal politics%
Their collaboration within the Pact government had consolidated
the NP and LP as instruments for ruling class control over the
working class. They had been used to draw white workers and
their organisations into structures of collaboration; to look to
Parliament for the solution to their problems; to channel their
grievances against blacks, rather than the ruling class; to
attack the living standards of small white farmers and white
workers; to set up a system of industrial legislation which
reflected the interests of the ruling class, and as a social base
in the state attacks against the black workers and oppressed
petty bourgeoisie. Together, these two parties had exercised
political control over a large majority of white workers.
In the period under discussion, as we have seen, dissatisfaction
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amongst sections of the electoral base of the Pact parties had
been growing. This was reflected in the Colesberg bye-election,
in which the NP narrowly retained the seat T5 and the Germiston
bye-election, in which the SAP won an LP seatl. r The capitalist
depression hit particularly hard at the white small farmers who
made up an important part of the electoral base of the NP. This
had resulted in the movement to the towns of large numbers of
failed Afrikaner farmers7 and a growing anger at the banks and
big capitalists who, between them, were profiting from the
economic plight of these people. In the towns there developed
large concentrations of unemployed whites, embittered by "their"
government, whose two election victories had involved a range of
economic promises. O'Meara points out that by "September 1933,
approximately 22% of all white and coloured males (188,000 men)
were officially registered as unemployedhere these people did
find work, they were almost exclusively absorbed into unskilled
or semi-skilled jobs. Both the NP, and the divided LP - party of
the weakening craft unions - were targets of growing resentment.489
Hertzog faced additional problems, from another source. In 1931,
Britain had gone off the gold standard.190The big capitalists in
South Africa mounted a growing campaign for Hertzog to follow
suit. This finally developed into the withdrawal of capital on a
large scale, in order to create pressure on the government to
follow Britain and abandon the gold standard?' The Nationalists
were faced with two options: either they could seek to promote
their position inside the ruling class by following the dictates
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of big capital; or they could turn to the growing dissatisfaction
amongst their electoral base, and seek to use it as a lever of
pressure with which to secure and promote their interests within
the ruling class. Both courses posed political problems. The
first meant effectively relinquishing a crucial part of the anti-
Hoggenheimer rhetoric, which was so central to Afrikaner
nationalism's appeal to white workers, to pursue a political
alliance with the major party of big capital. But the value of
the NP for big capital in any such alliance depended, in large
part, on the political hold of the Nationalists over their
electoral base in the first place. The second meant promoting
political opposition amongst those whose class interests directed
against capital, in order to gain a more powerful position within
the ranks of the ruling class.
Different elements within the nationalist movement were, over
time, to take the latter courseTHertzog had little option but to
take the former. A leadership which had spent two terms of
government disciplining the working class cannot easily shift to
try to organise controlled opposition within the working class.
Hertzog himself had become identified with the big capitalist
interests which he served, and would have lacked credibility as a
new leader of those who were being dispossessed, or economically
attacked, to the advantage of those same interests. The only
route to continued power and a secure place within the ranks of
the ruling class lay in a deal with big capital. Despite repeated
protestations that he would never move in that direction, Hertzog
responded to the pressure from the ruling class and took South
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Africa off the gold standard:93
For the big capitalists, this seemed to create the opportunity to
assert more direct control over an increasingly important section
of white workers. The popular frontist Pact represented a form of
alliance with the white workers into which capital had, in part,
been forced. Given the self-inflicted weakness of the LP, and the
declining support for the NP, the possibility seemed to be
opening up, for big capital, of reconstructing that alliance on a
more acceptable basis, while retaining political control over the
other petty bourgeois element of the social base of the ruling
class. A political realignment with the NP would further
marginalise the LP, placing it under increased political pressure
to maintain the collaboration which it had always offered the
ruling class. Elements within the ruling class misread the
Germiston bye-election results to confirm their thinking. Big
capital began to use the uncertainty within the Nationalist
leadership to that end. Pressure began to grow within the ranks
of that leadership for an alliance between the NP and the SAP:94
Despite his promises and protestations, Hertzog was being
ineluctably driven towards such an alliance. It was duly formed,
in 1933, and carried forward into the fusion of the two parties,
to form the United Party, in 1934?5
The immediate pre-history of fusion was a period of sustained and
aggressive class conflict, political turmoil, and economic
crisis. By the time of fusion South Africa was already clearly
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emerging from the economic cr1sis196 For the ruling class, the
prospects of a united party of capital appeared to carry with
them the prospects of sustained political stability as well. At a
time when the struggle of white workers had been defused through
the popular front, and the struggle of black workers defeated,
problems in controlling the working class may not have been at
the forefront of big capital's thinking as the moves towards
fusion developed.
Nonetheless, there was opposition to Hertzog's suggestion that
Creswell should be included in the Cabinetrand the programme of
fusion included a firm declaration "against any policy which has
for its object the tendency to advance class warfare, or to
sacrifice any interests of the people in favour of organised
capitalism."198The fact that the struggle of the working class was
not apparent at the forefront of bourgeois thinking as fusion
developed is itself a part of the explanation of the process.
The extent to which the bourgeois parties believed that the white
workers would follow where they led can be explained by the
effectiveness, for capital, of the popular front. That key
analysts of fusion have effectively ignored the white workers in
the same way, is the product of an analytical approach which
seeks to explain developments in class society primarily in terms
of the relations within the ruling class.
A group of Nationalists under Malan broke from Hertzog,
expressing and seeking to mobilise, inter alia, the discontent
amongst parts of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie 9.9 For the first
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time, although in a tentative way, organised Afrikaner
nationalism turned also to the question of developing a base of
working class support. In 1935, Die Raad Van Trustees was formed
to fulfil that role 2.°°A Malanite expressed their fears: "Coalition
will drive our poor classes into the hands of the Bolsheviks
because they will have no other spokesmen."201
It was only later that this tentative turn was fully carried
through - and only when it was did the political strength of
Afrikaner nationalism reach a point where it could once again be
used as a political lever which the ruling class as a whole could
not ignore. Already at this early stage, the embryo existed of
what was to develop into the historical role of Malanite
Afrikaner nationalism. But, before that happened, the Malanites
would have to capture the political support of the developing
social layer of Afrikaans workers. At the time of the split
within the ranks of Afrikaner nationalism, that was still a task
which lay ahead. Even before there was any consistent attempt to
exploit these, there were openings for Nationalist agitators to
use the conditions facing Afrikaans workers, to seek to develop
the political influence of Afrikaner Nationalism over these
workers. The first important success for the Nationalists emerged
within a relatively short period on the Railways 2 2 The only ways
of disrupting this process involved either an aggressive defence
of independent unionism by the white union leaders, and a
campaign by them to organise and protect Afrikaans workers; or it
meant the existence of an organised movement of black workers
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which was so powerful that it could impress its strength on these
workers and draw them towards it. (The former option would have
involved the latter.) In both cases political leadership was
necessary in order to achieve those results. The reality was
that state attacks removed the latter possibility. And the racist
politics and conservatism of the majority of union leaders were
enormous obstacles to the former.
In the same period, the sectarian policies of the CP had largely
removed its capacity to influence the actual political process.
The established craft unions made no serious attempt to organise
the Afrikaans workers. Exclusivist criteria for apprenticeships
were often used to keep Afrikaners out of skilled jobs 2.°3 It was
mainly within the growing industrial unions that Afrikaners, who
made up the bulk of unskilled and semi-skilled white labour, were
organised.204 As the case of the garment workers shows, where there
was a relatively militant lead presented to them, many Afrikaans
workers were willing to take it. But, in the great majority of
cases, that lead was not forthcoming.
The result of the policies of the majority of the union and LP
leadership was that the Afrikaans workers were turned away from
the organisations of white workers. This does not mean that these
workers simply turned to the right. In the eyes of many of them,
the existing organisations of white workers were seen as
inadequate because they were so totally tied up with and
committed to the interests of big capital and the government. The
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reality is that the question of the political course which these
workers would follow was opened up in this period. A minority of
such workers, presented with the option of a degree of
independent unionism - the Afrikaans women in the clothing
industry - took it. Amongst many Afrikaans workers, including
some of the women in the clothing industry, the simplistic, anti-
big capital, anti-black propaganda of Nationalist agitators
began, over time, to strike a chord. This occurred in a context
in which other important social institutions -notably the church
and the family- were often repeating a form of the same message.
So the process out of which the Afrikaner Nationalists came to
politically dominate the white workers was in motion - but it was
not completed, nor was it the only process which the objective
conditions made possible.
In his analysis of fusion Nzula wrote: "The Malanites, the
Vissers, serve to distract the attention of the poor white
farmers and workers from the real issue and thus prevent the
genuine element of revolt among these classes to mature." He
continued: "These people are all agents of the bourgeoisie, the
agents of the capitalists in the ranks of the poor white farmers
and workers whose reactionary feudalist policies must be
thoroughly exposeenhe politics of the third period asserts
that the economic crisis (from which South Africa was already
emerging) could not be resolved. The continuing crisis would
itself serve to break the illusions of the poor white farmers and
workers - but, they would be tricked by the Malanites.
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On the basis of this approach, the CP, in 1935, began the
publication of "Die Aarbeider en Arme Boer" 2.°6In accordance with
its method, the Party was responding to a set of superficial,
sometimes apparently contradictory, developments . There was a
tendency, arising out of the politics of the third period, to
attribute to the isolated case of co-operation between black and
white workers an a-historical depth and solidity which they did
not have227 There were deep-rooted grievances amongst Afrikaans
workers and unemployed - at a time when the organised wings of
the labour movement were obviously in retreat. Moreover, a turn
to Afrikaans workers was a politically consistent move by a third
period leadership which was facing a developing opposition to its
policies within the CP.
At the beginning of 1933 the Woltons, suddenly and without the
agreement of the Party, left South AfriceThe Party, almost
completely crippled, was left in the hands of Bach. The weak
state of the Party had made it relatively easy for the
Bach/Wolton leadership to maintain a bureaucratic grip. Leading
critics or potential critics had already been expelled. The
attacks against the workers' movement and the decline in struggle
meant that there was no immediate pressure from the workers'
struggle itself promoting the confidence of any opposition. But
Bach was not able to maintain control of the decimated Party for
long. In 1933 Moses Kotane returned from the USSR, and an
opposition grouping began to develop around himr9
A number of factors combined to promote a turn, by elements
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within the CP, away from the politics of the third period. The
blanket denunciations of the petty bourgeoisie made by the CP had
ignored the material reality of the oppression which the black
petty bourgeoisie faced, and also the enormous social and
economic differences between different elements within the petty
bourgeoisie. A section of the black membership of the CP was
itself derived from the black petty bourgeoisie, and could feel
the political pressures operating within their class. The reality
was that these did not conform to the simplistic denunciations
with which the CP had defined the black petty bourgeoisie en
masse. The level of struggle during the preceding period had
radicalised elements within the petty bourgeoisie. The defeats of
the workers' movement had led to a decline in working class
action; but the political developments which followed that defeat
were such as to promote a continuing radicalisation amongst
elements within the petty bourgeoisie. There also persisted a
residue of support for the organisations which had developed in
that struggle - the ICU and in particular, the IANC.
The savage repression with which the state had responded to the
struggles of the preceding period meant, for a section of the
black petty bourgeoisie, that the prospect of reforms was
receding. During the heightened struggle of the preceding period,
the petty bourgeoisie had lacked an organisation through which it
could seek to maintain an independent position. The Seme
leadership of the ANC had responded to the state attacks by
increasing its quest for allies with a section of the state. The
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Cape voters' organisations were in the grip of established
capitalist and pro-capitalist leaderships. On the basis of the
radicalisation which the struggle of the period had promoted
amongst a section of the petty bourgeoisie, and in the face of
the failure of the Seme leadership strategy to keep open the
option of reforms, a left-wing opposition developed inside the
ANC.210
 The existence of this opposition was clearly expressed at
the 1932 ANC conference. The fusion process promoted the growth
of such an opposition, making more immediate the threat of
political attacks against the black petty bourgeoisie.
In 1929, the Hertzog Bills had been withdrawn:" Superficially,
this was because of the opposition from the SAP. The reality was
that they were withdrawn while the Pact parties dealt with the
immediate political priority - the attacks against the workers'
movement. Once that priority had been successfully carried
through, the political conditions were created for the Hertzog
Bills to be introduced again. The possible alliance of resistance
between the black petty bourgeoisie and the working class had
failed to materialise. Then the immediate prospect of such an
alliance had been undermined by the severity and impact of the
state attacks. And fusion now presented Hertzog with the
parliamentary majority which he needed.
For elements within the SAP, who had opposed the Hertzog Bills,
the state attacks had revealed that an alliance with the black
petty bourgeoisie was not a necessary condition of political
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control over black workers. In addition, the value of the black
franchise in the Cape had been heavily eroded. (At the 1929
election there were nearly 42,000 black voters, out of a total
of 452,000.)212 The swartgevaar election campaign of 1929, the
Womens Enfranchisement Act of 1930 2,13 and the Franchise Laws
Amendment Act collectively ensured that resure4
For big capital, coalition and fusion were political mechanisms
which appeared to provide them with the prospect of direct
political control over the social base of the ruling class. With
those developments went the medium term prospect of reversing
some of the economic costs of the "privileged position" of the
white workers. But the economic attacks by the popular front
government, and the economic developments, which began occurring
as early as 1932, meant that, for big capital, the pressure for
moving directly against the economic position of the white
workers was considerably lessened. The attacks of the preceding
period had secured an adequate supply of black labour, cheap
enough for the immediate needs of profitable industrial
expansion. But fusion itself could not be achieved without some
cost. Economically, this immediately meant the relatively minor
measure of increased state aid to white farmersTand the Excess
Profits Act 16 It also meant that sections of big capital, who had
always tried to keep open the option of an alliance with the
petty bourgeoisie, were forced into a political retreat on the
issue.
Sections of the black petty bourgeoisie responded to the
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situation by turning to the government and white political
parties with pledges of loyalty and moral appeals. Umteteli
declared hopefully:
"General Hertzog still presses for the passage of his Native
Bills, but it is practically certain that they will not be dealt
with during the life of the coalition government; and there is
reason to believe that when the Bills are again introduced their
main provisions will be substantially modified."217
A later edition of the paper continues the line of argument:
"It is inconceivable that these political elements [in the SAP]
will surrender their convictions: or that the nation will
acquiesce in a fusion policy likely to deprive the Native of the
principles he has so long enjoyed.—. We can express our belief
that those who, apart from the Native intelligentsia, have the
interests of Africans at heart, will fight any such proposal to
the bitter end.—. Fortunately we are not without friends - and
powerful ones at that! We look to them to support us in our
effort to see that justice is done. And we feel that we shall not
look in vain."m
These were methods which, earlier, had appeared to be successful
in defending the Cape franchise. But amongst a minority of the
organised petty bourgeoisie, particularly when the hopes in
"powerful friends" began to seem misplaced, there was a
substantial shift to the left. Sidzumo, writing in Umteteli
reflects a part of this mood, even amongst conservatives and
moderates:
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"Hitherto the African cherished an implied hope, however
vacillating, for his political and economic protection and
security in the South African Party.—. Now that the South
African Party has virually been absorbed into the Nationalist
Party, or vice versa, —. the African realises he stands little
or no chance of a tangible realisation of his political
aspirations and a substantial redress of his grievances.''2'9
The increasing collaboration between the NP and the SAP fuelled
the growing belief amongst a section of the black petty
bourgeoisie that the struggle for reforms could not be won simply
through appeals to the liberals. Fusion could only confirm this
view - which already had a historical tradition established under
the Gumede leadership. Fusion did not simply mean that the
likelihood of reforms through an alliance with big capital
receded even further. It also brought onto the agenda the
increasingly immediate possibility of attacks through the Hertzog
Bills. It was the overt removal of the prospects of an effective
alliance with sections of the state, and the equally overt threat
of attacks, which lay behind a continued radicalisation amongst
elements within the petty bourgeoisie - even while the workers'
movement was in retreat. It was to this radicalisation that
elements within the CP began to respond - just as there had been
an orientation to Kadalie and then Gumede when they were
radicalised. As part of the same process, there was a reaction
against the politics of the Party, which had become more and more
removed from the concrete situation.
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In 1934, this response, consistent with the method of the Party,
but in direct contradiction with the politics of the third
period, came to be crystallised in an opposition which developed
in the Cape around Moses KotaneY°After a tour of Party branches,
he wrote to the Johannesburg District Party Committee
(effectively the Party leadership), pointing to the separation of
the Party from the actual political situationT Kotane had
"started [his] observations in Queenstown among the African
intellectuals" whom he found to be most concerned "for their
dependent economic position". He had then started working "among
the non-intellectual section of the native people". They were
"the most interesting of the whole lot". They were "revolutionary
but have not yet learnt the weapon of organisation and some of
them are misled by ministers.—." He argued that "our Party
members (especially the whites) —. subordinate South Africa in
the interests of Europe, in fact, ideologically they are not
South Africans, they are foreigners who know nothing about and
who are not the least interested in the country in which they are
living at present." He argued that "the majority of the African
working population are more national conscious than class
conscious", pointing out that there was a still strong support
for the IANC. He called for the Party to become "more
Africanised", "more Bolshevised", and to "speak the language of
the Native masses and —. know their demands". According to
Kotane, sectarian denunciations of leaders like Tonjeni "would
simply be tactless".
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Kotane's letter blurs class distinctions among the "non-
intellectual section of the Native people", and offers no
understanding of the urban working class. It also misassesses
what was in effect the residue of support for the IANC, remaining
after the forward drive of the organisation had been defeated.
But it provided a challenge to some of the abstraction of the
Party. And the call it made "to study the conditions in this
country and concretise the demands of the toiling masses from
first hand information" laid the basis for further challenges.
But the divisions within the Party were not taken up on that
basis.
Within a short period, the policies of the Party were overtaken
by new developments of the policies of the Comintern. Bach at
first attempted to control the situation through the use of
bureaucratic powers 222.But the position which Kotane was putting
forward was too attractive to elements within the Party for it to
be ordered out of existence. The reality is that the politics of
the initial interpretation of the Black Republic programme,
primarily the orientation to the black petty bourgeoisie, had
persisted amongst elements within the Party through the whole
period. Now that the objective conditions appeared to deny the
politics of the third period and confirm those of the second so
conclusively, they became more and more confident in putting
forward their positions. In addition, in a period in which the
authority of the Comintern had come to be reified within the
Party, Kotane, recently returned from the Soviet Union, could
assume some of that authority. Faced with this situation, Bach
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attempted to invoke Comintern decisions, and went to the Soviet
Union to seek endorsement for his policies against the
opposition.223He arrived, however, at a time when the Comintern was
carrying through a reversal of policy. Far from receiving
endorsement, it seems that he was one of the thousands who were
executed at that time.224
CHAPTER FOUR
1935 - 1939
"In 1934 that was the year that marked my disrespect for the
white man. I worked at a laundry. I used to earn one pound ten
shillings a month and I used to sleep in a house full of bugs and
my food was bad. Then in 1938 somebody came along by the name of
Wilfred he had an assistant called Freddie they organised us to
join the trade union. Our employer protested extremely. The
people used to start at six in the morning, they used to knock
off at 5.30 in the afternoon. Since then what we discovered was
that the long period we worked for was cut.
"Then again in 1939 came in the Wage Board, then there was a
slight increase in wages, then little by little they gave us some
increments. In 1939 it [the union] was left to drop because
according to the custom of Africans once they see some betterment
then they leave struggle, as a result the union became weaker and
weaker and the employer started oppressing us once more. Then we
said, but surely the trade union was helping us. Again we
combined, it was true once more we saw some true and good
development."'
For No Sizwe, the period 1935 to 1945 is "the pivotal period" in
South African politics! For Tabata, 1935 saw an unprecedented
"awakening of the masses" Both of these analysts express their
viewpoint via a consideration primarily of the political
developments within and between petty bourgeois organisations. In
different ways, they reflect the tendency of analysts of this
period to seek to explain the course of political developments by
focussing on developments within the state and/or the petty
bourgeoisie. I will be arguing that in this period, there were
three political processes underway which, together, formed the
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most dynamic political components of the balance of class forces.
- The resurgence and development of the movement of black
workers;
- The upsurge of organised political opposition within the black
petty bourgeoisie;
- The growth of influence by organised Afrikaner Nationalists
amongst white workers.
The purpose of this section is to investigate the first two
processes, and consider the relationship between them. The third
process will be touched on briefly, and considered more fully in
a later section.4
In the period 1935-1939, there were two main developments which
suggest that the working class was beginning to move forward, out
of the defeats of the preceding period; firstly, the growth of
unions, and, secondly, clear signs of mounting tension, and a
growing combativity amongst workers in the black urban areas. In
general, the period under discussion was one characterised by a
lack of formal organisation amongst black workers. Despite this,
small black unions continued to exist. Although, in the early
stages in particular, these unions only involved a tiny
percentage of the workers their very existence is testimony to
the possibility for working class organisation which did exist at
the time; their growth is testimony to the extension of that
possibility and a receptivity to unionism amongst growing numbers
of workers.
242
In 1935, Max Gordon, regarded varyingly as an actual or a nominal
Trotskyist, became Secretary of the African Laundry Workers
Union.6
 This was one of the unions which had been set up by the
Communists in 1928, and was part of AFTU. From this position, he
was to play a large role in the development of unions centred in
Johannesburg and Pretoria. It is significant that this initial
development of unionism, after the state attacks of the preceding
period, should be in an industry in which there had been a
history of industrial organisation amongst black workers. The way
in which the defeats had been inflicted on the workers' movement
meant that the basic organisational framework of the union, to
the extent that it had existed, had not itself been destroyed.
As we have seen, the combination of state attacks and leadership
policies did have, as one of their consequences, the near
collapse of AFTU. But this did not occur in a direct test of
strength between the unions and the state. Rather, it was through
attacks at other points that the state secured a victory with
wider implications. The indirect way in which state attacks had
led to the the substantial weakening of AFTU made it likely that
in the experience and perception of at least some workers
connected with the unions, there was no dominant feeling of
weakness attached to those unions. The more likely situation was
that, for workers who could escape, or were emerging from, the
general feeling of demoralisation after the defeats, the unions
were seen (to the extent that they were visible) as a way
forward:
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After a period of attacks and defeats in the experience of the
workers' movement, no policy, however correct, can define the
impact of the defeats out of existence. Whatever happens, the
working class needs a period of time to emerge out of the
feelings of demoralisation, powerlessness, and the impact of the
new conditions on the shop-floor and in the community, which a
defeat imposes upon them and their organisations. The
preservation of already existing forms of independent class
organisation means that as the mood begins to change amongst
sections of the working class, and the resurgence begins to
develop, workers can find an already existing framework through
which their independent needs and interests can be taken up, and
class action considered and organised.
The initial success of attempts to promote unionism was based on
the receptivity of workers to the form of organisation which
unionists like Gordon were presenting. They could also draw on
the recent, albeit limited, experience of unionism, without
having to cope with the problem of the morale of workers whose
commitment to unionism had been drained in a real trial of
strength with the state. Initially, that receptivity could only
exist amongst a small minority of workers - and the resources of
the union could only allow a small minority of workers to be
reached. But that small minority, very quickly, became a growing
minority. And the "message of unionism" very quickly spread.
Within a short period, Gordon had become General Secretary of a
group of seven unions, united under the umbrella of the Joint
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Committee. In 1940, Bill Andrews put the membership at 19,920!
The second AFTU union which was still in existence in 1935 was
the African Clothing Workers' Union, whose General Secretary was
Gana Makabeni? In 1936, working closely with Communists, he began
to form several new unions, and later that year a Co-ordinating
Committee was set up, at a conference with delegates from
Clothing, Building, Timber, Meat, Mining, Stone, Dairy, Furniture
and Bedding, and Baking Workers' Unions20 The membership of all
these unions was small (e.g. Clothing, 1939, 500) 1: and in 1940,
Andrews was to put to full membership at not more than 4,0001.2
Does the small size of the unions mean that they can not really
be used as evidence for the beginnings of a resurgence in the
workers' movement? The combined membership of the two union
Federations at the end of the period under discussion was a small
fraction of the total workforce. But the membership levels,
although small, are an early stage in what was to prove to be a
generally upward trend:3 although there were temporary falls
within that general trend. The unions which were developed in the
second half of the 1930's were to form an essential part of the
foundation upon which the Council of Non-European Trade Unions
(CNETU) was formed, with a membership reaching more than 150,00d4
in the 1940's. Nor should the membership levels be regarded as
anywhere near the upper limit, in terms of potential union
support. The material problems in the way of union organisation
were enormous. Black unions could not be given state
registration; 15
 the tradition of unionism was not deeply embedded
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in the experience of black workers, especially in view of the
large numbers coming to the towns for the first time, and being
employed in new jobs of the post-1933 economic expansion;* there
was an enormous turnover of black workers in all industries -
Hirson points to the fact that unionism was generally most
solidly established in industries with a higher than average
permanency;17 union organisers and workers had to contend with a
myriad of repressive laws. These factors meant not only that
there were many workers who would not be likely to join unions,
but also that there were many workers who, while willing to join
unions, could not be reached, or had to move from one area to the
other, or from one job to the other, or who were unemployed.
In addition, in the eyes of some workers, unions would be seen,
not as collective weapons, but as barriers to their own
advancement, used against them by white workers2 8 There is a
noticeable contrast in the position of white garment workers, in
an industry where black unionism developed, and white miners, in
an industry where it only developed much later. In the former
case, white workers were often productive workers;19 in the latter,
their jobs were become increasingly supervisoryr This different
starting point promoted differences in the approaches of the
white workers concerned towards unionism, and towards black
workers. It was also one of the factors creating a different
workplace environment in the different industries. In the
experience of black workers, the existence of a layer of white
workers can be like working under the direct supervision of
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management. White workers, in addition to supervisors, can be
experienced as a layer of workplace "policemen" for the employer.
Where those workers are organised into a strong trade union, the
union can itself come to be seen as a part of management (a role
which some unions in those circumstances actually do play). At a
time when the confidence of black workers was only beginning to
develop, when on the whole they were moving relatively
tentatively towards building their own class organisation, in an
environment which was fundamentally new to many of them, the
immediate fact of a layer of physical supervision at the
workplace militates against the easy development of the
resurgence which was beginning to take place. And where that
layer of supervision is additionally experienced as a division
within the ranks of the working class, and seen as a well-
organised (unionised) layer, the pressures against a turn to
unionism are compounded.
There were substantial obstacles, then, to the growth of
receptivity to unionism by the mass of black workers. Those same
obstacles stood in the way of a growth of militant action. The
dynamic factor in the situation was the growing willingness of
workers to organise, despite and against those obstacles. That
growing willingness was to be reflected in the actual development
of organisation and action in the period. But it extended,
beneath the surface of appearances, far more widely than is made
clear by those indicators.
The reaction of some elements within the state bureaucracy to the
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development of the unions was not based on an understanding of
the underlying process which that development reflected. Later in
the period under discussion there were proposals from within the
Department of Labour that the black unions be allowed official
registration!' Following the thinking of the state, this has led
some analysts to attribute to the unions a particular
"moderation"r To do so, without a full appreciation of the
underlying process, is to hypostatise "militancy" and seek to
understand trade unions outside of the historical context in
which they have their existence.
The question of what approach the state should take to the unions
was posed in a situation in which two factors were particularly
significant: firstly, the industrial expansion underway was to
bring growing pressure for a secure supply of semi-skilled and
skilled labour;23 secondly, the balance of forces in this period
was favourable to the state. The workers' movement had still not
recovered from the impact of the attacks and defeats which it had
suffered. The government had proved able, after a long process,
to secure the political conditions in which it was able to put
the Hertzog Bills on the statute book, and draw the majority of
the organised black petty bourgeoisie into operating within the
framework of the state structures which those new laws createe
The economy was expandineDifferent sections of the ruling class
and the white petty bourgeoisie were collaborating within the
framework of the relatively newly formed UP. The situation seemed
to be one of stable state control over potential sources of
opposition.
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The reality, as we have seen, was different. But bourgeois
ideology is inherently and inescapably focussed on surface
appearances. With a political vision constructed by that
ideology, elements of the state bureaucracy and the ruling class
could not be expected to see the real underlying dynamic, the
process of resurgence underway within the working class. Without
an understanding of that dynamic, neither could they be expected
to always choose the policies which best suited the interests of
the ruling class. Indeed, whatever course of action is pursued by
the state, it will always contain seeds for future social tension
and conflict. The very industrial expansion underway was in fact
laying part of the foundation for the working class organisation,
demands and action of the future. Whatever measures are taken by
the state to maximise profits, they will contain contradictions
which hold the seeds of the social crisis of the future, and
which, over time, will exacerbate and fuel social tension and
struggle. But bourgeois ideology can not give a clear vision of
these things. Elements within the ruling class and amongst its
agents see in the appearance of social stability the actual
existence of that stability. They see in the apparent
effectiveness of their control over the workers' movement the
continued effectiveness of that control.
It is true that the ruling class and its agents have the
experience of class rule to draw on; and that they must have a
certain understanding of reality to maintain capitalist class
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rule and profits. But no amount of experience or understanding
can reveal for them a course of action which removes the basis
of class conflict and secures a genuine and a lasting stability
in capitalist control. After a decisive victory over the workers'
movement, there are always capitalists who believe that their
final victory has been won, that the class struggle is over. Even
more so is that the case when that victory has allowed them to
impose on workers the conditions necessary for an industrial
expansion. Like bourgeois historians and analysts, the
capitalists believe in the natural stability, not the natural
instability, of their rule. They develop a misplaced confidence
which is fuel led by things as they appear to be - by the apparent
effectiveness of their control and the apparent passivity of the
masses. Within the capitalist class, and amongst the ranks of
those it employs to run the institutions of its rule, there start
developing blueprints for social engineering. These plans
generally tend to assume that the conditions created by the
defeats of the past can be secured for all time. It is in this
way that elements within the state apparatus start developing
schemes for orderly trade unionism. In effect, these are seen as
instruments through which the passivity of the masses can be
regulated, and the labour requirements of capital serviced. When
capitalists blame working class struggle on agitators, they are
not always simply using propaganda. Sometimes, they are
reflecting the fact that they can never properly understand that
the very functioning of their system creates a dynamic, always
operating within the working class, making for the development of
struggle. Elements within the ruling class and amongst their
250
agents were still wondering how to proceed with the recognition
of trade unions when the mass struggles of 1942 overtook them.
They were still considering the measures which they believed had
been made possible by their last victory when a new wave of
struggle developed.
The state does not always have existing and ready-made forms of
control which it can deploy against a working class whose will to
struggle and social weight are both developing. In the mid-
1930's, the state had not yet fully developed the forms of
control, and the experience of control, over the relatively new,
expanded urban industrial working class communitiesrIt was in
conditions of apparent political stability, with a structurally
changed working class, and an economy in which the labour
requirements of capital were changing, that the plans for
recognition of the black trade unions were put forward as one
response, developed by elements within the state. The serious
consideration and support for the recognition of black trade
unions, in fact, tells us about the politics of the state rather
than the moderation of the unions. To see the politics of the
state as emerging from the moderation of the unions is to ignore
the real political dynamics at work, to focus on appearances
rather than the underlying processes, to allow the state a
capacity for strategic thinking and a stability which it did not
have.
In their functioning, the Joint Committee Unions focussed mainly
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on the attempt to secure "favourable" wage determinations, and on
seeking to ensure that employers complied with these
determinations 7
 There can be little doubt that the major
attraction which the unions offered to workers was the hope of at
least some limited success on the issue of wages. In January 1940
the unions held a rally, after a wage determination. The response
of Mokgatle must have been widespread amongst black workers at
the time:
"The purpose of the meeting was to celebrate an event which was
worth celebrating, the coming into force of industrial law in the
commercial and distributive trades, which for the first time
covered African workers in that field of South African industry.
A minimum wage was laid down for unskilled men in the industry,
which of course meant African workers."8
At a time when the resurgence of the workers' movement was still
in its initial phase, the test of the Joint Committee Unions was
not in the number of strikes they had, nor in the militancy of
their public declarations. The value or otherwise of the unions
to the working class generally lay in the extent to which they
fulfilled a need posed by the concrete situation of the workers'
movement. At least for the many thousands of workers who joined
them, and for probably many more workers who looked to them, the
Joint Committee Unions in the period under consideration provided
a form of independent class organisation - a framework within
which the resurgence underway could be articulated and developed.
In December 1936, SAW reported the escalation of action, under
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the headline " Growing militancy of Native Workers":
"Almost daily we get the news in our daily press of Native
workers coming out on strike against the inhuman conditions of
work and particularly the brutal way in which those in authority
are treating them."29
The article proceeds to report five strikes, including two at
mines (Jumpers Deep Gold and Luipaardsvlei), as well as a strike
of 800 laundry workers in Johannesburg. In that strike, 13 strike
leaders were arrested. But they were discharged on a
technicality, and the strike led to an improvement in wages?°
Hirson concludes, on the basis of this strike, and that in
September 1937 of workers at a steel construction site;' that:
"Strike action in these pre-war years was not feasible. Despite
the impatience in the shops and the factories over the refusal of
the bosses to increase wages, the workers had to be restrained
until the unions could be built up." 32Although the resurgence was
well underway by 1937, it is probably unlikely that the mass of
workers were immediately ready to strike - and certainly unlikely
that the unions could have restrained them if they chose to. For
those workers in the Joint Council Unions, however, the tactics
which the union leaders were employing probably did have the
effect of making strikes less likely. The result is that the
statistics on the escalating actioe while clearly expressing a
break from the 1933 slough, do not fully capture the depth of the
resurgence which was underway. The mass of unorganised
(employed) workers were still heading to the point at which they
decided to strike. But the tension which was developing was
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clearly expressed by outbursts of violent struggle in different
black communities.
The developing anger came to be expressed around the Native
Urban Areas Amendment Act of 1937; 4 and the measures taken to
enforce it in the growing urban concentrations. SAW summarised
the Act as meaning: the increased likelihood of arrest and
"deportation" for failure to pay rent or tax; an increasingly
rigid control of movement and prohibition of movement to areas
without employment; and, through the obligation on municipal
authorities to make regular statistical returns on the numbers of
black workers in employment in their areas, an increasingly
efficient machinery of control, especially over workers seeking
employment:5 There were mass meetings in the Transvaal against the
proposed Amendment, and at these meetings a range of issues
facing blacks in the urban areas was raised.36SAW headlines give a
picture of the conditions in the black areas and the grievances
which they were creating: "Suffering beyond endurance" (a letter
from a resident of Prospect Township); 37 "Insanitary conditions of
Pimville Township"r"Location conditions scandal in Pretoria";39
"Pick-up van plays havoc among the people"r"Terrible conditions
in Germiston Location"; "Ferreira Tenants League struggle against
High rents and Decent Housing [sic]'T and then, in June 1937,
after the Urban Areas Amendment had been passed: "Police Raids
Becoming More vicious and Brutal. Native Laws Amendment Act in
Action" 4.2 0ne week later, there were "riots" in Benonit3 Location
police had been conducting permit raids on Coronation Day when
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"rioting" broke out. The location police were forced to call in
SA Police reinforcements. Then, in Vereeniging, the anger aroused
by the pick-up raids reached a new level, and two white policemen
were killed."
There have been numerous violent conflicts with the repressive
forces of the state in South African history. In some cases, such
as Soweto 1976, they have been indicators of a massive resurgence
of combativity within the workers' movement which has developed,
for the main part, beneath the surface. At times, they have been
the continuing resistance of relatively isolated groups, when the
mass struggle on the issue has already been defeated. In 1937,
there was violent resistance at Harding, where tax collectors
were forced to retreat for fear of their lives 4. 5 There were also
the "riots" of Vereeniging and Benoni. The Harding struggle was a
remnant of the historically effectively defeated struggle of the
rural masses against the imposition of taxation. The action at
Vereeniging and Benoni represented something else: it was an
indicator of the growing combativity which was developing, not
just amongst those involved, but extending much more broadly to
workers like themselves, who shared the same experience, in the
major urban centres of the country.
We have seen the real problems which stood in the way of the
development of the unions. It would take time for the experience
of collective production in an industrial urban environment to be
fully assimilated for the thousands of new industrial workers; it
would take time also for the impact of the attacks and defeats to
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be overcome by the experience of new organisation and collective
class strength. These things meant that the process of resurgence
into which more and more black workers were being drawn would not
develop in a single, unobstructed series of linear steps; nor
would the process be given clear and unambiguous confirmation at
every point. The process was one in which the mood of workers
changed - a development which is particularly difficult to
measure at every stage. But the landmarks of the process, even in
its initial phase, were there:- the development of two unions
which had nearly collapsed; the emergence of new unions; a
general growth in union membership. There were signs that
industrial action was beginning to escalate again. And the
underlying process of resurgence was to be reflected also in
oubursts of action in the black working class communities,
exemplified by the Vereeniging riot of 1937. By 1938, the process
of resurgence in the workers' movement was well underway.
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The threat posed by the Hertzog Bills had been discussed at
different conferences of black petty bourgeois political
organisations, and there were moves to establish a united
opposition amongst the different leaders and organisations6After
fusion had been carried through, a broad conference was organised
to be held in Bloemfontein in December 1935 4: Out of this
conference, the All Africa Convention was established, as a co-
ordinating federation of different organisations: 8 The conference
was chaired by Jabavu. In a combination of overstatement and
understatement, Umteteli commented:
"Politically the African National Convention of December 1935
holds up another light and lead to the people for the coming
year. The Native Bills seem to have put new life into that
Convention, and to have inspired it with a determination to get
them amended with a reasonable conception of equity.— We feel
that the Convention will be wisely led by Professor Jabavu. He
is, fortunately, no champion of violent methods.°9
Tabata, who was at the conference, describes the gathering in
this way:
"The meeting was characterised by great enthusiasm and
determination. Once more the mood of the people was high. A
common danger had brought to their consciousness the need to
unite. Under the force of events, all the petty organisational
rivalries were swept aside and all the old leaders came together.
Every single leader was present, and every organisation
represented. With a single voice the people manifested their
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determination to resist the Bills. The keynote of the conference
was unity, unity of purpose and unity of struggle. Conference
passed a resolution rejecting the Bills and instructed its
executive to inform the Government of its decision."53
It is true that the conference was unanimous in its opposition to
the Bills. But it was not the radical rejection, on the basis of
mass pressure, that Tabata suggests. The whole emphasis in the
decisions of the conference was not on "unity of purpose and
unity of struggle", but on consultation, delay, and further
investigations. All the major resolutions are characterised by
moderation: on the Franchise Bill, the Convention appealed to the
Senate and called for a conference; on the Native Land and Trust
Bill, the Convention welcomed the attempt of the government to
deal with the issue, called for the dropping of the Bill, a
Union-wide census, and the establishment of a mixed commission.
The Convention criticised oppressive laws and various
discriminative measures and "prayed", as "His Majesty's loyal
subjects", that the government alleviate the "Black man's lot"T
On Urban Areas, the Convention stated that: "The projected
amendment of the Native (Urban Areas) Act threatens to
disorganise everything already initiated by urban Africans in the
way of self-development." It "respectfully and yet strongly
urge[d] the Government to desist from introducing further
legislation that disturbs the progress already initiated by the
Africans in the urban areas". Amongst the organisational measures
adopted, it was urged that "shilling collections be made at homes
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in all towns and villages, specially by Chiefs, from all
sympathisers with the movement."52
Apart from the delegation to the government, the only action that
was decided upon was to have another meeting in 1936, and to call
a "National Day of Humiliation" on 19 January 1936." The
delegation from the AAC saw Hertzog in Cape Town in February
1936. After the meeting, Hertzog announced that a compromise had
been reached. The enfranchised Africans would be placed on a
separate voters' roll and would be entitled to elect three white
Members of Parliament and two white Provincial CouncilloreThere
is some dispute over whether or not the AAC delegation did agree
to the compromise 5. 5 On balance, the evidence indicates that the
compromise was seriously discussed by the delegation, and that
they were willing to accept it, as the best option seriously on
offer. But other members of the AAC Executive, amongst whom Xuma
was notable, and white liberals in the SAIRR were opposed to
acceptance of the compromise, at that stagerAn emergency AAC
executive meeting was held in Cape Town, and opposition to the
Bills reaffirmed.57
By the time the AAC held its next meeting, in June 1936, the
Hertzog Bills, with the compromise included in the Representation
of Natives Act, had become law. Those assembled therefore had to
decide how to respond to the framework of elections set up under
that Act 8 The divisions within the elements making up the AAC
were apparent almost immediately after its establishment, in the
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dispute about whether the compromise should be and had been
accepted. Further divisions were to surface, as soon as the Bills
became law. A motion calling for a boycott was put forward by
militant delegates from the Caper but was defeated. In Jabavu's
Presidential address, he had made his opposition to the boycott
clear: he described the tactic of the boycott as "retaliative
reprisals and bottled revenge" and made it clear that, in his
judgement, a boycott would not work, would have unpredictable
consequences, and would be an attempt to "win our rights by using
the fear of a bloody revolution as a weapon of propaganda„rThe
main resolution expressed "profound disappointment with the
Government” in its enactment of the Bills, and called for "the
adoption of a policy of political identity". Such a policy would
"ensure the ultimate creation of a South African society in
which, while the various groups may, develop on different lines
socially and culturally they will be bound together by the
pursuit of common political objectives". The resolution
instructed the Executive to explore all avenues of action to
secure the goal of common citizenship rights for all. It then
declared: "Now therefore this All-African Convention solemnly
resolves to pick up the gauntlet thrown before it by the White
Parliament of South Africa."61
Despite the more assertive tone of the 1936 resolution, and the
unanimous Executive rejection of the Hertzog compromise, the
majority of those represented at the AAC turned towards
participation within the electoral framework established by the
Representation of Natives Act. By the time the next AAC meeting
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was held, in December 1937,62 the NRC elections had taken place,
and six members of the 1935 AAC Executive had been elected as NRC
membereBetween the 1936 and 1937 meetings, the major activity
of the AAC appears to have been an attempt to arrive at an agreed
set of candidates for the Transvaal NRC seats, and the
OFS/Transvaal Senate seat.64
At the 1937 meeting, a constitution was adopted which laid down
that meetings would be held only every three years 6.5
 The
conference adopted policies on a wide range of issues, including
trade union rights, the 8 hour day, unemployment benefits, the
abolition of the pass laws, the right to strike, and the
franchise for Africans.66 As opposed to the 1935 resolutions, the
language in 1937 was one of "demands", "rights", "freedom", and
"agitation". Amongst all of this was Included, in a section on
economic policy, a series of demands which clearly expressed the
capitalist aspirations of sections of the petty bourgeoisie: "the
need of an education on the lines of book-keeping and business
methods, thereby promoting economic uplift, initiative and
efficiency"; and "urging successful business men and women to
provide frequent public lectures calculated to rouse the national
conscience and to stimulate African latent gifts in trading and
business capacity".67
These decisions of the AAC are an apparently strange, and
potentially contradictory, mixture. They included recognition
that those elected under the Hertzog Bill structures were "the
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accepted mouthpiece of Africans in their various representative
state chambers"rthis is combined with an attempt to turn those
representatives into delegates of the AAC. The conference placed
an obligation on those elected individuals to attend AAC meetings
"to discover African views and to give an account of their
"stewardship'.69 The Constitution laid down that all chiefs were ex
officio members of the organisation's Executive.m Despite the
conservative aspects of the 1937 decisions, the radicals within
the AAC, focussing on different decisions, saw the 1937
conference as reflecting the continuing expression of the
militant popular will within the AAC.
The reality was, however, that the majority of the organised
petty bourgeoisie were not defeated in a political contest with
the radicals. Nor were they drawn along behind the leadership of
those radicals. The AAC leaders who had become committed to
participation in the NRC elections had no particular need to
pursue the matter through the AAC. The elected seats on the NRC
were distributed provincially - and it was at that level that the
potential candidate faced the most likely opposition - either in
the form of opposing candidates, or by an organised radical
element.
In this period, the ANC was a federation of largely autonomous
provincial unitsil the provincial organisations of the ANC were
far more important, in NRC electoral terms, than the irregular
gathering of leaders which the AAC amounted to. As an
organisation of opposition to the Hertzog Bills, the AAC had
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proved to be still-born. As an organisation through which an
accommodation to those Bills could be structured, it also
presented problems. Firstly, the organisation had a record of
opposition to the Bills, agreed at the 1935 conference,
reaffirmed by the 1936 special Executive meeting, and strongly
suggested by the 1936 resolution. Secondly, there was an
organised radical component of the AAC which would resist any
accommodation. Thirdly, the structure of the AAC was not
electorally useful. As electoral machines, the local community
organisations, urban advisory boards, traditional tribal
structures and provincial congresses of the ANC were all far more
appropriate Not surprisingly, the majority of the AAC leadership
layer simply deserted the organisation; with electoral bases in
the provinces, and the NRC providing a new national forum through
which they believed they could better organise their relationship
to the government, the elements within the black petty
bourgeoisie who had accepted the new laws politically turned
their backs on the AAC.
The Seme leadership of the ANC had been characterised by retreat73
right-wing politics, divisions, and undemocratic procedures.
Walshe argues that "by 1933 he had reduced the Bloemfontein
Congress to a farce" 7. 4
 The threat posed by fusion and the
"challenge" of the AAC promoted attempts by Seme to revive an
organisation which had been merely "limp[ing] along."75 The major
element in these moves was Seme's plan for establishing a series
76of businesses under the ANC - the African Congress Clubs. But the
basis for his leadership of Congress was being eroded by events.
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As we have seen, Seme's leadership had arisen out of the
perceived need by a section of the black petty bourgeoisie to
present themselves as moderate and responsible, and thereby avoid
the attacks which they believed a Gumede leadership would have
provoked. With the consolidation of fusion, and the enactment of
the Hertzog Bills, that basis for Seme's leadership no longer
existed.
In 1936 Calata became acting General Secretary, and was confirmed
in this position by the elections of 1937. In 1937 Mahabane, who
was at that time an AAC Vice-President, was elected President-
General, to replace Seme.77
 The immediate importance of the ANC for
the black petty bourgeoisie at this stage was as an electoral
machine; that importance would extend to the way in which it
connected with the NRC. The change of leadership had, in part, to
do with preparing the ANC to play this new role. As far as that
went, the ANC proved reasonably successful. With the exception of
the Transvaal, the ANC was able to put forward a list of
candidates and contribute to their success in the 1937 NRC
elections:8 This served to confirm the belief of key leaders that
it was the ANC which could, on the one hand, help secure their
election to positions of apparent national authority; and, on the
other, leave them with the relative autonomy which they had
enjoyed at a provincial level more or less intact. The experience
of the 1937 elections confirmed the decision to effectively
desert the AAC in favour of the ANC. The fact that the ANC (or
any other organisation) was not able to secure a full success as
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far as the nomination and election of candidates was concerned,
became one of the pressures making for a re-organisation of the
Congress. This process was most clear in the Transvaal, where the
failure of the provincial Congress promoted rapid moves to
revitalise it. In 1937, the Reef and Pretoria Co-ordinating
Committee of leaders was formed, with the goal of resurrecting
the Transvaal ANC:9
But the movement into and within the ANC at this stage cannot be
explained simply in terms of its advantages as an electoral
vehicle. There were three other factors which explained the
movement which was in motion; firstly, the traditional leaders of
the ANC were aware of a "problem" being posed, or which was
looming, out of the development of an articulate, semi-organised,
relatively radicalised layer of the urban petty bourgeoisier
Seme's response to this developing challenge had been to denounce
radical moves as an attempt to destroy the ANCT Calata was to
pursue a different alternative. It became a goal, from the
viewpoint of Calata, to re-organise the ANC in such a way as to
incorporate that potential source of opposition 2 secondly, the
stirring and growing combativity amongst layers of the working
class was filtering through and beginning to affect the political
perception of elements within the petty bourgeoisie;83 and thirdly,
state action had removed the security buffer, which at least some
elements of the black petty bourgeoisie saw in the Cape franchise
- or, more particularly, in the hope that the Cape franchise
provided a springboard for its extension s': All of these factors
created pressure for a shift away from the conservatism of the
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Seme leadership.
Mahabane became a stop-gap leader. He was reasonably acceptable
to the emerging radicals - and certainly did not present the same
clear target as Seme. He was also not regarded as a threat by the
provincial leaders. Meanwhile, from the less frontline position
of Secretary General, Calata set about organising the ANC along
lines which would consolidate its usefulness in relation to the
NRC structure 5 without alienating "the graduates". The
reconstruction of the ANC was in motion. But, through the period
under discussion, its position as the leading organisation of the
black petty bourgeoisie was by no means established.
Despite a major shift by the petty bourgeoisie when the Bills
became law, elements within the petty bourgeoisie persisted with
a radical rejection of the electoral framework which the Bills
established. These people, some of whom were influenced by
Trotskyism, were, and remained, the most active enthusiasts of
the AAC. Tabata is particularly useful, not just as an analyst of
the AAC, but because he was a participant whose ex post facto
analysis reveals much of the thinking of radicals in the AAC at
the time. They were responsible for the radical developments in
the programme of the AAC, and for the decision to establish it as
a permanent organisation. For these radicals, the AAC had
represented the will of the oppressed people; it was seen as the
alliance of the people into a united, radical, organic whole of
Opposition. Both the compromise, and the shift towards
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participation meant breaking the unity which was seen as having
an organisational existence in the AAeHow valid is the picture
protrayed by Tabata? To what extent did the AAC express the
interests of "the oppressed people"? To what extent were those
interests organised within the AAC? Did it represent an alliance
between the petty bourgeoisie and the working class?
In its 1929 programme, the CP had expressed its commitment to
promoting the leadership of the working class in an alliance with
the petty bourgeoisie!' This was consistent with the orthodox
position of Communists on the issue of class alliances. The
objective basis for an alliance between the black petty
bourgeoisie and the working class is twofold: black workers and
the black petty bourgeoisie are both oppressed as blacks; black
workers and the great majority of the black petty bourgeoisie
suffer under the capitalist economy. But that objective basis for
an alliance does not immediately translate into the
concretisation, in the actual political process, of the type of
alliance to which the CP had declared itself committed. Nor does
an analytical identification of an oppression which spans
different classes provide a precise understanding of the
particular political relationship between them. Is there the
perception of a common enemy and shared immediate goals; are
workers and the petty bourgeoisie organised together; is there an
organised alliance between their class organisations; is there
collaboration on a shared programme, or on specific policies?
Which class interests does such a programme and such policies
represent? It is on the basis of answers to such questions that
the relationship between the black petty bourgeoisie and black
workers will be concretised in each historical period.
In the period under discussion, black workers and the great
majority of the black petty bourgeoisie shared a common interest
in opposing the Hertzog Bills; they faced attacks from a common
enemy. Apart from the general underlying factors which create the
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basis for a class alliance, these were immediate political
factors which concretely expressed that potential. Behind those
immediate common objectives, however, were a set of experiences
and interests which did not automatically pull the two different
classes together. Those differences were to mean that the common
immediate interests of the two classes emerged, not out of a
complete unity of identical interests, but out of a co-incidence
of different class interests.
The Hertzog Bills raised three major issues - the franchise, the
land, and the associated issue of the pass laws.88 On the issue of
the land, Mokgatle provides us with an insight into the thinking
of workers in the towns for the first time. Describing a society
which he had set up with some friends he wrote:"Our sole aim was
to raise money to buy plots of land and eventually build on the
properties which could bring us enough income to become rich
men."
89The story of the failure of that society and the completely
unrealisable nature of the dream was the story of many blacks who
were moving to work in the towns for the first time. For the
blacks still on the land, the dream must have been a little more
basic, but was equally unrealisable. The dominance of capitalist
relations had meant that more and more blacks were unable even to
maintain a subsistence living on the land. They were forced to
become wage labourers for at least part of the yearr And
ineluctably, the movement of blacks from peasant farming into
capitalist agriculture, and into the towns in search of work and
wages continued. In 1932, a government commission had pointed to
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the position of labour tenants:
"[A] very important factor is the small proportion of the farm
wage which is paid in cash. Generally the amount is not enough
for the cash requirements of the labour tenant, and he must
necessarily increase it by going to work elsewhere."9'
The commission had also identified the massive movement to the
towns: "One of the outstanding migrational movements in the Union
is the movement of the young Natives to towns.'92 Under
capitalist relations that process was irreversible. For growing
numbers of blacks in rural areas the underlying issue was not
ownership, or even access to enough land. It was from an income,
from the sale of labour power, that the means of social
reproduction of these people was achieved. 93 That meant that they
were being caught up in a process of proletarianisation. For the
4
workers living, working, or depending on the income derived from
the sale of labour power in the capitalist farming sector, the
underlying issue was even more clearly that of an adequate
income. But, for a minority of black landowners, ownership of the
land was not a direct means of keeping alive but, rather, a means
of making a profit. Land was, in other words, a capital asset.
Access to more land was posed for them in terms of the
possibility of acquiring more capital. That is why some of them
were willing to welcome the approach of the Native Lands Trust?4
which formalised the legal situation regarding purchase of land;
and some of them were willing to seriously entertain the notion
of segregation - which would open the door to ownership of more
land, without "white" competition.95
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For the urban petty bourgeoisie the importance of the land issue
was different. The issue of the land was not posed in terms of
capital, or potential capital - but in terms of rights and
security. Concretely, this meant that the land issue was
translated into the demand for the right to urban freehold9.6The
Trust and Lands Act raised the issue, to the extent that it
opened up the general question of the rights of black ownership.
In addition, for the urban petty bourgeoisie, there was an
importance in the land question in the sense that attacks against
any section of the petty bourgeoisie brought forward the
possibility of further attacks against them.
The Hertzog Bills raised the issue of the pass laws - not
directly through their content, but through the related issues of
movement to the towns, and the rights of residence in the towns.
They also represented the determination of the government -
reflected soon in the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act - to
modernise the pass laws and tighten up control in the growing
population concentrations in the urban areas generally. Of those
blacks who were exempt, the great majority would come from the
petty bourgeoisie?' The way in which pass law raids were conducted
- at centres like railway stations, where workers were likely to
congregate, also made it likely that the impact of the pass laws
was greatest for black workers.98
Umsebenzi posed the reasons for a common defence of the
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franchise:
"It may be true that the present Cape native franchise is of
little use to the Natives of the Union. But it follows from this
not that we should willingly surrender this franchise, but that
we should fight resolutely to extend it, to make it a universal
franchise for all the Natives in the Union, that we should fight
for a common voters roll of black and white all over the Union. "99
In the concrete situation, defence of the existing franchise was
inevitably remote from workers who had no direct link with that
franchise. Only the demand for a universal franchise could have
definitively changed that situation. That was the demand which
would have reflected the interests of both the petty bourgeoisie
and the working class. But, in the face of the attack of the
Hertzog Bills, the petty bourgeoisie focussed on the defence of
its franchise as it existed.'w
On each of these issues, the objective potential for shared
demands between the black workers and the great majority of the
black petty bourgeoisie existed: the abolition of all pass laws;
the abolition of all segregation measures; the universal
franchise. The first two of these demands had been repeatedly
made by organisations of the black petty bourgeoisiealthough, in
making the demands, there was the basis for a division between
the voteless urban petty bourgeoisie and the enfranchised rural
landowners. But in the face of the attacks coming from the state,
the majority leadership of the organised petty bourgeoisie
clearly believed that this was the time for a retreat, with as
much salvaged as possible, rather than the time for a concerted
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stand of resistance; nor could such a stance have been
effectively taken without acceptance of the demand for the
universal franchise.
It was in the area of actual resistance that the lines pursued by
the petty bourgeoisie and the working class were to diverge most
sharply. The opposition of the organised petty bourgeoisie had
generally focussed away from the point where the law would most
directly affect the mass of workers - at its point of
application. Instead, the focus had tended to be on the visible
point of decision-making - parliament. This was the point at
which the black petty bourgeoisie identified its allies within
the state - the point of apparent decision-making at which "it
was not without friends". Once the decision was taken at that
level, the declared opposition from the black petty bourgeoisie
began to crumble. The leadership of the black petty bourgeoisie
could survive under the law as it was, and it was therefore able
to accept the law because it was the lawl°2
Insofar, however, as the Hertzog Bills were immediately relevant
to the mass of workers, this was not primarily as a decision in
Parliament, or through the removal of a franchise they had never
had. The central issue was the threat of the imposition of
streamlined pass laws, and the intention to harden the
implementation of the pass laws which the Bills represented. This
was a period in which the resistance by workers to the pass laws
was being reflected in the growing anger directed at the pick-upP
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The growing anger and rising combativity inside the working class
created the basis for a mass movement of opposition directed at
the Hertzog Bills and the range of issues which workers were
facing. The fact that the petty bourgeoisie was under attack
promoted the possibilities of an alliance between the two
classes. But these factors did not, in themselves, ensure that
the interests of the working class would be fully represented in
such an alliance, or that the alliance would be under the
leadership of the working class. What role did the CP play in
this situation?
A combination of state attacks and the policies adopted by the
Party meant that it had moved into the period under discussion as
a weakened, disoriented and divided forcer 4The divisions in the
CP, reflected in the opposing approaches put forward by Bach and
Kotane, were further revealed in a debate which developed in
Umsebenzi from the beginning of 1935.° 5
 whileboth Bach and Kotane
were in the Soviet Union. The debate focussed on the existence or
otherwise of a black bourgeoisie, and returned to the unresolved
issue of the meaning of the Native Republic slogan.106
 Behind the
debate was the question of the approach which the Party took to
non-working class blacks generally. Kotane's letter, although
breaking with some of the abstractions of the third period, had
provided no developed clarity on the issue. The implications of
his letter were that the way forward was based on the "national
consciousness" of the "native people". While Bach and Kotane were
in the Soviet Union, the third period position was put in the
1	 1 08debate by Mark 07s and Mofutsanyana. Roux109
 and CokaMargued against
it. While this debate was proceeding, there was a major change of
policy within the Comintern. That change overtook the debate
inside the CPSA - with the result that the break from the
politics of the third period became the product of a Comintern
decisionrbefore the issues posed by Kotane, and in the Umsebenzi
debate were resolved by the CPSA.
The struggle against fascism was, according to the Comintern, now
to be pursued through the quest by the working class and
Communist Parties for alliances with "progressive forces.°12In the
event, almost any force which was willing to oppose war (until
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the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941), or collaborate in
a military alliance against Hitler (after the invasion), came to
be regarded as such a progressive ally. The Peoples Front policy
of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern represented a major
break from the sectarianism of the third period, and appeared to
confirm the policy approach being taken by the Kotane opposition
within the CPSA. With striking similarities to the way in which
the Native Republic programme came to be adopted, the change of
policy in the Comintern co-melded with pressures for a change
inside the SA Party. The Party was able to make a break with the
politics of the third period, but was freed from the pressure of
reaching theoretical clarity on the issues which had been posed
before it, and was able instead to turn to the new Comintern
policy. As was the case with the united front approach in
1923/1924, and the adoption of the Native Republic programme, the
Comintern policy provided a theorisation of the political shift.
The doubts about a sectarian position in relation to the
oppressed black petty bourgeoisie, and the response to the
radicalisation amongst elements within that petty bourgeoisie
were now given theoretical expression in terms of the Peoples
Front policy. The change in policy and activity which was set in
motion did not represent a change in the Party's theoretical
method, but the fact that that method was being employed in
changed political circumstances. With these changes was to
develop the quest, not just for an alliance between the working
class and the black petty bourgeoisie, but for an alliance with
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"progressive sections of capital" as well.
In September 1935, Umsebenzi clearly stated the break with the
politics of the third period. The article pointed to the
sectarianism within the broader international Communist movement,
and continued:
"In South Africa, too, for we are not exceptional, the Party has
suffered from the left sectarian tendencies, tending to isolate
the Party from the toiling masses. It is our immediate task, on
the lines laid down by the Seventh Congress, to set about
liquidating these left sectarian tendencies, which still persist
in the Party and which cause a faulty approach to the masses of
workers and toilers, and in particular to the forming of a broad
peoples' united front against imperialism, fascism and war."113
The new policies of the CP would, it was hoped, carry it forward
out of the sectarianism and isolation of the third period. The
Party and its supporters turned resolutely to the task of
building Peoples Front alliances. It was a task which seemed
clear-cut, after the policies of the third period. But it
immediately brought significant political problems. Who were the
allies in the Peoples Front to be? In Soviet foreign policy
terms, the allies were "progressives" and "democrats" who would
oppose war in general. This approach led the Soviet Union into a
persistent misconceived effort to forge an alliance with the
bourgeois democracies as the political means of fighting fascise
In each national situation, it meant the alliance with any forces
which would declare themselves against fascism and war. The
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theoretical method of the South African Party, reinforced by the
Comintern policies, led it in the direction of two major
potential allies. These were the forces which were most visible,
best organised and regarded as most likely to join in such an
alliance - the black petty bourgeoisie and the white unions. In
December 1935 two conferences were held which the Party welcomed
as laying the basis for the Peoples Front - the Johannesburg
Conference of the League against Fascism and War 5 and the
Bloemfontein Conference of the AAC:16
The Party was initially muted in its enthusiasm for the AAC,
arguing that "nothing very effective has been decided to put up a
struggle against these [Hertzog] Bills becoming law":17 But, in
the spirit of the new quest for allies, Umsebenzi soon made it
clear that the CP regarded the AAC as the primary organisation of
the "African people". When Seme voiced his opposition to the
possibility of the AAC becoming a permanent organisation,
Umsebenzi replied:118
"Surely it must be obvious to any sensible person that the broad
representative character of the AAC is by far a more competent
body to decide what steps to take further for the rights of the
African people than the 'ANC'"; "...all the worth and help the
ANC is to the Native people in their plight is like a fountain in
comparison to the sea."119
If the AAC was the organisation which best fitted the Peoples
Front approach, how was the CP to pursue its relationship with
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that organisation? Proposals are put forward to strengthen the
AAC - the affiliation of trade unions and the establishment of
local branches. The Party warns against the AAC becoming "a
Parliament of the Bantu people, with annual conferences, to
discuss abstract sentimental questions of no importance "! ° But CP
members, in participating in the deliberations of the first AAC
meeting, agree to all its proposals, and in fact put forward a
resolution which is not distinguishable in tone or demands from
any other proposed by the petty bourgeoisief l The Party
enthusiastically welcomed the Day of Humiliation. In its pre-
publicity, there is no indication of any plan of how the Day of
Humiliation is to be used:22 0n what the Party calls "this all-
123important question" of whether to boycott the NRC elections, no
policy is put forward. Repeatedly, articles in Umsebenzi raise
the importance of the issue 24and it is clearly stated that "the CP
must give a lead to the toiling masses of South Africa" on the
question:25But at no stage was this lead forthcomin
the attitude of the majority within the AAC had been made clear,
that the CP shifted into line behind them and adopted a public
position of opposition to the boycott.
A combination of the method of the Party and the policies of the
Comintern created the pressure for the Party to follow, rather
than attempt to lead, potential allies. The empiricist method
directed towards surface appearances. And at that level, the
petty bourgeoisie appeared to be the main political actor, and
appeared to be moving in a progressive direction. The CP was
ready to follow those moves. When these meant that
g1.26 It was after
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organisationally the petty bourgeoisie deserted the AAC and
turned to the ANC, the CP followed again. For two years, when
that shift was not yet absolutely clear, the CF publicly favoured
the AAC:nOnly when the moves to revitalise the ANC were clearly
under way did the Party follow, with members becoming centrally
involved in the formation of the Reef and Pretoria Co-ordinating
Committee:28 As far as Comintern policy was concerned, that
established the Peoples Front as the absolute priority of the
Party. This came to mean, in effect, a policy of no public
criticism of potential alliesTOne of the consequences of this
was that, on major political questions, the CF placed itself in a
position where it was more likely to follow the lead of potential
allies, than to put forward a lead of its own.
The second potential ally to which the Party was directed was the
unions of the white workers. The Party promoted two front
organisations - the Friends of the Soviet Union and the League
against Fascism and War:30 In neither of these cases was the Party
able to secure the affiliation of its real target - the TLC. But,
for a part of the period under discussion, the Party could see
some success. At the 1935 TLC conference, a motion was adopted
instructing the NEC "to bring into existence a Workers and
Peoples' Front to fight on the economic and political fields for
the democratic rights of all people"?' In October 1936, the TLC
convened a conference which set up the Peoples Front Movement:32
Andrews was in the chair and the organising committee included a
significant minority of Communists and supporters: 33 At the
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conference, an attempt by Communists to have demands relating to
black workers discussed was defeatee4 In the 1937 elections for
the TLC Executive Wolfson, Andrews, Johanna Cornelius, Tyler,
Kalk, Weinberg, Weinbren and Sachs were all electee5
Umsebenzi of 25 January 1936 reports the victory of Emmerich, a
Communist, over Stuart, leader of the Cape Federation, in the
elections for Secretary of the Tramwaymens Union. (The election
result was soon after reversed on a technicality.) Stuart, the
leader of the Cape Federation, was described as "the most
reactionary and most dangerous trade union functionary in SA" and
"the chief cause of the most backward state of affairs prevailing
there, the weakest organisation of workers, and, on the whole,
the worst conditions of labour.—
Cape Federation and the TLC developTthe Party press reports drop
the categorisation, or any criticism of Stuart.
In April 1937, there was a strike at the Simmer and Jack Mine
against the refusal of a member of the Mynwerkersbond to pay
union dues. The strike, which was almost 100% supported, was seen
by the Party as a great blow against the NationalistsT As a
result of the strike, a closed shop agreement was reached with
the Chamber. The employers agreed to deal only with already
recognised unions2 39But the deal also included an effective no-
strike agreement14°In its enthusiastic support for what was seen
as a blow against Nationalism, the Party did not take up the
potential damage of the no-strike aspect of the agreement:4'
"136As unity moves between the
281
In relation to the LP, the CP adopted a position which was far
more conciliatory than any previous position, including the CP
support for the Pace. 42 The major criticism was directed at the
failure of the LP to join the Peoples Front Movement: 43 In the
Transvaal Provincial election campaign the Party declared that
"apart from the foregoing [the red-herring of segregation] we
believe that the LP is sincere in its endevours [sic] to improve
the lot of the poor people." 1441n the 1937 Johannesburg municipal
elections, the Party wrote to the LP, proposing an electoral
agreement (on a programme which included the demand for a
differential minimum wage for black and white municipal workers)r
Despite the overtures, the LP retained its traditional positions
and refused any collaboration with the CP, or the political
ventures of the TLC in which the Party had significant influence.
Despite this single setback, the successes served to confirm the
primary orientation to the white workers, for some individuals
within the Party.
But the orientation which the Party was adopting created
difficulties in any attempt to win the support of Afrikaans
workers 1.46 The quest was for organised allies and, especially for
those members and supporters of the Party in leading positions
within the TLC, the support of the organised union movement was a
priority, ahead of any attempts to win the support of rank and
file Afrikaans workers. The dropping of criticism of the LP, and
the uncritical acclamation for the Simmer and Jack settlement
opened up the CP to the criticism from Nationalist agitators
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that it was ready to sacrifice the Afrikaans workers in favour of
the union and political leaders who adopted racist attitudes
towards them - and also in favour of the blacks.
The single significant trade union sucess for Afrikaner
Nationalists in this period was on the Railways, which was one of
the main centres of employment for Afrikaans workers'. 47 The
Spoorbond was formed in 1934, and recognised by management in
1942. It was largely made up of the lowest paid unskilled
workers145 In the mid-30's, it claimed 16,000 membere9Initially,
it had been amongst white collar workers that there was support
for Afrikaner nationalism: 5° From within this layer there was
pressure for a turn to the mass of railway workers, not because
they were part of the yolk, but because they could provide a mass
base which would strengthen the white collar workers. The eight
craft unions on the Railways, however, combined in opposition to
the Spoorbond, ensuring that even with its widespread support
amongst a layer of workers, it would always face a hostile
majority within the union movementr l In this, the craft unions
could naturally rely on the support of the employers, for whom
divisions amongst the unions seemed only to be of benefit.
Despite these obstacles, the Spoorbond was successful, both in
developing an industrial working class base for the Afrikaner
Nationalists, and in achieving the retreat and collapse of
NURAHS, under Nationalist pressurer 2 However, the failure of the
attempts by the Nationalists to undermine the position of Sachs
amongst the Afrikaans women in the clothing industry was
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demonstrated at a debate between Sachs and Grobelaar, of the
Nationalist Hervormingsorganisasie. At a meeting of 3,000 only 20
people voted against Sachs53
In 1936, the 6th National Conference of the CPSA confirmed the
dual orientation of the Party. The conference resolved that the
main methods of Party work were the national liberation of the
Natives through the AAC, and political and economic struggle in
the trade unions14 For many Party members, and in much Party
propaganda, there was no particular orientation to black workers.
Insofar as work amongst organised blacks was concerned, the
priority was the AAC (and then the ANC) ahead of the black
unions255There is no evidence that the CP pursued its earlier call
for the affiliation of unions to the AAC, and the establishment
of local AAC branches. The "political and economic struggle in
the unions" referred primarily to the TLC unions - in which
individual CP members held several leadership positions16At
times, as had been the case in the past, the orientation to white
workers reflected a continuation of aspects of the white labour
tradition. In 'Communism and the Native Question', a pamphlet
produced by the Johannesburg District of the Party in this
period, this was carried into a crude racism. In the pamphlet,
there is an attempt to appeal to white workers by criticising the
civilised labour policy for not securing their interests. But the
basis of the criticism is that the policy has failed because it
has not stopped blacks from having "far more than their share in
the number of jobs"TIn passages which are not dissimilar to
Nationalist propaganda, the document considers how best to avoid
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racial mixing. Notwithstanding the consistent anti-racist
commitment of the Party, the document reflects a minority
tendency within the Party to seek to combat the growing influence
of Nationalists amongst white workers by adapting to racism, in
effect using some of the racist arguments of the Nationalists.
In 1937, the ANC was beginning to replace the AAC as the
organisational focus as far as blacks were concerned, but the
dual orientation continued. By the time of the 1937 conference,
the work of the Party had promoted the formation of the Peoples
Front Movement, and individual Party members were increasingly
located within the ANC: 58The conference heard from Mofutsanyana
that "conditions had never been so favourable as they then were
for a revolutionary movement" 1.59Within a year, that optimism had
given way to the "crisis conference" of 19381.60
There were developments in 1938 which could have promoted the
change in the Party assessment. In that year, the TLC, fearing
the pressure of Nationalists, retreated, and withdrew support
from the Peoples Front Movement. In its place, the Council for
the Maintenance of Democracy was set up, with the CP being
specifically barred from affiliationr'In the Transvaal, a major
focus of the Party had been the NRC elections. When these were
over, the Party was faced with the need to develop a new
immediate focus. The LP had clearly rejected the overtures from
the CP. And, as far as the black unions were concerned, the
failure of a "unity" meeting in 1938 had left the Party in a
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position where the unions which it influenced had far fewer
members than a rival, Trotskyist-influenced organisatiori.62But
1938 brought successes, as far as the quest for allies was
concerned. In April, a Non-European Unity conference was held,
and the Non-European United Front was set up ml an organisation in
which Communists had strong influence from the very outsetT4
It was not, then, simply the experience of failure which promoted
the crisis of 1938. Rather, the clear setbacks which elements
within the Party had received brought to the fore a confusion of
orientation, method and policy which had been embedded in the
Party through the whole period. The renewed Native Republic
debate in 1935 clearly reveals that confusion. As the
participants in the Party debate revealed, the problem was not
simply the meaning of the Native Republic slogan, but the
political confusion of the Party membership. In April 1935, Roux
wrote: "Even today I doubt whether the average rank and filer in
the Party has a clear picture of the Native Republic. 465in the
next edition of Umsebenzi, A Z replied:
"If Comrade Roux will say that an independent Native Republic is
a stage towards a workers' and peasants' government, and I say
that it is a workers' and peasants' government, what will the
average rank and filer who Cde Roux speaks of, understand?
"I say there are Native exploiters, he says there are only
elements of exploitation in South Africa. Why not discuss such
questions in any form he likes within the Party until we come to
an understanding? I maintain that speaking of clarity of the
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average members of the party, when the leading party members are
not in agreement is nonsense. It is only when the leading members
of the party arrive at an understanding that we should not only
go to the rank and file members of our party and explain to them,
but Umsebenzi will give them a line and not two opinions, to
confuse them.
Confusion was also revealed on the central orientation of the
period - the Peoples Front. The Party looked for, but could not
find, the "progressive elements of the bourgeoisie" to which the
Peoples Front policy directed it:
"As to the 'peoples front', it is evedent [sic] that the
difficulties of having such a front of Whites and Natives
together are at present insurmountable because there is no
economic base for the rapproachement [sic] of the White bourgeois
elements that go to make up such a wider front with the Natives
for the moment. Besides the Natives who are already subject to
impirialist [sic] dictatorship fascist in charatar [sic] can not
be called upon to defend democratic rights which they have not
..167
got."
Given the dual orientations - to the black petty bourgeoisie and
the white unions - were there to be two fronts, or one? Reporting
on a CP meeting to discuss the Party programme, SAW writes:
"Comrade Mofutsanyana demonstrated clearley [sic] that the
Peoples Front could not be two separate fronts for the European
on the one hand and the Native on the other, for both black and
white have the [sic] common enemy, the Government and the
”166
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employers.
Immediately after this, the Party proceeded to participate in the
establishment of the "all-white Peoples Front Movement" which was
hailed as a major step forward.169
 And the debate clearly continued:
"There can be no talk of two fronts if the struggle has to be
between the oppressors and the oppressed. The parallel lines of
the working class in this country are not fronts, but two
sections of one front, working on the conditions and
peculiarities of SA as we find them. If proper educational bases
are laid these two parallel lines will converge as one mighty
army against the common enemy of all the imperialist
exploiters.	 ,,170
The Guardian, referring to moves towards the establishment of the
NEUF writes:
"[O]ut of experience a non-European front is being forged. It
would be disastrous, however, if the movement was to take on a
general anti-white character. Its success depends in the long run
upon the degree of unity that can be achieved with the white
worker, whose interests are broadly the same as those of the non-
European. o71
Apart from an abstract theoretical sense, if there was meant to
be one front, how could the educational bases be laid, and the
bridge between the "two sections" be buil-CrThe reality was that
no serious attempt could be made to integrate the two different
formations without serious criticisms which, while necessary for
political clarity, might alienate the potential ally. The racism
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of the white union leaders, as well as their political
conservatism, had to be addressed if a single mass front was a
serious goal; similarly, as regards the depth of support for
British imperialism amongst elements of the organised petty
bourgeoisie; and the fact that the interests and demands of the
black petty bourgeoisie and black workers were overlapping, but
not identical. Without these issues being taken up seriously,
there was no possibility of a single Peoples Front, even on the
terms conceived by the Party. But the politics of alliance before
political leadership meant that such criticism could not be
raised. Nor could political criticism from the CP alone bridge
the gap between the two fronts which were developing.
There was only one bridge which could seriously have achieved the
task - the movement of black workers. It was only where the
strength of black workers was clear that both the white workers
and the black petty bourgeoisie could have been drawn towards the
black workers and, in that way, towards a broader alliance. But,
in the period under discussion, the resurgence of the workers'
movement was still in its initial phase. Black workers were not
powerfully organised; nor were they taking action in a way which
clearly showed their strength. The CP itself was focussing on
other social groups, before the mass of the working class. The
only possible way of pursuing that politics meant that the
alliances with the black petty bourgeoisie and the white workers
had to be pursued separately. And that is what had been
happening. The very fact that it was happening created confusion
in the Party. If that was the situation, surely it had to be
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explained - and justified. A debate on these issues developed
inside the Party. That such a debate should be conducted publicly
from time to time suggests that uncertainty reached deep into the
Party. The question began to be posed as to whether the Party
should not be divided formally, in accordance with the way in
which it was becoming divided actually. And, connected with that
question, confusion began to develop about the very existence of
the Party. If Fronts were the main weapon of the working class -
and if the policy of those fronts had to be pursued and could not
be openly critcised, then what role could the Party play in
relation to the Fronts?
All of these confusions were contained within the Party from the
beginning of the Peoples Front turn 73 And, through the whole
period, remnants of the internal regime established in the third
period persisted. SAW revealed a part of the situation which had
developed:
"The growth of the membership of the CPSA Johannesburg District,
compared with the activities of the members themselves reveal a
serious and criminal neglect of their individual duties in the
party. Every week, we have new members filling in forms for
membership, especially Natives. The groups function, but in most
of them the attendance is very poor. Not every member is active.
The majority are do-nothing spectators.—. One of the reasons for
such political irresponsibility in the Party is the political low
level of our members. "174
The orientation, method and policies of the Party led it into the
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situation described in SAW. The result of these was the crisis
conference, at which it was seriously proposed that the Party
should formally split into racial wings 1.75 That proposal was
rejected. In its place, as the only solution which was agreed,
the headquarters of the Party was moved to Cape Town 1?6 In that
geographic move was a political shift which was to develop over
time.
The NEUF had been established in Cape Town, and the local branch
of the CP was centrally involved in its formation, development
and leadership. Although unions attended the founding conference,
and individual unionists became leading figures in the NEUF:77it
was predominantly an organisation of the black petty bourgeoisie,
drawing together "Coloureds" and Africans in particular. The CP
involvement in the NEUF represented, in part, a continuation, in
different circumstances, of the orientation to the black petty
bourgeoisie which had been pursued in the Transvaal. There were
two important differences in the Cape: the struggle against
segregation measures was still being pursued - and was to
escalate sharply in 1939i78 and the majority of unions in the Cape
were affiliated to the Federation in which the CP was far less
firmly located than was the case with the TLC:79
In the meantime, the Party continued with its quest for allies
after the emergency conference, focussing on the ANC, the NEUF,
and the TLC. The move to Cape Town may have resolved problems of
spirit in the leadershiprBut it did not clarify the political
confusion which had, in part, promoted those problems. It was a
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change in political circumstances in the opposition movement
generally, rather than a change of political method and
orientation, which brought the CP out of the crisis of 1938. The
Party had changed its politics from those of the third period. It
had done so, however, without the method of the Party, its
theoretical empiricism and abstraction, being consciously
challenged. As we have seen, the fact that there were "mistakes"
in the third period had been acknowledged by the PartyrBut there
was no serious attempt to analyse and account for those mistakes.
The "mistakes" of the third period are criticised, while the
validity of the policies which actually produced the "mistakes"
is asserted:
"The Seventh World Congress made a serious change in the line of
the Communist International and its constituent parties. This
change in no way implies that the previous decisions were
incorrect. On the contrary, the decisions of the Communist
International are made in accordance with the conditions
obtaining at the time. The fact that serious mistakes were made
in the application of the correct line —. does not justify the
opposition of some comrades. The purging of the party of
opposition tendencies is the necessary prerequisite for the
successful struggle against fascism.
"The mistakes of the CPSA consist in indulging in academic
discussions regarding the slogan, instead of carrying on
consistant [ sic] mass work, resulting in a faction struggle
within the party and in partial isolation from the masses. ,,182
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More recently, Party historians have acknowledged the confusion
and disorientation in the period under discussion l.a3 But in this
case, again, there is no serious analysis. Simons attributes the
problem to Hardy, the Comintern representative, and his reformist
ideas - without any explanation of how a Comintern representative
could have such ideas, or of why the CPSA accepted them:84
On one issue, where the Party clearly took a different line to
the Soviet leadership, an assessment of the difference is
effectively sidestepped. The invasion of Ethiopia by the Italians
had an enormous impact in South Africa2 85 As Hemson points out:
"When the Communist Party initiated a campaign in support of
Ethiopian resistance to Italian imperialism in August 1935, the
dock workers were enthusiastic supporters of the mass meetings,
and refused to load Italian ships with provisions."' m The CP
called for the League of Nations to impose sanctions, focussing
in particular on the supply of petrol to Mussolini. Umsebenzi
asked:
"[W]here is the League [of Nations] and what is its attitude in
this hour when Fascist Italy is invading Abyssinia? The League is
definitely dominated by Britain and France and these two powers
dictate its policy.
Soviet leadership, was not the defence of Ethiopia against
imperialism, but the pursuit of an international Peoples Front
against Germany. In order not to "alienate" any potential allies
in the League of Nations, the Soviet Union was willing to follow
the path of the League. In the same period, Stalin signed a
°87 But in this period, the priority of the
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treaty with Laval? This further strengthened the Soviet
determination to accept the League of Nations "solution".
Manuilsky, the leader of the Comintern explained the Soviet
position in this way:
" [H]ere.—.is another example which shows that the party in
power occupies a special position; and failure to understand this
may lead to a host of mistakes being committed when working out
the tactical line.
"I refer to the slogan of boycotting Italy in connection with the
Italo-Abyssinian conflict. The Second and Amsterdam
Internationals are calling upon the League of Nations to apply
sanctions.—. Suppose however that the bourgeois states will not
apply these sanctions, and that the USSR will be the only state
which does, —. who will gain by this? The capitalist states
which will maintain relations with Italy. Who will lose by it?
Not Italy but the USSR. Actually the boycott will hit, not
fascist Italy, but the socialist Land of the Soviets."189
The CPSA had made the supposition which Manuilsky called for:
"The workers in all four corners of the earth are realising that
in order that the colonial adventure of Italian Fascism be
stopped .— in order that the world peace be maintained —., it
is not enough to rely on the League of Nations to apply
sanctions, for the workers know how little one can rely on
imperialist governments to apply such sanctions effectively.,090
But the solution which the Party put forward was the continued
call for such sanctions, and working class blacking action:
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"Although we know that the effective application of sanctions is
necessary and we therefore urge such application, the Communist
Party knows that working class action is the strongest and most
reliable weapon."191
The result was a situation in which the CPSA called for and
organised blacking, while the Soviet Union, amongst other
countries, continued to supply Italy with oil.
In a politically fluid and dynamic situation, the effectiveness
of the CP's political activities was undermined by the confusion
and disorientation which its policies and method had created. It
had tried to respond to the growing political volatility amongst
Afrikaans workers by the publication of Die Aarbeider en Arme
Boer in 1.935 1.92 But the priority of the time was organised
alliances - and the Party's orientation was therefore directed
primarily at the "traditional" organisations of the white
workers. Amidst all the other political pressures operating in
the situation, its propaganda aimed at Afrikaans workers was
undermined by its overt attempt to conciliate the leaders of the
organisations which neglected the needs of those workers;
instances of adapting to racism simply repeated the arguments
being put forward more consistently by Nationalist agitators.
In the case of the black petty bourgeoisie, the CP could do
little more than tail that ally - able to do so effectively only
when the movement of the ally was absolutely clear. In the case
of the black workers, the CF became involved in the development
of the unions. Ray Alexander, H A Naidoeand Gomaeere amongst
the leading Communists who played a central role in the
development of the unions. But here too, the political problems
which Party policies had created came to the fore. Out of the
collapse of NURAHS, the Coloured and Indian workers who had been
members formed a new union - the South African Railway and
Harbour Workers' Union (SARHWU3 9.5 Ray Alexander, at that time a
full-time unpaid Party worker became centrally involved in the
development of that new union, and played a leading role in the
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development of other unions in the Cape. But the overall policies
of the CP created three immediate problems: how could the
development of these unions promote the alliance with the TLC
leaders? Would the demands made for blacks be the same as those
made for whites? And would the Peoples Front approach extend to
unions in which Trotskyists were in leading positions? The first
problem was dealt with by a consistent attempt, in the case of
all unions, including those in the Transvaal, to get them to
affiliate to the TLC.196The second was answered by the spread, into
the union sphere, of the dual alliances practice which the CP was
pursuing generally.
At the 1937 TLC conference the Leather Workers' Union, under the
leadership of the CP member Kalk, proposed a racially determined
differential minimum wage of 10/- per day for white workers and
5/- per day for blacksTAt the conference, an amendment was
proposed by the African Iron and Steel Workers Union to increase
the "Native" minimum to 7/6 per day. The amendment was accepted
by Kalk, but rejected by the conference 18 In its 1938 manifesto,
the CP carried the demand for the differental wage agreed by the
TLC conference:99
At the same time as it was putting forward this racially based
demand, the CP strongly opposed the participation of white
secretaries of black unions in attempts to build a single
federation of black unions. In the discussion above, we have seen
a more or less parallel development between the unions which came
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together under the Joint Committee, and those which formed the
Co-ordinating Committee. So far, that dual development has been
identified as an indicator of the resurgence which was
developing. The growth of the unions has been explained as the
result of the growing receptivity to unionism amongst some
workers, and the efforts to tap and develop that receptivity. The
very fact that these developments were taking place in the same
period inevitably opened up the question of unity between the
different unions. A meeting to discuss the issue was held in
November l938°° The meeting opened up the possibility of a
qualitative strengthening of the black unions through the
establishment of a single, authoritative trade union centre.
Given the political fluidity within the petty bourgeoisie, and
the rising combativity of the great mass of unorganised workers,
such an authoritative centre could have played a significant
political role. Above all else, it would have strengthened the
framework of independent class organisation - extending that
option to workers whose rising combativity was making them more
and more receptive to organisation. But the unity meeting was a
complete failure.
The breakdown of unity moves is attributed, by Party analysts, to
the question of the raceof union leadereMakabeni argued - with
the strong support of Communists- that whites should not be
allowed to be general secretaries - although they could be
members of union executives 2.°2 These conditions conform to the
situation prevailing in the Co-ordinating Committee unions, and
are at odds with that in the Joint Committee Unions. The CP has
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explained the position it pursued at the unity meeting in terms
of the need for black unions to be allowed to develop under black
control. Later, at the time of a division inside CNETU, the CP
was to spell out clearly an approach which throws its
explanations of the breakdown of the November meeting into
question. A resolution to the 1945 Party conference, calling for
the establishment of a National Council of Non-European Trade
Unions was defeated:mThe argument - which cut across the rigid
position on black leadership - was that black unions should only
be organised separately where affiliation to the TLC was not
possible!'
The more likely explanation is that the CP was pursuing their
declared policy in relation to Trotskyists in the union movement,
and were prepared to obstruct the possibilities of union unity to
do so2.m Certainly the attitude which the Party demonstrates, as
well as its declared position, suggest that the unions under
Trotskyists were not part of the "labour movement". In Wolfson's
trade union report to the Party conference in 1936, there is no
mention of the Laundry Workers Unior0In March 1937, the Union of
Laundry, Cleaning and Drycleaning Workers was formed in Cape Town
at a meeting attended by La Guma, Gomas and Weinbere7 The SAW
report does not mention the existence of the Transvaal union - at
a time when the CP is actively promoting unity between the Cape
Federation and the TLC. The attitude taken at the November
meeting was in sharp contrast to the conciliatory approach which
was taken in order to promote unity between the Cape Federation
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and the TLe8In the Guardian of 12 August 1938, the Co-ordinating
Committee is described as "representative of practically all
Native trade unions." Hirson points out that Gordon "was reviled
by his political opponents in the CPSA, and a paper such as Chain
Breaker gave publicity almost exclusively to the unions built by
Gana Makabeni"P9
Responding to the Vereeniging "riots", the CP had written:
"The Vereeniging affair —. reveals the fact that the African
masses can not yet understand that the fight against the
instruments of the lawmaker must be made into an organised fight,
as the only means of fighting the real oppressors.—. They can
not understand it because they have no lead.—. The spontaneous
protest in Vereeniging, the Harding affair where tax collectors
were forced to retreat, the ever increasing spontaneous strikes
for higher wages - they are signals to the African leaders. They
indicate that the masses are becoming more and more ready to
fight against their persecution, but the African leaders are
lagging behind the masses. ft210
The CP characterisation of the position of the African leaders is
borne out by developments within the organisations of the petty
bourgeoisie. The dynamics of capitalist development, and the
immediate historical experience of state attacks and defeats
against the workers' movement had placed real obstacles to the
growth of unionism and militant working class action. The working
class had to contend with such obstacles; the failures of the
"African leaders" did, as the CP suggested, constitute a problem.
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But the rising spontaneous combativity, which the CP identifies,
was not simply a problem for the resurgent workers' movement. It
was in fact the driving force of that resurgence. It was that
rising spontaneous combativity which, even if it had led to
isolated defeats in the early phase of the resurgence, was to be
at the root of the massive growth of class organisation and
action which developed in a later stage. The immediate internal
problem which obstructed the resurgence of the workers' movement
was that of divisions between union leaders. As a result of
these, the moves towards union unity failed. For workers who were
becoming more ready and determined to organise and struggle, the
option of independent class organisation was far less visible
than it could have been. At the same time, the petty bourgeoisie
was developing its organisations, and elements within the petty
bourgeoisie were beginning to turn more consciously towards
workers.
Overall, then, the role of the CP in the period under discussion
mirrors the confusion and disorientation in the Party generally.
As far as the resurgence of the workers' movement was concerned,
the Party actually obstructed the development of union unity,
posed as an objective possibility in the situation. As far as the
political fluidity within the black petty bourgeoisie was
concerned, the CP followed, rather than tried to lead. Its own
policies ensured that it was in no way capable of seeking to
direct receptive elements within the black petty bourgeoisie
towards a conscious alliance, behind the resurgent workers'
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movement.
The decision to move the headquarters of the Party from
Johannesburg to Cape Town meant a change in the Party leadership.
The new Political Bureau consisted of H J Simons, Bill Andrews,
Sam Kahn, Cissie Gool and Moses Kotane, who became General
Secretary "CP historians argue that there was "a better spirit ,212
in Cape Town, and explain the progress which the Party made after
the 1938 conference as resulting from the move, and the change of
leadership which it entailed 2. 13The political situation in Cape
Town, and the experience of the Communists there differed in
important ways to that in Johannesburg.
In the case of the ANC, the opposition to the Seme leadership had
resulted in his replacement at the 1936 conference. In the Cape,
the opposition to the conservative leadership of the APO under
Abdurahman had lead to the development of an opposition which
21
organised outside the APO 4. As we have seen, individual Communists
in the Cape were relatively immunised from the purges in the
third period, and, because of the rise of the IANC, were more
connected with the broader movement of opposition than the
Communists in Johannesburg. In 1935, the Communists in the Cape
had become involved in the formation of the National Liberation
League (NLL): 15 The League participated enthusiastically in the
formation of the AAC2,16 and was a central organising force behind
the formation of the NEUFT 7 One feature of the AAC which has not
yet been mentioned is that it brought together into an organised
forum Indians, Africans and Coloureds. For elements within the
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Coloured population of the Western Cape, an alliance with radical
Africans was a way forward out of the conservatism of the
Abdurahman leadership. The collapse of the AAC took away that
organised forum; it was left to the NLL to continue to provide
it.
For the Communists in the Cape, this created two important
differences with the situation in the Transvaal. Firstly, they
co-operated with Trotskyists within the NLL; and, secondly, the
NLL provided an ongoing organised forum through which an
orientation to the black petty bourgeoisie could be structured,
as opposed to the situation in the Transvaal, where the Party was
shifting from the AAC to the ANC. The NLL was based primarily on
individual membership - the NEUF was planned on the basis of
organisational affiliations 2. 18The attempt to develop, from the
experience of the NLL, an organisation based on affiliations
rather than individual membership fitted into the Peoples Front
policy, especially at a time when the CP had clearly decided to
follow the majority of the petty bourgeoisie away from the AAC.
The NEUF, especially after the election of the new Political
Bureau, came to be regarded as the Peoples Front, in the same way
that the AAC had once been seen. The difference was that, very
quickly, the NEUF connected with the rise of a popular mood of
resistance in a way which the AAC had noe 9 But the shift of the
Party headquarters to Cape Town also meant that the NEUF came to
be influenced more directly by the political line of the
Comintern. The relative freedom which the Cape leadership had
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initially had to formulate policies in response to the popular
mood came to be overtaken by the responsibility, imposed upon it
inter alia by its new status, of propagandising the CP attitude
to the war. The move to Cape Town did not simply mean an escape
from the "atmosphere" of the Party in Johannesburg. It meant that
some of the political problems which had promoted the atmosphere
in Johannesburg were brought into the major success of the Party
- the NEUF. The Party in Cape Town now had full responsibility
for pursuing the policies and priorities dictated by the needs of
the Soviet leadership. The relative freedom - which had immunised
the Party in Cape Town from some of the problems of central and
international policy was broken. As far as Communists in the
leadership of the NEUF were concerned, the attempt by the
organisation to take up immediate issues as they appeared in the
mass struggle had to be blended together with the CP policy on
the war. The co-operation with Trotskyists within the NEUF and
NLL could no longer be pursued. These factors promoted the
problem to which Bunting points: "Ideological disunity —.
prevented the Front from establishing itself firmly on a
„220permanent basis.
Earlier in this chapter, the issue of an alliance between the
petty bourgeoisie and the working class was posed. In the period
under discussion, Tabata clearly believes that such an alliance
existed and was expressed in the unity of the people and
organisationally in the AACf 21 According to Bunting, the NEUF laid
the foundations of the national liberation movement which, in the
Party view, represents a revolutionary popular alliance.222
The underlying objective bases for a class alliance were given an
immediacy in the period under discussion by the Hertzog Bills and
the segregation measures proposed in the Cape. But was that
objective basis given subjective expression? Gomas refers to a
"sea of enthusiasm for Unity and Action created by the Convention
all over the Country" F'We have seen already that there was rising
combativity. The extent to which the Convention promoted that
combativity could be argued. It is clear, however, that it did
not create it. To the extent that the black workers knew about
the Convention and the Bills, this information was transmitted to
them by and large through the organisations of the petty
bourgeoisie. This meant that, initially at least, workers would
not be left to form an understanding of the Bills in a political
vacuum. The initial information which they received on the Bills
would almost certainly reflect the particular emphasis and
priorities of the petty bourgeoisie who passed on the
information. When the question of action came to be posed,
different class positions existed. The focus of the petty
bourgeoisie was the decision in Parliament. The focus of the
working class was the actual point of application of the laws.
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For elements within the urban petty bourgeoisie in particular,
once the Bills became law, the Native Representation Act assumed
an increased practical significance - more so than the Lands
Trust Act. But for workers, the immediate meaning of the Bills
was not an election in which they had no part, or no direct partT
but the toughening of the pass laws against which they were
already struggling. To the extent that workers focussed on the
NRC elections, this was because the issue was brought before them
as the immediate focus of the petty bourgeoisie. The extent to
which workers were aware of the Bills, however, has to be
questioned. In 1936, one of the leaders of the AAC was to raise
the point that knowledge of the Bills was not wide and that they
225had not even been translated into African languages. At the Day
of Humiliation meetings (the size of which has been impossible to
discover) it was the leaders of the petty bourgeois organisations
who explained the Bills - and gave their vision of what should be
done about them. As SAW argued:
"There is a danger of the AAC becoming a parliament of the Bantu
people, with annual conferences, to discuss abstract sentimental
questions of no importance unless ways and means can be devised
by which this movement can be activised and the organisation made
really representative of the oppressed and exploited workers of
South Africa. ,,226
That situation was not achieved in the period under discussion.
At every stage, it was the organised petty bourgeoisie taking the
lead, defining the issues, deciding the way forward - and
workers, in the great majority unorganised, being informed of the
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decisions and interpretations. It was a situation, in other
words, in which the process of drawing workers into the movement
directed against the Hertzog Bills was a process under the
leadership of the organised petty bourgeoisie.
Tabata conveys the idea that the radical decisions of the AAC
reflected the upward pressure of the masses on the leaders. As we
have seen, the decisions of the AAC were not all, or
consistently, radical 2:7The 1937 decisions promoted by the left
were accompanied by a petty bourgeois set of economic demands -
and a constitution which gave a place on the Executive to Chiefs.
Those policy decisions of 1937 were taken in what was becoming
the empty shell of an organisation against which the majority of
key leaders of the organised petty bourgeoisie had turned their
backs. And if Tabata's vision is valid, why did the AAC move to
the right, after the 1937 conference, when the resurgence of the
workers' movement was more developed, from the radical positions
of 1935, when that resurgence was only beginning to develop? The
petty bourgeoisie are not immunised from the pressure of the
masses. The rising combativity of the working class would have
permeated upwards, especially to those elements within the petty
bourgeoisie closest to the working class. But, especially in the
first part of the period under discussion (the part which Tabata
regards as the left phase of the AAC), powerful mass pressure did
not come from either of the two most powerful possibilities - a
wave of class action, or powerful independent class
organisations. It was in fact the absence of organised mass
pressure which explains some of the conservative decisions of the
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AAC.
Apart from the driving force of working class mass action, how
could the interests of the working class be articulated within
the AAC, and how could the working class participate in its
decisions, and raise its own priorities within the organisation?
Despite the position of the CP, and the decision of the AAC to
set up local branches, the policy was not carried through.
Although unions were represented at the AAC meetings, there is no
evidence of their leaders raising specifically working class
demands - or of the unions being represented on the AAC
Executive. There was no developed system of rank and file
participation, or channels of leadership accountability. The
participation of the supporters of the AAC was effectively
limited to propaganda meetings where no decisions were taken. In
the actual course of events, any potential which existed for the
interests of the working class to be independently articulated
within the organisational framework provided by the AAC was not
exploited. The confused and disoriented CP was tailing the petty
bourgeoisie, in no political position to attempt to draw it into
an alliance behind the working class, or to seek to build working
class leadership within the AAC. The fact that radicals like
Tabata believed that an alliance had already been spontaneously
constructed meant that they were unable to turn themselves to the
task of actually building it.
For the petty bourgeoisie, the underlying political process of
resurgence within the workers' movement was not yet obvious. Nor
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were they being turned towards that resurgence by the political
groups operating within their class. Neither through action nor
the strength of its organisation was the workers' movement acting
as an immediate factor on the political consciousness of the
organised petty bourgeoisie. This does not mean that elements
within the petty bourgeoisie did not turn towards the workers.
But, to the extent that they did so, it was generally because
they believed that there was a mass of politically uneducated and
inactive blacks who could be "aroused" by the politicised
educated petty bourgeoisie. Jabavu wrote that it was "fortunate
for the Government that the masses of our people are not aware of
what is going on in Parliament as they do not read the papers.
This however is no security for the European race; for the
intelligent [sic] Blacks have a way of passing on the information
and thus act as an agency for creating distrust in the rule of
228
White people." The view of the CP was not without similarities.
Referring to the AAC and United Front Conferences, SAW wrote in
October 1936:
"[T]hey were preceded by a coming together of the leaders of the
different organisations which feel the necessity for unity. The
people of SA who are in the majority unorganised, both European
and non-European did not participate, nor has the meaning and
future of these movements been grasped by the individual workers.
But this means that we have the advantage in this country of
having leaders who see the necessity of rousing and organising
the people and that the conferences were preliminary ones not
based on already existing mass action of workers and people, but
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which WILL lead to ACTION.'29
In the absence of any definitive pressure from the working class,
either through organisation or powerful class action, and given
the political approaches amongst both the radicals and
conservatives within the black petty bourgeoisie, elements within
the leadership of the AAC became more and more vulnerable to
pressure from the state. Without a leadership consciously aiming
at mobilising the mass of workers, there was little possibility
of effective resistance to the passage of the Hertzog Bills.
Given the preliminary state of the resurgence of the workers'
movement, there was little likelihood of spontaneous mass action
in opposition to the passage of those Bills. The white liberals
acted as a conscious political force drawing the AAC leadership
towards participation within the framework of the Bills.
Consistent with the political philosophy of liberalism, they were
prepared to counsel opposition to the Bills, but also
acquiescence, once the Bills became law. Obeying the law, and
campaigning within the law to change it, were greater priorities
than the struggle to resist the law'j It was in this way that the
AAC, as an organisation of opposition to the Bills, was
effectively still-born.
In the first phase of its existence the AAC proceeded, from an
organisation whose existence reflected the potential of an
effective opposition class alliance, to being a top-heavy body -
a forum for leaders from the petty bourgeoisie - more and more
detached from the real possibilities of developing rank and file
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organisation and struggle. Several factors combined to produce
the breakdown of the resistance by the AAC to the Hertzog Bills:
it was immunised by its structure from organised rank and file
control; it lacked a consistent, organised, articulated working
class presence and input; many of its leaders were subjected to
consistent pressure from the white liberals to focus on the
parliamentary process, at a time when the underlying resurgence
in the workers' movement was still in its early stage of
development. Consequently, its initial programme reflected the
interests of those with the franchise, and the possibility of
becoming land-owning capitalists, ahead of the interests of the
mass of black workers.
The radicals made gains, in terms of policy, in what was in the
process of becoming the empty shell of an effectively still-born
organisation of resistance to the Hertzog Bills. The collapse of
the organisation as an effective instrument of opposition to the
Hertzog Bills was based on the absence of the class alliance
which expressed fully the interests of the working class - the
very class alliance whose existence the radicals presumed. The
political developments represented within the AAC and reflected
in its development were largely conducted above the heads and
outside of the experience of workers. To the extent that there
was a class alliance, it was one in which the petty bourgeoisie
led, and its interests dominated.
The assessment above provides the basis also for an understanding
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of the class relations within the NEUF. Bunting points to a
central similarity between the two organisations when he writes
of the NEUF that "this was a Front organised from the top, and
not from below" 2.31 There were two important differences. By the
time the NEUF was created, and definitely in 1939, when it became
an organisation with a much broader location, the development of
the rise of combativity inside the working class had been in
motion for a significantly longer period. A significant stage in
the development of the NEUF was the March 1939 rally, which drew
a crowd of 20,000 - and developed into a violent clas1 3.2 By this
time, the black unions were far more developed than had been the
case even three years previously, when the AAC was formed.
Secondly, the NEUF was set up by mainly left-wing political
forces and was, from its inception, strongly influenced by the
CP. This meant that there was, unlike in the leadership of the
AAC, a declared commitment to mass organisation in the leadership
of the NEUF. But when the NEUF meetings began to trigger off a
mass response, this brought the political problems posed by the
policies of the CP to the fore. The mass response to the NEUF
created a growing pressure upon that organisation for leadership.
The overall political state of the CP did not equip it to give
that leadership. Simons quotes Cissie Gool at the 27 March
demonstration in Cape Town as saying: "Our weapons will be the
strike, the boycott and peaceful demonstrationks the events of
that day showed, the peacefulness or otherwise of demonstrations
was not simply up to the demonstrators. And Simons does not add
that Cissie Gool continued: "But the time is not now.1P4
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Throughout the period under discussion, the CP had argued the
need for mass organisation and mass protest 2 5 These general calls
posed questions of more specific programme, both of demands and
action. Would the NEUF, whose supporters must have included some
of the Coloured Union members in the Cape, campaign like the CP
for a racially differential minimum wage? How could the Party
make an open contribution, and contribute to an open debate on
programme, if it was not allowed to publicly criticise its
allies? When would the time come to use the weapons which Cissie
Gool identified? How could preparations be made for that time?
The CP had already been forced, in the face of attacks from the
Transvaal ANC, to make clear that it was not seeking the
leadership of the ANC, and had no interests different from anyone
else.ns Logically, and consistently with the whole Peoples Front
approach, the Party could not campaign for policies which were
different to those of its "allies". These were problems posed in
the development of the NEUF - more sharply, because the Cape CP
now had responsibility for implementing the official line of the
Comintern. This meant that, soon after its formation, the
priority of the NEUF became propagandising the CP approach to the
war.
Tabata's assessment of the existence of the "radical, united,
peoples alliance" reflects a failure to take into account class
differences within "the people" and an overestimation of the
upward pressure which was being operated on petty bourgeois
political leaders at the time. The clearly visible political
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strength, in this period, was the political strength of the
state. And when the majority of petty bourgeois political leaders
made their political choices, it was state power, rather than the
upward pressure of the masses, which operated upon them as a
major pressure. Within a short period, this situation was to
change. But the change did not come about primarily because of
the political developments within the petty bourgeoisie. At the
root of political changes in the next period of our study was the
visible division, within the state, on the question of the war,
and the massive development of the resurgence of the workers'
movement whose beginnings and initial development we have already
seen. It was these developments which were in fact to have the
major responsibility for political developments within the petty
bourgeoisie.
The process through which workers re-emerge into developing and
sustained struggle and the building of their organisations after
a period of blows and defeats does not follow a specific or pre-
determined timetable. There is a general pattern - but within
that pattern there are a series of options. Once the conditions
for a resurgence are established, the exact timing, the rhythm
and the forms which it will take vary enormously from situation
to situation. Finally these things depend on the subjective
factor - a recovery of morale after the impact of the last set of
defeats, a growing feeling that struggle is possible, a belief
that conditions can and should be changed, growing confidence
that something can be done about them, the increasing recognition
that individual experiences and moods are shared, and the
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organisational framework through which that collective experience
can be articulated.
For a period, however, while the process of resurgence within the
workers' movement was developing beneath the surface, it was the
political decisions of the petty bourgeoisie which dominated the
black organisations. That resurgence was thus not taking place
in a political vacuum in which workers would be untouched by the
political influence of other classes. The unions were growing,
but were still relatively small. With the exception of these
organisations, which were weakened by the failure of their
leaders to achieve a single federation, workers, beginning to
look for organisation as they broke away from the impact of the
state attacks and defeats, would have the organisations under the
leadership of the petty bourgeoisie as the most visible option
before them. The precise impact of the politics of the petty
bourgeoisie on the working class is impossible to measure. As we
have seen, for the most part the political developments in the
petty bourgeoisie took place outside of the experience of
workers. But, to the extent that there was an impact, it could
only have been for workers to be disoriented by the political
choices and decisions already made by the petty bourgeoisie -
responding as it was to the pressure of the state.
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CHAPTER FIVE
1939 - 1946
At the outbreak of the war, the black unions were divided. The
ANC was beginning to be re-organised, but it still existed not
primarily as a national organisation, but as a set of badly-
integrated provincial organisations: The AAC, despite the
apparent militancy of its formation and early history was not set
to meet, after its 1937 conference, until 1940! A significant
section of the black petty bourgeoisie had become absorbed into
the structures of the NRC. The resurgence of the workers'
movement had not developed beyond sporadic and localised action.
The number of African workers who went on strike in 1940 dropped
sharply from the 1939 level? But this situation was to change
very quickly. Within a few years the ANC had become a genuinely
national organisation, drawing in new layers of the petty
bourgeoisie, and adopting more left-wing positions. Repeated
strike action in 1942/43 was to coalesce into a significant
strike wave, the impetus of which extended into the miners'
strike of 1946. With the strike wave, there developed a series of
working class community mobilisations. Trade union organisation
developed, was extended into broader areas, and its membership
rose sharply. And this resurgence of the workers' movement, in
the form of widespread action and developing organisation, took
place in a context in which the ruling class was divided over its
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position on the war, and increasingly faced with the problem of
securing its social base, and stabilising the class alliance
through which it organised its rule.
The war accelerated and promoted processes already at work which
were to increase the strength of the black working class, and
promote outbreaks of class action on a wide scale. The industrial
expansion of the early 1930's had now run for several years, and
its consequences were being consolidated. Amongst black workers,
they meant the further development of an urban industrial
proletariat, increased in size, and also one whose experience was
increasingly becoming that of an urban proletariat. Between 1936
and 1946, the annual rate of growth of the black population in
the urban areas was 4.33%. This compares with a rate in the rural
areas over the same period of 1.05%, and 2.77% over the period
1911-1921 (a period of a big industrial expansion). In some
areas, the population more than doubled over the same ten year
period; e.g. Vereeniging/Vanderbijlpark from 38,055 to 80,693. In
all urban areas, the increase was large; e.g.: Johannesburg from
240,939 to 440,452; East Rand, 271,102 to 330,722: And these are
official figures which make no allowance for the tens of
thousands who were living in every urban area illegally.
The social changes which accompany an industrial expansion were
maturing. In particular, there was a sharp increase in the number
of women in the urban areas,5 and an accompanying increase of the
number of urban youth whose whole experience and set of
expectations were located in the urban areas. The labour
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requirements of capital, at a time of industrial expansion and
changes in the labour process, opened up new jobs for blacks in
industry. This process was accelerated by the need to promote
local manufacturing for the war effort, at a time when there was
increasing difficulty in obtaining imports:
The number of black workers employed in manufacturing almost
doubled in the war years, from 143,000 in 1938/39 to 248,000 in
1944/45. The total number of whites employed in manufacturing
also increased in the same period from 93,000 to 112,000. But as
a proportion of the workforce in manufacturing, this represented
a drop from 36% to 29%. In the same period, the proportion of the
manufacturing workforce which was African rose from 49% to 54%.
Together with the rise in the numbers and proportion of black
workers went a change in the occupation structure of black
workers. The changing labour requirements of expanding industry,
coupled with the shortages of skilled labour exacerbated by a
movement of white workers into the defence forces, led to the
increased employment of black workers in semi-skilled and skilled
jobs.8
 There was thus not simply a numerical increase of black
workers, but also an increase in their industrial strength, as
growing numbers of them were drawn into skilled and semi-skilled
work in concentrated areas of strategically important production.
At the same time as these population increases were creating
great strains on the provison of social services and promoting
great social tensions in the urban areas, inflation was rising
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sharply, and continued to rise through the entire course of the
war.9 Continued crop failures in the rural areas° apart from the
hardship that they caused there, could only increase the tensions
which were being sharpened in the towns. This came through extra
movement to the already overcrowded towns, and added pressure on
workers in the urban areas to use part of their wages for their
families in.the rural areas (the time had long since passed that
i
rural production was able to subsidise wages) l. The process over
many years of deterioration in rural production brought with it
the concurrent deterioration of social services which had been
traditionally provided in the rural areas - in particular, the
care of children and old people. The experience of the urban
proletariat combined to undermine traditional tribal authority
structures, even though the state tried to maintain these in
certain important ways - for example, discipline on the mines.
There was a massive and growing housing problem: 2 The increased
numbers of women and children in the towns posed increasingly
sharply the problem of non-existent social services - like child
care; or totally inadequate services - like education: 3 All of
these factors combined to promote a growing catalogue of
grievances, and sharpen growing social tensions in the increasing
working class concentrations in the urban areas.
The structural changes in the production process served, in
themselves, to increase the social weight of the black workers
and the working class generally. The worsening economic and
social conditions in the context of which these changes occurred
served in turn to promote the grievances of black workers. They
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occurred at a time when the underlying process making for a
resurgence of the workers' movement was itself beginning to
mature. Renewed class action on a wide scale became an increasing
likelihood. It was these developments which were set to challenge
the balance of class forces as it had been established. In the
meantime, in the period leading up to the war and in its first
years, the ruling class was itself being weakened by divisions
over its position on the war. When the challenge to the balance
of forces was carried through, it would happen in conditions
where a structurally strengthened black working class confronted
a divided ruling class.
As we have seen earlier, the fusion government was intended by
the ruling class to resolve the question of a social base, and
the question of discipline over that social base. But it was a
solution which was unstable from the very outset. The period
leading up to war and the outbreak of the war opened up deep
divisions inside the ruling class, and revealed the instability
of the fusion government, and the irresolved issues of
stabilising a social base for the ruling class. Elements within
Afrikaner nationalism saw in a victory for Hitler the prospects
of improving their own position in the ruling class, in relation
both to the largely English-speaking big capitalists who
dominated the South African ruling class, and to British
imperialism generally. An anti-British position struck a strong
chord with Afrikaner workers when it was tied to overt hostility
to the big capitalists. This hostility had been clearly expressed
320
and developed in the 1922 miners strike, but could be taken back
even earlier. On the question of whether South Africa should be
neutral, or give support to Britain, the United Party split
largely along the lines of the pre-fusion parties. With the
support of the Native Representatives, Labour Party jingoists and
strongly pro-British elements from Natal, Smuts was able to win a
parliamentary majority committing South Africa to enter the war
in support of the Al1ies: 4
 The United Party split, with Hertzog
leaving to form the Afrikaner Party, and Smuts taking over as
Prime Minister. A coalition popular front was set up, with the
Labour Party being given ministerial seats in the war cabinet:5
Able to draw support from the English-speaking petty bourgeoisie
and the majority of the leadership of the white unions, Smuts's
government had a parliamentary stability, and he was returned in
1943 to head another coalition government: 6 But the reality, as
far as the stability of the government of the ruling class was
concerned, was different. Parallel to the movement of blacks to
the towns had been a movement of Afrikanersr This had been
accelerated through the employment policies of the Pact
goverment, by the economic depression, and then by the industrial
expansion of the 1930's. This meant that Afrikaners were coming
to make up an increasing proportion of the urban petty
bourgeoisie and the white working class T For a period, this
population and economic movement was not given a clear, organised
political expression. This was especially the case while the
fusion government was still in power. The growing social weight
of Afrikaans workers, the ongoing attempt by initially minority
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elements within the nationalist movement to win the allegiance of
those workers? and the break-up of the fusion government all
promoted conditions in which a re-organised Afrikaner nationalist
movement was to turn more consistently to exploit the grievances
of Afrikaans workers. The pro-war policies of the union leaders,
the LP and, after June 1941, the CP, created a partial political
vacuum, as far as an aggressive anti-war politics aimed at white
workers was concerned. This the Nationalists were able to
exploit. Despite the electoral stability of the governing popular
front, conditions were developing in which the form by which the
ruling class alliance with white workers was organised was to
come under increasing challenge.
-
The dramatic social upheaval of war accelerates social
developments and exacerbates social tensions. It poses political
questions in the sharpest possible terms, placing before each
class and its organisations clear political choices. Questions of
basic human values and ideals are immediately placed before all
sections of society. Workers are no longer just told that it is
their duty to create profits. They are now told that it is
immediately necessary for them to go out and fight and die to
defend the status quo. They are no longer simply expected to put
up with oppression. Now they are told instead that they have to
go out and fight to defend the status quo against oppression. As
far as working class organisations are concerned, it is no longer
enough for the state that they should maintain routine
collaboration; nor is it enough that workers maintain routine
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levels of output. The state mounts extra pressure for
increasingly rigorous full-time support from the organisations of
the working class. And it mounts similar pressure for the
industrial collaboration of workers on the shop-floor.
In the 1914-1918 war, these pressures brought to the fore
tendencies for class collaboration which were already deeply
located amongst the leadership of the workers' organisations.
This was reflected in the massive response of social patriotism,
first demonstrated and then developed by that leadership. Class
collaboration on day to day issues was carried through into
support for "your own country" (i.e. ruling class) against
another country (i.e. a competing national bourgeoisie). Support
for your own ruling class was carried through to its necessary
conclusion, and the leadership of the workers' organisations
campaigned for workers to give up their demands and increase
their productivity (offer their labour or their lives) in
collaboration with the ruling class against the foreign enemy.
For the ruling class, in the conditions of war, that
collaboration cannot be half-hearted or qualified. There is only
one form of collaboration which is acceptable - the complete
surrender by workers of their own class interests, workers who
then have to fall in line behind the ruling class (or, to put it
more graphically, stand in front of them as cannon-fodder).
The turn to more developed forms of collaboration by the
leadership of the workers' organisations went together with
theorisations and legitimations on the ideological level, in
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terms of which the basic contradiction between capital and labour
was defined out of existencerIt was in the face of this massive
betrayal of the struggle to pursue the independent interests of
the working class that the Third International was formed. But
the formation of a new International could not remove the
pressures for collaboration from the ruling class. What it could
could potentially do was to more effectively arm the working
class and its leaders to better resist those pressures. In
reality, as will be discussed further below, the Third
International in its turn also pursued policies of class
collaboration during the war, although the basis of those
policies was different to that upon which the collaboratio of
the Second International had developed!'
The issue of its policy on the war was posed clearly before each
organisation and each class - not simply as a relatively abstract
ideological issue, but in terms of immediate political answers to
concrete questions. Would the different organisations call for
war volunteers? Would the conditions of the war be exploited, in
order to pursue political programmes developed before the war?
Would those political programmes be extended? Would there be
active support for the ruling class and its war effort - or
passive aquiescence - or an escalation of the struggle against
the ruling class? From the majority of the TLC unions 2 from the
Cape FederationPand from the LP, the ruling class was offered
almost immediate collaboration.
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The first response from the organised black petty bourgeoisie
came in a statement issued by the ANC executive on 9 September
1939.24 It offered conditional support, provided that the
government gave "military training whereby our men shall not be
used as labourers but as soldiers", and that the "African people
are included in the South African Body Politic and Defence
Schemes". There are differing accounts of what was decided at the
ANC conference in December 1939. According to the record of the
decisions in Karis and Carter, there was to be no support "unless
and until the government grants the African full democratic and
citizenship rights" 2.5
 Some accounts say that the resolution was
amended to give support to the parliamentary decision to enter
the war, and to call on the government "to consider the
expediency" of granting full citizenship rightsr Whichever
decision was taken, it was clear that there was division and an
initial lack of certainty within the ANC about precisely what
attitude to adopt. By July 1940, the ANC stated its position
unambiguously. A joint statement issued with the AAC declared
support for the war:
"Since the chiefs who are the rulers of the African people have
already informed the Government that the African people are loyal
to the King of England, and to the Union Government, we too
affirm that declaration, but we say that the Africans be accepted
as citizens in this country, and be granted citizenship
rights...."27 (The statement also called for the abolition of
oppressive laws.)
Apart from the differences between conservatives, who supported
the war, and radicals, who did not, it seeme likely that there
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was a tactical confusion which did not follow a simple
conservative/radical divide, about whether to exploit the war
conditions through expressions of loyalty, or through more
aggressive demands. That tactical confusion came to be
"answered", by and large, by the changing policy which the
government pursued towards the demands made by the black petty
bourgeoisie.
The support which the government had for the war effort
represented, in the first case, the logical progression of class
collaboration of the Second International; and in the second, the
logical line-up of an oppressed section of the petty bourgeoisie
with that part of the ruling class, locally and internationally,
which seemed the most progressive and liberal. Consistent
organised opposition to the war effort came from elements within
the Afrikaner Nationalist movement and a a minority of trade
union leaders. It was. however, the class action of black
workers, which was to create the greatest challenge to the war
effort. Hirson has argued that the mass of black workers were
"not pro-war, not anti-war, just indifferent". Ballinger was to
report with concern that blacks did not see the war as their
concern. In the course of the war, it became clear that as far as
the organised black petty bourgeoisie was concerned, there was a
considerable depth of support for British imperialism. Black
workers did not see it as their war. But the conditions which the
war imposed on them were their concern. And, by a massive wave of
class action, they cave their answer to the calls to nut the war
326
effort as the first priority.
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At the end of 1940, the moves which had begun in 1936/37 to re-
organise the ANC as the principal organisation of the black petty
bourgeoisie were extended, with the replacement of the stop-gap
28leader Mahabane, by Xuma. Immediately after the ANC conference,
steps were taken to confirm the principal role of the ANC and
remove the tensions promoted by, and reflected in, the overlap
29between the ANC and the AAC. On the initiative of the ANC, a
committee of three delegates from each organisation was set up.
Its recommendation was that the ANC should deal with "the
political aspirations and consitutional rights of the Africans",
and the AAC should be "the co-ordinating and consultative
committee of African national organisations, dealing with social,
educational, economic, political and industrial matters". It also
recommended that "except in exceptional circumstances
organisations of a mainly local character should not be eligible
for direct affiliation to the AAC."3°
This agreement was in part codifying the status quo in terms of
which the AAC was allowed to lie dormant unless and until the
petty bourgeois leaders had reason to look for consultations
outside of the framework of the ANC; it ruled out the decision of
the 1937 AAC conference to set up local branches of the
organisationT In 1940 the AAC met for a three-yearly conference.
This was in accordance with its constitution, but it reflected
also the turmoil within the petty bourgeoisie, without which it
is more than likely that the constitutional requirement would
have been ignored. A radical group at the conference succeeded in
getting an agreement to hold an emergency conference in 19422
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This radical group opposed the AAC/ANC agreement, fearing that it
was a formula designed to stop the AAC from building direct
support amongst the masses. As a result of their opposition, a
decision on the recommendation was deferree 3 (It was then
rejected by the 1941 conference.)34In terms of any base, the AAC
rested largely on the base of the radicals within it. This was
almost exclusively restricted to the Transkei, with limited
influence in only one industrial area - the Western Cape.
Plans to make Xuma President of the ANC go back at least to 1938.
The immediate basis for his election in 1940 was a combination
of the openings for a reforming alliance with sections of the
state which appeared to have been created by the war, and the
initial failure of the ANC to develop a clear position and
approach which could exploit those openings. Xuma therefore
assumed a mandate to develop a productive link with the state,
and extend the re-organisation of the ANC to establish it as the
cohesive primary organisation of the black petty bourgeoisie.
Xuma's election had a lot to do with behind-the-scenes
organisation by Calata 3. 5 Calata had recognised that a new
leadership would come - either through the rise of opposition to
the traditional leaders, or through a tactical decison made by
36those leaders. Calata chose the latter course, and was
instrumental in making sure that it was accepted by the
organisation as a wholeF Xuma clearly believed that, in
conditions where the pro-British element of the ruling class
appeared to be rid of the pressure to reach an accord with anti-
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black Afrikaner nationalism, the prospects for an alliance with
the ruling class were better than they had been for some time;
gains could be made, provided demands were articulated
forcefully 8 In this belief he demonstrated a misplaced
confidence, both in white liberal influences within the
government, and in the willingness and capacity of any government
of capital to put the extension of effective political reforms to
blacks ahead of the task of maintaining discipline over black
workers.39
In general, the fact and experience of oppression creates a
ready-made basis for receptivity for liberal ideals amongst the
non-exploited black petty bourgeoisie. At a more concrete level,
the special appeal of liberalism for sections of the black petty
bourgeoisie was that it was the ideology of alliance with a
section of the state. It was perceived as providing a means of
political opposition to some of the measures adopted by the
state, but with the support of a section of the state. The
receptivity for liberal ideals amongst the petty bourgeoisie can
coincide with a receptivity to democratic demands amongst the
mass of the working class. But it has a different basis -
representing in one case the aspiration for the freedom to rise
within expanding capitalism and, in the other, the necessity to
seek collective solutions, and to be able to sell labour power at
the best price without restrictions. This tendency for the
different class interests to comes to the fore more than once. We
have seen it already in the case of opposition to the Hertzog
Bills4.° In the period under discussion it could be seen in the
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apparently common struggle around housing, which drew together
t
sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the working class o. But the
class difference, underlying the transient coincidence of
interests, is always there, and at different points, liable to
pull the different classes in different directions. For the petty
bourgeoisie, the demand which grew over this period was for
freehold rights 4. 2 For the working class, the issue was not one of
property-ownership, but the need to have housing at the cheapest
possible cost at the points where labour power could be most
easily sole3
At the beginning of the war, the ideological turmoil within the
petty bourgeoisie was not yet concretised into specific demands.
There was a lack of clarity about precisely what approach to take
to the war and what tactics to employ. It was a period of
considerable ideological flux within the ranks of the black petty
bourgeoisie. The fact that the black petty bourgeoisie was
searching for political answers was to be reflected, within a
relatively short time of the outbreak of the war, in a flurry of
organisational and political developments. How did the OP
approach this situation of ideological flux and movement?
With the rise to power, and expansionist aggression, of fascism
in Germany, the dominant political interest of the Soviet
leadership was perceived as avoiding an attack by Germany.44The
form through which the Soviet Union tried to achieve this goal
was through an attempt to build an alliance internationally with
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progressive allies. On the international level, this took the
form of diplomatic overtures to the major bourgeois democracies.
On the national level it took the form of a quest for anti-war
alliances with any forces, provided only that they would oppose
the expansionism of German imperialism. This was the peoples'
front policy, which was generally explained as representing the
quest for an alliance with democracy against fascism. The reality
is, however, that both the Soviet government and national
Communist Parties tried to pursue alliances with whatever forces
were likely to oppose German imperialism - or prevent an attack
against the Soviet Union. Effectively, this meant alliances with
whatever forces were ready to support British, French and US
imperialism. The peoples' front turn of 1935 promoted the belief
that the struggle against fascism was the struggle for alliances
with the "democratic" imperialists.
As the war approached there was, therefore, the logical belief
amongst elements within the CP that the position of the Party, on
the outbreak of war, would be support for the democracies against
fascism. In June 1939, the Party issued a pamphlet "Must we
fight?"45 According to one CP historian, this "was a very clear
exposition of the Communist Party's attitude to the coming
war.... "46 1n fact the pamphlet gave no precise answer to the
question which it posed. That this was so was recognised by the
Party in March 1940. Delivering the report on "The War and South
Africa" at the Party conference in March 1940, J Morkel said of
the pamphlet:
"No clear lead was given as to the attitude that should be
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adopted in the event of war. The omission was deliberate. The
complexities of the international situation did not allow any
conclusions to be drawn as to the character of the war that, we
felt, would come. We confined ourselves to a demand for a Peace
Front based on mutual defence treaties, coupled with a 'clearly
stated determinbation to resist fascist violence with armed
force'." How was it that the Party acquired clarity on "the
character of the war"747
In April 1937, SAW had discounted the possibilities of any
agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, in an article
under the heading "Soviet Union will Never be Friendly with
Hitler" 8 0n 23 August 1939, a week before the German invasion of
Poland, the Soviet government signed a non-aggression Pact with
Germany49. The move, like the people's front policy, was designed
to avoid an attack against the Soviet Union. Once the fact that
war was inevitable had become clear to the Soviet leadership,
the continuation of the quest for an alliance  with the
democracies against Germany seemed to increase the threat of
German attack. Consistent with their own priority of avoiding
such an attack, and their own assessment of how to do that, the
Soviet leadership broke with their previous line of an alliance
with the democracies. The way to avoid an attack by fascism was
no longer seen as an alliance with democracy against fascism, but
through an accommodation with fascism itself.50
This move, which 'clarified' the fact that the approaching war
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was an imperialist war, caused massive confusion within the world
Communist movement, which, since 1935, had been promoting the
politics of an alliance with the democracies to stop fascism. It
created a crisis for the CPSA - reflected in the fact that the
Stalin/Hitler Pact is not mentioned, much less explained, by
Simons, Bunting, or Lerumo. It had been possible to encompass the
generally pro-British feeling amongst the leadership of the black
petty bourgeoisie within a broad anti-war alliance. It had been
possible, at the same time, to maintain organised links with the
white union leadership on the same basis. The Stalin/Hitler pact
placed enormous strains on these links, and the way in which they
had been built up. When both of these groups shifted, at the
outbreak of war, towards support for Britain, this placed even
greater pressure on the CP to move with them. At the same time,
however, the CF had on no single issue opposed the line of the
Soviet government.
When the war broke out some leaders, members and supporters of
the CP followed the apparent logic of the peoples front policy,
and declared support for what they now saw as the war against
fascism. The Guardian 1939 reported a CP meeting in Johannesburg
immediately after the outbreak of war, where a CP platform
speaker stated: "The attitude of the Communist Party of South
Africa to the war was one of whole-hearted co-operation with the
forces opposing fascism." 51An article in Nkululeko reflected a
continuation of the "alliance with democracy against fascism"
policy and expressed a note of ambivalence about the decision by
Smuts to assume emergency powers:
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"It is clear that these emergency powers will affect any and
every organisation of the people, but we are of the opinion that
they are not primarily aimed at the CP. It is our opinion that
they are aimed at any pro-Nazi elements in the country, and their
irresponsible followers, who may be disloyal to the country
unless they are prevented in time."52
Bunting argues that the "Central Committee had no doubts about
53the character of the war", basing his argument on extracts from a
Central Committee policy statement issued days after the
outbreak of the war. On the basis of the extracts from the same
policy statement, the 1981 history of the CP argues: "The
54
Communist Party's first statements were somewhat tentative." The
report to the Party conference explained a dilemma which the
Party faced:
"The policy was ... one of opposition to the war. But the
complication arose out of a split in the Government on the war
issue. There seemed to be a danger that the Hertzog-Malan
combination might attempt to seize power by a coup, or force an
election. They would in either case have stood for 'neutrality',
but a neutrality which would have drawn them further into support
for German imperialism. Internally, they would have introduced a
fascist regime. The party, therefore, while declaring opposition
to the war , stated that at the moment, the struggle was in South
Africa against the Nazis."55
According to Morkel, this view "undoubtedly weakened the line of
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struggle against the war, since it meant a passive acceptance of
the Smuts government and its war policy." 56The same viewpoint -
that the struggle against Nazism had to be carried on in South
Africa as a struggle "against the Hertzog-Malan forces and all
pro-Nazis" is put forward by Bunting as confirmation of the
Party's correct attitude to the war. Bunting continues, to point
approvingly to a second statement by the Central Committee which
reflected exactly the view which Morkel criticised: The Africans,
Coloureds and Indians, it states, "must see that the Hertzog-
Malan-Pirow group does not take over the government of the Union.
They must demand that the Smuts Government suppress the Nazi
supporters who are out to enslave the Non-Europeans still
further. "57
All the Party statements at the time contain clear demands for
full civil liberties to be granted to blacks. On the immediate
issue of attitude to the war, there is an equally obvious
ambiguity and confusion within the Party. These were reflected in
the NEUF positions. In September, the NEUF issued a policy
statement, "On the NEUF and the War"P"The NEUF ... realising the
dangers of fascism and Nazism to the rights and liberties of the
non-Europeans of South Africa, reaffirms its determination to
fight against fascism." It argued that the real danger of fascism
in South Africa arose from the denial of democratic rights to the
black people, and that the only effective way of fighting fascism
was for the government to grant those rights. It ended with a
call on the government to remove colour bar laws, and to take
immediate steps to stop profiteering, higher rents, and the
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rising cost of living. Bunting puts forward the statement as an
example of a clear anti-war position 5. 9 But the absence of a
precise statement about whether blacks should join up or not is
noticeable; and the lack of clarity on this issue was pointed to
by Z Gool, who delivered the statement. She said that on her
recent tour she "was repeatedly asked what line the NEUF would
take on the war situation". Informally she said that "non-
Europeans should think very carefully before they volunteered for
active service."50
In the initial phase of the war the Party was not able to put
forward an unambiguous position which clearly answered the
questions being posed in the situation. The popular front
approach had resulted in a widespread belief within the Party
that the correct position was support for the war effort against
fascism. At the same time, the Party assumed the responsibility
of supporting the Stalin/Hitler Pact. The confusion which this
situation created affected Party members. But its significance
was wider than the impact within the Party. This initial
uncertainty occurred in the context of widespread ideological
turmoil within sections of the black petty bourgeoisie. For a
period at the outbreak of the war, the Party disqualified itself
from responding to that situation with clarity and consistency.
Morkel argues that "the doubt about the war being Imperialist"
was resolved, "mainly because of the change in line of the
British Party"T It is likely that, as it had done before, the
Party took its policy from the Soviet leadership, as soon as that
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policy was clear. The result was that, despite the basis of
confusion which had been created within the Party by the peoples
front policy, within a short period it began, in official policy
statements, to reflect the Soviet assessment of the war. Its
propaganda and agitation began to reflect the poltical and
economic conditions which the war meant for the great majority of
blacks. Freed from the policy of no public criticism of allies,
with no immediate prospects of an anti-war alliance with the TLC,
the Party developed a powerful anti-war position, which began to
be reflected in gains for the organisation. Brookes states that
by "April 1941, the CP could show a 40 per cent increase in
62
membership over its 1940 figure" (of 280) 2
	there can
be little doubt that the basis of confusion which had been
revealed in the Party had not been definitively removed. The
greatest growth in membership and influence of the Party was to
come when, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22
June 1941 1P
 the Party changed policy, returning to the first form
of the Peoples Front approach, and seeking once more to build an
alliance with democracy against fascism.
The initial reaction of the Party to the invasion of the Soviet
Union was a call to fight fascism by struggling against
segregation:
"Only when the people of South Africa have been assured by the
Government's practical actions of the sincerity of its claim to
fight for democracy can they give it their full support in the
prosection of the war.
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"The Communist Party declares that the utmost degree of vigilance
and preparedness is needed to deal with the elements that will
attempt to bring about the downfall of the Soviet Union.
"The Communist Party therefore calls upon all workers, friends of
democracy and oppressed peoples to redouble their efforts to
organise themselves in their struggle for rights and liberties
and social justice.
"The successful struggle for workers' rights is the only means of
ensuring victory over Fascism in South Africa and in Europe...."
Within a limited period, this position had changed. The fight
against fascism was no longer dependent on the struggle for
workers' rights. The priority was support for the Allied war
effort. The fight against fascism was dependent upon a military
victory against Hitler. There were clearly Party members and
supporters for whom this change of policy represented a return to
the "correct orientation", from which the Stalin/Hitler Pact had
been a confusing deviationP5
On the surface, as had been the case with much of the preceding
period, it appeared that the petty bourgeoisie were the chief
political actors and, in addition, that they were consistently
moving to the left. The state of things at the level of
appearances suggested that the organised petty bourgeoisie might
be in a position to give leadership to the workers, at a time
when the appetite for struggle amongst the working class was
growing. The pattern appeared to be something like this: 'The
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politicised petty bourgeoisie develops the ANC and its policies.
These reflect a consistent move to the left. First, Seme is
replaced by Mahabane, then Mahabane is replaced by Xuma. As the
organisation moves to the left, so it begins to grow in
influence, and become the authoritative organisation of the
opposition movement. The workers meantime are relatively passive,
and not politicised.' That is an approach which is reflected,
with variants, in the work of some analysts of the period. It
gets things almost directly the wrong way round. As events
unfolded, the underlying process which had been developing within
the working class came to the fore. A massive wave of spontaneous
working class action developed. This became the decisive factor
in the balance of class forces, and a major factor in determining
the pace and nature of political developments within the
organisations of the petty bourgeoisie which occurred within the
context of that balance of class forces. It was primarily the
spontaneous action by workers which politicised those workers,
developed the whole workers' movement, and taught political
lessons to the petty bourgeoisie. And it was the process making
for a resurgence of struggle - the fact that groups of workers
eventually will be pushed into struggle because of the conditions
of life and work imposed upon them by capitalism, which prepared
the working class for the action which was to follow, rather than
any of the organisations of the petty bourgeoisie. Indeed, when
the action came, it was unexpected, and usually, unwelcomed by
the petty bourgeoisie.
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In the course of 1942, there was a series of developments which
suggested that significant reforms from the government were a
serious possibility. A speech by Smuts to the SAIRR led Umteteli
to carry an article by Ballinger under the headline: "Prime
Minsiter repudiates segregation policy" 6. 6
 The Smit Committee
reportee and amongst its recommendations were included the
abolition of the pass laws, and the inclusion of Africans within
the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA). Smit also called for the
abolition of the economic colour bar. And Smit had reported to a
delegation from the NRC that there would be no enforcement of the
pass laws, unless the individual was suspected of committing a
crimeP Writing to Ballinger, Smuts promised that African
workers would be included within the framework of the ICA? In
November Madeley opened the CNETU conference, indicating that
there was a possibiltiy of government registration being opened
up to black unions7.0
 Earlier in the year, the Guardian had carried
a front-page article under the headline "Thank You Mr. MadeleyiT
The article reported that Madeley had convinced the rest of the
Cabinet to support the recognition of African trade unions.
The apparent reformist climate did not change the reality of war-
time production for the increasing numbers of black workers, and
the social conditions facing the growing concentrations of
workers in the urban areas. The immediate meaning of the war was
soaring inflation, deteriorating living conditions, and harsher
working conditions for the majority of those workers with jobs.
Shortly after war was declared there was a march of striking
black miners from Vereeniging to Johannesburg:2
 In the same
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period, there was a strike of sugar mill . workers in Nata1 7.3 In May
1940, a major garment workers' strike in Johannesburg was
successful in winning wage increases 7.4 Later in the year, there
was an unsuccessful strike of Rustenburg tobacco workers (led by
Johanna Cornelius)7.5 In May 1941, the Guardian reported victory in
a wages strike by black miners which, it said, was organised by
the Johannesburg Commercial and Distributive Workers Union76
Against the background of the broader process of resurgence which
we have seen, these strikes reflect a growing combativity,
accelerated by the impact of war conditions. In the same period,
the divisions between the unions of black workers were partly
reso1ved 7 and the African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU)78 and the Food
and Canning Workers' Union (FCWU)were formed. In both of these
cases, the CP played a major role, and CP members were in leading
positions within both unions from their formationr
1n1940, Gordon was arrested as an opponent of the war effort.
The impact of his arrest on the Joint- Committee Unions proved to
be considerable, and there was a marked drop in the numbers
paying union subscriptions 8. 1 At a conference in Johannesburg in
December 1941, the Council of Non-European Trade Unions ( CNETU)
was formed, drawing together the former Co-ordinating Committee
unions, and a weakened Joint Committee. 32 Unions were
represented at the conference which was reported as being "almost
entirely free from those regrettable signs of disharmony which
have so often interfered with the work of the African trade
unions in Johannesburg and the Reef " 8. 2 It was to become clear,
342
however, that there remained basic differences between those
leaders from, or influenced by, the CP, and those influenced by
GordonP3
 For the meantime, however, the organisational unity
achieved by the formation of CNETU provided the possibility of a
stronger organisational framework through which the resurgence of
the workers' movement could potentially be expressed.
In February 1940, largely on the initiative of Sachs, a trade
union rally was held in Johannesburg to unite wage demands. A
Trade Union Council of Action was set up to "ginger up the trade
4union movement' . At the TLC conference in March 1940 there was
considerable opposition to the pro-war position of the
leadership. Sachs moved an anti-war resolution which was defeated
by the narrow margin of 23 to 30T 5
 Within the Cape Federation,
there was also wide opposition to the pro-war position of the
leadership, and in the elections of May 1941, the President
(Stuart), Vice-Pres4dent and the Secretary were all defeated by
candidates backed by the left. These results promoted a deep
division within the Cape Federation, with Stuart being accused of
efforts to form a rival federation 8. 6 Divisions within the Cape
federation and the SATLC were also reflected on the 1941
Factories Bills which, amongst other things, legislated for
workplace segregation. It was supported by the leaderships of
both federations, but opposed in public meetings by the 1eft 8.7
 The
support of the leadership for the Bill led Andrews to comment:
"Dictatorship is coming to this country in seven-league boots,
the workers have not been sold - they have been given away. um
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These developments reflect the considerable turmoil and flux
amongst wide layers of black and white workers, and within their
organisations. In the course of 1942/43 developments within the
workers' movement were to be led onto a new level by a sustained
wave of spontaneous strikes by black industrial workers. In
September 1942, a Wage Board determination affecting 47,000
workers in 34 industries was published. It set a minimum wage
level of 25s a weekP9 The Smit report had set the poverty datum
line for an average urban African family at 37/6 per weekP°The
wage being demanded by CNETU at this time was 40/- per week9.1
Between September 1942 and February 1943 there were 19 recorded
strikes on the Witwatersrand, mainly focussing on the issue of
wages 92
Against the background outlined here concerning attempts at
social engineering, the Smit proposals, and gestures such as
Madeley attending the CNETU conference, were aimed at winning the
support of the petty bourgeoisie and the working class
organisations for the war effort, and making the servicing of
capital's labour requirements more efficient. Where workers
showed, through their action, that they were more concerned with
immediate material reforms than talk about reforms, that talk was
subsumed beneath repression. Attempts to win support for the war
effort through talk of reform were very quickly replaced by
attempts to enforce support for the war effort by enforcing
continued production. Legislation to that effect had entailed War
Measure 9, which prohibited strikes in essential industriesr Its
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scope was massively extended through the introduction of War
Measure 145 which, in response to the strike wave, made all
strikes by black workers illegal in all circumstances.94
There is a temptation, using simple logic, to explain the reform
proposals as due to the liberal, or strategically far-sighted,
elements within the state, and the repression as due to the
illiberal elements, or those who could not see the value of a
plan for co-option. But the reality was different, even though
there may indeed have been individuals within the state machine
who fitted into one or the other of those categories. In the
actual dynamics of the class struggle it was one thing to talk
about reforms, holding them out as a medium term possible reward
for disciplined support of the war effort. It was entirely
another thing to be confronted by a growing level of working
class mobilisation, which not only threatened to immediately
disrupt the war effort, but also demanded reforms which related
more directly to workers' immediate needs - and showed a capacity
to develop action in order to force the state to grant those
reforms.
Two features of the strike movement, which continued into 1943
with a strike by power workers, stand out, and go hand in hand.
The first is the wide range of workers, in different industries,
who took action on the same or similar demands, over a
concentrated time period. The second is the way in which,
despite this, the groups of workers who did take action remained,
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in large part, isolated from each other. One group followed the
next into action which was objectively linked into a common
movement, but not through conscious organisation. There can be no
doubt that the unions and the petty bourgeois organisations not
only failed to try to promote the action and build such links,
but, on the contrary, actively attempted to restrict it9 5 This was
the only possible course of action for those who placed their
support for the war effort above all else; similarly, for those
who believed that indisciplined action by workers would upset
what they believed was a consistent improvement in their own
relations with the state. The report of the Lansdowne Commission
made this clear:
"The Commission appreciates the discretion and moderation which
characterise Mr Makabeni's submission of the case for workers,
and there can be no doubt that in the troublesome negotiations of
December 1942, the Council of Non-European Trade Unions of which
he was Chairman, wisely exerted its influence to restrain
excessive demands and induce the workers to suspend further
action pending the determination of their claims after inquiry by
a Commission."96
The policies and propaganda of the CP, in relation to the strikes
and in the period following the change of policy generally,
reflect a combination of the impact of the militancy to which
they were responding, and the restrictions imposed on that
response by the policy priority of support for the war effort.
The Central Committee issued a statement on 25 May 1942 which
lays out the Party's position. The statement "urges" that "Non-
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Committee was set up by CNET IeIt hel two rallies, focussing on111
Europeans .. be given the right to bear arms, that they ... be
allowed facilities to train as skilled workers, that their
standard of living, health services, housing conditions, and
educational facilities ... be raised to the level of the European
section of the population." The statement also makes clear the
support of the Party for the war effort: "We support the
Government in all measures that promote the war effort." The
demands which are made "are not only essentially democratic
proposals, they are also of primary importance to South Africa's
future and the immediate problem of achieving victory over the
enemy u .97 Freedom approvingly quoted the Guardian:
"The workers must become the driving force behind the whole-
hearted war effort, and its most vigilant guarantors. Their
contribution is to bring about the greatest possible production
of goods required for the war." The Party repeated in 1942 the
argument which had been rejected at the conference of 1940:
"We realise that the Government is a capitalist government which
stands for the existing system of exploitation and national
oppression .—. But by attacking the Government except for
ommissions and weaknesses in its war policy, we would weaken the
war effort and strengthen the hands of the pro-Nazi element."98
In October, as the strike wave began to develop, an Emergency
the demand for a minimum wage of 40 - per week. As in the case of
the May statement from the Party, the demands are made, but no
clear proposals about how they should be won Is put forward. The
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Guardian report of the CNETU conference, held at the end of 1942
in the midst of the strike wave, includes the wage demand, but no
discussion of the strikes, or how the demand should be achievee°
A combination of its policies and the actual course of events
created difficulties for the Party. Workers' demands were
supported; any obstruction of the war effort was opposed. But
thousands of workers were pursuing their demands by taking strike
action which disrupted the war effort. The way in which the Party
responded to this situation reflected the further shift in the
changed policy after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. It is
no longer the case that the struggle for workers' demands is seen
as the way to defeat fascism. Increasingly, the way to defeat
fascism is seen as military victory over Germany. Through this
shift, the Party prioritised support for the war effort ahead of
the struggle by workers for their immediate day-to-day demands.
In a Comintern statement, endorsed by the CPSA, issued on 15 May
1943, the priority is made clear:
"In the countries of the Anti-Hitlerite Coalition, it is the
sacred duty of the broadest mases [sic] of the people and first
and foremost of the progressive workers, to support in every way
the war efforts of the governments of those countres - aimed at
,,101the speediest destruction of the Hitlerite bloc.—.
It also directed its propaganda not primarily at the workers
taking action and making the demands, but at the government and
"progressives" - explaining why the government should, in its own
interests, accede to workers' demands. The Party continued to
make, promote and support these demands. But its policy
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priorities placed it in a position in which it opposed the action
which workers took to secure those demands.
The combination of these different positions is reflected in the
Guardian report of the 1943 Party conference 1,02 and in a statement
which the Party issued in October 1942. The statement argued
that:
"The steady increase in the cost of living is imposing an
intolerable burden upon great numbers of low paid workers.—
Unless steps are taken to ease the position of the workers
further strikes must be expected at a time when every effort
should be made to expand production of essential goods to the
utmost limit." (For essential, read essential to the war effort.)
The statement continues to make it clear that it is the self-
interest of the government in promoting the war effort, not the
action or needs of workers, which should lead to demands being
met. In the midst of a strike wave the absence of any clear
support for the strikes, or any calls to action from workers, as
opposed to the government, is notable.m In a further statement, on
31 December 1942, the Party declared its opposition to War
Measure 145. The statement comes closer than any other to issuing
a call to action, appealing to "the organised workers" (sic) to
"press" demands on the government and employers. The demands made
are for wage increases, the inclusion of Africans under the
Industrial Conciliation Act, and the repeal of the War Measure.
The statement repeats a part of the October statement,
reiterating the Party's call for "full and uninterrupted
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mobilisation of all labour resources". The Guardian reported that
the main industrial discussion at the 1943 conference was "the
position of African workers and the recent strikes by Africans in
industry. While deploring any stoppage in work which might hinder
the war effort, delegate after delegate pointed to the abominable
pay and conditions of the African workers.
All the policy statements of the Party in this period follow the
same pattern - demands are made, but they are directed as calls
upon the government - not as calls to action. Repeatedly, the
demands are justified because the failure to meet them threatens
the war effort. In the conception of the Party, it is clear that
spontaneous (or organised) strike action to pursue those demands
also threatens the war effort196 The Party called for the
establishment of Joint Production Committees, declaring that
"[i]t is scandalous to hear stories of workers slacking and of
employers who are concerned only with increasing their profits%107
On the basis of this approach, when action does develop, the
demands are supported, but the action taken to win them is
opposed. The Party demands the right to strike, but is opposed to
the use of that rightr8
There can be no doubt that the strikes of 1942/43 brought to the
surface the developments within the workers' movement in the
preceding period which this study has been pointing to. Equally,
at the point at which that process of resurgence expressed itself
in wide-spread class action, there can be no doubt that it was
neither strengthened nor even supported by the leadership of
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either the unions or the petty bourgeois nationalist
organisations. The resurgence developed spontaneously and emerged
spontaneously. When it did so, it was not led out and
strengthened by the petty bourgeois organisations, nor by the
unions which existed. Rather, it confronted these organisations
as obstacles, which sought to "restrain demands and suspend
further action". The reason why they combined in doing this had
little to do with tactical assessments of the strength of the
workers' movement - which, in any event, neither the petty
bourgeoisie nor the union leadership could properly assess. It
had to do with the fact that, for different reasons, both the
petty bourgeois organisations and the union leaderships were
intent on supporting the war effort. In the way that we have
seen, the CF also put support for the war effort as its priority.
It was also therefore concerned to ensure that workers did not
take action. It promoted the belief, shared by the ANC
leadership, that reforms could be won in return for co-operation
in promoting the war effort. The difference is that the Party was
sometimes more assertive in demanding the reforms, although it
consistently opposed action which disrupted the war effort to win
them. Xuma in fact expressed concern that the "Communists will
steal our thunder" 109, as far as policy on the war was concerned. A
wide gap existed, therefore, between the spontaneous vitality and
strength of the resurgence in the workers' movement, and the
political priorities of the petty bourgeoisie and the union and
CP leaderships. With this role being played by the union leaders
and the leaders of the political opposition, given the level of
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state repression, the spontaneous militancy of the workers was
not in itself enough to carry the strike movement consistently
forward. It nonetheless became the dominant factor shaping the
further development of class action; becoming a central influence
on political developments within the petty bourgeoisie; and
ushering in a period in which the unions developed to membership
levels never before reached.
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Strike action continued into 1943. In January, 500 miners struck2I°
A mass meeting of workers in the steel industry called for strike
action. But the workers were restrained from such action by a
leadership which "supports the war and aims to prevent all
strikes and stoppages"11 1 In February, power workers took protest
action, and their wage demand was referred to the Witwatersrand
Mine Native Wages Commission 1.12 In the course of 1943, 7,400 black
workers were on strike; the 1944 figure was 12,000. This compares
with a figure of 12,800 in 1942 112
 There was a relatively high
level of strike action through the whole period. But at no later
stage did such action repeat the strike wave, concentrated in
time and geography at the end of 1942/ beginning of 1943. When
the power workers did take strike action, at the beginning of
1944, the state was better prepared, and the strike was isolated.
The strike was defeated when the leadership agreed to a return to
work on behalf of their members, without consultation, after a
massive show of police and army strength /.14 In the same period,
workers continued to join the unions in unprecedented numbers1.15
And there was also a significant development of broadly based
community struggles.
Action in the community can be undertaken by sections of the
working class - notably the unemployed and youth - which do not
have industrial strength - and therefore do not experience trials
of industrial strength in the same way as industrial workers.
State plans were to ensure that the working class communities
were centres for disorganisation - for example, through the
maintenance of different tribal areas. There was, however, a set
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of factors which could serve to weld working class communities
together. The basis for this was the common oppression which the
state imposed. On many issues, it was within the community
framework that the system of repression was acted out - for
example, the pass laws, and the associated permit systems
operating in the municipal areas.
Pass law raids had potentially contradictory results. On the one
hand, they served to isolate the individual, and divide
communities between "legals" and "illegals". On the other hand,
they could provoke a united reaction in two different ways.
Firtly, the raid was carried out within a specified area with
common brutality for all those within that area within a
specified time, whether they had passes or not. Secondly, there
had to be developed an extremely effective informal organised
network to warn of pass raids and to help those without passes
escape them. In different political circumstances, this network
could change from something which helped the atomised individual
to escape a personal attack into an informal organisation through
which a more generalised resistance to the common attacks was
organised.
Aspects of traditional social organisation could similarly change
as far as their political meaning was concerned within the urban
areas. On the one hand, those aspects served to carry barriers to
working class identity and organisation from the rural areas to
the towns. On the other, they could become communal activities
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which, when attacked, evoked a communal response. An example
which serves to illustrate this is brewine Traditionally,
brewing is "woman's work". In the towns, brewing took on a
different meaning. Firstly, it was one of the few ways available
to women to actually earn money1.17 Secondly, the fact that it was
traditionally performed collectively was changed from meaning a
common oppression of doing "woman's work", to a collective target
for state attack. When the state acted against brewing in the
towns, it was therefore acting against something which was often
a matter of economic life and death for women, and something in
which women worked together collectively. In this situation,
attacks against brewing could, and sometimes did, provoke a
united resistance. So, despite the conscious attempts of the
state to maintain discipline and divide the working class
communities, the very process of seeking to do that could
1sometimes provoke a united response.18 Segregation meant that every
single aspect of life and death for every single individual in
the towns was acted out in the same confined space, under
generally common economic conditions, with a generally uniform
oppression being imposed on all.
As has been pointed out, war-time inflation and the lack of
social services in the towns could only serve to deepen
grievances and heighten social tension. In 1943, these pressures
led to a bus boycott in Alexandra township which, in the
conditions of a resurgent workers' movement, drew together almost
the whole community, and came to serve as a national focal point
of struggle. Mokonyane, describing the struggle in Alexandra,
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writes that to the "penury" facing blacks "was added the
impossible demands of wartime inflation which made deep incisions
into the very sinews, blood and marrow of the African worker,
even whilst he was called to lay down his life for 'freedom for
all"119
 An attempt to increase fares from 4d to 5d led to a
spontaneous nine-day bus boycott which forced the bus companies
to withdraw the increase?°The Government appointed a Commission
to investigate the matter?' Its report captures a part of the
reality of lfe for black workers:
"The worker is compelled to live far away from his work, and must
in most cases pay his transport to and from work. The tax must be
paid, or he may find himself in gaol.—. [The workers] save on
food and most are in a state of hunger. Continuous life and work
in confined space and often impure air takes its toll of the
workers' strength - their sole capital - and their children's
lives. And most families appear to be burdened with debt: 022
Before the report of the Commission was published, an emergency
regulation increased the fare to 5d. In November 1944, a second
boycott began, this time for 7 weeksFAt the end of December 1944
the City Council proposed a compromise, the effect of which was
to allow workers to travel at the old 4d pricel'
During the course of 1944, on the basis of a combination of the
same factors which generated the Alexandra boycotts, and the
pressure of an acute housing shortage and appalling living
conditions, a massive movement of homeless workers developed
around OrlandoP5Mokonyane describes the conditions in Orlando as
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a "miasma of chill stygian darkness, poverty and squalor, disease
and death":
"The location had simply become supersaturated with human beings.
Some thousands of them, men, women and children camped on a
vacant municipal ground nearby. They built themselves shelters of
sticks, sacking, old tins and maize. Thousands of other homeless
peope came to join them. Thus came into being the Orlando
Shanties - Masakeng (at the shacks). They were led by James
Mpanza under the slogan 'Sofasonke' (We will die together):p6
The Sofasonke movement was successful to an extent, in that it
succeeded in protecting "illegal squatters" for a period. There
can be no doubt that the three major issues involved in these
struggles - prices, housing, and the pass laws - were issues
facing the whole working class. Nor can there be any doubt that
the basis for the struggles which developed in Alexandra and
Orlanda was also present, or potentially present, in many other
working class communities.
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While groups of workers were heading towards the action discussed
above, both the ANC and the CP were going through phases of
growth. For the first time, the ANC was being extended out of the
group of traditional leaders, and was becoming a genuine
representative of wide layers of the petty bourgeoisie?7Between
1941 and 1943 the membership of the CP more than treblee sIn some
ways, the Party was gaining a new legitimac09 According to a
Guardian editorial at the beginning of 1943, "people are not so
frightened by the word 'Communist' these days. The Communists who
are driving the Nazis before them in Leningrad and in the
Caucasus are opening many minds". A Consular representative from
the Soviet Union arrived in 1942. Dr. Colin Steyn, the Minister
of Justice, released two Communists who had been detained, and
became a patron of the Friends of the Soviet Unior?°Mrs Smuts,
wife of the Prime Minister, became a patron of Medical Aid for
Russia?' White Communists were elected as members of the
Johannesburg and Cape Town City Councils 1.32 Communists continued to
hold influential positions within the white trade unions, and
gained new positions of influence within the ANC, particularly in
the Transvaalinnside the ANC, Xuma took executive measures to
consolidate his influence within the organisation13'and assert
discipline in the Tranvaal and Cape congressesTThe ANC continued
to focus on the NRC, and in the 1942 NRC elections seven of the
16 elected members were declared ANC supporters137
Both the CP and the ANC had pursued variations of the argument
that segregation and oppressive measures should be abolished,
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because these were not in the government's interests. For a
period, as we have seen, it appeared that there was some
willingness within the government to respond to the argument. As
the response to Madeley's talk of recognition for black trade
unions demonstrates 38the Party began to read into the situation a
new reformist sincerity from the government. This political
vision was consistent with the Peoples Front approach - but not
with the actual situation. Through its attitude to the reformist
talk, the Party actually promoted a vision of a reforming
government which was not dissimilar to the liberal vision amongst
elements within the black petty bourgeoisie. The liberal vision
on a world-scale was codified in the Atlantic Charter. In South
Africa, the extent of its influence on elements within the black
petty bourgeoisie could be seen in the document "African Claims",
produced by the ANC under Xuma's guidance°
In the first phase of the war period, the petty bourgeoisie had
seemed able to deliver important support for the government war
effort. There had been a relative freedom within which the black
petty bourgeoisie had been allowed to operate. But the conditions
which created that situation were transient. In 1943, changes in
the war situationl`m
 the impact of the strike wave, and the
142pressure from Afrikaner Nationalists collectively put an end
even to the suggestion of reforms. The first step had already
been taken, in the repressive measures taken to suppress the
strike movement. This was followed by a massive pass arrest
campaign1.43 Proposals were tabled to restrict the property rights
of Indiansra Coloured Affairs Department, on the model of the
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Native Affairs Department, was established in 1943, in order to
organise the segregation and other measures applying to
145Coloureds. Two sections of the black petty bourgeoisie were under
direct attack; and with the proposed measures in relation to
Coloureds and Indians came the threat of further segregation
measures in relation to Africans.
As the 1943 elections approacheethe room for manoeuvre of the
government was being restricted. The government was under
pressure from the Nationalists, who were beginning to extend
their influence, although in a limited way, amongst key groups in
the social base of the ruling class1.47 Despite the dissipation of
the strike wave, workers had signalled that renewed mass action
was an ongoing possibility. The government had to seek a balance
between repressive measures, and the problem of provoking a mass
reaction to those measures. The workers' movement was not able to
seize the initiative because it was not well enough organised,
because its leadership could not regard that as a priority while
there was the war effort to support, and because spontaneity in
itself was not enough to drive the movement forward consistently.
But neither was the government in a position in which it could
simply choose and implement any programme in relation to the
black petty bourgeoisie and black workets. Each option brought
with it the possibility of growing opposition from some
significant quarter.
This was a situation in which the petty bourgeoisie was coming
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under pressure from both major classes. Major political questions
were being opened up: Would support for the war effort continue,
if the government was going to launch attacks against the petty
bourgeoisie? Would the attacks against Indians and Coloureds
promote a drive for a broader black unity? Would the demands of
workers in struggle be supported? Did the threatened attacks mean
that the policy of concessions through alliance was not viable?
How would resistance be articulated? What programme of action and
demands would be pursued? The constraints facing both the
workers' movement and the government created a temporary
stalemate, in which the petty bourgeoisie was relatively free to
respond in its own way to those pressures. There followed a
massive wave of organisation, re-organisation and renewed
organisation within the petty bourgeoisie, as different elements
within it grappled with the political questions which they saw
before them. Within a short period the AAC was partially revived,
the revival already underway in the ANC was taken forward, and
several new organisations were formed - all in 1943: The African
Democratic Party (ADP); the Congress Youth League (CYL); the
Transkei Organised Bodies (TOB); the Non-European Unity Movement
(NEUM), and the Anti-CAD.
The ADP arose directly on the basis of the mass action of
1942/43, and especially the Alexandra bus boycott, which had been
fought and won in August 1943. The Party was officially
inaugurated in September 1943, and came to be dominated by Paul
Mosaka, an NRC member, and Hymie Basner, a former Communist, and
Native Member of the SenaterAn added impetus for the emergence
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of the Party was the adminstrative decision, taken by Xuma, to
cancel ANC elections in the Transvaal 149. The effect of this was to
remove the possibility of youth militants winning control of the
Transvaal Congress. Some of the militants who were at the
receiving end of this decision stayed in the ANC and formed the
Youth League 1.50 Self Mampuru, who had been the militants' key
candidate, and others left, and were involved in the formation of
the ADP 1.51 The genesis of the ADP can thus be traced to the general
resurgence of the workers' movement, and the limitations with
which the CP and the ANC related to the action which developed.
The CP recognised a part of this reality when it wrote of the
formation of the ADP: "[T]his Party could not have been born in
[sic] the Congress leaders had organised the people, mobilised
them in their millions...." 152
The ADP rejected what it described as "the extremes" of the
"Method of Revolt", and "The Policy of Appeasement", adopting
what it called the "Method of Peaceful Revolution" 1.53
 This was
"the method of the STRIKE used as the weapon of TRADE UNIONS
throughout the world - it is the method of MASS PROTESTS and MASS
DEMONSTRATIONS such as brought victory to the residents of
Alexandra Township in their recent Bus dispute." In its general
call for strike action, the ADP Manifesto moved beyond the CP and
ANC policies of opposition to disruption of the war effort. The
Manifesto included general statements on a post-war world which
"will end [the misery of the masses] and set their feet on the
paths of peace and progre s S " 1 .54 But it contained no clear
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statement of policy on the war effort. The likelihood is that
amongst its leadership there were differing positions. The
Manifesto committed the ADP to the "the struggle for economic
emancipation" of Africans, and to "the struggle for a share of
political power". It made demands for a fair distribution of
land, a living wage, educational facilities, the abolition of the
industrial colour bar, and of the Pass Laws. As Inkululeko
pointed out, these were not new demands1.55 What was new, however,
was the extent of the political movement within the petty
bourgeoisie in the quest for political answers. The formation of
the ADP reflected that movement. As its manifesto indicated, at
its foundation, the party had not yet provided firm and clear
answers to the questions which promoted its formation.
According to the Manifesto, the Method of Peaceful Revolution
"require[d] for its success intelligent and disciplined
leadership and the undivided loyalty and co-operation of the
masses". All over the world, the "masses of unprivileged
humanity" were "look[ing] to men of vision, learning and
authority" 1.56 The conception which key ADP leaders had of the mass
movement, and the way in which they related to it, was
empiricist When the resurgence of the workers' movement had not
yet come to the fore, Mosaka was part of the petty bourgeois
accommodation to the NRC structure set up by the state, and
Basner was, without any trace of open opposition, arguing the CP
position. When the resurgence came to the surface, they, and
others like them, were shifted by it. Out of the mass movement,
when it existed empirically, they saw developing an upward spiral
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of militant action which needed radical propaganda and the
leadership of "men of vision, learning and authority" to speed
its development. The opposite side of the empiricist coin which
idealises the militancy of the masses in this way is the belief
that "the masses are passive" when there is no longer empirical
evidence of mass militancy. This can lead to a range of different
political options, ranging from a retreat from politics in
complete demoralisation, to ultra-left adventuri sm. Any
organisation which is produced out of a mass movement and a wave
of mass action cannot automatically be sustained. Either it has
to be able to relate to the dynamic of the workers' movement,
being able to understand and connect with the real ebbs and flows
in the struggle, and the real rhythm of developments within that
movement. Or it will inevitably be forced towards organisational
and political measures which start distancing it from the real
movement of the workers. In the case of the ADP, the latter
option was the one which applied. When the mass action upon which
it had in part emerged did not develop in that upward spiral, the
organisation began to fall apart157
It was within the ANC that there was to be the greatest
flexibility in the approach of the petty bourgeoisie to the
masses, and it was in that organisation, in part through its
flexibility, that the greatest organisational stability was going
to be provided for the petty bourgeoisie. A decision of the 1942
ANC conference made provision for the establishment of an ANC
Youth LeagueT8 The 1943 conference took the decision to establish
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such a Leaguer This formalised a situation in which an organised
group of youth had already been functioning and active around the
campaign to have Self Mampuru elected as Transvaal ANC presidene.°
Even without the resurgence of the workers' movement there were
strong pressures for a decisive change in the leadership of the
ANC. The growth of the social weight of the urban working class
had been accompanied with the growth of the weight of the urban
petty bourgeoisie within the petty bourgeoisie as a whole. And
within the urban petty bourgeoisie, a new layer of professionals,
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comprising in particular teachers and lawyers, had developed.
This layer began to replace, in terms of numbers and social
prestige, the handful of clerics, professors and doctors who had
traditionally dominated the organisations of the petty
bourgeoisieT2 This new layer of the urban petty bourgeoisie lacked
the personal and professional ties of the traditional leaders
with white liberals;163 they began to organise in part as an
opposition to the tradition of seeking to win demands through
that connection; they came under the pressure of the resurgent
workers' movement which had emerged through action all around
them; they were caught up in the general ideological turmoil, and
the social problems sharpened by the war. In these conditions,
this increasingly significant layer of the petty bourgeoisie
began to assert a political identity and organise. The Congress
Youth League, they declared, "must be the brains-trust and power-
station of the spirit of African Nationalism" Co-operation with
other blacks and progressive organisations could come only when
Africans were "an organised self-concious [sic] unit." 165In 1948 A
P Mda, one of the CYL founders, explained that it had been
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founded "in order to strengthen the National Movement, and give
youth scope for training as the future leaders of the people. „166
The ideology of the CYL reflected a self-confidence and self-
assertion, embodied in the declaration of their Manifesto: "[The
African] NOW ELECTS TO DETERMINE HIS FUTURE BY HIS OWN EFFORTS.467
This was in part directed at what was seen as the self-humbling
moderation of the traditional leaders in relation to the white
liberals and the state. The League members clearly shared some of
the criticisms of the Congress leadership which they attributed
to the ADP.
"The critics of Congress attribute the inability of Congress in
the last twenty years to advance the national cause in a manner
commensurate with the demands of the times, to weaknesses in its
organisation and constitution; to its erratic policy of yielding
to oppression, regarding itself as a body of gentlemen with clean
hands and failing to see the problems of the African through the
proper perspective. „168
The Manifesto declared that some of these and other criticisms of
the Congress leadership were founded on fact. "It is admitted
that in the process of our development, our leadership made
certain blunders. It was inevitable that this should have been
the case, encompassed as the African people were and still are
with forces inimical to their progress."169
The first political task which the Youth League set itself was to
pursue its own political development, and then to win support for
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its ideas amongst other elements of the elite. Part of the
self-assertive African nationalism of the League was a rejection
of "foreign leadership of Africa"7° Ngubane has written that
"[t]he intention was to establish a pressure group inside the
ANC"TWalshe points out that the "CYL was not an attempt at a
mass youth movement, and settled down with a core membership of
approximately sixty."172The task of the League was to rise above
the forces "inimical to African progress", and prepare itself for
leadership. Karis and Carter point out that "the manifesto did
not tell leadership what to do but what to be: 'the
personification and symbol of popular aspirations and ideals'"7
It had to "combat moral disintegration among Africans by
maintaining and upholding high ethical standards ourselves" 1.74 The
League identified the task of "rousing popular political
consciousness", and declared that it would "educate the people
politically"75
 Consistently with the priority of developing the
type of leadership which the League envisaged, the masses were to
be politicised once the preparation within the elite had been
accomplished.
The AAC met in emergency conference in 1941. Despite previous
positions for a boycott of Hertzog Bill elections, and the
presence of an organised radical faction, the conference endorsed
a slate for the forthcoming elections for Native Parliamentary
Representatives and NRC members 76 In the period before the strike
wave, the political pressure on different sections of the petty
bourgeoisie to focus on the NRC was considerable. It was the
single organised forum, acceptable to the government, through
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which a relationship with the government could be structured by
the petty bourgeoisie. Particularly where some elements of the
petty bourgeoisie had started operating in the forum -
apparently increasing their own political prestige in the process
- there was pressure created on other elements to make sure that
they were not excluded. This pressure was increased when the talk
of reforms developed - and was directed at the NRC.
Between the 1941 conference and the next scheduled conference in
1943 there was no major meeting of the AAC. The organisation was
effectively divided between a layer of leadership whose politics
would be determined by the policies of the ANC, and a group of
radicals with a limited regional base. In 1942/43, the urban
petty bourgeoisie from which the CYL was to be formed were
surrounded by the strike movement, and faced the ongoing question
of their relationship to the established regional and national
ANC leadership. For the radicals within the AAC, the situation
was different. Their main location was in the Transkei 1f7 where the
traditional ANC and social leaders had been chiefs, not the petty
bourgeois professionals who made up the Transvaal and national
leadership of the ANC. To this group in the Transkei was attached
a group based in Cape Tow0But the latter had little or no base
within the working class in the Cape industrial areas, and turned
to the base which their co-thinkers had in the Transkei. Not
surprisingly, a majority within this group came to hold the view
that the primary question in the struggle overall was the land
questionTThe view had been expressed clearly by the Workers'
Party of South Africa, a grouping whose members were influential
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within the AAC and then the NEUM.
"[T]he Native Problem is mainly the Agrarian Problem. In a
country predominantly agricultural where 95% of the population is
rural, the axis of the revolution revolves around the agrarian
problem .—. which is the alfa and omega of the revolution .—.
The Native needs first of all land and then national
emancipation. The national question is not the fundamental
problem of our revolution: the agrarian question is and will
1 8remain the basic task. If 0
During the course of 1943, the Western Province section of the
AAC issued the pamphlet "Calling All Africans" 181 Th s section was
dominated by the radicals within the AAC, the same radical
element which was active within the framework of the TOE. The
central thrust of this pamphlet was to call for unity under the
AAC.
In December 1943, a preliminary unity conference launched the
Non-European Unity Movement. This drew together the Anti-CAD,
which had been set up to oppose the Smuts segregation proposals
relating to Coloureds, and the AAC, with a small group of
Coloured radicals linked to the radicals within the TOE,
providing the link between the two. The NEUM produced the Ten
Point Programme, containing generally the same democratic and
civil liberty demands as were propagated by the TOE. The NEUM was
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portrayed as representing the organic unity of "the oppressed
people" 1:92 A letter from Tabata to Mandela shows the vision of the
NEUM leadership:
"The African people spontaneously created the ALL-AFRICAN
CONVENTION. The political exigencies of the time and the crisis
(of the new slave Bills) forced the people to organise on a
nation-wide scale. So without any premeditated theory the people
spontaneously gave birth to a form of organisation which could
knit together a whole people into a single compact unit, a
fighting force. The predominant idea at the time was unity. This
was one higher political level .—. Mutual antagonisms and
rivalry were replaced by the spirit of co-operation. The leader
who jealously guarded his personal position was replaced by a
unified leadership and petty sectional interests gave way to a
form of thought which embraced the whole race.—.
"I know that you [Mandela] have often wondered why we [the NEUM]
are so intransigent and yet we say we want unity.—. The truth of
the matter is that we are defending a position which was
conquered by the African people in 1935."183
In the years that followed, the Unity Movement emphasised the
programme as the minimum principled position, and non-
collaboration with government institutions as the minimum
principled tactic. This set of minimum principles was repeatedly
invoked to explain differences with other organisations which in
fact shared similar basic democratic demands. On the land
question - the key issue for the NEUM - its programme called for
a redistribution of the land as "the first task of a democratic
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state and Parliament." The basis on which this redistribution was
to take place was made clear by G.H. Gool, a leading NEUM figure.
"When we drafted this point of the 10 Point Programme we took it
for granted that it could mean one thing only: the right to own
land, to buy land, and to hire land." 184As Blair points out, this
approach led to the charge, from other Cape radicals, that the
NEUM's programme identified it as having an aspirant petty
bourgeois leadership.185
The perspective of the NEUM followed a pattern which was not
dissimilar to the ADP, with which it had some contact. The
difference was that, over time, it was not the workers, but the
rural masses whose visible militancy promoted an idealisation of
the masses. In 1943, the radicals who were central to the
formation of the NEUM became active in the newly-formed Transkei
Organised Bodies. This brought together in an unstable federation
the chiefs, the Transkei Voters Association, various welfare
organisations, and two women's organisations1 86 The main activity
of the TOB was in advocating general civil rights reforms. In
1945 and 1946, the situation in this area was changed
dramatically. The Rehabilitation Scheme was launched in the
Transkei with measures such as stock-culling, fencing, and
removais187 These measures generally had the support of the
chiefs, who were sometimes active in their enforcement. A massive
wave of opposition, directed mainly at the chiefs, was unleashed.
The radical petty bourgeoisie within the Transkei thus faced
conditions of struggle which had their own rhythm - different to
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that which was operating in the urban industrial areas - that in
itself promoted an organisational and political response which
was in part different to that of the urban petty bourgeoisie in
the Transvaal. This difference was further promoted by the fact
that the ANC was no longer an appropriate vehicle through which
an internal organisational opposition to the chiefs could be
conducted. In 1943, the new constitution of the ANC had abolished
the Upper House of Chiefs?8This was in response to the pressure
from the Youth League, in accordance with organisational measures
which Xuma was taking to modernise the ANC as the organisation of
the urban petty bourgeoisie, and in accordance also with
administrative measures he had taken to try to restrict the power
of other groups within the ANC.
This situation promoted a tendency, already evident in the
radical element of the AAC, to identify the rural masses as the
most radical base for an opposition movement. At the same time,
in conditions of general ideological turmoil within the petty
bourgeoisie, there were ongoing attempts by different elements to
win authority within the petty bourgeoisie in general. This
promoted the tendency for such groups to cling to "their own"
organisational base. It was partly such competition for authority
which meant that 1940 AAC/ANC agreement to share authority was
never likely to be implemented. A similar agreement was reached
189between the two organisations in 1943. But while groups within
both organisations were still struggling for dominance, and
maintaining their own separate support as a weapon in that
struggle, it was again likely that it would not be implemented.
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Even while political principles and the masses were constantly
being invoked - not by the Unity Movement alone - the politics of
the petty bourgeoisie, in the period immediately following these
organisational developments, was primarily politics within the
petty bourgeoisie. The masses were invoked while different petty
bourgeois elements were actually defining their political
positions, often in relation to, and through opposition with,
each other.
In the face of all of this political movement within the petty
bourgeoisie, and against the background of the strike wave, the
leadership of the ANC reacted to maintain their authority. On one
level, this meant manouevres and bureaucratic measures - such as
the measures taken to postpone elections in the Transvaal, when
it looked as if the youth radicals might win them. But the
relatively new Xuma leadership was in part subject to the same
pressures which were promoting the organisation, self-assertion
and development of demands amongst other sections of the urban
petty bourgeoisie. Thus it was that, through the new constitution
of 1943 and in written programme, the ANC moved substantially,
from the proposal to extend democratic rights to a "qualified
elite", to the demand for a genuine, all-embracing democracy.190
This then was a period of considerable organisational development
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within the black petty bourgeoisie. Despite the apparent
differences and antagonisms between different organisations
formed in the period, and the political conflict between them,
there were fundamental similarities between them. Not only did
they share generally the same democratic demands; essential to
the political perspective of the different organisations, only
combined and expressed in different ways - were two major
political features: firstly, an idealist conception of the masses
and the mass struggle; secondly the conviction that the course of
events depended on the political leadership given by the petty
bourgeoisie.
To identify a common idealist conception of the masses is not to
suggest that the organisations were consciously formed with that
orientation. It was rather a part of the ideology of the petty
bourgeoisie which, when that class was left in relative freedom
to express its views and interests, could be expected to be
contained in the politics which developed. Similarly with the
leading role attributed to the petty bourgeoisie: the assertion
is not that all the organisations were consciously set up to
promote petty bourgeois leadership, nor that they all expressed
an open or conscious commitment to it. But rather that essential
to their politics and the way in which they went about enacting
that politics was the assumption that the struggle would depend
on the struggle for political dominance within the petty
bourgeoisie. This went hand in hand with the idealisation of the
masses. These two features were conbined in different ways. In
the case of the ADP, there was a vision of an upward spiral of
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action, at the head of which would be the radical propagandist.
For the NEUM/AAC, it involved an idealisation of the rural masses
and the belief that a leadership cleansed of collaboration would
arouse the masses to new heights. In the case of the CYL, there
was the belief that provided a politicised elite was prepared,
the masses would respond to political education from that elite.
For the ANC leadership, the masses were either seen as
undisciplined - or as the potentially disciplined supporters who
would provide leaders with a powerful negotiating weapon.
Elements of these different approaches, in the real situation,
were combined and overlapped. But, in broad terms, they were the
approaches adopted and pursued by the ADP, the AAC/Unity
Movement, CYL, and the ANC respectively. Clearly, between these
approaches there was room for sharp political differences, and
disagreements. Developing populist rhetoric in the midst of the
masses could lead to clashes with those who were trying to
prepare programmes of political education amongst the
"politicised elite". A focus on the discontent against the chiefs
in the rural areas created different pressures and promoted
different responses from a focus on the urban working class. And,
together with political differences arising in that way, there
was the basis for a range of careerist, opportunist,
individualist clashes which could sometimes be expressed through
invoking political disagreements and criticisms. But neither
disagreements on this basis, nor actual substantive political
disagreements displace what are, beneath the surface, common
political features.
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As these organisational developments, and the political develop-
ments which they represented, unfolded, the petty bourgeoisie
appeared to be the major political actor; the developments within
the petty bourgeoisie appeared to make up the major political
process - the movement of the petty bourgeoisie to the left. But,
far from taking the political initiative, the petty bourgeoisie
was operating within a balance of class forces which it did not
recognise, could not itself create and could not itself maintain.
The developments we have considered within the petty bourgeoisie
were not the next step forward in the resurgence of the workers'
movement. They occurred at a time when there was a descent from
the peak reached in the strike wave. The next step forward in the
resurgence of the workers' movement would depend - like the first
step - on the rising combativity of groups of workers. And the
really decisive political process underway was not that of the
organisation and developments of the petty bourgeoisie. It was
that of the ongoing and renewed development of combativity within
the working class.
The organisational developments we have seen within the petty
bourgeoisie reflected the attempts to seek and provide political
answers, in the aftermath of the strike wave and Alexandra
boycott. In the conditions of ideological flux in the petty
bourgeoisie at the outset of the war, the CF's initial
uncertainty had disqualified it from putting forward clear
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answers to the questions being addressed by the organised petty
bourgeoisie. By 1943, the Party was able to put forward a clear
position on the issue of the war. That position was reflected in
its response to the calls by the ADP for a widening of the
Alexandra and Orlando struggles. In Orlando Advisory Board
elections, Sofasonke and ADP candidates defeated Communists. In
its analysis of the reasons for the defeat, the Party
demonstrated the continuing, self-imposed constraints of its
opposition to disruption of the war effort:
"Mr Mpanza may seem to be a figure hardly worth taking seriously.
Yet his 'Shanty Town' movement - however questionable his motives
and advice - gave the people what they demanded: something to do
about the housing shortage. Similarly, the ADP suffers from all
the faults of sectarianism, political inexperience and stupidity.
Yet over the train fares issue they had the enormous advantage
over our comrades (who are infinitely more advanced politically)
that they were advocating something positive - i.e. to boycott
the trains - however silly and impractical.'191
But the Party was placed under increasing pressure - both by the
action of workers, and by the developments within the petty
bourgeoisie, to propose some form of action to win demands. In
November 1943, the Johannesburg CP set up an anti-pass campaign.192
In January 1944, a demonstration called by the Campaign was
attended by over 2,000 people 1.93At a conference in May 1944, an
Anti-Pass Council was elected, and the leadership of the Campaign
broadened, with Xuma becoming Chairman1 .94 The campaign raised the
same problem which had faced the Party more generally. The demand
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for the abolition of the pass laws was clear-cut, and reflected
the interests of the mass of workers. But no action in the
struggle against the pass laws could be supported if it disrupted
the war effort. In a situation where there had been a clear break
by the government even from reformist talk, the Party was forced
to look for an approach which put pressure on the government,
without disrupting the war effort. While a movement of thousands
was taking effective action against the pass laws in Orlando, the
campaign set its sights on a petition to the government
In August 1944, David Bopape, who was secretary of the campaign,
was dismissed from his job as a teacher because of his political
role in the campaign. This was met by a general strike in
Brakpan, where he lived and workee6 If that was the response
which could be immediately generated against the victimisation of
a leader of the campaign, then the willingness to take action in
support of the demands of the campaign, which reflected the needs
of workers, must have been very great. An incident in
Johannesburg in November served also to demonstrate the combative
climate within the workers' movement, the extent to which anger
had built up and the extent to which workers were ready to show
that anger. When a black was killed by a tram, there were
immediate "riots" by workers in the area: 97 An area general strike
on the side effects of the campaign and "riots" in reaction to
one death - these are clear indicators of the basis which existed
within the working class for a broad organised movement. But by
March 1945, Mofutsanyana was warning that the basis for the
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Campaign was not being exploited:
"It is necessary to point out that after the successful National
Conference and demonstrations last year the work of the Anti-Pass
Campaign slackened terribly, particularly in the Transvaal. As a
matter of fact for some time there were no activities at all.—.
[T]he fact is that the general activities of the Committee
ceased, and enthusiasm demonstrated by the Conference died out.
And as a result, the required signatures could not be
obtained.... "198
A more comprehensive Party analysis, freed from the constraints
of opposition to class action which disrupted the war effort,
would have pointed to the way in which the objective
opportunities created by working class combativity at the time of
the strike wave and community action were also not exploited by
the leadership. At the 1944 AMWU conference there were repeated
calls from delegates for an organised strike on wages. But these
calls were opposed by the leadershipTand the possibility of a
new front being opened up by a strategically powerful group of
workers was lost. Both the strike wave and the community action
suffered from the same lack of co-ordination and preparation
which Mofutsanyana identified as a problem for the Anti-Pass
Campaign. As was the case with the Campaign, the lack of a
united, energetic leadership fully in support of the action meant
that the potential in the situation could not be fully exploited.
In each case, the position which the CP took was dictated by its
opposition to any disruption of the war effort.
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After the peaks reached in the strike wave and community action,
there was a pause in the broader development of class action. In
this situation the Anti-Pass Campaign was not being taken forward
by either its leadership, or the spontaneous forward drive of
workers, and it reached the low point which Mofutsanyana
describes.
In the course of 1944, the developments within the petty
bourgeoisie continued. In December, the Campaign for Right and
Justice was set up, with support from white liberals, the ANC and
the CPno. In 1944, the AAC, which had amended its constitution to
allow competition with the ANC for individual membershie issued
"Along the New Road", which called for provincial, district and
local branches to be set up (:)2 The Youth League issued its
203
manifesto. In August, Xuma sent a draft of "Africa Claims" to
Smuts
am
. A teachers' march in Johannesburg, led by the Transvaal
African Teachers Association (with the CYL in influential
positions), demanded higher pay and better conditions!05Xuma
became Chairman of the Johannesburg Joint Council, with Tambo
joining as a member 2. 06While all these moves were taking place, the
objective basis for the development of a broader, organised
struggle continued, largely untapped, undeveloped and unused by
the political and union organisations. To the extent that it was
developed, this depended primarily on the spontaneous receptivity
to organisation and action, which generated the struggles we have
seen, promoted the growth of the unions, and laid the basis for
the class action which was to follow.
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As far as white workers were concerned, the opposition of the
majority of their leadership to class action was even more
determined than that faced by black workers. After the war, Smuts
was to thank the engineering unions for their collaboration:
"The outbreak of the hostilities found the engineering industry
faced with many problems, not the least of which was the shortage
of skilled artisans, and to overcome this particular difficulty
so far as possible it was necessary for the Controller of
Industrial Manpower to impose restrictions on the engagement of
labour and to take other steps which infringed on the normal
freedom of action of employers [sic]. Any major disturbances in
the engineering industry would have adversely affected South
Africa's contribution to the Allied victory, and the fact that
these did not occur must be attributed to the whole-hearted co-
operation of employers and employees alike in the interests of
the war effort."207
The positions adopted by the unions and the LP, and the economic
conditions created by the war, promoted a growing opposition to
the policies of the leadership. This was reflected in a series
of splits within the LP 2. ()8 It also created conditions which the
Afrikaner Nationalists, now better organised and more consciously
oriented to Afrikaans workers, were able to exploit. In the same
period, Afrikaans workers became a significantly larger
proportion of whites in skilled and semi-skilled work. In the
general elections of 1943, the TLC, the Cape Federation, the LP
and the CP all supported the continuation of the governing
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popular front. The CP attempted to get agreement for a pro-war
electoral alliance with the LP, UP and Dominion Party. When the
other parties refused to co-operate, the CP decided to stand its
own candidate 9In the same election, the Herenigde Nasionale of
Volksparty (HNP), Afrikaner Party (AP), Nuwe Orde (NO), and
Ossewabrandwag (OB) all put foward election propaganda professing
a variety of anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist convictions2.10
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In 1945, the anti-pass petition was handed in. Measured against
the expectations of reforms aroused during the war, the petition
was a failure. Smuts refused to receive the delegation which
presented it, indicating the way in which the government would
respond to it2.11 The petition had received only a small part of the
support which had been hoped for.212
Since 1943, pegging proposals, relating to the acquisition of
213property by Asians (the "Ghetto Bill") had been on the table.
This had resulted in the rapid development of an opposition
faction - the Anti-Segregation Council - within the Natal Indian
Congress (NIC) 2.14 In 1945, the opposition succeeded for the first
time in winning a majority in the NIC leadership elections and
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replacing the conservative Kajee leadership. A Passive Resistance
Campaign was launched against the Ghetto BillTFor the new NIC
leadership, facing the threat of further oppressive measures, the
pressure existed for a turn towards the rest of the black petty
bourgeoisie 7 This pressure developed at the time when the ANC
leadership was seeing its hopes in the Anti-Pass petition being
dashed by the government response. The prospect of reform was
clearly receding, and there was the threat all round of further
restrictive legislation. Out of this pressure, unity moves
started developing between the ANC and the NIC. The CP provided a
crucial link in establishing that unity - later to be concretised
in the Doctors Pace- through the person of Dadoo. Political
developments within the petty bourgeoisie - stimulated first by
the war, then by the resurgence of the workers' movement - were
now being accelerated because of the extension of oppressive
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legislation and government threats of more such measures.
Meanwhile, within the ANC, the Youth League had been extending
its influence. Although, in the course of the war, the CP had
become relatively well located within the Transvaal ANC in
particular, its position within that organisation was threatened
by the concurrent growth of the influence of the CYL. In 1945,
the Transvaal ANC accepted a motion, coming from Tambo, Lembede,
Mandela and Sisulu which asserted that members of other parties
should forfeit their membership of the ANC.219 The motion
represented the clearest possible challenge to the alliance with
the petty bourgeoisie which the CP was trying to build, and for
the actual way in which it was seeking to pursue that alliance -
support for the ANC. The motion was rejected by the National
220Conference of the ANC, and, in the short-term, the CP came to owe
its continued location within the ANC to the support of some of
the more moderate elements within the ANC nationally, against the
opposition of the rising militant youth wing.
Part of the basis of the CYL opposition to the CP had arisen from
the conservatism of the CP in relation to the strike wave, and to
mass action in general. At the Party conference at the end of
1944, with the end of the war in sight, the Party had turned to
the issue of its post-war policy. The end of the war would free
the Party of the limitations imposed by its support for the war
effort. But there were differing approaches as to how the post-
war policy should be developed. In particular, there was a
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division between those who looked to a continued focus on "the
democratic alliance" (which for some, included the UP); and those
who believed that the Party should move outside of the Peoples
Front framework. The policy document "What Next" represents a
partial blend of the two positions. The Peoples Front perspective
is retained, but there is also a willingness to call for mass
action:
"How is a programme for progress to be put into effect? The
answer is through mass pressure and political action by the
working class and progressive organisations. The lead must be
taken by organised bodies, European and Non-European. The trade
unions, The LP, the Communists, the ANC and other national
organisations are capable of bringing large sections of the
population into action.—. [Such a policy] pressed with vigour
and persistence will obtain the backing of progressive
capitalists and middle class people—..",221
The Party leadership was faced with criticism of this approach at
the 1944222and 1945 223conferences. Harry Snitcher is quoted at the
1944 conference as arguing:
"How is our policy as set forth in our pamphlet 'What Next?'
going to meet the post-war situation? Some of our comrades
describe this pamphlet as "wishy-washy" because it advocates the
development of industrialism, the establishment of a national
health service, compulsory education for all, and democratic
rights for all - because they do not consider it revolutionary in
content.—. COMRADES, THERE ARE TIMES WHEN TO BE EXTREME ULTRA-
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REVOLUTIONARY IS TO BETRAY THE CAUSE FOR WHICH WE ARE WORKING.' ,224
The Party had considerable difficulty in seeking to pursue the
blend of differing positions embodied in "What Next?". At the
beginning of 1945, the Party attempted to organise the "People's
Covention" which the conference had called for. This was to be a
an alliance of the CP, LP, trade unions, and "non-European
liberatory organisations". But the preliminary meeting was "a
complete flop", and the Party was forced to declare: "It is an
obvious fact that the 'progressive forces' are heartily sick of
us; and our own comrades too are clearly un-enthusiastic about
these efforts to link up with these 'progressive forces' except
when they momentarily get scared of the fascist shoutings of the
Nationalists". The Party recognised its own confusion of
orientation, as it attempted to move beyond the clear lines laid
down by support for the war effort: "Browderism caught on so
easily. It is our weakness that the Party as a whole has little
grasp of its revolutionary function."225
As will be discussed, the Party did not completely turn its back
on the attempt to build an alliance with 'progressive forces',
which were later to specifically include parts of the ruling
class, and all "non-Nationalist South Africans". But the CP was
also ready to support more radical proposals at the 1946 Anti-
Pass Campaign conference 26The Xuma leadership of the ANC was
under pressure to do the same; its war position was made
redundant by the situation; it was frustrated by the lack of a
return in the form of reforms from the government, moving towards
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an alliance with radicalised sections of the Indian petty
bourgeoisie, and under pressure from the Youth League militants.
For the CYL, the central element in its political approach to the
masses was the need to politicise them into action2. 27The second
national Anti-pass campaign conference, in June 1946, was the
first major political conference after the war, and it reflected
a break from the CP and ANC constraints of support for the war
effort. The anti-pass campaign had agreed to work on a petition,
in conditions where there was a mass movement maturing, a
widespread mood of combativity and a mobilised mass struggle
against the pass laws. These were conditions in which, as the
Brakpan strike indicates, there was a movement in part mobilised
around the anti-pass campaign, although not called into action by
it. From the same campaign, in 1946, when the strike wave had
been dissipated, when two Alexandra bus boycotts had run their
course, when the level of spontaneous action was dying down,
there now came the proposal to launch a mass struggle, to
culminate in pass-burning and a national stoppage within three
months28
This new radical position from the anti-pass Campaign came not
long after CNETU had claimed the greatly increased membership of
150,000 29(The joint membership of the Co-ordinating Committee and
the Joint Committee at the beginning of the war was a maximum of
23,000). Xuma had given the opening address to the 1945 CNETU
conference. Makabeni had been replaced as Secretary General by
231Marks. The immediate post-war situation was one in which the
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leadership of the unions was more left-wing, and the ANC and CP
had moved to the left; there was a level of political agreement
and co-operation between these different organisations. The petty
bourgeoisie was better organised than at the outset of the warF32
n3The membership of the CP had risen. The unions were very much
larger. There thus seemed to be the organisational and political
basis for the mass campaign. Benson talks of the "immense feeling
generated by the anti-pass campaign. „234Bunting speaks of the
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"country-wide ferment” in 1946.
The basis for widespread class action is always unstable. It is
never permanently there. It can never be sustained, at the
highest level it reaches, unless it is developed at that time.
And, certainly, it cannot be conjured into existence because of a
set of factors operating to change the minds of sections of the
petty bourgeoisie and Communists. The beginning of 1943 was the
peak of the strike movement. During the course of 1944, the peak
of community action was reached. By the beginning of 1945, there
was a peak in the rise of union membership. That was the actual
rhythm of the development of the resurgent workers' movement. The
reality was that in 1945, the spontaneous tide pushing forward
the mass movement had already begun to ebb. CNETU was already
beginning to break up in a process which involved two major
splits - the PTU in 19452,36 and the Makabeni group in 19472.37In
fact, the 1944 unity developments in CNETU were not uni-causal.
As well as representing the drive inside the working class for
unity and organisation, they also had to do with leadership
attempts to ensure a majority against the PTU within CNETU2.38F0r
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the major period in which the resurgence of the workers' movement
had come to the fore in action and organisation, the leadership
was generally opposed to a large scale class action. In the next
phase of that resurgence the unions, because of the policies of
their leaders, began to split. A spontaneous mass movement, with
such a leadership where it is organised, and more generally
lacking formal organisation cannot remain at the peaks of
militancy and immediate willingness to struggle. The peaks which
could be spontaneously reached had already been reached. When the
basis existed for the workers' movement to be developed further,
from the heights which it had spontaneously reached, that was not
in accordance with the policies of its leaders. When the policies
of those leaders changed, workers were no longer waiting, at
precisely the same levels of combativity which had been reached.
This meant that to be sustained and developed, the Campaign could
not simply rely on the "country-wide ferment" and "immense
feeling generated by the campaign". Working class spontaneity was
not likely to provide the lead, as it had done in the 1942/43
strikes. That responsibility lay with the Campaign leadership.
Within the Campaign leadership, there was not a unified approach.
The Youth League and the Communists were still in an uneasy,
sometimes hostile relationship. The Xuma leadership was obviously
reluctant, and later proved unwilling, to support the programme
which had been agreed. The different approaches created an uneasy
alliance within the Anti-Pass Campaign which was reflected at the
conference. Inkululeko found it necessary to argue that there
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was no truth in reports of splits within the Campaign. But it
pointed out that the resolution on the action decided by the 1946
conference "was keenly debated, and it was not carried by a very
_big majority."239 A divided and indecisive Campaign leadership had
before it the questions posed by its own programme. How would a
national strike be organised? What demands would be put forward?
How would these be secured? Before the questions facing the
Campaign leadership were answered, it was overtaken by the
development of the miners' strike of August 1946.
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As has been stated, the possibility of a miners' strike
developing in the course of 1944 had been clear at the AMWU
conference. Basner described the strong support for a strike in
this way:
"Over 1000 delegates from different shafts on the Witwatersrand
were present. They wanted —. to strike there and then —. and on
the other hand you had the officials who wanted to know whether
we had exhausted all channels of negotiation for coming to an
amicable settlement. „240
In the course of 1944, power workers, coal trade workers, baking
workers and milling workers were all on strike” In the same
period, there was the second Alexandra bus boycott, and the
struggle in Orlando was at its peak. But after the peaks of
industrial strike and community action had been reached and
passed, the climate no longer existed in which a single important
industrial struggle was in itself likely to be the catalyst for
the development of a broader upsurge of struggle.
At the end of June 1946, there was a spontaneous strike of
strategically important steel workers in Vereeniging 242. On the
mines, spontaneous strikes had broken out around the time of the
243
April 1946 AMWU conference. But, at that time the leadership was
still seeking a negotiated settlement. When the strike was
officially called in August, it met with an immediate widespread
response from the miners. At least 70,000, and possibly as many
244as 110,000, miners were involved in co-ordinated action. The
miners were showing the same combativity which, amongst other
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conditions of rising combativity, serve
layers of workers, had already been expressed in class action.
The particular living and working conditions of the miners
served, to a certain extent, to isolate them from the mass of the
class. But the issues facing the rest of the working class were
also facing miners, even if they were experienced under unique
conditions - for example, buying from mine stores, and living in
mine compounds. Certainly the repression facing miners was
greater than that facing other sections of the class. The miners
generally face a tighter discipline through the compound system
than other groups of workers. But although regimentation under
tribal and mine police is specific to the miners, it can, in
to fuel anger and
. 245	 .	 .determination to struggle, rather than suppress it. Similarly,
the pressure of having to subsidise a family in the rural areas
can, in conditions of rising combativity, serve to fuel that
combativity.
The fact is that, when the strike did occur, it is likely that
the repression was far greater than it would have been earlier.
Firstly, War Measure 1425 had been passed, and meetings on the
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mines and of mine workers were now banned. Secondly, the state
was freed from the pressures of the war effort, to be able to
concentrate single-mindedly on repression in the face of a
struggle. And thirdly, when the strike did finally develop, the
miners were isolated, lacking the level of protection which would
automatically have been afforded had their strike been part of a
broader strike wave. The miners' strike reflected the same
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combativity of the earlier strike wave and community action - but
at a time when it had already run a part of its course amongst
other sections of the class.
The strike decision was taken at a conference of more than 1,000
delegates on Sunday 4 August 2.47The strike was to begin on Monday
12 August. The Guardian carried part of a speech made by Marks
at the conference: "You are challenging the basis of the cheap
labour system.— You must be ready to sacrifice in the struggle
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for the right to be treated as human beings." The Guardian also
reported that "the majority of the miners present, though they
had stood at the meeting the whole morning, decided to remain for
the anti-pass demonstration that afternoon." 249The strike received
wide backing on the first day, with more than 50,000 miners
reported as being on strike. On the same day, six workers were
shot deace50
On the 13th, a meeting of the strike committee agreed to call a
251
general strike "within 48 hours". In the middle of the meeting
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which took this decision, Marks was arrested. The Strike Bulletin
issued the following day announced that the strike would begin
"from tomorrow", claiming that Johannesburg had been flooded with
thousands of leaflets in support of the general strike cal12.530n
15 August, a mass meeting in Market Square was forced to
a5disperse. The strike call received hardly any suppor-0 5 The CNETU
unions in Pretoria promised support for the strike "as soon as it
gets going in Johannesburg ": 56 A statement issued by the EC of
CNETU declared that "it has been decided to postpone the general
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strike called in sympathy with the African mineworkers' strike,
until such time as it is considered expedient"As we have seen,
the programme of the Anti-pass Campaign was for a general strike.
At the conference of the AMWU in April, it had been clear that a
miners' strike was almost inevitable2.58 The annual conference of
CNETU, held in May, had unanimously agreed to give support to the
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miners if they went on strike. Despite this, there had been no
preparation either by CNETU or by the Anti-pass Campaign for a
260general strike. Two days after the strike began, Phillips, the
Chairman of the Strike Committee, commented that it had already
been handicapped by arrests and raidel
Benson argues that "the strike committee had been incapacitated
by the arrest of Marks and several other members. In the
background trade unionists and the ANC quarrelled. Some of the
ANC felt the strike was precipitate and should not have been
called until the Union had achieved far greater strength, and for
this blamed the influence of communists, while Lembede and the
Youth League felt that Marks together with Xuma should have
carefully organised a country-wide general strike, using the
immense feeling generated by the anti-pass campaign."262
 Simons
claims that there were divisions within the Strike Committee2.63
Xuma refused to issue any statement of support while the strike
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was on. In conditions where there had already been a descent from
the peaks of combativity, a combination of a lack of
preparation, leadership divisions and state attacks explain why
there was little response to the CNETU strike call. The miners
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were therefore left to fight their struggle without any
industrial solidarity action. In the face of such widespread
action from workers at the very heart of the economy, the
government was forced to look for decisive measures. It was not
the first government to try to look for ways of simulating a mood
of national emergency amongst the electorate immediately after a
war, when its popularity was clearly declining. The strike was
broken at gunpoint, after a massive wave of repression2.65A
swartgevaar/red menace campaign was launched. Despite the
militancy of the strike itself, the government was presented with
conditions in which the isolation of the strike made its defeat
more possible, and it was ended on 17 August, five days after it
had begur266
In his Strike Diary, Harmel wrote of
"the glorious heroism, unity and determination of the African
mineworkers, over 200,000 of whom, at one stage or another during
the week participated in the strike.— Let us remember that
these men live in compounds at the mercy of their employers and
with no other place to go; scattered over the miles of the
Witwatersrand with communication between mines impossible. That
the organisation of their union was of the very slightest,
hampered by the Fascist 'war measure' 1425 and the continual
normal terrorism practiced on the mines. That they speak many
different languages and have been indentured from every corner of
Southern and Tropical Africa, and that no opportunity of
imperialist play upon tribal differences has ever been missed by
the Chamber of Mines.
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"Then remember what it meant to strike last week. To face,
unarmed, police batons, bayonets, and rifles. Thousands of
unknown miners have been seriously wounded, had their heads
bashed in, their bones broken. Reliable reports show that at
least thirty have been shot dead or otherwise killed. So you can
appreciate what those miners have done for the common cause:
renew your faith in the working man and his destiny.
"The strike ceased to be merely a strike, and became a war
between the government and the workers.—. The workers of South
Africa will never forget Bloody Tuesday and Bloody Wednesday, the
„ 26713th and 14th of August.—.
The defeat of the strike had an impact far beyond the strikers
themselves. The resurgence of the workers' movement had now been
struck a decisive blow. The working class had, after the 1942/43
strikes, stepped back from the levels of confrontation which
those strikes had created. The wave of community action had, in
turn, followed a similar pattern. Now the miners' strike had
created a new level of confrontation. In the first phase, the
working class had not sustained the level of confrontation
reached because of the limits of spontaneity and the policies of
its leaders. In this new phase of confrontation, the state was
able to exploit those factors. This time, the workers did not
step back, nor were they led back from the level of confrontation
which they had created. In the case of the 1946 miners' strike,
the workers were driven back by force, inadefeat with
implications for the class in general. Inevitably, there followed
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a period in which workers paused and held back from action. In
this 1u11 2,68 as after the peak of the 1942/43 strike wave, there
was again an upsurge of political development within the petty
bourgeoisie.
But just as the last phase of the development of the politics of
the petty bourgeoisie could only be understood against the
background of the strike wave, so now the political developments
within the petty bourgeoisie could only be understood in terms of
the impact of the fact, and then the defeat, of the miners'
strike. Each phase of the resurgence of the workers' movement had
completely transformed the political conditions in which the
opposition to the government and the employers was being carried
through. While the impact of that defeat still dominated the
working class and imposed a lull in the resurgence of the
workers' movement, the processes making for the revival of class
confidence and combativity were already in motion. While this
continued beneath the surface, the miners' strike and the waves
of struggle before it were having a profound impact and
increasing the instability of the class alliance through which
the ruling class organised its rule.
CHAPTER SIX
1946 - 1952
Until the strike wave, the black members of the NRC continued a
fairly routine activity of making proposals which were largely
ignored by the state] As we have seen, 1942 was the highpoint as
far as state talk about reforms was concerned. For as long as
that talk continued, and the petty bourgeoisie was relatively
free of direct mass pressure, the NRC provided a means through
which a reasonably stable relationship between the government and
sections of the black petty bourgeoisie could be acted out.
Certainly, in the eyes of elements within the petty bourgeoisie,
it came to be seen in this ways But the pressures which combined
to create the political developments which we have already seen
within the petty bourgeoisie were acting to change the relative
equilibrium upon which the NRC operated. The political approach
of the CYL brought participation within the NRC under question
and such participation was attacked by the NEUM, in accordance
with the policy of "non-collaboration with the oppressor."
By the end of the war, political conditions had been changed by
the resurgence of the workers' movement and the political
developments amongst the petty bourgeoisie which followed. These
in turn changed the relative stability of the relationship
between the petty bourgeoisie and the government, and those
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changes were increased by the moves which the government took, or
threatened to take, in relation to the petty bourgeoisie. Luthuli
was elected to the NRC in a bye-election in 1946. He has written
of the situation:
"I was interested, though not at all suprised, as I went about
among the people before the election, to notice how deeply
disillusioned they were by this time with the Council.
"What is the use,' they asked me, 'of your going to the N.R.C.
in Pretoria? They do nothing but talk. Where has this Council got
us?'
"It was only too true. For years now they had talked. Nobody
listened. I was disillusioned myself and could only reply, 'There
are people beyond South Africa who sometimes hear what we say.
All we can do is try to shout to the world. All I can do is to
help us shout louder.'
"It was hardly surprising that the Native Representation [sic]
Council was no more than a hollow show. White South Africa was
impenetrably dead, and their newspapers did nothing to educate
them."5
The pressures which this process of participation in the "hollow
show" created were reflected in a letter written by Xuma in July
1946 After the government had rejected what Luthuli calls "the
Council's moderate proposals for certain reforms": Xuma called
for the NRC to be adjourned, until the government removed major
segregation measures, including the pass laws. But, as
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developments were to show, this was not really the political
position which Xuma held. Following the miners' strike, there was
a series of moves relating to the NRC. As an immediate response
to the political conditions created by the strike, the NRC voted
to adjourn indefinitely? Xuma called an emergency conference of
the ANC in October? That conference voted for a boycott of all
elections under the Hertzog Bills, but opposed Lembede's motion
for mass resignationsT The petty bourgeoisie was responding to
and reflecting the level of confrontation which had been created
by the strike, but keeping doors open at the same time. In
December 1946, the annual ANC conference supported the boycott
and the adjournment decision:' In January 1947, the CP conference
endorsed the ANC position:2
Several resolutions at the ANC conference in December 1946 relate
directly to the miners' strike? A combination of the impact of
the strike and the growing influence of the CYL militants can be
seen in the generally militant tone and content of the
resolutions overall. Known collectively as the "ANC minimum
programme"; the resolutions of 1946 were precursors of the
Programme of Action of 1949. But in the aftermath of the strike,
it was not merely the massive show of working class combativity
which continued to have an impact on the organised petty
bourgeoisie. There was also the fact that the strike - and with
it the broader workers' movement - had suffered a serious defeat.
The positions adopted in resolutions showed a shift to the lefty
As far as the immediate practical political steps of the petty
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bourgeoisie were concerned, there was a retreat. In October,
before the emergency ANC meeting, Inkululeko had raised the
prospect of such a retreat:
"If Bloemfontein [the site of the emergency ANC meeting] shows
that Africans are not yet in a position to carry forward the
inspiring example of our Indian bothers and sisters in their
great resistance campaign, we must admit that this phase of the
Anti-Pass Campaign has not been a success:116
After the Bloemfontein meeting, the National Action Committee of
the Anti-Pass Campaign met and issued a statement which postponed
indefinitely the burning of passes and the one-day general
strike': The ANC leadership responded to the overt strength of the
state and began, again, to try to use the channel of
communication which the state had created. In February 1947, a
special ANC Executive meeting decided to re-open the boycott
questionT In March, the Doctors Pact was signee In May a
delegation of NRC members saw Smuts, and began to exert strong
pressure within the ANC for the boycott and adjournment position
to be changed.2° In August, a statement from Paul Mosaka, an NRC
member, confirmed the process underway:
"The leaders of the National Congress have not indicated how this
resolution of Conference [the boycott resolution] is to be
implemented. Meanhile Dr. Xuma has openly declared his opposition
to the boycott. Professor Matthews, Councillors Champion and
Thema and Mr. R. Baloyi, prominent members of the National
Executive of Congress, are not supporting the boycott resolution
and attempts are being made to call a special Conference in order
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to rescind or reverse this Resolution."2'
At the December 1947 ANC conference, the CYL proposed that the
boycott decision be reaffirmedrThey were opposed by the ANC
leadership, which was supported by the CP. The conference voted
57 to seven to reject the former boycott position in favour of
boycott candidatesPAt its conference in January 1948, the CP
formally endorsed the ANC position:
"Conference recognises that the stand taken by the NRC
Councillors in the boycott campaign has forced the Government to
make concessions, but denounces these concessions as useless.-.
The NRC can not achieve any useful purpose, and the African
peoples' efforts must be directed towards its abolition. In the
forthcoming election to the Council, Conference resolves to work
for the election of a bloc of candidates pledged to repeal of the
Act, the introduction of a universal franchise, and recognition
of the right of all South Africans to sit in Parliament."24
The position adopted by the CP on the boycott was an important
factor in the persistence of the antagonistic relationship which
it had with the CYL. Initially, the Party had strongly criticised
what it saw as the conservative nationalism of the CYL. The
attempt to have Communists excluded from the ANC at the 1945
Conference was regarded as marking "a turning point or a swing to
the right". It was described as coming from "reactionary elements
in the Transvaal".25 A
 meeting of the African Improvement Society
was described in this way:
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"Its speakers, in true Nazi fashion, launched out in vicious and
lying attacks.–. [A] well-known member of the African National
Congress, Mr A M Lembede, was misguided and foolish enough to
associate himself publicly with the meeting held by this
questionable crowd.— [W]e find a new group of anti-Communists
among the Africans. They call themselves 'nationalists'. But
whether they realise it or not, they are the enemies of the
African nation."26
A Communist conference in Cape Town in September 1945 "took note
of the tendency amongst certain sections of the non-Europeans to
be influenced by anti-Soviet, anti-Communist and anti-white
prejudices deliberately fostered by political opportunists among
non-Europeans themselves." An article reported comments by
Lembede about the trade unions and the national struggle under
the headline: 'Mr. Lembede's outdated nationalism.'27
The later course of developments was to show that the anti-
Communist and narrowly nationalist views put forward from within
the CYL were not unchangeable. The reality was that the positions
of the CYL, like the general political conditions in which they
emerged, were dynamic. As far as their political goals went, the
CYL showed a combination of clarity and uncertainty. They were
clear that Africans were the leading force in their own struggle,
and that the struggle was directed against racial oppression. But
there was no fixed clarity about the precise goals of that
struggle. The CYL in fact faced the same questions which the OP
had faced in adopting the slogan of the Native Republic. Was it a
bourgeois democracy? Was it a form of socialism? If so, which
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form? How could it be achieved? As was the case in the
development of the ICU and the AAC, a radicalisation of elements
within the oppressed petty bourgeoisie opened up the possibility
of an alliance with the working class. The general orientation
which the CYL had to the African masses in turn opened up, rather
than constituted, an answer to questions of the relationship
between two oppressed classes. Through what forms of organisation
would that orientation be pursued? What precise demands would be
put forward? What relationship would there be with actual
struggles? What programme of action would be put forward? The CYL
did not emerge with a fixed position on any of these questions.
In conditions in which they were still seeking political clarity,
two pressures served to draw them to the left. The first was
their own oppression. The second was the impact of the workers'
struggle. For much of the initial development of the CYL, the
hostile relationship between it and the CP meant that the Party
was not able to influence the CYL.
Apart of the opposition from within the CYL to the CP was simply
directed at the fact that the CP had many white leaders, and
pursued what was seen as a "foreign ideology" r Moreover, the
Communists were an increasingly influential, organised grouping
within the ANC, at the time when the CYL was seeking to establish
its own dominance within the organisation. The CP was
encountered as an obstacle to the rise to dominance of the CYL
within the ANC, and the organised petty bourgeoisie more
generally. The CYL was made up of petty bourgeois individuals,
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the majority of whom had no history of union involvement 9
 These
factors did not make for an easy or immediate alliance with a
Party in which white trade unionists were in a central position.
But the CYL was not simply or definitively anti-white, or just
seeking leadership positions. It was made up of a layer of
individuals who were radicalised by their own oppression - and by
the impact of the workers' struggle around them. Moreover, this
was a layer whose political positions were not yet fixed, or
fully developed.
In addition to the factors already mentioned, particular policies
of the CP also served to promote an antagonism in the
relationship with the CYL - and hence to undermine the Party's
capacity to influence the radicalised youth. During the course of
the war, two aspects of Party policy were particularly important
in this regard. The first was its opposition to disruption of the
war effort; the second was its attempts to maintain an alliance
with, and its support for, a popular frontist government. As we
have seen, the Party's policy during the war meant that it
supported demands, but could not support action which disrupted
the war effort in support of those demands. The need to reconcile
these two aspects of its approach created extreme difficulties
for the Party, when workers took spontaneous action. It also
meant that the Party was not in a position to provide clear
answers to the militants of the CYL as they began to address the
issue of how to connect with the masses. The pattern was
repeated in the Party's support for the government popular front.
It was this same governing popular front which organised the
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oppression which was part of the cause for the emergence of the
CYL in the first place. The Party's position on each of these
issues undermined its capacity both to relate to the action which
workers were taking, and to influence the way in which black
militants pursued that relationship. At the same time, the quest
for allies which the Peoples Front policy promoted had led the
Party into a quest for an alliance with the leadership of the
organised black petty bourgeoisie. This led it to support the
very ANC leadership which the CYL was trying to depose, partly
because of the conservatism of that leadership.
The end of the war freed the Party from the constraints of
support for the war effort. The immediate result of this was to
make possible a more radical stance within the Anti-Pass
Campaign, and to free the Party from resistance to a miners'
strike. In both of these cases, the CP and the CYL had formally
coinciding positions. There were thus conditions in which some
improvement in the relations between the two organisations seemed
possible. But the defeat of the miners' strike meant that the
pressure of the workers' movement as an immediate factor in the
situation was significantly reduced. As has been stated, the
programme of action of the Campaign was suspended, in the
aftermath of the strike, and the Campaign eventually floundered
in a myriad of mutual recriminations 3.° One area of potential
collaboration between the CYL and the CP was therefore removed.
And, in the parallel process of arriving at a position in
relation to the NRC, the CP and the CYL consistently took
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different positions.
At the October ANC emergency meeting Kotane, the CF General
Secretary, supported the boycott. But, in opposition to the
position proposed by Lembede, he argued against the concurrent
resignation of the NRC members Some accounts claim that it was
Marks who proposed a change of position at the December 1947 ANC
conference, again in opposition to the CYL position? 2 Whether this
was the case or not, the Party supported the change, and Party
policy changed accordingly?3
Bunting argues that the relationship between the CF and the CYL
was greatly improved by the co-operation between Kotane and
Lembede at the emergency ANC conference in 1946. He also argues
that "the whole course of the NRC boycott launched in 1946 is an
example of ANC influence being exerted on the Communist Party,
and not vice versa" 3.4
 We have seen that the Party followed the
position of the ANC on the boycott. This gave rise to criticisms
within the Party:
"Now and again a question arises, giving a sudden jolt to the
accepted view, and angry voices denounce what may be regarded as
'tailing behind the Non-European organisations'. At the 1947
National Conference and again at this year's conference consider-
able discussion centred on the question of boycotting .—. At the
first conference some comrades felt that, had the ANC not decided
to boycott the election under this act, the Party would not have
fallen in line."35
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When the position of the ANC changed, the Party followed. But the
position of the ANC was not the position of the CYL. On the issue
of maintaining the boycott position, the CYL was an isolated
minority against the Communists and the rest of the ANC
leadership. Under pressure from the organised petty bourgeoisie
before, the Party had asserted that it had no interests different
to anyone else's 3. 6
 Under challenge from the CYL, it again asserted
its loyalty to the ANC. But the CYL was not committed to the ANC
in the abstract - its primary commitment was to establishing the
ANC under its own leadership. It was only when the CYL took over
the leadership of the Congress that the Party's willingness to
follow the ANC could work to remove tension between the
Communists and the Youth League.
The defeat of the miners' strike meant that the open assertion of
the strength of the working class was not an immediate
possibility. The development of class action and class
organisation which had acted as a magnet on elements within the
petty bourgeoisie was no longer an immediate force operating upon
them. It was not in this way that the radicalised petty
bourgeoisie was going to be drawn to the working class. The CP,
partly because of its policy choices, was unable to act as a
decisive influence upon the CYL. This meant that the primary
pressure operating on the radicals of the CYL was the experience
of their own oppression. Their response demonstrated the features
of petty bourgeois ideology which have been mentioned. The
primary task to which the CYL turned was the preparation of a
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politicised elite. The support of the masses would be called for,
once the politicised leaders were in place. Thus it was that for
crucial parts of its development, the CYL was turned inward,
fighting for dominance within the petty bourgeoisie. Consistent
with petty bourgeois politics, the masses became a backdrop,
against which the politicised leaders prepared themselves.
For a period, the political position within the petty bourgeoisie
of the rising urban layer which made up the CYL had lagged behind
its developing social position. In this phase, the CP had been
encountered as the politically conservative allies of the older
leadership which the CYL was seeking to displace. The CYL had
tried to promote organisational measures designed to get the
Communists out of the way. But as the political significance of
this rising layer of the petty bourgeoisie began to be reflected
in its influence within the ANC, so the problem which they
believed the CP to be lessened. The disintegration of CNETemeant
that, as far as a mass base was concerned, the CP no longer
presented a powerful potential rival and opponent.
The leadership struggle of the CYL was taken a decisive step
forward at the 1949 ANC conference. Sisulu was elected General
Secretary, the Programme of Action was accepted, and Xuma was
replaced by Moroka, as the result of organised Youth League
pressure For the CYL, these steps advanced both its ideological
and organisational influence within the primary organisation of
the black petty bourgeoisie. In the period leading up to this
change of leadership, the relationship between the CYL and the CP
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was still tense. The manifesto of the Youth League, issued in
1948, had warned against "certain groups which seek to impose on
our struggle cut and dried formulae, which so far from clarifying
the issues of the struggle, only serve to obscure the fundamental
fact that we are oppressed not as a class, but as a people, as a
Nation." 39As the influence of the Youth League within the ANC
leadership grew, the Party was criticised from within that
leadership. In April 1948, the Party set up a propaganda
campaign, focussing on the call for a universal franchise. The
campaign, under the name of the Peoples Assembly for Votes for
All was given backing by Xuma 4.9
 But there was opposition from
within the ANC leadership and the CYL to what was seen as a Party
attempt to campaign for mass support.
The Party, in turn, criticised the ANC for a lack of clarity in
its attitude to the Peoples Assembly. "Until recently, when
preparations of the first Transvaal-OFS conference of the Peoples
Assembly for votes for all, were being made - up to the time
of conference - —. [there] appeared conflicting statements in
the press from the leaders. At this stage, nobody knows whether
the ANC was supporting the Assembly or not —.. Thus the people
go one way and the leaders another way. " 41 In July, speaking on
behalf of the Transvaal ANC executive, Mandela criticised
Ramahonoe (Transvaal ANC President) for supporting the Assembly,2
The tension between the two organisations was finally removed
only when the Youth League was confident that the Communists were
not rivals in trying to win the support of the mass of blacks;
and when the hold which the CYL had on the leadership of the ANC
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was secure.
The CYL had, unlike the earlier ANC leaders, risen to leadership
within the organisation with a programme which directed outward
towards the mass of blacks, and called them to action. The strike
wave had promoted this orientation; the miners' strike had
confirmed it. But basic features of petty bourgeois political
ideology remained intact within this perspective. From the point
at which the organisational and ideological dominance of the CYL
was achieved, the activities of the CYL reflected the assumption
that, once its dominance was secure, its programme could more or
less immediately be triggered off amongst the masses. A closer
alliance was in the making between the petty bourgeoisie and the
working class. But the movement of the petty bourgeoisie towards
that alliance had developed in such a way that it would be
pursued, not on the basis of the actual rhythms of the workers'
struggle, but through calls to action whose form and demands
reflected the issues and priorities determined by the petty
bourgeois radicals of the CYL.
During the 1946 miners' strike, the media had carried reports of
a threatened attack by thousands of armed b1acks:i3 In the after-
math of the strike, leading Communists were charged with
sedition. One of the main prosecution charges was that the Party
had a secret army:' 4 The strike was portrayed by Smuts as the work
of agitators 5
 The TLC had also made clear its belief that
"natives were misled by irresponsible people." 48These developments
combined to promote a combination of rooigevaar and swartgevaar
fears which played into the hands of the Afrikaner Nationalists.
They could exploit the uncertainty amongst white workers,
generated by the way in which the growing strength of black
workers was portrayed, and present themselves as the most
resolute opponents of the rooiswartgevaar. The Nationalists were
operating on ground made fertile by the growing receptivity
amongst white workers to radical policies which seemed better
able to meet their needs as industrial workers, than those of the
LP.
In the wake of the industrial expansion after 1933, white trade
union membership had rocketedr The majority of this new
membership was in the industrial unions, and included an
increasing number of Afrikaners, drawn to the towns and the jobs
of the industrial expansion: 8 The movement continued through the
1930's and 1940's. By 1946, 72.5% of whites were living in the
urban areas, compared to 61.3% in 1931f9 According to the 1946
census, Afrikaners constituted 49.5% of the urban population, as
opposed to 43.5% in 1936. The comparable figures for the
Witwatersrand were 29.2% and 36.4eIn the period 1939-1948, the
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number of Afrikaners who were factory operatives increased by
298%, constituting 63% of whites in that occupation; in the same
period, the figures for the number of Afrikaans fitters rose by
350%, although they still constituted only 21% of white fitters.
In 1948, Afrikaners made up 86% of white unskilled workers' By
1939, Albert Hertzog was claiming that over 80% of white trade
union members were Afrikaners.52
 But the majority of trade union
leaders were English-speaking and, in many cases, actually born
in Britain:3 The same applied to the leaders and parliamentary
representatives of the Labour Party.54 In a range of ways, the
English-speaking trade union leaders discriminated against
Afrikaans workers. That discrimination combined a traditional
craft exclusivity with a simple racism. It involved corruption,
exploiting recognition from employers, and control of access to
apprenticeships.
Before the war, despite the grievances which clearly existed
amongst the growing numbers of Afrikaans workers, the Afrikaner
nationalist organisations in general had no specific orientation
to white workers per se. The exception, as has been mentioned,
was the Broederbond Raad van Trustees?5 When an orientation to the
white workers had arisen within the nationalist organisations it
generally had to do with the entrepreneurial possibilities
presented by the control of the money of white workers 6 But the
composition of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie was changing, with
an increasingly powerful urban petty bourgeoisie developing,
amongst whom teachers were especially noticeable.57 The increased
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social weight of the Afrikaans workers was bound to act as a
magnet for the petty bourgeois nationalist forces. During the
war, with minor exceptions, the Afrikaner nationalists (and a
small minority of the left) had been consistently opposed to
support for Britain 8 In this position, they were able to strike a
chord with the politically different, but similarly anti-British,
sentiments of Afrikaner workers. The position of the CP from 1941
onwards was not one of which the same could be said. Before the
war the CP, in line with the peoples fronts policy, and under
pressure from elements who maintained an orientation to white
workers, had generally tried to win the support of white union
leaders. There was a limited level of co-operation in anti-war
committees. The level of co-operation between the CP and white
union leaders was greatly increased when they could join together
in organised support for the war effort. And, all the time,
individual Communists held influential positions within the union
movement. At any point at which the Communists raised support for
black workers, or called for democratic reforms to be extended to
blacks, they could be denounced as "kaffirboeties". Moreover, in
the propaganda from Afrikaner nationalists, they could also be
portrayed and denounced as part of the discriminatory
establishment of the white trade unions. Afrikaner ideologues
could hold out the spectacle of the Communist and English white
trade unionists discriminating against the Afrikaner on one hand,
but calling for advances for the blacks on the other.
The outbreak of the war led to the breaking up of the fusion UP.
Kruger writes that "Mith the end of Fusion in September 1939 it
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had for a moment been thought that adversity might make
bedfellows of Hertzog and Malan once again"? By January 1940,
there had been what O'Meara categorises as "a very shaky party
political hereniging (reunion)—.. °° This was expressed in the
formation of the Herenigde Nasionale Party (HNP) 6: Within a few
months, this had broken down, as different interests within the
nationalist movement tried to respond to and exploit war-time
conditions. Out of this process, the Afrikaner Party (AP)62and
then the Nuwe Order (NO)63 - New Order - were formed. War-time
pressures had promoted a set of divisions within the Afrikaner
nationalist movement and a competition for authority between the
different elements. Given the increasing social weight of the
Afrikaner workers, and their receptivity to political propaganda
which attacked the discrimination and exploitation which they
suffered, there was pressure on different elements within the
nationalist movement to start turning towards the workers, in
search of a base from which to take forward their own struggle.
In the course of the war the attempts by different elements
within the nationalist movement to establish a working class base
escalated. It was only around such a base that the divisions
within the nationalist movement began to be resolved, and the
political strength of Afrikaner nationalism qualitatively
increased.
The 1943 elections were an important indicator of the process in
motion. Repeated attempts to construct some form of electoral
front between the Nuwe Orde, Afrikaner Party, Ossewabrandwag (OB)
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and HNP failed.64 In those elections, the HNP received overwhelming
support. This increased both its confidence and its capacity to
put itself forward as the authentic political expression of
Afrikanerdom. The AP, which had an ambivalent position on the
war, lost all its parliamentary representation.66 Behind the "khaki
election victory" of the UP-led popular front, the HNP was
increasing its support in key urban areas. On the Witwatersrand,
its share of the vote went up from 22.1% in the 1938 election to
34.1% in 1943. In Pretoria, the increase was from 28.7% to 39.9%.
In Johannesburg, the increase was from 12.8% to 17.2%. In each of
the same areas, the vote of the LP, in alliance with the UP,
dropped!6
 The election results, which revealed a growing core of
urban working class support for the HNP, promoted an organised
turn to the white workers. An HNP statement in Die Kruithoring
declared.:
"The source of Nationalist strength in the towns lies in the
workers who are streaming in their thousands to the industrial
centres. For them the Nationalist Party offers a straightforward
system of representation in the place of the present Communistic
trade unions. Further, we assure them of a reasonable minimum
wage based on the difference between the payments of White,
Coloured and Native labour. Segregation will be forced in our
industries as far as possible.—"
In December 1943 the Guardian revealed that the HNP in the Cape
was planning a census of all white workers over 176.6
Until the outbreak of the war, the trade union success of the
nationalists had been limited to the Railways. In 1943, the
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Ossewabrandwag, which had been active in opposition to the
war, formed the Aarbeidsfront (Labour Front) in a direct attempt
to construct a mass base, and use the industrial strength of
Afrikaans workers to disrupt the war effort. The efforts of the
OB met with some success.69
 This further accelerated a turn to the
question of support amongst workers by other groups in the
nationalist petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie. In 1944 the
Blankewerkersbeskermingsbond (White Workers' Protection League)
was set up by the HNP, partly as a response to the formation of
the Aarbeidsfront:° In 1945, as the pressures for unity began to
produce results within the nationalist movement, the Bond
absorbed the Nasionale Raad van Trustees which had been formed by
Broederbond members and focussed on workers in the mines. It was
finally on the mines that the trade union base of Afrikaner
nationalism was consolidated.
The Mine Workers Union was run on autocratic lines, serving as an
instrument of management control': In terms of a closed shop
agreement in 1937, the union leadership had undertaken to stop
any action which could threaten production, in exchange for
control over access to jobs:2 There was a solid base for every
kind of opposition within the union. The Hervormers 3
 the
Afrikaner nationalist opposition, exploited the corruption of
the union leaders and their overt collaboration with management.
It was above all the policing role of the union on the issue of
wages that provided the basis for a massive growth of the
influence of Afrikaner nationalists. In 1943, under tremendous
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pressure, the union leadership was forced to put forward a 30%
wage demand:4 In December 1943, miners at Crown Mines went on
strike in support of the demaneAfter first declaring that the
time to strike was right, Broderick succeeded in having the
strike called off and an arbitrator appointee At the beginning
of 1944, the union began to ballot on a strike call, in support
of the 30% wage demand. Ballot results began to produce massive
majorities in favour of action: 7 At the first opportunity, union
negotiators withdrew the 30% wage demand. Instead, the Union
agreed to drop all wage demands, in return for a cash grant of
half a million pounds over five years from the employers 7.8 The
nationalist opposition within the MWU was thus provided with
conditions in which the struggle for widely supported economic
demands of workers could be turned against the union leadership.
The Labour Party, as well as the union leaders, were skilfully
set up as targets by Afrikaner nationalist propagandists. The
Labour Party was strongly associated with the old craft unions.
The union leaders were generally supporters of the Labour Party,
or at least willing to co-operate with it. Any propaganda
directed against the exclusivity of the craft unions and the
policies of the union leadership could be extended to cover the
Labour Party. Moreover, the Labour Party had entered the
coalition government in suppport of British imperialism. Thus the
Labour Party, with a degree of validity, could be seen as the
party of corrupt craft union racists, ready to co-operate with
the big capitalists, against the interests of white workers.
Decades of class collaboration by the Labour Party were promoting
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the conditions in which Afrikaner nationalism could gain a hold
over white workers. There had been the support for British
imperialism in the 1914-1918 war; the limitations which LP
leaders and reformist unions had tried to place on the 1922
strike - a strike in which the Afrikaner nationalists had been
able to nurture the beginnings of a working class base; the
collaboration of the Labour Party in the Pact government which
had placed restrictions on independent trade union activities;
and finally, the collaboration with the ruling class in the war
coalition. The Labour Party had promoted the conditions of its
own demise. It had promoted amongst white workers a tradition of
popular frontism and collaboration by union leaders. It was to be
expected, therefore, that the Labour Party would one day have to
watch not only Afrikaans workers but also some of its own leading
members79turning towards Afrikaner nationalism - a different form
of a continuing popular frontism.
While this situation was developing, the Labour Party was racked
by another major split s.°The immediate issue was the proposal by
Smuts to re-introduce and extend the provisions of the Pegging
Act. Some Labour Party members tried to form a new party, others
joined the UP, and others joined the Afrikaner Nationalists
Underlying this split was the ongoing process making for the
political disintegration of the Labour Party. Changes in the
structure of the white working class had eroded its traditional
base. A history of class collaboration had culminated in the war
coalition, in which the Labour Party not only acted as an adjunct
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of the primary political party of the ruling class, but was seen
to be acting as such an adjunct. The LP had, since the 1915
split, lacked an independent class line. But, through the
allegiance of white workers and the link with the craft unions,
it had been able to maintain an organisational existence. In the
war, that separate organisational existence was surrendered in
favour of participation in the coalition. The disagreements over
the Pegging Act were only the immediate issues around which the
underlying process making for the disintegration of the LP came
to the fore. At each stage, once the Afrikaner nationalists had
taken the decisision to seek a working class base, the politics
of the Labour Party and the process making for its disintegration
could be exploited. The decline of the Labour Party and the
growth of the working class base of Afrikaner nationalism went
hand in hand.
When Smuts introduced the repressive 1947 Trade Union Bill, he
was in part seeking to make clear that his government would be
completely resolute and firm in dealing with the struggles of
black workersP But, in the climate of opposition to black
organisation which was being promoted amongst white workers, it
was the Afrikaner nationalists, not Smuts, who reaped the
benefits. They could point to past liberal utterances to show
that Smuts was a kaffirboetie; to the way in which Smuts had
allowed the perceived threat of organised black workers to
develop while he was busy concentrating on support for British
imperialism; to Smuts as the person who let blacks organise to
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the point where thousands of them could arm themselves and march
against the whites (the propaganda of the swartgevaar), but who
had called out planes to attack white miners when they went on
strike. Above all, the Afrikaner nationalists could sow this type
of propaganda in ground which was made fertile by the material
situation facing the white workers - a situation in which social
and economic pressures were mounting.
In 194683and 194784two miners' strikes under the leadership of the
nationalist opposition within the MWU confirmed and promoted the
processes under way. The 1946 strike was organised around the
orchestrated sacking of an Afrikaans miner who had refused to pay
union dues. In terms of the closed shop agreement he was sacked.
8,500 white miners responded to a strike call.a5 In January 1947,
the nationalists called a one-day strike on the Rand. This was
extended, into a strike of almost seven weeks, of nearly 6,000
miners 86
The TLC responded to the growing challenge of Afrikaner
nationalism with a series of retreats. Resistance to those
retreats was weakened by divisions amongst the lefe 7 At the 1946
TLC conference Sachs moved a motion to refer back the Executive's
Annual Report - effectively a motion of no confidenceThe motion
was seconded by Johanna Cornelius, a one-time Communist. One of
the major points of Sachs' criticism was the "apathy" of the TLC
leadership in fighting "fascist" influence inside the unions.
Sachs in particular urged a policy of aggressive campaigning for
the needs of white workers, as the best policy for combatting the
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growing influence of the nationalistsP At the same time, he
argued that any direct attack on racism in the workers' movement
would be counter-productive.
In the immediate post-war situation there was growing resentment
and anger on the issue of food prices and shortages?° This
promoted the single campaign which the TLC leadership undertook
in this period. The TLC executive decided to call on individual
unions to ballot on the proposal for a general strike on the
issue?' In addition to the TLC unions, CNETU and the ANC expressed
support for the campaign 9. 2
 The prospect was being opened up of a
struggle on a wide front which began to challenge racial
divisions within the working class. The Guardian reported that
balloting was "proceeding in a number of unions, and in all cases
the majority of the workers favour the proposal of a general
strike." But the campaign ground to a halt, in the face of "what
cap
 only be described as sabotage on the part of certain top
leaders of the SATLC". The President (Downes) and Secretary (De
Vries) were singled out as "doing all in their power to impede
the movement which their Executive has called into being." Some
unions, including the MWU, refused to ballot their members.93
In the course of 1946 and 1947, as the strikes under the
nationalists were successfully called, there were moves within
the TLC to institute a colour bar. The Pretoria branch
unilaterally decided to bar the affiliation of black unione In
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the run-up to the 1947 conference, there were reports of moves to
drop the policy of allowing black members within the TLe 5 At the
conference, attempts to amend the constitution to that end were
defeatedr During the course of 1947, the TLC was provided with
its best opportunity of providing a militant counter to the
nationalists. A strike of more than 10,000 white building workers
lasted for nine weeks. It was eventually partly successful in
winning a limited wage increase 9.7 The strike became the focal
point for wide support within the labour movement, and it
received statements of support from the TLC nationallyP The
attempts by the nationalists to act as strike breakers met with
little success in Johannesburg, although the nationalists did
have some support amongst building workers outside the
Johannesburg area 9.9 The strike created an opportunity to expose
the strike-breaking approach of the nationalists - and underline
the capacity of the organised centre of the labour movement to
support strikers until victory was secured. But leadership
divisions meant that the opportunity was not fully exploited.
There was consistent tension between the Strike Committee and a
committee of Joint Executives of the six unions involved in the
strikerThe Southern Transvaal Local Committee of the TLC later
complained that "the craft unions withheld their support from the
strike both financially and morally" Pl It was only when the strike
had already been running for several weeks that the Local
Committee of the TLC called a one day general strike in support
of the building workers7Immediately that this call was issued,
leading union leaders started campaigning against it, and the
belated attempt to broaden the strike was effectively quashee3
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The strike also opened up opportunities for racial divisions and
104
the racial policies of the Building Workers Union to be taken up.
But the TLC and BWIU leadership surrendered those opportunities.
The strike resulted in thousands of blacks being laid off, and
some being sacked. The TLC and BWIU leadership refused to demand
their re-instatement7 The Strike Committee - the militant
leadership in the situation - was not even aware of the content
of demands which were being put forward by black workers in the
industry at the same time. If the TLC and union leadership were
resisting a racial division in formal policy terms, they were
operating in terms of such a division in practice. A similar
approach had been revealed in the policy of the leadership to the
1946 miners' strike. At the time of the strike, a NEC telegram to
the World Federation of Trade Unions read:
"Appears natives were misled by irresponsible people. Police
methods controlling strike drastic but warranted. Such action was
necessary to maintain law and order and prevent chaos. "106
It was later revealed that the TLC leadership had offered to
organise the white unions to provide strike-breakers during the
miners' strikeP7
The attempts to introduce a colour bar as formal policy were
repeated at the 1948 TLC conference, and defeated againT8This
time there had been a break-away by six Pretoria Unions, which
formed the Co-ordinating Council of South African Trade Unione
Not for the first time, the Guardian reported that the left had
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won control of the leadership at the TLC conference1 10 The extent
to which it was the left that was now in control has to be
questioned. Not long after the change of leadership, Calder, the
TLC President, was calling on black unions to accept the
principle of apartheid in the union movement1' This was a
principle in terms of which the majority of the white unions had
operated - and which was being most effectively championed by the
right-wing unions. At the April 1949 conference the TLC
disbanded, and was reconstituted as the "SATLC 1949 1 ° 1.2
 The
conference of 1950 adopted the colour bar for which the
nationalists had agitatee 3 The result was that the nationalists
had effective political control, both over the unions which had
broken away from the TLC, and the majority of those which
remained in the reconstituted organisation. In the case of the
former, this was through the political allegiance of the union
leadership. In the case of the latter it was through the
developing practice of the TLC of adopting nationalist policies
in order to resist the nationalists.
In the course of this process, conditions had been created which
made possible the victory of the opposition within the MWU, and
the consolidation of a broader working class and trade union base
for Afrikaner nationalism. That in turn meant that the stage had
been set for the petty bourgeois and capitalist leaders of
Afrikaner nationalism to seek new terms for themselves within the
popular front through which the capitalists organised their rule.
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In 1948, the Afrikaner Nationalists defeated Smuts at the polls.
Malan became Prime Minister at the head of a coalition of the NP
and the AP (led by Havenga) with a majority of five in the House
of Assembly and one (the President's casting vote) in the Senate:14
The analysis of this victory of Afrikaner nationalism has been
dominated by the conventional wisdom of the liberal analysts1:5and
the reponse to that analysis by a range of analysts using a
perspective informed by Marxism116The liberal conventional wisdom
asserts that the apartheid policy of the Afrikaner Nationalists
is irrational, that there is an essential contradiction between
the dictates of economic development and the ideology of
apartheid. This argument has been developed to assert that
economic rationality will, through an undefined political
process, impose itself upon the political irrationality. Much
left-wing analysis is founded on a debate with this viewpoint.
Against the liberals it is argued that apartheid has served the
economic interests of capital; that, far from being incompatible
with capitalist profits, it has served to promote and protect
those profits, and the process through which they are extracted.
Much of the analysis along these lines has had as its clear task
the exposure of the illusions of liberal analysis. Insofar as
that task is concerned, analysis by the left has been largely
successful in establishing the functionality of apartheid in
serving capitalist interests. Through this analysis, there has
been developed a conventional wisdom of the left based on an
identification of that function. The changing labour requirements
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of capital, and the need to maintain a cheap labour supply to
meet those needs has been reflected, at the level of the state,
in the development of apartheid. But this conventional wisdom has
sometimes been reduced to a mechanical functionalism. This is
most clearly reflected in the analysis of apartheid developed by
Wo 1 pe 2'' His point of departure is analysis, developed by
Leggasick, which follows the broad outline stated above. Wolpe's
concern is to trace the genesis of apartheid to the changing
structure of production in the Reserves, identifying a
fundamental change between segregation and apartheid at that
point. The methodology through which he approaches this task
consists of an identification of changes in the Reserves, an
identification of the emergence of apartheid, and an
identification of the function of apartheid in serving capital's
needs in the context of those changes. These three factors are
then collapsed through a mechanist reductionism in terms of which
the emergence of apartheid is explained simply in terms of its
function.
Wolpe recognises the necessity of investigating what he calls
"the critical point of articulation between ideology, racial
practice and the economic system". He states that "the nature,
form and extent of the conflicts generated by the structural
conditions will depend not only on the measures of state control
but on the complex conjuncture of political ideologies and
organisation, trade unions, the cohesion of the dominant sector,
and so on. " 118 But his methodology precludes an examination of the
political dynamics of the process out of which apartheid emerges.
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Once the genesis of apartheid is explained in terms of its
functionality to capital, the struggles of black and white
workers are automatically reduced to responses to a form of state
which has been shaped, outside of class struggle, according to
the changing structure of production in the Reserves. To the
extent that the political movement of white workers is addressed,
Wolpe employs an ex post facto description which loses the
vitality of the political struggle for the leadership of white
workers, the general dynamics of which have been considered
above."9
There is a validity and a necessity in pointing to the way in
which apartheid has served and continues to serve the interests
of capital. But it is a simple form of economic determinism which
identifies the functionality of apartheid to capital as if that
in itself captures the political dynamic out of which apartheid
emerges. The 1948 election represents not merely a change in
government, but is also the reflection of an underlying dynamic
movement in the political allegiances of white workers. As Lewis
points out, without victory in key urban working class seats, the
Nationalists would have been defeated in 1948rBut the importance
of the shifting allegiance of white workers does not lie simply,
or even primarily, in the fact that it has such an impact on
electoral arithmetic. Underlying the electoral arithmetic of the
1948 election was a changing form of popular frontism. And
leading up to that change, as has been discussed, was a dynamic
process of political struggle for the allegiance of white
workers.
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In 1924, the opposition of white workers to Smuts had forced
capital to change the form of its rule. The process was repeated
in 1948. Faced still with the impact of the miners' strike, and
also with the growing oppositionist base of Afrikaner nationalism
within the working class, the ruling class was forced to
restructure the alliance through which they organised their rule.
The method of rule which was promoted through the results of the
election was dynamic, containing within itself class tensions
between workers and the petty bourgeoisie, and the petty
bourgeoisie and capital, and basic class conflict between workers
and capitalists. One of the tasks of the nationalist movement was
to ensure that these conflicts and tensions were contained and
not expressed. But they were there, nonetheless. Analysis
employing the methodology of Wolpe distorts the broader political
dynamic in this process. A correct aspect of analysis is
distorted into being a whole analysis. From the understanding
that apartheid serves the economic needs of capital, and from an
attempt to combat liberal idealism, there is a distorted
induction that apartheid arises ineluctably out of those economic
needs as an automatic and inevitable response. In seeking to
establish a position in debate with liberals, there is the danger
that a more or less crude economic mechanism is substituted for
the idealism through which the liberals explain apartheid. In the
tendency towards such a substitution, what happens is that the
crude economic determinism with which the liberals see apartheid
crumbling is replaced with a similarly crude economic determinism
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at another point. Apartheid is presented as if it emerges with an
a-historical inevitability - because it serves the interests of
capita1121 The implication of such an oversimplification is a
twofold distortion. Firstly, it is presumed that the white
workers were inevitably drawn into a class alliance with capital;
secondly, there is an assumption that the historical process
automatically produces results which are in the best interests of
capital; either that the ruling class was in an unchallengeable
position to decide, according to its own interests, when there
should be a re-organisation of its rule, and what form it should
take; or that it was made inevitable (by an unspecified process)
that the form of re-organisation which emerged, against the
conscious will of the majority of the most economically powerful
big capitalists in South Africa and internationall
the form which big capital actually required to best serve its
interests. Wolpe would contest these oversimplifications. But
they are the product of a methodology which he is employing.
Translated into the conditions before the 1948 election, this
means that the increasing hold of Afrikaner nationalism over the
white workers was inevitable; that the ruling class logically
chose Afrikaner nationalism to run their government; or, if they
miscalculated, that automatic historical forces imposed the most
favourable solution for capital on the situation, to correct the
miscalculation by capital. It is perfectly possible and
predictable that recurrently, the ruling class will miscalculate
the situation. It is also possible that the balance of class
forces, which the ruling class does not properly understand, may
122y, should be
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produce a solution in its interests despite its miscalculation. I
believe that both of these possibilities were operating, at the
time of the 1948 elections. However, what is lost in simply
explaining the course of events in that way is an understanding
of the dynamics of the situation; the dynamics through which the
balance of class forces becomes such as to produce that result;
the extent to which the ruling class is never in complete control
over the class struggle and the balance of forces which it
creates.
Top layers of big capital in South Africa and internationally
chose the outgoing UP government as their preferred option in the
1948 election. This does not mean that the Afrikaner Nationalists
were not an acceptable option. Nor does it mean that there was
not ruling class support for the Nationalists. But the fact is
that the ruling class was not in a perfect position to choose, or
have its choice implemented. The victory of the NP was in part
forced on the ruling class through the position of a crucial and
growing section of the white workers and petty bourgeoisie. For
the capitalists, as their reaction to the 1922 strike amongst
other things had shown, privileges for white workers over black
workers was not - given the free choice of capital - the most
logical and profitable situation. But it was a situation which
the white workers, through their industrial and political
strength and their social weight, had, in part, been able to
force onto the ruling class. Similarly in 1948. In the abstract,
a government which brought the prospects for the capitalists of
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having to pay a higher bill for the "privileges" of white workers
was not the ideal option, nor one which they all chose. It was,
nonetheless, the actual option which the dynamic balance of class
forces produced. The growing level of organisation and the open
expressions of combativity amongst a structurally and socially
changing white working class, and the challenge posed by an
increasingly powerful black working class, took away any abstract
freedom which capital may have had to choose perfect solutions.
It imposed on the ruling class a form of rule which contained the
seeds of its own instability. This was not merely because of the
external threat to the ruling class alliance of the movement of
struggle led by black workers, but due also to the fact that the
internal stability of that ruling class alliance depended on the
economic capacity of capital to continue to pay the price of
relative privileges for white workers. It was primarily on the
basis of their economic needs and grievances that the white
workers were moving towards Afrikaner nationalism. It would
depend on the extent to which the new government was able to
diffuse and buy off those economic demands, service the labour
requirements of capital, and control black workers, that the
stability of the ruling class alliance was maintained. In 1948,
the economic basis for parts of those requirements was there - an
expanding economy. The political basis was less established, both
as far as consolidating the new popular front, and imposing the
necessary control over black workers, were concerned.
The development of the workers' movement had ensured that the
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capitalists did not have the power to rule precisely as they
chose. The ruling class had to accept a popular front, and the
form of popular front which the 1948 elections and the political
changes amongst white workers produced. But the limitations on
that development - expressed both by the political influence of
Afrikaner nationalism on one group of workers and the political
context of the defeat of a strike amongst the other - meant that
the ruling class was not being challenged to the extent that its
capacity to rule in a way which served its interests was under
threat.
In this balance of forces, the ruling class was able to begin to
re-organise its rule in a way which would, all else being equal,
impose discipline on the two wings of the workers' movement.
Whether all else was equal or not would depend on factors outside
of the complete control of the ruling class - consistent economic
expansion, the extent to which the impact of the defeat imposed
on the resurgent movement of black workers could be maintained,
the extent to which Afrikaner nationalism could maintain and
extend its influence amongst white workers. The 1948 election
victory of Afrikaner nationalism did not, in itself, bring the
discipline and the political stability which the ruling class was
seeking. The Afrikaner Nationalists now assumed a mandate, on
behalf of capital in general, of consolidating the political
allegiance of the white workers within a popular front, and using
a stabilised social base and the development of a more adequate
repressive state apparatus from which to discipline the
increasing, demonstrable strength of the black workers. That was
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a task which lay before the new government, not one which its
election victory had accomplished. The struggle for political
control over the white workers was still in motion. For the
meantime, a growing layer of white workers had been drawn into
support for Afrikaner nationalism, and through that, into a
popular frontist alliance. But, as 0' Meara points out, although
the LP was effectively disintegrating, the electoral base of the
nationalists amongst white workers was still limited" For
workers turning towards the nationalists, their support for the.
nationalists was still tentative. At the same time, it should be
recognised that the political alternatives available to white
workers - even that represented by the CP - all promoted some
form of popular frontism. Nonetheless, beneath the change in the
form of popular front alliance, was an underlying basis of class
conflict and tension, not a foundation of guaranteed stability
and historical permanence.
As far as the black workers were concerned, the defeat of the
miners' strike had, for a period, served to drive back the
resurgence of their movement. But the new government did not
inherit conditions, nor create conditions by its electoral
victory, in which the combativity of black workers was
permanently supressed. Even as it turned to the tasks facing it,
there were already signs of the build-up of a new wave of
combativity amongst black workers.
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In 1923/24, the CP had called upon white workers to vote for a
popular front to "get rid of Smuts". The Peoples Front policy
adopted in 1935 meant that the Party turned to building a popular
front to resist fascism. In the elections of 1943, the Party had
tried to promote a popular front between the UP, LP, Dominion
Party and the CommunistsTWhen these attempts failed, the Party
decided to stand its own candidates?5 Arguing against criticism
from the LP for this decision, an editorial in the Guardian
replied: "The CP believes that it can make a valuable
contribution to the achievement of a total war effort in South
Africa. For this purpose alone it wants representation in
Parliament.The Party did not stand against the LP in any seat,
and declared its support in seats where neither the CP nor the LP
were standing, for "the pro-war candidates.°27
The 1948 Party conference declared:
"[C]onference regards the primary task of the Party in the
forthcoming general elections as that of advancing the struggle
for the universal franchise, and for a Socialist democracy, and
of rallying the people against Imperialism.,128
But when it came to translating that position into a precise
statement of whom to vote for and what action to take, a
continuity with the positions of 1923/24, 1935 and 1943 emerged.
There was a growing tendency to portray the Nationalists as
fascists- and an associated tendency to look to the war-time
popular front for a solution to the advance of the Nationalists.
A Guardian editorial, under the heading "Keep the Nats out" put
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the position in this way:
"Even though the UP manifesto published last week can make little
claim for providing the electorate with a clear-cut alternative
to the fascist aspirations of the Nationalists, it would be wrong
to assume there are no differences between the parties
	
 The
primary duty of every voter in the coming General Election is to
keep out of power that section of the reactionary wing which
offers the greatest threat to democracy and progress - the
National Party.
The Party put up three candidates itself - in Cape Flats,
Hillbrow and Troyevil le, and called on the voters to "USE YOUR
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VOTE TO DEAL A DEATH BLOW TO THE MALANITES". In each of these
cases, the implication of the position was clear - a vote for the
UP where there were no LP or CP candidates. In an interview with
the Guardian, Kotane spelled out the position. Arguing against
those who were calling for a Coloured boycott, he called on
Coloureds to vote for the UP where there was no CP candidate1.32
The CP described the impact of the election results in the
pamphlet ' Mal anazi Menace': "Shocked and bewildered. That just
about sums up the feeling of most South Africans on learning the
result of the General Election. 33This reaction clearly extended
deeply into the Party membership and leadership. It was to be an
important component of the perspective from which the Party
leadership decided how to react both to the growing threat of
government attacks, and the growing receptivity to organisation
and action developing amongst black workers. In the immediate
„130
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aftermath of the election, the Party explains the election result
in terms of the role of the UP:
"The defeat of the United Party is the result of widespread
dissatisfaction with a government which failed to oppose the
programme and policy of the reactionary Nationalist Party and its
allies with a bold, positive and progressive programme."
It argues that "[t]here can be no doubt that the United Party
itself paved the way for the victory of their Nationalist
opponents". The statement calls on "all democratic elements" to
"devote themselves to the task of developing a broad democratic
front to resist any attempt to attack the present rights of any
section of the people, and which will fight for the extension of
Democracy.... 1,134
As early as 1944, in the pamphlet 'What Next?', the Party had
warned that the UP could not be seen as a safeguard against
fascism:35But in the run-up to the 1948 election, it identified
the UP as a part of the resistance to what it portrayed as
fascism. In the immediate post-election analysis, the Party has
identified the UP as the cause of the Nationalist victory. But
there is a tendency also to see the UP as a part of the solution
to "Malanazism". Under the headline "Hold the fort", the post-
election editorial of the Guardian argues:
"It is the duty of every anti-fascist today to hold the fort
until the present state of affairs can be reversed, until we can
return to power a government under which it is possible to work
for progress and democratic advance, a government which is
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susceptible to pressure from the progressive rather than the most
reactionary and racialist section of the population."136
For some within the Party, the "anti-fascists" clearly included
the UP, or at least a large part of it; and the government which
fitted the description was the type of government which had
played a "progressive role" during the war. This tendency was to
become clearer, as the threat of direct government action against
the Party grew. In its call for resistance to the Unlawful
Organisations Bill, the Party made it clear that the broad
democratic front of resistance included "every South African who
is not in the NP."137
In the period after the 1946 miners' strike, the ANC was
searching for an orientation. The minimum programme adopted in
1946 contained an orientation to the masses. But, in the period
in which it was adopted, a period dominated by the development
and defeat of the 1946 strike, the Xuma leadership retreated from
the programme of action agreed by the 1946 Anti-Pass conference,
and did not pursue the programme of action called for in the 1946
ANC conference resolutions; nor were conditions within the
workers' movement in this period such as to promote a mass
upsurge towards which the ANC could orientate. Neither did the
situation appear to provide the openings for an alliance, which
could be expected to produce real reforms, with sections of the
state. The 1948 election results confirmed and deepened the
dilemma facing the ANC: its leadership was not committed to
actively pursuing a mass orientation; nor did it seem able to
deliver reforms through an alliance with sections of the state.
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The confusion as to how to pursue the struggle for reforms was
reflected at the top level of the ANC. The 1949 conference
minutes record an appeal against disciplinary proceedings
instituted by the Alexandra branch against Baloyi, Gumede and
Modiso who acted as agents for the Nationalists during the 1948
elections:
"The facts in favour of the Appellants were that they claimed
that they had participated in the elections because no direction
had been given as to the attitude to be adopted by Congress
members and they were accordingly free to support whom they
pleased.—. Prof. Matthews said that the Executive Committee
frankly admitted that there had been much confusion amongst the
most loyal of Congress members owing to the vacillating policy of
Congress on this question.°38
In this period, the CP identified and responded to manifestations
of the crisis of orientation within the ANC:- vacillation,
conflicting statements, failure to carry through ANC policy, and
a general lack of clarity of ANC approach on key issues, at
leadership level. At the end of 1947, Freedom wrote:
"Me have waited in vain for bold and courageous action to be
initiated by the leaders of the Congress in support of their own
'boycott' decision. But with exception of a few isolated but
determined action —. all is quiet on the boycott front."139
In June 1948, Inkululeko wrote:
"The African National Congress, the only African peoples'
organisation worth speaking about, is undergoing a serious
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political crisis. Since August, 1946, when the African mine
workers came out on strike, and the Native Representative Council
'adjourned indefinitely', the crisis set in.
"Since then, the movement entered a period of resolution to
boycott, which were taken at various national conferences. These
resolutions were either not carried out, or deliberately violated
by the leaders themselves. Until recently, when preparations for
the first Transvaal-OFS conference of the People's Assembly for
votes for all, were being made - up to the time of conference -
it became very clear that the crisis was intensifying. There
appeared conflicting statements in the press from the leaders. At
this stage, nobody knew whether the ANC was supporting the
Assemby or not.... Thus the people go one way and the leaders
another way. „lac)
The problems facing the ANC emerged, in part, because of the non-
viability of an orientation based on the expectation of reforms
from a "progressive wing” of the state. The election results had
not themselves created the situation in which such reforms were
not forthcoming. But they had made that situation clearer to
those within the ANC. The CP identified and criticised the
consequences of that orientation, but not its basis. The Party
had accepted the core of that basis in their own approach during
the war. Now, in the conditions immediately following the
Nationalist election victory, it is refected again in the
tendency to look towards "progressive" sections of capital for an
alliance against the Afrikaner Nationalist government.
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This was not the only tendency within the Party. As the Party
comes under increasing attack from the government, there is a
tendency also to turn to mass action as a form of defence. In
November 1949, Carneson declared:
"The old form of protests will not work any longer.— We have
got to start seriously thinking about organising a general strike
of the non-European people down here in the Cape within the next
csix months to safeguard our liberties. ',l
The two tendencies within the Party were not necessarily
compatible2 The attempt to develop mass strike action by blacks
was not likely to be seen as useful by those within the Party
who, consistently with the Peoples Front approach, were seeking
to develop alliances stretching from racist trade union leaders
to UP-supporting employers. Together with the attempt to build
such alliances, and on the basis of the method of the Peoples'
Front, there was a pressure against any criticism of potential
allies. Although the Party was sometimes sharply critical of the
policies of the TLC and LP leaderships, in the its post-election
analysis, there is a notable absence of any analysis of the role
of the TLC and LP in the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism.
In its analysis of apartheid, the Party position showed
similarities both with the liberal conventional wisdom and with
the mechanist methodology reflected in the analyses of Wolpe and
Bunting. In October 1948, Freedom portrayed apartheid as
economically irrational, as far as capital's interests were
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concerned:
"There is, in fact, a point where the capitalist's self-interest
clashes with a rigid caste system. The two things can be
reconciled at the 'higher' level at which profits are
distributed.—. When extended to the source of profit, labour
power, however, the caste barriers are an obstacle to profit-
making.... [T]he Nationalists vow that they will sacrifice
profits —. to appease their god of race and colour".
The article argues that the UP, "representing the 'liberal'
capitalist, is torn between the conflicting aims of preserving
White domination and of increasing profits by removing the colour
bar in industry.—." On the basis of that conflict, Freedom
identified a progressive wing of the ruling class which
constituted a potential ally in the struggle against apartheid:
"[This conflict] means that the ruling class is divided in their
attitude towards segregation; that among them are potential
allies of the non-Europeans. The obvious thing to be done is to
transform this section into active adherents of the struggle
against the colour bar":43
When it came to explaining why white workers had voted for the
NP, the Party analysis reflects a reductionism, applied at a
different point to that of Wolpe. "The defeat of the United Party
is the result of widespread dissatisfaction with a government,
which failed to oppose the programme and policy of the
reactionary Nationalist Party and its allies with a bold,
positive and progressive programme.'°"The Party seeks to identify
the reasons for a turn away from the UP, but puts forward no
442
explanation of why that "dissatisfaction" is expressed in a vote
for the NP. The process out of which the dissatisfaction turns
into that particular response is not explored; the latter is
reduced to the former. A similar methodological pattern sees
apartheid arising because of the economic needs of capitalism;
and white workers turning to the Nationalists because of their
experience under capitalism. There is an aspect of reality
contained in each vision. But the approach precludes a
recognition, and hence an investigation, of the dynamic political
process by which the economic reality is translated into the
political development.
We have seen that when the Party tried to pursue the Peoples'
Front after 1935, there was confusion as to the precise role of
the Party - a confusion which extended to questions about its
very existence. In the period after the Nationalist victory, when
there is a tendency within the Party to seek to reconstruct the
war-time Peoples' Front, a similar confusion develops. Lerumo, a
member of the Party Central Committee at the time, points out
that there were those in the Party leadership "who had come to
doubt the need for the very existence of the independent Marxist-
Leninist Party of the working class.The implications of this
position and the way in which the Party connected with the
developments around it will be discussed at different points
below. But it indicates that, at a leadership level, it was a
confused and disoriented Party, with two significantly differing
approaches which had to respond to the dynamic political
conditions of the post-1948 election period.
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An ex post facto analysis which sees only that apartheid serves
the needs of capital actually ignores the real process of
struggle for the political leadership of the white workers which
was in dynamic motion at the time. The same a-historical
extrapolation, applied at a different point, distorts the
political dynamics at work after the electoral victory. This
approach is exemplified in Bunting's analysis of apartheid, The
Rise of the South African Reich. Apartheid, as the full range of
social, economic and political controls which it came to embody
is lifted out of time and historical process, and placed as a
finished social blueprint into the minds of the new Nationalist
government, and from there, onto society. Bunting writes:
"There has been nothing haphazard or laissez-faire about
Nationalist rule, in striking contrast to previous regimes.
Operating on the basis of a preconceived ideology which has
undergone very little change in the last fifteen years [writing
in 1963/64] the Nationalists have planned their strategy with
care and worked step by step towards their goal. Nothing has been
left to chance. o46
A number of moves by the new government appeared to confirm this
approach. In December 1948, they stopped the payment of family
allowances to Indiansf 47 school feeding schemes for Africans in the
rural areas were abolished; the grant for school feeding for
Africans in the urban areas was cutf 48 unemployment insurance was
taken away from Africans earning below 182 pounds, and from
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casual and seasonal labourers 1.49 But, in the politically volatile
situation of South Africa after 1948, the government was not free
to simply mould society according to an ideological blueprint. On
the contrary, it was the political volatility of the situation
which moulded and imposed on the government the immediate range
and nature of the political steps it took.
It is possible to trace back an ideological continuity,
particularly to the 1930's, and show the way in which the
framework of apartheid was being developed by Nationalist
ideo1ogues
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. It is also possible to show a degree of consistency
between that framework as it was ideologically conceived, and the
reality of apartheid through its history. But none of this
removes the actual historical process through which the ideas
were generated, given social meaning, acted out, implemented, and
adapted. Even if apartheid can be identified as a coherent and
developed ideology, and if reality has been changed along the
lines of that ideology, still the actual dynamic relationship
between the ideas and the attempt to implement them remains.
That dynamic is a crucial part of the historical process. To
ignore it is to see the continued rule and relative stability of
the Nationalist government, and project that apparent stability
backwards to the first point at which a Nationalist government
emerged. It is to identify the extent to which apartheid has
served the interests of capital, and project that backwards to
make the emergence of apartheid an historical inevitability,
without seeing the political dynamic out of which apartheid
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actually emerged and was shaped.
In 1948, the balance of these forces in no way ensured that the
form of rule imposed on the ruling class would be stable and that
the interests of the ruling class would be met in the optimum way
through the election victory of the Nationalists. A concomitant
of the failure to recognise the political dynamics out of which
apartheid emerges is the failure to recognise that, in the period
immediately after the Nationalist election victory, those
dynamics are still in motion. White workers were an active factor
in the change of government and form of popular front. The
Nationalists were able to qualititatively increase their support,
and the form of popular front changed because, in part, growing
numbers of white workers were not willing to continue living in
conditions of insecurity, with perceived threats to their jobs
and living standards. The legacy of the history of popular
frontism and the retreats by the leaders of white workers that
have been discussed was that these political expectations amongst
white workers should lead them towards the available bourgeois
alternative. Nonetheless, the determination to improve their
situation was a moving factor amongst white workers which did not
necessarily, or automatically, translate into support for the
alternative to which they turned. As the 1946 developments around
food shortages and the 1947 building workers' strike
demonstrated, the issue of an alliance with black workers was
posed before white workers in the context of the issues actually
and immediately facing them, not simply as an abstract issue of
class solidarity.
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The ruling class was divided, with some capitalists being leading
supporters of the Nationalists, and others continuing support for
the UP251 Behind this division was ruling class uncertainty about
how to modernise state control over the mass of black workers.
The judiciary, representing the political status quo of the
ruling class before the election, clashed with the new government
on some key issues. These included government attempts to remove
passports 1,52 and the proposed legislation to remove the Coloured
franchiser The judges had all risen to their positions in a
framework dominated by the norms of the British judiciary; they
had been appointed by the Smuts government. The controlling
forces within the new government represented the rise of social
groups which, by and large, had been excluded from the dominant
political culture. The judiciary continued to oppose some
government moves. What was different was that they were now
opposing moves whose essence was to confirm the new political
balance of forces within the government structure. Over time, the
Nationalists refined their method of dealing with this
opposition, and began placing their own appointees in key
judicial positions 54 Amongst some erstwhile capitalist opponents
of Afrikaner nationalism, the response to the election result was
a quest for a new relationship with the Nationalists. Others
looked for ways of maintaining an effective opposition which
would restore their first choice political party to governmentr
There was the hope that the 1948 election result, which had been
unexpected, would be overturned by the 1953 elections.
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The movement of struggle developed by black workers had been
driven back after the defeat of the miners' strike. But, beneath
the surface, combativity was already beginning to grow again, and
was to show itself in massive responses from workers to calls for
political action. As has been discussed, the rising militants of
the CYL were moving towards their victory within the ANC. This
meant a situation in which the primary organisation of the black
petty bourgeoisie was increasingly committed to a mass
orientation and the attempt to develop mass action Finally, the
volatile political situation which had seen class action by black
workers, then white workers, then a change of government, meant a
growing political nervousness amongst sections of the white petty
bourgeoisie who had seen their interests as tied up and secure
with the UP government 56 This nervousness was promoted, as black
opposition mounted and was reflected in massive demonstrations
and support for political strikes, in 1950-1952. In April 1951,
the Torch Commando emerged, holding a massive procession of more
than 20,000 people through the streets of Johannesbure7The
immediate focus of the demonstration was the Separate
Representation of Voters Bill, which had been published in
February. Much of the support for the Torch Commando came from
ex-servicemen. It is likely that amongst its supporters were
white workers who had no organisational alternative through which
to pursue their grievances, in conditions in which the TLC was
consistently retreating, the CP had disbanded, and the LP was
collapsing. As the Defiance Campaign began to develop, the Torch
Commando declared its opposition, and the leadership soon
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disintegrated with the apparent mass support evaporating. These
developments reflected the same things as the formation of the
Torch Commando in the first place. There was dissatisfaction,
insecurity and uncertainty within sections of the white petty
bourgeoisie which could be traditionally relied upon to be more
or less passive supporters of the major party of the ruling
class.
In the period immediately following the elections, many of the
most decisive moves of the new government had little to do with
any pre-ordained abstract blueprint; nor did they emerge as
direct responses to the labour requirements of capital. In the
situation, characterised as it was by the instability of the
government, these measures had to do with the attempt by a
bourgeois political party to secure its electoral base, and by a
government of capital to organise the popular front which it was
in power, in part, to maintain.
The Group Areas Act, and the associated Population Registration
Act158 were such measures. Amongst other political and economic
functions, they were also useful as political devices which drew
clearer social lines of demarcation around those whom the
Nationalists were seeking to consolidate as a political base.
Administrative decisions which were implemented in the Transvaal,
imposed language-based segregation on white schools159and served a
similar purpose. Together with clear moves to rationalise the
system of Bantu education (which had developed in a fairly ad hoc
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way) to ensure that it became a training for a cheap labour
system, were equally crucial moves aimed at ensuring that white
education helped in the consolidation of a distinct social group,
from which could be drawn a social and electoral base. What such
social policies did, first and foremost, was to promote the
consolidation of socially, culturally and physically distinct
centres of political support for Afrikaner nationalism.
It is consistent with this approach that the first targets for
repression by the government should have been those who stood in
the way of its consolidation of a solid political base within the
working class. The victory at the polls served to accelerate, and
add an administrative/legislative weapon to the campaign which
was already being waged by sections of the nationalist movement
to destroy the left-wing of the white unions, and build
organisations of white workers under the direct leadership of
nationalists. The nationalists identified the Communists as their
primary target. Two major industries which were identified were
mining (the nationalist opposition had already won a majority in
1948) 0
 and clothing. The first was an economically central
industry in which large numbers of Afrikaans workers had come
into urban employment 1.61
 In the case of the clothing industry, the
target was a union leadership which, despite public Communist
affiliations and the consistent campaign of Nationalists,
succeeded in holding the support of its largely Afrikaans
membership.
The tactics which the Nationalists used were threefold: firstly,
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there were legislative and administrative measures; secondly,
they set up a number of rival union bodies; thirdly, elements
within the nationalist movement exploited the grievances of
workers against their employers and organised extra-parliamentary
action which sometimes amounted to simple mob violence. Together
with the campaign employing these means, and aimed at the white
workers in specific target industries, went a continuing and
escalating attempt to undermine the influence of the TLC as an
authoritative trade union centre. Immediately after its election
victory, the government appointed the Industrial Legislation
Commission of Enquiry to investigate all areas of industrial
legislation and organisation. The recommendations of the
Commission in 1951 included proposals for state control over
many areas of union activity including, for example, the right of
unions to issue publications. A special CNETU conference to study
the recommendations of the Commission concluded that the
"fundamental aim of the Recommendations [was] to consolidate race
prejudice and to divide and muzzle the trade union movement so as
to perpetuate the idea of baaskap.
In 1949, the government introduced statutory job reservation
measures in the building industry, which were consolidated within
the Native Building Workers' Act of 1951.163 For the rest, job
reservation continued through the industrial colour bar, rather
than through new legislation 1.64 The Building Industry legislation
served to provide white workers with protected access to jobs in
one industry165But the real meaning of the legislation extended
„ 162
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further. It served also to take the control of access to jobs out
of the hands of the union, and bring it firmly within the control
of the government (subject, outside of government employment, to
the employment decisions of capital). This process was continued
and developed through administrative measures and the
Apprenticeship Amendment BillT6 From that period, there were
complaints made by some unions that appointments, previously made
in consultation with the unions (for example, to positions such
as Industrial Compensation Assessors), were now being made
unilaterally by the government.167
In reality, the new government was doing what the Smuts
government had been incapable of doing. Through a set of
administrative and legislative measures, any semblance of
independence of the white unions was being undermined. Their
sources of influence were being removed. This process was
reflected and extended by the development of new trade union
bodies by the NationalistsrThe fact that these were effectively
government-sponsored organisations represented a further step in
the process by which the remaining vestiges of the independence
of the union movement as a whole were being eroded. The process
of extending Afrikaner Nationalist influence and control amongst
the organisations of white workers went hand in hand with the
process of extending state control. The former was, in part, the
means through which the latter was achieved.
The same process was continued in the different conditions of the
Garment Workers' Union. Although Sachs, the General Secretary,
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was set up as a Communist bogeyman and kaffirboetie by the
bourgeois media, it is worth noting that, firstly, his union had
maintained racial separation, with separate white and coloured
branches; secondly, he had been expelled by the CP 1.69 His
willingness to move outside the constraints of CP policy during
the war and respond to the anti-British feelings of his members
was a central factor in the maintenance of his support within the
union17°Nonetheless, in the conception of the government and his
members, Sachs was a Communist fellow-traveller. As we have seen,
under pressure from the Nationalists, he was ready to clearly
state his support for the Soviet Union. The Afrikaner
nationalists used the Communist label to attack him. But he was a
target first and foremost because he was seen as being
responsible for the maintenance of a form of independent
unionism, with the support of Afrikaans workers. Nationalist
attempts to undermine the position of Sachs go back at least to
l944 1 at a time when the nationalists were turning their
attention to the white workers in a more consistent and organised
way, when there was an attempt to generate an anti-leadership
strike. The election victory of the Nationalists changed the
conditions of their struggle against the Sachs leadership. In May
1949 he had his passport withdrawn, to prevent him from attending
a conference in Britain 72 In 1950, the Nationalist Werkerspers
started three union newspapers, for the garment workers, building
workers and mine-workers74 (Sachs was involved in a number of
successful libel cases against them.) 1mThere were claims that the
Nationalists would defeat Sachs in the 1950 union leadership
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elections. Despite this, in February, a meeting of more than
2,000 members elected him, with only 15 votes against176
Eventually, in 1952, the Suppression of Communism Act was used in
an attempt to remove Sachs from officentogether with other left-
wingers and Communists within the union movement).
With the consistent support of a layer of Afrikaans women
unionists, Sachs had remained in his position, and the union had
resisted state interference. These Afrikaans women represent the
continuing tradition of commitment to unionism amongst Afrikaans
workers. In the actual conditions of the time, they represent the
one strand of the political development of Afrikaner workers; the
other, which was coming to dominate, was the growing influence of
Afrikaner nationalism. The women in the clothing industry were
often productive workers, and could be expected to be freer to
respond to their experiences as workers than many other groups of
whites78 For a period, the majority of them continued to resist
the attempt by the nationalist movement to bring them "under
control". However, the more direct state attack against Sachs
coincided with three other factors which were combining to
undermine his position, and weaken the capacity of the women to
continue with their commitment to independent unionism. Firstly,
the deteriorating economic conditions within the industry and the
grievances which these generated could be exploited by skilful
Nationalist propagandistsY 9 Secondly, the general process of the
consolidation of Afrikaner nationalism was going on around the
women in the union. Thirdly, the union leadership in general was
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consistently stepping back from any stand against the
Nationalists. Each Nationalist advance within the union movement
was met by a retreat or a concession from the TLC leadership.
Consistent collaboration and reformism had left that leadership
totally unequipped to build a resistance and make a stand, even
when its own existence was under direct threat in the changed
conditions after the Nationalist election victory. Lewis points
out that "the failure of the TLC to unite in total opposition to
the government's Suppression of Communism Bill in 1950
demonstrates the penetration of anti-communism and the political
bankruptcy of the Council. w80
On the one hand, the Afrikaans women were subjected to the
articulate and aggressive voice of the Nationalist-dominated
unions and media, apparently having the ear of the government. On
the other, there was the tentative, retreating voice of the TLC.
And this was going on while their own union was seemingly unable,
with its relatively independent stance, to develop a resistance
to the economic attacks by the employers. If the voice coming
from the TLC was muted, even more so was that of the LP. It was
in the process of breaking up. In these conditions, any attempt
to develop the identity of the women with the broader
organisations of white workers was made extremely difficult, and
increasingly likely to fail. There is no evidence that Sachs
tried to promote the alternative of developing the link with
black workers in the industry. The processes of undermining the
limited level of trade union independence which existed were in
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motion, and could not be expected to be permanently and
successfully resisted by one isolated group of workers.
In the case of the mineworkers, the opposition movement won
control of the leadership in 1948, and was confirmed in office
after the parliamentary election victory of the Nationalists.181The
reality of Nationalist politics within the trade union movement
is clearly demonstrated by the position of the leadership in
putting forward the 1949 pay demands. The leadership advanced a
30% wage demand, not because of the needs of workers, but as part
of the struggle against Communists:
"We want to avoid the danger of the mineworker being pushed down
to the level of a proletarian, with all the attendant dangers of
him becoming a prey to Communist influence. We want to avoid the
development of a working class in the European sense, and the
attendant class difficulties.
Initially, the MWU joined the Pretoria Co-ordinating Committee3
which was set up by the Nationalists as a right-wing alternative
to the TLC in 1950. This move came even after the retreat of the
TLC at the February 1950 conference, in a decision to deny
affiliation rights to black unionsT4
 which was aimed at avoiding
precisely such break-aways. The political volatility in the
situation, and the as yet limited success of Nationalist
attempts to impose complete state control over the unions, was
reflected in the decision of the MWU to leave the Co-ordinating
Committee in September 195185
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In 1951, the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) was
set up, with the MWU providing the strategic industrial corer
Both the break-away and the formation of the new Federation had
the open and immediate support of NP trade union spokesmen in
ParliamentrThere can be little doubt that the Federation was set
up because the Co-ordinating Committee was not as successfully
under government control as had been intended. There may have
been a division between different factions of Afrikaner
nationalism behind the new FederationrThe accusation came from
both the Guardian and some leaders of the Co-ordinating Committee
that the reason for the formation of the new Federation was the
failure of NP politicians to acquire total direct control over
the Co-ordinating Committee. Whether that was the case or not,
it represented also the underlying tension between the different
class forces within Afrikaner nationalism.
It was to be expected that for some Afrikaans workers the
Nationalist victory would mean that they came to rely on the
government to meet their needs, rather than on their own class
action or organisation. But it was not simply that content of
class consciousness which militated against class action. It was
also the fact that any remnant of an organised class life was
being broken down - through the legislative and administrative
measures taken by the government; through the political decision
of the TLC to retreat; through the collapse of the LP; and
through the extension of more direct state influence into the
unions, through the leadership of erstwhile Nationalist
agitators, who were now effectively government officials, whether
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that was formally the case or not.
For a period, the electoral victory of the Afrikaner
Nationalists, and the political conditions surrounding that
victory, served to supress the likelihood of class action by
white workers. Where such action did develop, it was roundly
condemned by the new government of capitalrAs these processes
developed, the CP's propaganda calls for an alliance with black
workers were buried beneath the other forces at work. They were
also muted by the Party's confusion as to the best approach the
struggle against the Nationalist government. Should resistance be
through a popular front alliance? How could black workers be
drawn into such an alliance? These were questions which had been
posed, as the Party set out to try to implement the peoples'
front approach after the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. They
were posed again in the period after the 1948 election.
In this period, immediately following the 1948 election, the new
Nationalist government was in an insecure position. It had only a
tiny electoral majority, depending on a coalition to sustain it.
It faced a series of clashes with the judiciary. Sections of the
white petty bourgeoisie were organised, or willing to organise,
in extra-parliamentary protest. Its political hold, even over
white workers who had voted for it, was not consolidated. There
were cases of action by white workers, within the civil service
over which the nationalists now presided. There were divisions
within the ruling class. It was in this situation that the
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movement of opposition which led to the Defiance Campaign
developed.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
1946 - 1952 (2)
The sustained forward drive of black workers had been halted by
the impact of the defeat of the 1946 miners' strike and the
series of expulsions and splits in the trade unions. The total
membership of black unions dropped sharply. But even as these
processes were developing, a new combativity within the black
working class was beginning to develop. There was a series of
violent clashes, in different urban areas of the country, ranging
from a minor incident in January 1947 in Durban' to pitched
battles with the police at the end of 1949 and beginning of 1950
in Newlands and Sophiatown! The immediate causes and issues were
different in different places. But all the cases of "rioting"
expressed the explosive tensions which were building up in the
overcrowded slums in which black workers were forced to live. In
1949, further bus boycotts in New Brighton; Moroka, Jabavu 4 and a
tram boycott in Western Native Township 5 were indicators of
workers' readiness to build on the experience of earlier waves of
struggle, and of the widespread grievances on prices and
services.
In 1944 a doctor, in evidence submitted to a government
commission on the living conditions and health of urban blacks,
had concluded: "The bald fact remains that the diet as purchased
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is grossly deficient in many of the requirements of an adult
male, still more does it fail to meet the needs of the children
and the pregnant or lactating woman." 6 The SAIRR had commented:
"It might well be asked how the African worker can keep alive
under such circumstances. The African workers keeps alive but not
healthily alive."' By 1950, these conditions for many workers and
working class families had deteriorated. At the end of 1949, the
prices of staples like tea, candles and condensed milk were all
raised! A SAIRR survey conducted in 1950, revealed that the real
wages of many black workers were declining:
"Since 1944, there has been no increase in basic wages paid to
unskilled labour in the building industry, municipal
undertakings, commercial and distributive trade, the motor
transport industry in Johannesburg and the brewing industry there
and the printing industry in Pretoria and the Reef towns.
"In Johannesburg, the minimum basic wages paid in the commercial
and distributive industry were in 1944 and were still in 1950
only 1/15/0 a week, and the same amount to labourers working for
the municipalities.... In the biscuit trade, the lowest basic
wage is 2s 6d a week less than was paid in 1944."9
A letter to the Guardian from "A resident" reveals some of the
mounting grievances in the black areas:
"When questioning the authorities about the high rent you are
told of the stove and the few other items which most people
possess themselves before moving in.
"The houses are very cold in winter and just the opposite in
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summer. There is absolutely no privacy for the family because the
inside walls do not reach the roof ... transport is most
difficult. A bus trip from the location to the station costs 3d.
The majority of the people walk to the station as they can not
afford the busfare.... Because there is only one big school most
children are not at school and those who are lucky go to school
at Orlando, Pimville, or even far-way Sophiatown and Eastern
Native Township (an additional transport burden for the family).
There is only one school in Jabavu White City, but there is also
a very big jail built by the government."10
These were conditions and signs of combativity which suggested
that there was a growing basis for the renewal of the movement
which had expressed itself in earlier waves of struggle and
organisation. But neither the ANC nor the unions were able,
initially, to organise or develop that rising militancy. The
first attempt by the political organisations to build resistance
to a move by the government - The Committee Against Apartheid in
the Railways - collapsed and split almost immediately after it
was formed, because of disagreements between the different
political organisations represented': In the period 1947-1951, the
CNETU unions appear not to have taken a major initiative on any
issue. It was only in 1951, after increasingly clear signs of
rising combativity, that a campaign on a minimum wage was
launched! For the CP, the consistent priority in relation to the
black unions was to direct them towards the TLC; the question of
organising non-organised workers was a secondary priorityP
Developments in the black communities proceeded without the CNETU
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unions assuming any clear or distinct role. Within the ANC, the
priority of the CYL militants was building their own leadership,
and winning support for their proposed programme. While this
process was in motion, the ANC leadership was largely
ineffective, unable to produce anything tangible out of an
alliance with liberal whites, and divided as to how to respond to
the new Nationalist government:4
But the "riots", particularly those in Newclare and Sophiatown,
focussed the attention of the CYL on the mass of black workers,
in a way which was similar to the move in that direction after
the 1946 miners' strike. There were three important differences
in 1950. The first was that the movement of workers was beginning
to move into a new upsurge, whereas in 1946 the struggle which
turned the CYL towards workers ended in a major defeat, with the
broader impact we have seen. Secondly, in 1950, the CYL had
secured far greater influence within the ANC, to the point at
which their struggle for ideological and organisational control
was largely won. And, thirdly, the 1948 election victory, and the
measures taken and threatened by the Nationalist government,
constituted a direct threat to the black petty bourgeoisie.
The cumulative effect of all these factors was that from within
the CYL leadership of the ANC there were growing calls for a turn
to the masses, at a time when the mass movement was beginning to
develop. The CYL conference in Durban in 1950 stated: "If the
masses can be properly educated and organised, we have an
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instrument of liberating ourselves without bloodshed."Aeading
CYL activist G M Pitje wrote to the CYL newspaper, African
Lodestar: "Our [task] is to revitalise and build up Congress so
that it becomes the real liberatory movement it was intended to
be." 16
 As the ANC gradually began to be turned, on this basis,
towards the developing movement of black workers, the more
conservative Selby Msimang expressed, as if it were fact, the
aspiration of the old-guard ANC leadership:
"African leadership stands between the cheap labour market
provided by the inarticulate and benighted masses of our race,
and the capitalist interests.— [A]frican intellectuals have
become a menace and a danger to white domination in this
country—. When mobile labour can be harnessed effectively and
the reserves converted to centres of great national self-
expression, self-development and self-assertion, it will be the
beginning of the end of apartheid and race prejudice.°7
The Central Committee report to the 1949 CF conference had
identified "the present favourable conditions for the growth of
the Party"2 8
 The report pointed to weaknesses in the Party
structure, but continued: "Our prestige has grown. The people are
turning to the Party in ever-increasing numbers.— In some
Districts our Party has succeeded in gaining big influence
amongst the African workers, with the result that African
membership is increasing by leaps and bounds, far outstripping
the rate of recruitment amongst other sections." 19
 The response to
the 1950 May Day strike call indicates that, as far as the
464
receptivity of black workers to political action was concerned,
the conditions had grown more favourable. In the interim, Sam
Kahn had been elected as the Party's first MP.2° At a general
level, the Party was to express its belief that "communism can
not be destroyed as long as society is divided into two worlds:
rich and poor, oppressor and oppressed.' 21
 The Party claimed that
22Communism was "gaining in strength and stature". But the
decisions concerning the immediate future of the Party were to be
determined, not on the basis of these beliefs and developments,
but by the imminent passage of legislation through Parliament,
and developments amongst two organised groups to which the Party
looked for support for a broad front - the white unions and the
black petty bourgeoisie.
When, in March 1949, the Minister of Justice announced his
intention to "combat the dangerous subversives of our national
23life, democratic institutions and Western outlook", the CP
launched the Campaign for Freedom of Speech and Assembly 2. 4 This
led, in March 1950, to the calling of the Defend Free Speech
Convention, at which the newly-elected ANC President, Moroka, was
the main speaker. The Convention called for a National Convention
to be held in July, and for May Day 1950 to be "celebrated as a
People's Ho 1 i day " .25 The reponse to what for workers was
effectively a call for a one-day political strike, was
widespread, with the Convention claiming 80% support. Groups of
demonstrating workers were attacked by police in Benoni, Orlando,
Alexandra and Sophiatown, with at least 19 blacks being killedr
Shortly afterwards the Unlawful Organisations Bill, later changed
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to the Suppression of Communism Bill, was introduced. The Bill
aimed at rendering illegal all political activity of any kind by
anyone regarded as fitting into a very widely defined category of
Communistr On 7 May 1950 the Central Committee resolved to
dissolve the Party from the date of the third reading of the
Bill.28 0n 20 June 1950 the Communist MP read out a statement in
the House of Assembly, announcing the dissolution of the Party.29
There is a temptation, using simple logic, to explain the
dissolution decision simply as the product of state attacks.
S 1 ovo does so when he writes: "The Party operated as a legal body
until 1950, when it was declared illegal under the Suppression of
Communism Act." 80The South African Communist Party, the party that
was eventually rebuilt after the dissolution of the CPSA, has
tried to look deeper; the Party historians all put forward the
explanation of dissolution contained in the 1962 Programme of the
South African Communist Party:
"Despite its great achievements and struggles, the Communist
Party of South Africa proved incapable of surviving under illegal
conditions. Legalistic illusions had penetrated into the ranks of
the Party, including its leading personnel. The Party was
unprepared and unable to work underground. These errors
culminated in the dissolution of the Party."3'
To what extent does this argument explain the dissolution
decision?
In the post-war situation, given the fact that the "progressive
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forces are heartily sick of us [the CP]", 32 and that Browderism had
now been rejected by the Soviet leadership 3 the Party was under
pressure to seek a new approach. But what was that approach to
be? When the Party first turned to Dimitrov's people's front,
Gomas had identified the confusion within the Party membership
about how to relate to other organisations. That confusion had
reached a point where the existence of a single unified Communist
Party had come under question. Now, as the Party looked for a
path away from its war policy, a similar uncertainty began to
manifest itself. The Party's own assessment was that "it is our
weakness that the Party as a whole has little grasp of its
0revolutionary function' 4. Within the Party, there was disagreement
over the relative value of work amongst blacks. Freedom
commented: "A Johannesburg municipal election rouses the DPC
[District Party Committee] to a height of activity which it never
achieves at any other time of the year. On the other hand,
elections for advisory boards in the locations pass almost
unnoticed by the bulk of the Party members."35
After the sedition charges following the 1946 strike, the Party
lost a significant part of its membership7 It is likely that
these were mainly people who had seen the Party as the most
resolute supporter of the war effort in the struggle against
facism. But there remained a persistent tendency within the Party
which continued to see the way forward as involving a
reconstructed people's front. This tendency manifested itself
especially clearly, as has been discussed, in the period
immediately up to and following the 1948 election. This was not a
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new political approach for the Party. It can be traced back to
1924, when the bourgeois NP was seen as a progressive ally of the
labour movement. It re-emerged in 1935, in a period in which the
Party was willing to give up criticism of any potential allies,
undermining its capacity to put forward independent answers to
the political questions being posed. And it persisted, through
the formal rejection of Browderism, into the post-1948 situation.
The Party was faced again with the question of how to build an
alliance stretching from black workers to white employers.
The report of the Central Committee to the 1950 Party Conference
represents the most systematic attempt made to address a part of
that question3.7 The report argues that "South Africa is entering a
period of bitter national conflict". From that starting point, it
proceeds to lay out the theoretical foundation upon which to base
"the relationship between the working class and the national
liberatory organisations". The report expresses a clear hostility
to the leadership of the ANC and, in particular, the CYL: "We
must no longer allow the bourgeois elements in the national
movements to slander the Party, and to adopt a hostile or
negative attitude to the international working class." "Because
of its petty bourgeois character, its economic dependence on the
white ruling class, and its isolation from the workers, the
leadership of the national organisations tend to take refuge in
negative and defeatist tactics which, for mass consumption, are
wrapped in fierce-sounding revolutionary phrases." The report
points to a commitment, expressed by both Xuma and Mda, for
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freedom from national oppression. "But", it continues, "the
people are not told what kind of 'freedom' they are to struggle
for, or what is to be the content of the true democracy and just
social order". Presumably, the objective is to be complete
equality with the Europeans. But the 'equality' envisaged is not
the equality of socialism: it is the kind of 'equality before the
law'." The report criticises the "fundamental principles of the
programme of action", arguing that it might suggest a form of
apartheid, and that it is chacterised by "meagreness and
crudity".
The political limitations which are ascribed to the leadership of
the national organisations are linked to their class background
and position - but, at points, this is done purely descriptively.
In other words, the leadership is seen as petty bourgeois, but
not as reflecting petty bourgeois class interests. On the
contrary, the report specifically argued that there are not
important class differences, even between black capitalists and
black workers:
"To be sure, no clear line can be drawn between the bourgeois and
working class demands; pass laws, residential segregation,
prohibition of buying land, the exclusion from employment, the
whole range of colour bars, affect every section of the non-
Europeans, and therefore constitute national issues. Moreover,
since the non-European bourgeoisie is weak, no serious
divergences can develop between it and the non-European working
class."
As well as the above, the report states: "[T]he conclusion must
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be drawn that the national liberatory organisations can develop
into powerful, mass movements only to the extent that their
content and aims are determined by the interests of workers and
peasants."
The report is clearly seeking to address the questions facing the
Party. In so doing, it serves primarily to open up those
questions. If there are no separate, distinct working class
interests, what is the basis for a separate working class party?
If workers are to be distinguished from other classes because of
the greater urgency they bring to the national struggle, why is a
separate party, rather than the organisation of a faction within
the national organisations, necessary? If there are distinct
working class interests which have to be made primary within the
national movement, how can it be argued at the same time that
there are, and can be, no serious divergences between the
interests of black capitalists and black workers? The report
itself identifies the serious divergences which, it has argued,
cannot exist between the black capitalist and the black worker.
Criticising the leaders of the national organisations, the report
argues: "These leaders, in reality, are 'liberal capitalists' and
the 'freedom' they want is the liberty of squeezing profits out
of their people."
The report also reflects a confusion about how the Communists
should proceed. The Programme of Action is being attacked, at the
same time as it is appearing above the signature of a leading
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Communist, David BopapeT3
 The report argues that the "colour bar
is primarily a technique of exploitation for private profit". It
explains that the capitalists who claim to oppose the colour bar
do so "to intensify the degree of exploitation, by increasing the
supply of skilled workers, and therefore depressing skilled
wages". The Party has argued previously that the conflict on this
issue "means that the ruling class is divided in their attitude
towards segregation, that amongst them are potential allies of
the non-Europeans. The obvious thing to be done is to transform
this section into active adherents of the struggle against the
colour bar."39The report criticises the CYL for aiming "for the
kind of equality that exists in a freely competitive capitalism";
but, immediately after the 1948 election, the Party identified
the task for "progressive forces" in this way: "All democratic
elements must henceforth devote themselves to the task of
developing a broad democratic front to resist any attempt to
attack the present rights of any section of the people and which
will fight for the extension of Democracy.
The report, while seeking to resolve the problems posed before
the Party, serves primarily, to reflect those problems. On the
basis of the report, different approaches could be, and were,
pursued. The most consistent of these was the attempt to build a
broad anti-apartheid front. As had been the case after the
Seventh Comintern Congress, the Party aimed at building an
alliance of organisations. But pursuing that attempt posed
increased problems in 1950. As we have seen, militancy was rising
among black workers. But the extent of organisation amongst those
1140
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workers was less than it had been during the war. The Party had
significant influence within CNETU, but its repeated calls on the
black unions to affiliate to the TLC were largely unheeded. CNETU
was declining, and its ability to lead black workers in a
direction in which they were not already moving is doubtful. The
Party repeatedly tried to find positive signs in the policies of
the TLC, even as the organisation moved towards accepting the
colour bar and, in effect, the Suppression of Communism Act. In
April 1948, the Guardian had hopefully reported a victory for the
left at the TLC conference, regarding it as "an important turning
point in the history of the trade union movement" 4.1
 In January
1949 Freedom argued: "The reactionary leadership which has
dominated the SATLC for a decade received a decided check at this
year's [1948] annual conference.—. Delegates from the more
progressive unions were able to work together and defeat the
determined efforts of the reactionaries to split the trade union
movement into sections on colour lines."42In May 1949, Freedom
argued that the "heart of the trade union movement still seems
sound" 43. But the 1950 TLC conference represented a major blow to
these hopes. The conference accepted the colour bar, undermining
its own independence as a workers' organisation, the
possibilities of black and white working class co-operation, and
the major component of CP trade union work. The Guardian was
nonetheless positive about the lack of majority support for the
Suppression of Communism Bill:" But, immediately after the
conference, the TLC leadership moved further to the right and,
while not supporting the Bill formally, made plans for what was,
472
in effect, their own anti-Communist b1acklist5
In the period immediately following the Seventh Congress of the
Comintern, the CPSA had declared its difficulty in finding
"progressive sections of capital" with which to build an
alliance. The attempt to uncover progressive sections of the
bourgeoisie was as misconceived in 1950 as it had been in 1936.
As has been discussed, the Party argued that apartheid obstructed
profitability, and saw in that analysis the basis for an alliance
with sections of capital. Oppenheimer was identified as a
potential ally; 45 and the Party supported the attempt to enlist the
support of employers for political strikes 4. 7 But, despite the
Party's efforts, a bridge between a major employer, who
benefitted from the oppression of the working class, and the
exploited and oppessed workers, proved elusive.
It was from the organised black petty bourgeoisie - the social
group to which the CP had been most consistently oriented since
1935 - that the Party was to receive the most severe setback to
its hopes of building an alliance. This came in the response of
the CYL to the May Day strike call of the Free Speech Convention,
which had been initiated by the CP. Ngubane, writing in Inkundla
ya Bantu, reflected the thinking of some within the CYL:
"The May Day demonstrations were intended to be part of a world
campaign engineered by the Communists to help advance the cause
of Communism and not of the oppressed African. Knowing that the
African is now in a mood to challenge oppression, the Communists
took advantage of this and came up with the idea of the
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demonstration. ,,48
The CP responded agressively to the position taken within the
CYL. Under a headline "'Youth League' disrupters exposed and
rejected", Inkululeko wrote:
"The people are ready to make sacrifices for their liberation -
only some of the leaders are afraid. Everywhere the so-called
'Youh [sic] League' which has tried to disrupt and confuse the
people, has met with defeat. Their policy was rejected, even
though they made use of Mr. Ramohanoe. At Alexandra, after a huge
crowd had listened to J.B. Marks and other Communist speakers,
standing in the pouring rain, Mr. Radebe and other 'Youth League'
supporters tried to hold an opposition meeting. But they remained
talking to the air."9
Despite this stance, there can be no doubt that the reaction of
the CYL to the May Day call promoted a demoralisation amongst
elements within the Party. Since the initial people's front turn
of 1935, an orientaton to the organised black petty bourgeoisie
had been a persistent priority for the Party. In the post-war
period, this had led to criticism from within the Party that it
was simply "tailing the non-European organisations"r It was
necessary for a writer in the theoretical journal of the CP to
make clear: "In my opinion the Party has everything to gain by
retaining its independence, by not allowing itself to be so
closely identified with the national organisations as to lose its
character as a class organisation."51
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As has been discussed, the Party's theoretical perspective posed
serious questions about the role of an independent working class
party. And, in conditions characterised by the rise within the
ANC of the CY1, any attempt by the Party to assert its character
as a class organisation, and seek to build and mobilise a working
class base, was the cause of a deepening of tension with another
potential ally - the organised petty bourgeoisie. In the periods
in which it supported mass action, the Party assumed and played
the role of a pressure group within the broader opposition
movement, seeking to promote within that movement an orientation
to the masses and to mass organisation and action. In the 1930's
th Party directed repeated calls along these lines at the AAC and
the ANC. In the period after the miners' strike, that role was no
longer left simply to the CP. The CYL was beginning to develop
its own mass orientation. Now, in the post-war situation, the
Party's major attempt to pursue the same approach, through the
attempt to win ANC support for the Defend Free Speech Convention,
and its limited proposals for mass action, created new problems.
The CYL did not seek access to the masses through the CP. On the
contrary, to the extent that the CF had any access to the masses,
this was seen as a challenge to its own position by the CYL. Then
how was the Party to respond? They asserted the fact that Moroka
had supported the Convention 5. 2 But the Party was aware of the fact
that the CYL was the effective and rising leadership of the ANC.
Caught up in this situation, the Party did not make its response
on the basis of the "forward march of the masses"T but most
immediately on the basis of the position of the state. This was
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not a new approach by the Party. It had followed the same course,
for example, during the upsurge of strike action by black workers
during the war. The Party leadership repeated the approach of the
wartime people's front, which it was seeking to reconstruct. It
based its decisions about what course to pursue on the massive
setback represented by the 1950 TLC conference decisions, the
legislative moves by the state, and the increasingly powerful
CYL. As had been the case in the mid-1930's, the Party had begun
its pursuit of a people's front alliance from a basis of
disorientation and uncertainty. In the period 1935-1945 (with the
interruption of 1939-1941), the Party had been willing to give up
political criticism and oppose working class action, in support
of its popular front priority. In 1950 the pursuit of a similar
priority brought into question not only the extent to which the
Party pursued independent policies, but also its existence as an
independent organisation. If the national liberation struggle and
the class struggle were the same thing, and the interests of all
blacks the same, what was the role of a party of the working
class? If the existence of an independent Communist Party was an
obstacle to the construction of a broad democratic front, and
Communists could promote such an alliance as individuals within
other organisations, then the reasons for the existence of the
Party itself were unclear.
The 1950 report of the Central Committee had not served to
resolve these issues. Rather, it provided the theoretical
underpinning for what was a developing crisis of orientation
within the Party. As events were to show, these factors had
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combined to produce a demoralised, disoriented and confused
leadership, for whom the 1950 Central Committee report had
provided no convincing answers. The immediate threat posed by the
Suppression of Communism Bill brought this situation to the fore.
Within the leadership there were three main responses. A minority
were opposed to the dissolution proposal. Bill Andrews, who had
taken that position, wrote to the membership:
"Remembering the path which has been blazed by our members for
over thirty years and inspired by the example of such fighters
for freedom as Nkosi and many others who died for their opinions,
let us face boldly the renewed and perhaps more ruthless attacks
which are threatened."54
Within the majority which supported dissolution, there were those
"who had come to doubt the need for the very existence of the
independent Marxist-Leninist party of the working class" 5 or
could not see how it could play its role. They were also those
who believed that it was necessary for Communists to dissolve as
a "tactical expedient"? These were people who believed that the
Party should re-group underground, but took the dissolution
decision without any preparation or clear plans as to how that
should happen, or any recognition of what the impact of the
decision on the broader political situation would be. The support
for dissolution from this group was not simply the product of
tactical thinking. Behind it lay the political approach which
identified the building of broad fronts as a greater priority
than the expression of a Communist identity, or saw the former as
the appropriate way of achieving the goals of the latter.
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In 1943, the Comintern had disbanded. The CPSA had supported that
decision, and not questioned the logic with which it was
explained:
"The entire course course of events in the past quarter of a
century, as well as the accumulated experience of the Comintern,
has convincingly shown that the organisation for uniting workers
chosen by the First Congress of the Comintern, and which
corresponded to the initial needs of the initial period of
rebirth of the working class movement, has more and more been
outgrown by the movement's development and the increasing
complexity of its problems in separate countries. It has even
become a hindrance to the further strengthening of the national
working class parties." 57 [my emphasis J.G.]
The priority of the workers' movement internationally was
identified as being "to support in every way the war effort...."58
As the CPSA recognised, the reasoning behind this decision was "a
desire to bring about the maximum degree of unity between the
United Nations in the struggle against Hitler",59 i.e. the maximum
degree of unity between the "progressive forces" against the
fascists. At that time, the CPSA had jusitified the dissolution
decision by pointing to propaganda which "falsely accused the
Communist Party of subordinating the interests of the people of
South Africa to "the dictates of Moscow'." The Party argued that
the dissolution decision would expose "the real nature of this
propaganda" 60
In 1950, the CPSA found itself in a situation with basic
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similarities. As we have seen, there had been propaganda which
accused the Party of subordinating the needs of the African
people to the plans of international Communism. The antagonism
which its separate existance and independent activities generated
stood as an obstacle to the goal of the Party - the constrcution
of a peoples front against Afrikaner nationalism - "local
fascism", in the Party's view. The Party followed the same logic
it had supported in relation to the Comintern, and, now threat-
ened by the Suppression of Communism Bill, reached the same
conclusion concerning its own existence.
The CP historians all criticise the dissolution decision, in the
terms agreed by the South African Communist Party in its 1962
programme. This explanation both begs the question, and
describes, rather than explains. The Party had not proved
incapable of working underground - it chose not to try to. The
extent to which the legalistic illusions of the leadership
extended into the ranks of the Party, especially the black wor-
kers who had been joining in unprecedented numbers, has to be
questioned. Working class daily experience demystifies parts of
the law, making clear that it has its meaning not simply as a
decision of Parliament, but in the real clash of social forces
out of which the law emerges, and in the context of which it is
or is not implemented. Part of the legalism of the leadership was
reflected in the fact that the decision was finally announced in
Parliament, having been taken without any consultation with the
Party membership!' Neither the 1962 programme nor the Party
historians make any attempt to identify the source of these
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legalistic illusions, the point at which they emerged, the pro-
cess by which they arose, or the extent to which they affected
other aspects of the Party's work and analysis.
In explaining the dissolution decision in the descriptive
approach which they employ, the CP historians ignore both the
underlying disorientation of which the illusions were a product,
and the impact of those illusions on the broader political
process. The histories dealing with the period point to the
continuing militant role of Communists like Dadoo. They argue
that by 1953, the Party had been reconstituted underground, re-
organising itself as the South African Communist Pafty! 2 In doing
so, they appear to presume, without explanation, that the
legalistic illusions which they have identified, have
disappeared.
The effect of the dissolution decision, however, was to promote
misconceptions of the state and state power which existed within
the black petty bourgeoisie - and were to be expressed at
critical points in the unfolding of the Defiance Campaign. In
1950, the CF acquiesced to the law as if, through its imminent
passage through parliament, the content of the law was
immediately translated into a social reality. In the event,
because of the decision of the CP, this is what happened, until
the Party was reconstituted, despite the law. The dissolution
decision reflects the assumption that the state has the capacity
to impose its law, simply because it is the law. Earlier in this
480
study, it was observed that the liberal approach to law was to
call for it to be obeyed - because it was the law. During the
course of the Defiance Campaign, that position was to be taken
further, by a minority of liberals. The law was now to be defied
- but the punishment of defiance accepted. When a law was passed
which specifically outlawed defiance, that promoted the belief,
amongst some of the Campaign leadership, that the defiance could
no longer proceed. The CP position was not the same as that of
the liberals - but it promoted a similar result. The law was in
one case to be obeyed because it was a moral good either to do
so, or to accept the consequences of not doing so; in the other,
the law was to be obeyed because the power of the state to
implement it was assumed; in both cases, although in different
ways, the professed reason for obeying the law was - because it
was the law.
In the course of the Campaign, its leadership came up against the
questions posed by an attempt to pursue a mass orientation, and a
developing confrontation with state power. The CP, both because
of its dissolution, and the underlying disorientation which
promoted the dissolution decision, removed its capacity to put
forward clear answers to those questions.
At the 1948 conference of the ANC, the Programme of Action of the
Youth League had been referred back for discussion 6. 3 During the
course of 1949, the CYL stepped up its campaign to secure the
leadership of the ANC. A CYL statement in June 1949 declared:
"The leadership and rank and file of the CYL are seething with
the spirit of revolt against the Congress Old Guard.—. Down with
double-dealing and opportunism."64At the 1949, Mbonambi for the
CYL expressed their criticism: "Congress is not making any
progress.—. it failed to give and lead to the African peoples on
the burning issues facing them such as housing, unemployment and
the pass raids." 65At that conference, the CYL largely secured the
organisational and ideological victory for which it had been
campaigning within the ANC. Sisulu was elected Secretary General,
the Programme of Action was accepted, and Xuma was replaced by
Moroka, as a result of organised CYL pressure InFebruary 1950,
the ANC National Executive met, and appointed the Council of
Action which the Programme of Action called for 7
 The CYL had
been opposed not to demonstrations and strike action on May Day
per se, but to the fact that these were not under CYL leadership,
nor in strict accordance with the ANC Programme of Action. The
mass response to the May Day strike call accelerated the turn to
the masses by the CYL which was already in motion. On May 14 a
widely-based conference, attended by the ANC, SAIC, APO, CYL,
CNETU and Communists, was held to discuss co-ordinated action
and, a week later, the ANC executive called for a strike on June
26. There was generally wide support for the strike call,
although there were regional differences. A complete stoppage was
482
reported at Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Durban, Ladysmith, Evaton
and Alexandra. There were partial stoppages on the Witwatersrand,
Bloemfontein, Grahamstown and Cape Town, amongst other urban
areas!8 The 1950 Draft Report of the National Executive of the ANC
later described the response in the Transvaal as "very poor." It
attributed that response to poor field-workers, and intimidation
during May DayPThere can be little doubt that an added factor
was the impact of the division between the CYL and other
organisations which had been manifested during the May Day
strike.
In June 1951, the ANC and the SAIC agreed to the Defiance
Campaign, and a Joint Planning Council (JPC) was set up, and met
for the first time on July 29. This Council was made up of two
members from each organisation, with Moroka chairing:° In
November the JPC reported, and its report was accepted by the ANC
Conference in December, and by the SAIC shortly afterwards. It
was agreed to hold a series of meetings in different parts of the
country on April 6, 1952 (to coincide with the Van Riebeeck
tercentenary) and to launch the first acts of defiance some time
after that. The April 6 meetings had enormous attendances and, at
the end of May, the ANC/SAIC Executives met, and agreed to launch
the Campaign on June
In the same period, there was considerable political activity and
organisation amongst Coloureds. This was stimulated most
immediately by the introduction of the Separate Representation of
Voters Bill:2 The Franchise Action Committee (later Council) (FAC)
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was set up to resist the Bill and agitate for the extension of
the franchise. The FAC was responsible for the calling of a
protest strike, in the Cape, on 7 May 1951.73 Basil Davidson wrote:
"The strike was a marked success. In a tour of the industrial
suburbs of Cape Town early on Monday morning, I saw factory after
factory with its gates fast closed; while in other factories
which I also saw there was only a sprinkling of workers present."74
The success of the strike promoted calls for a widening of the
action, and a speeding-up of the preparation for the Defiance
Campaign. An FAC meeting in Worcester called for "a general
country-wide strike for full rights and votes for everybody, and
called on the leaders of the people to meet at the earliest
possible moment to plan for national resistance to the oppressive
laws."75 In October 1951, the Namakwalandse Volks Kongres was set
up under the influence of, and closely linked to, the FAC7.6And
in March 1952, the Coloured Trade Union and Political Action
Committee was set up to cover Johannesburg and the Reef, again
under the influence of, and closely linked to, the FAC: 7 Thus the
FAC effectively became an umbrella organisation, establishing
organised links between the Coloureds in the urban and rural
areas of the Cape and the industrial centres of the Transvaal.
The FAC became the third wing of the Defiance Campaign
leadership.
The government reacted to this series of developments before the
Campaign was actually launched. It targetted the "agitators"
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without whom, in its judgement, the masses would not be able to
build unified protest action. The Suppression of Communism Act
was used against opposition leaders. In May 1952, Kotane, Marks,
Bopape, Ngwevela and Dadoo were ordered to resign from their
organisations, and were prohibited from attending political
meetings. Kahn was expelled from the House of Assembly:9The
Guardian was banned, after a series of threats going back to
1950. The beginning of the Campaign was effectively brought
forward when key leaders decided to defy the May restriction
orders:9 In June, the Campaign was extended, with a Day of
Volunteers on the 22nd.9° Groups of volunteers started undertaking
defined acts of defiance from June 26, going into prohibited
areas - usually post-offices and railway property 8. 1 By October,
5,000 defiance volunteers, including key Campaign leaders, had
been arrested.82 Up until that stage, it appeared that the Campaign
was closely following the three stages in terms of which it had
been conceived: propaganda, individual selective defiance, mass
actionP
But, from October, the blueprint began to be disrupted. Mass
action began to develop, but in the form of rioting in a number
of centres - Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, Kimberley, East
London!34 At the same time, a group of white liberals became
directly involved in the Campaign, basing themselves on a widely
publicised statement calling for political reforms which had been
published in September. This was followed by a public meeting of
white supporters of the Campaign in November and, on December 8,
Patrick Duncan became the first white to be arrested for his
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involvement in the Campaign!'
From the apparent highpoint in October, the Campaign appears to
have moved into a downward spiral. After the first major violent
clashes in the Eastern Cape, the local ANC leadership reacted to
the pressure for mass action, and called a regional general
strike. There were calls from within the ANC locally for an
indefinite general strike. Moroka intervened, with the effect of
obstructing these, and substituting a call for a one-day protest
strike m.	 This had widespread regional support. But it was
regionally isolated, and the government and employers unleashed a
campaign of victimisation against leading militants!' In November,
regulations were gazetted providing for three hundred pound
fines, and three-year prison terms for defiance action. These
regulations were incorporated early in 1953 into the Criminal
Laws Amendment Act, which made it a crime to break the law in
protest against it. Soon afterwards, the Public Safety Act of
1953 was introduced; which effectively allowed the government to
declare a state of emergency without referring the matter to
Parliament!' Both of these Acts were speedily passed by the
Nationalists, who had just been re-elected with an increased
majorityP
As the repression mounted - in the form of direct police attacks,
arrests, victimisations by employers, and raids and bannings
through the course of the Campaign, and the measures taken in
accordance with the Suppression of Communism Act, then the two
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Acts mentioned above - the Defiance Campaign ground to a halt.
Clearly the repression was the immediate cause of the dissipation
of the Campaign. But there were underlying uncertainties in the
conception of the Campaign, and underlying divisions within its
leadership from the outset of the Campaign. These came to the
fore, as the necessity for clear answers concerning the direction
of the Campaign was posed by events. As the struggle unfolded,
both the threat and the reality of state repression were there.
But the state was provided with conditions created by the
uncertainty and division within the Campaign itself, which made
it easier for the repression to be carried through and become
effective.
Before the Campaign began, there was an unprecedented, albeit
slow, process of preparation. This was clearly reflected in the
level of publicity, organisation and national co-ordination
involved in the April 6 meetings. It was carried through into the
calling of special ANC Provincial conferences to discuss and
prepare for the campaignrThis level of preparation was
facilitated by an apparently high degree of common purpose, both
between different organisations, and between different political
tendencies within organisations. J Matthews, Transvaal CYL
secretary wrote in Spark: "Nobody, from extreme left to
conservatives argued against mass action. The debate centred
around details of action and not on the fundamental need for
action.° 1
 Events were to show that that unity could not be
sustained under the challenge of the developing politial
conflict. But even before the beginning of the Campaign, despite
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both the level of preparation and the degree of apparent unity,
there were crucial divisions within the ANC. These were most
importantly reflected at the 1950 national conference, and in the
Transvaal and Natal. In the Transvaal, provincial elections in
1950 in which Marks became President were suspended, under
pressure from a group around Se lope Thema, and also sections of
the CYO In Natal, Champion, for individualist opportunist
reasons, held back information about the Campaign from other
provincial leaders. This, together with the low level of
democracy which made it possible, meant that Natal was out of
phase with the rest of the country as far as preparations were
concerned; it led to Luthuli raising objections to the timing of
the Campaignr At the 1950 ANC national conference, there was a
big clash between Moroka and the CYL. The issue was the delay of
Moroka and Z K Matthews in resigning from the NRC. Moroka
declared that he would not be treated as a "fixture", and that he
would only pursue a course which he had satisfied himself about.
The Guardian reported: "There were times when divisions were so
wide on the floor of the house that one almost expected a feast
of fisticuffs any moment."94
These tactical pre-Campaign problems were compounded during the
actual unfolding of the campaign. The flimsy unity was largely
maintained until violent clashes developed and the blueprint
began to be disrupted. All groups of the Campaign leadership
95declared their opposition to the rioting. This rioting opened up
great problems for the leadership at a time when, according to
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the plan, there had to be a turn to mass action. Benson writes of
"Letele's misery" because the rioting had happened "in the
middle of the Defiance Campaign, destroying so much of the ANC's
work, just as they had won so much support."96Clearly, Letele had
in mind white opinion, not the support of those who were clashing
with the police. Apart from the division between the rank and
file, caught up in that mass action, and the leaders who saw it
as disrupting their plans, the rioting also opened up a division
between those in leadership who were simply reluctant to see mass
action developing, and those who supported mass action provided
it developed within the control of the Campaign leadership.
The gap underlying the apparent unity of the leadership was most
graphically revealed in the December trial of Moroka and others,
in which his open attack on Communists thinly disguised an attack
on aggressive mass action in general7 These gaps were deepened by
the overt intervention of the group of white liberals, which
began to have a growing impact on the direction of the Campaign
towards the end of 1952. The effect of this was to draw parts of
the ANC leadership away from any attempt to develop mass action,
and towards the attempt to move forward through the support of
influential individuals. At the same time, parts of the Campaign
leadership began to turn towards the forthcoming elections,
expressing the continuing hope that the struggle against
oppression could be promoted through parliament and through the
parliamentary political parties. That hope was expressed by the
call of Dadoo for a vote for the UP.98 The orientation towards
parliament constituted a powerful pressure against support for
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any action which might 'provoke' the white electorate.
Some elements within the leadership continued to call for the
development towards organised mass action. In February 1953,
Spark expressed their thinking:
"The great spirit and bravery which has been aroused in the
Defiance Campaign must be mobilised and raised to a higher level.
New forms of struggle, involving the entire masses of the
democratic population, must be evolved to meet this critical
”99emergency.
The same month, a youth rally of 8,000, in Alexandra "unanimously
and amidst thunderous applause" backed the call for a national
stoppage of work, and for the intensification of the Defiance
CampaignrSpark declared: "From the Cape, from the Transvaal, and
from all parts of the country, the people feel that conditions
are ripe for the next big step forward - THE NATIONAL STOPPAGE OF
WORK."
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 As will be discussed, these calls came at a time when
conditions were less favourable than they had been since 1950.
For those who supported the orientation expressed by Spark, the
problem posed was how to develop from the second stage of the
Campaign to the third. Apart from repeated expressions of the
need for such a development, the problem brought to the fore a
basic uncertainty which had existed at the outset of the
Campaign. According to Lerumo, "[t]he Defiance Campaign was not
designed to end the system of white supremacy by the sacrifice of
its victims; it was seen as an effective form of training and
mobilising disciplined volunteers in non-violent action-- WUIt
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is possible that there were individual leaders of the Campaign
who saw it in that way. But it is also clear that amongst some of
the militant supporters of the Campaign, including some
Communists, it was seen differently.
Kanyisa, of the CYL, writing in Inkundla ya Bantu had expressed
the initial approach, under the headline "Malanites are scared
pale":
"Dr. Moroka has told the world that he stands for a general
strike against oppression .—. The Non-Europeans realize today
that if the African downed tools, oppression, Malanism, apartheid
would all come down tumbling into the rubbish bin.—. The
leaders of the ANC are heading straight for jail. That finest
moment in every peoples history is approaching and Africa will
soon pass through jail fighting for his freedom.
"Soon we as a people shall have the honour of being bound in
chains and humiliated because we stand for a free Africa.—.
Africa will triumph in the end and an African will be Prime
Minister of the Union."103
J. Ngwevela, Chairman of the Cape Western Region of the ANC told
the Guardian: "People are aware that they must suffer for their
liberation and they understand that it is by unity and by
carrying out the decisions of their national organisation that
they will reach their goal. „104
Dawood Seedat of the Natal Indian Youth Congress had told a
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meeting on Colonial Youth Day: "I want to warn the puny fascists
of our country that it will not be long before their day is over.
The camp of Peace and Progress is far greater than the camp of
reaction and warmongers.
This was the basis on which important sections of the militants
within the Campaign made their assessment of how to deal with
state power, and how to relate to the masses. It expressed both
the rhetoric of public political platforms, but behind that, an
idealised vision, in terms of which the masses would respond to
calls from their leaders, and major political concessions,
generally unspecified, would be won. Those who operated in terms
of this idealised vision had a tendency to believe that the
masses were more or less permanently receptive to calls to
action; the vision also obstructed any full assessment of the
process by which mass action could win demands. What was seen as
the initial success of the first two stages of their Campaign
could only serve to compound the misconceptions of this group.
Spark declared: "April 6 has indeed been the greatest silent
process of the oppressed in South Africa. This is only the first
round. No amount of threats on the people or intimidation of
their leaders can stop the second round. n106
The April meetings reflected two different, although interlocking
processes. The first was the process, whose origins pre-dated the
Programme of Action and the Defiance Campaign, of the development
of rising combativity amongst black workers. The second was the
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process through which sections of the black petty bourgeoisie -
partly because of that rising combativity - were moving to the
left. By their response to the calls to action which came out of
the Defiance Campaign, workers were indicating their willingness
to participate in collective expressions of grievances. The most
co-ordinated and extensive specifically working class action
which developed during the Campaign - the Eastern Cape strike -
was the result of a mass mood and mass experience, which did not
conform to the blueprint in terms of which the Defiance Campaign
was conceived. At times, the Campaign tapped and chanelled the
receptivity amongst workers. But it neither created it, not
controlled it.
In the actual course of events, the Campaign was not initiated
and developed at the same pace as the rise of working class
combativity. It lagged behind these. The National Executive of
the ANC partly recognised this, in its report to the 1950 ANC
conference.
"The year 1950 was a turning point in the political history of
the African people in this country. It was marked by a number of
events which took place from the beginning of the year. These
events indicate a new political outlook on the part of the
African people. The events showed quite clearly that the
conditions under which the African people live have become
intolerable and that the masses are marching far ahead of the
leadership. ION
But the ANC leadership did not respond to its own assessment. It
took three big political strikes over more than a year, and the
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open response to a series of political meetings, and still an
additional three months, before the leadership formally called
into being a previously agreed campaign of defiance. The same lag
is evident in the way in which thousands of people at the April 6
meetings were sent home before the leadership organised its call
for volunteersP8
This lag behind the pace of the rise of working class combativity
meant, even within the terms of the Campaign itself, that the
problems which it faced were compounded. The Nationalist
government was given a period of time in which the developing
mood of combativity was not generally expressed in an organised
way against it. In this time, the government was, in part, able
to deal with some of the factors making for its instability. In
particular, it was left relatively free to move against the white
unions, and the Campaign was eventually launched in conditions in
which the government was on one level stabilising its position
and consolidating its political base. The calls for mass action
from sections of the Campaign leadership only began to escalate
after the momentum of the Campaign had been lost; repression at
different levels had taken its toll, not simply within the formal
Campaign, but within the broader workers' movement; the regional
strike had been isolated; and the government now had new laws on
the statute book, and a growing confidence, promoted by its
electoral victory and its victories over the CP and the white
unions, to use them.
In formulating the Programme of Action, and developing the idea
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of the Defiance Campaign which, in part, arose out of it, there
was the recent history of struggle, within the experience of the
CYL, from which to draw lessons. Within that history there had
been the Alexandra bus boycotts, the Sofasonke movement, the
1942/43 strike wave, and the 1946 strike. These struggles were
an important part of the political foundation upon which the rise
and development of the CYL occurred. It is true that the rise of
the CYL reflected the general rise in militancy of the working
class. Similarly, the rise to dominance of the CYL within the ANC
reflected the growing social weight of the urban working class.
The Programme of Action was a codification of the policies of the
CYL - and this programme was connected with the increased
militancy and strength of the working class. But there were
substantial differences between the Programme of Action -
representing the movement to the left of the petty bourgeoisie -
and the development of the movement of the working class. The
developments in the workers' movement were not directly reflected
in the Programme of Action. Rather, within a context
characterised by those developments, the Programme of Action
partly reflected the way in which those developments were
mediated for the petty bourgeoisie, through its own political
ideology and experience. To the extent that it drew on the
experiences of mass struggle, the Programme of Action reflected
the way in which the petty bourgeoisie understood those
experiences. As a programme it arose out of, and reflected, the
petty bourgeois conception of the need to draw workers into a
struggle according to a blueprint which has been worked out and
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approved by the politicised petty bourgeoisie.
This perspective has been seen in the timing of the Campaign. It
is demonstrated most clearly in the political role which the
Programme played, rather than in its abstract content. Although
the formal acceptance of the Programme only came in 1949,
decisions at the 1946 ANC conference suggest that it had already
begun to be developed129 By 1948, it had been developed into a more
systematic plan. For the first period of its development, at a
time when, largely beneath the surface, combativity was beginning
to rise again, the Programme was not used nor conceived as an
instrument through which to relate and attempt to develop that
rising combativity. Despite its formal content about mass
struggle, it was developed primarily as a codification of
political ideas for the internal debate within the ANC. The CYL
had a declared and developing orientation towards the masses; but
in reality, the early development of the CYL revolved around an
internal power struggle within the ANC - in which the question of
an orientation to the masses was an issue - rather than an
attempt to actually pursue a mass orientation. This is clearly
demonstrated in the way the CYL, despite its political commitment
to mass struggle, had not attempted to build a mass youth
organisation. It had seen itself, and acted, as a pressure group.
Its priority was to win ideological support for its declared
position within the organised petty bourgeoisie. It was only when
that support was won that there was any attempt to act out the
content of the Programme.
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Once the CYL came to dominate the leadership of the ANC, the
actual political nature of the orientation to the masses which
the Programme expressed was revealed in the static formalism with
which it was employed as a guide to action. It was the CYL's view
which had been expressed in initial resolutions dealing with the
JPC report 1° and the CYL and its allies in the Indian Youth
Congress played a major role in the initial development of the
Campaign. The campaign was to be based, finally, on mass action.
But the timing of this was to be determined by developments
within the Campaign, not amongst the masses. This had meant, for
example, that the Defiance Campaign was still being prepared,
even while there was mass defiance action already being taken by
workers - against forced remov a 1 s ;111 in opposition to rent
increasesin the struggle against bus and tram fare increases:13
The 1950 protest strikes and the meetings in April 1952 provided
overwhelming evidence on their own terms that the leadership of
the Defiance Campaign could call on mass support. But they still
stuck with their original formula, being moved to adapt to events
only when individual leaders were subjected to banning orders,
and chose to defy them. Behind all of this, whatever may have
been the subjective intentions of those involved, there is
revealed the consistent conception of the masses as more or less
active supporters, not as actors in their own right. Even where
there was a subjective commitment to a mass orientation, an
instrumentalist conception of the masses served to undermine that
orientation, promoting an objective turn away from the working
class - the reality of working class life, struggle and
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consciousness.
At any one time during the course of the Campaign, there were
workers using resources of tactical skill and ingenuity to avoid
being arrested by the police. As has been discussed earlier,
there is a permanent defiance campaign being conducted by the
working class:14 Every day, hundreds of thousands and even millions
of workers were breaking laws. The necessity of doing that was
unavoidably imposed on sections of the working class. But the
crucial thing for workers was to be successful in that defiance.
The formalised Defiance Campaign did not, however, base itself on
this reality of working class life. It must surely have been
strange, and definitely have run counter to the forms of action
which workers were likely to have chosen, to embark on a campaign
of breaking laws, which aimed specifically to fail in defying
them at their point of application. There may be conditions in
which it is necessary for the working class to impose the need
for mass arrests on the state. But the strategic and tactical
thinking behind the Campaign was not directly or clearly based on
such an assessment. As we have seen, there was a degree of
uncertainty about what the precise goals of the Defiance Campaign
were, or how precisely they would be won.
For the working class, the meaning of bourgeois law is derived,
first and foremost, from the real experience at the point of
application. That is partly why, inside the working class, there
can be a spontaneous grasp of the fact that the law is the result
of the clash of social forces, not of decisions in parliament,
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even if there are material pressures which act against a
conscious understanding of that fact. In everyday experience,
where workers are defying laws, even when the workers' movement
generally is in retreat or unorganised, the defiance is directed
against the law at its point of application.
The Sofasonke movement illustrates these points. It was a
movement which turned the individual acts of defiance against the
pass laws into a unified and organised resistance. It
successfully broke the pass laws by targetting the application of
those laws in a specific case. It can not be deduced from this
that there is automatically something wrong with an attempt to
make decisions of parliament the focal point of struggle. Such a
deduction would rule out a range of struggles which the working
class, in different circumstances, has fought and has had to
fight. But it does mean that, if such a struggle is to draw the
support of the working class, it has to take account of the
experience of workers, and the fact that workers are already
engaged in a struggle against bourgeois law at its point of
application.
Where the Defiance Campaign did focus on laws at their point of
application, it did so by a sending in a selected band, which
effectively substituted itself for the mass of workers. According
to the blueprint of the Campaign, this first substitution was
necessary - as a step which would provide the basis for educating
and later mobilising workers. The decisions of the Campaign did
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not reflect the experience or knowledge that the mass of workers
already had, taking account of the focal points of the working
class defiance which already existed. Thus it was that
individuals would select a site where workers were not in daily
defiance - a post office, or a railway waiting room - and go in
as an isolated group of protestors. In this process, the mass of
workers could only be spectators, even while there were millions
of workers who lived in, and moved to, areas where they were not
legally permitted, and "squatted" illegally, and housed family
and friends who were not on housing permits, amongst other acts
of defiance. The campaign made workers spectators in
confrontations whose precise goals were often unclear.
Nonetheless, the confrontations were real, and they provided the
state with conditions in which it could use its repressive power
against groups of activists who had willingly isolated themselves
to court arrest. It is not clear - nor was it clear to the
participants - what the precise impact of the Campaign on the
state was intended to be, or how precisely that impact would be
achieved. For some in the leadership of the Campaign, there can
be no doubt that it was merely a modernisation of the
historically recurrent attempts to threaten the government into
reforms. For others, there was a clear belief that the Campaign
could win substantial victories, a belief which, in the way in
which it was expressed and pursued, reflected an idealisation of
the masses and state power.
At times, a combination of the strength of mass action and the
subjective commitments of those who hold an instrumentalist
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conception may be strong enough to suppress its necessary
outcome. But, under the pressure of events, a gap will be opened
up between the actual development of the workers' movement, and
the vision of the way forward which is opened up through an
instrumentalist perspective. In some periods, as we have seen,
this may take the form of a search for a section of the masses
which better conforms to the idealised misconception. (Hence, for
example, the orientation of elements within the NEUM away from
the urban workers to the peasants.) At other times, it may take
the form of action in which bands of "politicised people" are
used as a substitute for what are seen as the passive masses.
This was a course which the CYL, in time, was actually to follow.
In the Defiance Campaign, the basic perspective of the CYL led to
the attempt to develop a campaign which was based on a
substitution; it required the mass of workers to be supporters
and spectators and adopted abstract focal points when the
workers' struggle had already identified a series of concrete
targets. Because of this, the CYL was in a weak position to
combat the way in which more conservative elements within the ANC
saw the masses.
It was at the point at which the problem of how to move from the
second to the third phases of the campaign was being most sharply
posed - and bringing to the fore the divisions and uncertainty
which were located in the foundations of the campaign - that the
government took decisive action. It was in these conditions that
the repression of the state was stepped up, and achieved its
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results.
The Campaign played a major part in promoting the development of
political organisation. At its highpoint, the developments within
and around the Campaign had created a mass ANC, with a membership
in the region of 100,000 15 and with influence which went far wider
through the petty bourgeoisie and the working class. Lerumo
points to the "growing preponderance" of youth and workers within
the ANC after the Campaigr 16 In this chapter, I have tried to show
that behind the radicalism of the Defiance Campaign, there were
two connected, but different, processes - the development of the
radicalism of the CYL, and the development of the combativity of
the oppressed and exploited black working class. The processes
were both reflected in the Defiance Campaign, and in the growth
of the ANC which followed. But they were developing at different
paces, involved different political focusses, generated different
forms of action, and did not automatically follow the same path.
The CP historians tend to portray the Defiance Campaign primarily
as a further chapter in the development of an increasingly
radical national movement. In the process, they conflate the two
different processes which we have seen, merging them into a
single process of developing radicalism. The promotion of working
class radicalism and petty bourgeois radicalism are abstracted
from the conditions in which they occur; the common demands
which, in part, they lead to, are identified; and the co-
incidence of developments in two different classes is conflated.
The process is not dissimilar to the way in which, in very
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different conditions, a much less theoretically sophisticated CP
saw the visit of Gumede to the Soviet Union as a "manifestation
of the revolutionising of the masses"TBunting focusses on the
radicalism of different leaders within the Campaign, and the
"cross-pollination between the Communist Party and the national
movement." 118In doing so, he does not mention, even within the
context of the Campaign, the Eastern Cape strike, and he argues
that the riots were "unconnected with the defiance campaign".
Lerumo's central analytical point is that the Defiance Campaign
was "not designed to end the system of white supremacy by the
sacrifice of its victims" 8 Slovo repeats this point, and argues
that, although the Defiance Campaign was defeated, it taught
valuable lessons7°The latter point has been extended by leading
Congress of Democrats member, Ben Turok. He argues that the
Campaign succeeded in its "subjective goals", "to highlight for
the country as a whole and not least for the Non-Whites
themselves, that the system of discrimination was unjust and
oppressive", and "to overcome fear of authority, build an
oppositionist attitude among the Black people and raise political
consciousness to a higher level.° 21The Campaign itself is seen as
the proof of its own success, in Turok's terms. But, as we have
seen, the Campaign lagged behind rising combativity, at times
tapping a receptivity to organisation and collective action which
had already been created by working class experience of the fact
that 'the system of discrimination was unjust and oppressive', as
well as one which promoted their exploitation.
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The experience of the Campaign served to deepen the turn to
masses, whose origins we have seen, by the CYL. The evidence of
mass receptivity to political action and organisation played the
same role, in promoting that process, that the 1946 miners strike
and the 1950 "riots" had done. In 1952, J. Matthews reflected the
increasingly conscious recognition by the CYL of the need to
build mass organisation:
"Mr A.P. Mda who is probably the chief architect of the ANCYL
once said that the task of the Youth was to transform the ANC
from an organisation of a few urban gentlemen with clean hands
into a militant peoples' movement. In the past few years the ANC
has become a mass movement, as was shown by the representatives
at the National Conference in 1951. More than half the delegates
consisted of people closely connected with the trade unions,
notably those from the Transvaal and Cape .". W22
At the 8th Annual conference of the CYL in 1952, the same concern
was expressed: "Mr. Mji urged the League to 're-orientate
ourselves.' The membership of the League had been mainly drawn
from a certain section of the African youth. 'The time has come
when the organisation must be placed on a mass basis%"nie argued
that the youth "must regard the organisation of workers into
strong trade unions as priority no. 1. Until we have a conscious
solid working class movement it will become increasingly
difficult to continue our struggle as our enemies change their
tricks from day to day. „124
For the CYL, the Campaign was successful, in that it secured its
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authority within the ANC, and won a level of mass support for
that authority. In that sense it was a crucial part of the
processes through which the CYL established its political
dominance within the petty bourgeoisie, and began to build a base
which extended firmly into the working class. The CYL had entered
the Campaign with a growing belief in the need for an orientation
to the masses. That belief had been strengthened. It had also
opened up a question to which the CYL had not yet developed a
consistent and comprehensive answer: how was the recognition of
the need for such an orientation to be translated into the
practice of that orientation?
Sections of the working class rallied to the banner of the ANC
through the course of the Defiance Campaign - the only nationally
organised forum in which basic political demands were being taken
up. There can be little doubt that, given the thousands of
workers who responded to the calls of the ANC, there existed the
real potential in the period for the development of independent
working class organisations. Similarly, there existed the
potential for the political interests of the working class to be
more powerfully represented in the alliance with the oppressed
petty bourgeoisie. That potential existed some time before the
Defiance Campaign. But, given the lack of independent working
class organisation from which it started, the nature of the mass
orientation of the Campaign leadership, and the repression
directed at working class action, the combativity of workers was
not, in itself, sufficient to realise that potential. The actual
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process of the Campaign promoted this situation. In fact, one of
the features of the Campaign was the lack of scope for mass
participation in decision-making. This meant that the support of
workers was a component of the Campaign but there was neither an
independent organisational base, nor democratic channels in the
actual struggle, for that component to have clear independent
expression. At the same time, the rise of combativity which
turned some workers towards the Defiance Campaign was, amongst
many many more, being dissipated into many isolated acts of
defiance, for which there was no immediate outlet, other than
spontaneous action, and the informal organisation which developed
around it. The Campaign extended the influence of the militant,
organised petty bourgeoisie within layers of the working class,
and further consolidated the CYL orientation, on the basis that
we have seen, to the masses. In the period of struggle which
followed, workers did build independent organisation, and
struggle against more clearly defined targets. The momentum for
this came, as had the initial receptivity to the calls to action
of the Defiance Campaign, from the fact that workers will respond
to their own experience, and the conditions of their own lives,
with the search for collective organisation and action. It came -
because the search by workers for the day that "the sun shall
rise for the workers' 125is itself a part of history.
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Statement by the Central Committee of the CPSA
(Printed in The Guardian, 22 October, 1942)
The steady rise in the cost of living is imposing an intolerable
burden upon great numbers of low-paid workers. Their increased
hardship has resulted in the outbreak of strikes in Johannesburg,
Port Elizabeth, East London and Natal. Unless steps are taken to
ease the position of the workers further strikes must be expected
at a time when every effort should be made to expand production
of essential goods to the utmost limits.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party believes that the
war effort calls for the full and uniterrupted mobilisation of
all labour resources, and that the working class as a whole is
solid in its determination to take all the action necessary for
the defeat of Hitlerism. Where sections of the working class
resort to the strike weapon it is because conditions are forcing
them to obtain relief from the crushing burden imposed upon them
and no alternative means of gaining some improvement appears to
be open to them.
A serious responsibility rests upon the Government and employers
to remove the conditions that are driving workers to adopt
measures injurious to the war effort. The many statements that
have been made by Government spokesmen and industrial leaders on
the need for social reconstruction after the War must surely be
given a practical meaning for today, when it is of prime
importance that all sections of the poopulation should be drawn
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together in a mighty struggle for victory.
General Smuts, who recently issued a warning that South Africa is
heading for a severe test in the following year or two, has asked
all classes in the community to cut down their requirements. The
great bulk of the working class has already been compelled to do
so by high prices and the scarcity of commodities. Every
Government Commission that has investigated the question has
stressed the appalling extent of the undernourishment that exists
in the great majority of the population.
The workers cannot have their standards further reduced without
disastrous consequences to their health, and therefore to South
Africa's output. It is therefore for other classes in the
community to make their contribution to the austerity campaign
which the Prime Minister has demanded.
The Communist Party realises that in the present circumstances
workers resort to the strike weapon only as a last remedy when
all other attempts to obtain adjustment to their legitimate
grievances have failed. It believes that the workers must make
every effort, by arousing public opinion and developing all forms
of pressure available, to obtain a satisfactory settlement, while
avoiding any stoppage of work.
But co-operation requires good will on both sides. Where
employers adopt stupid and provocative attitudes, where they
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remain blind to the vital political issues that are at stake,
when they put their own selfish interests before the national
welfare arnd the needs of the war effort, it becomes extremely
difficult for the workers' leaders to obviate the use of the
strike weapon.
The Communist Party therefore appeals to the public as a whole to
give its support to the workers who are negotiating wage
increases that are not only just but essential in the
circumstances created by low wages, the high cost of living and
difficulty of obtaining essential supplies. Above all, it
requests the Government to take immediate and effective action to
prevent further increases in prices and to ensure by higher wages
and cost of living allowances that the mass of poorly paid
workers are relieved of the heavy burden of poverty which now
rests upon them.
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